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In the contemporary East Asian security context, free trade is a double-edged sword that 
simultaneously secures and threatens the primary security referents vis-à-vis interests of 
periphery and semi-periphery states. This thesis aims to provide a much deeper and 
comprehensive understanding of the linkages between security and free trade by 
examining the experiences of smaller and weaker countries in East Asia, in particular, 
Taiwan, Singapore, the Philippines, and Malaysia. I argue that in their quest to enhance, 
promote, and secure their state-centric (“statist”) and/or people-centric (“humanist”) 
security referents, these countries have learned to re-imagine and re-invent the utility of 
free trade in the twenty-first century. Accordingly, free trade has become an integral 
function of national security, particularly for East Asian states that have a marginal geo-
economic size and geo-political position. However, to this point very little has been done 
to explore and explain these linkages based on the overarching assumption of 
“cohabitative security” or the view that security in the twenty-first century encompasses 
both statist and humanist dimensions. Furthermore, there is a dearth of comprehensive 
theoretical and empirical analyses concerning linking efforts and strategies especially by 
the non-major powers in East Asia. This thesis attempts to address those gaps. 
 Using a qualitative comparative method, I analyse both statist and humanist 
forms of security-trade linkages. I examine how small East Asian countries utilise free 
trade to promote, enhance, and secure the primary referents of their national security 
policies and strategies. I then investigate the roles of security issues and threats (both 
traditional and non-traditional) in the continuing relevance and proliferation of free trade 
in the region. To fulfill these objectives, the thesis performs two main tasks. First, I 
theoretically reconfigure the security concept by amalgamating the statist and humanist 
dimensions of security to establish a “cohabitative security” framework that will serve as 
the operative definition of security for this research. Second, I empirically analyse the 
linkages between cohabitative security referents (statist and humanist) vis-à-vis the 
various types of free trade (multilateral, minilateral, and bilateral). I then outline three 
main themes based on the findings generated from the case analyses: (i) high levels of 
internal and external insecurity; (ii) the multidimensional and multidirectional nature of 




 The thesis concludes by arguing that free trade is irrefutably being utilised by 
periphery and semi-periphery countries to promote, enhance, and secure their statist 
and/or humanist security referents and interests. The rationales and motives behind 
these linkages vary significantly from one country to another. For example, in Taiwan, 
free trade might be viewed as a sovereignty-upgrading mechanism; in Singapore, a 
defence-upgrading tool; in the Philippines, a development-upgrading instrument; and in 
Malaysia, a diversity-upgrading apparatus. However, it is important to note that while the 
constructed rationales for these linkage efforts usually sound altruistic (that is, to advance 
national security interests) the real motives behind them are often less than benevolent 
(that is, to advance a regime, a party, or a privileged group’s vested interests).  
 Furthermore, the steady proliferation of preferential bilateral and minilateral free 
trade amid all the difficulties impeding multilateral trade at the WTO has provided small 
countries in East Asia a strategic platform for pursuing a broad range of national security 
referents vis-à-vis interests - altruistically or otherwise. However, considering that free 
trade works like a double-edged sword, I make the corollary argument that states 
attempting to co-habit their security interests and free trade agendas are essentially 
“trading security”. The reason is that for every additional security that a linkage provides, 
a corresponding insecurity is reflected in other referents. This is clearly illustrated by the 
four cases examined in the study. With respect to “statist linkages”, Taiwan’s linkage 
efforts can lead to the island’s complete assimilation with China; while Singapore’s 
linkage attempts may result in the city-state’s failure to strategically balance American and 
Chinese interests in the region. With respect to “humanist linkages”, the Philippines’ 
linkage attempts have preserved uneven economic development and reinforced the 
oligarchic system and patronage culture; while Malaysia’s linkage efforts have perpetuated 
racial inequalities and further legitimised the UMNO-led Barisan Nasional. 
  Finally, in attempts to address both traditional and non-traditional security 
threats, East Asian countries (via their membership in APEC and ASEAN) have made 
some noteworthy progress in broadening and widening the respective agendas of these 
two regional organisations. Despite the limitations of their compliance mechanisms (or 
even the lack of them in some issue areas), the fact that both state and human security 
issues are now being openly discussed in relation to free trade underlines the ongoing 
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1.1 BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY 
Since the beginning of the mercantilist period in the sixteenth century, security experts 
and trade analysts have recognised the profound and multifaceted relations between their 
respective domains. Although some liberal economists normally prefer to exclude politics 
from their analyses, they strongly acknowledge the underlying connection between 
security and trade in the foreign policies of sovereign states. Along with the evolution of 
the global security environment comes the emergence of new forms of trade 
arrangements. As time goes by, linkages between the security realm, on the one hand, 
and the trade realm, on the other, have become more complex than ever before.  
 The significant bulk of research on the security-trade nexus has emphasised 
relationships between the level of economic interdependence and the incidence of 
interstate conflicts. While some analysts have tested whether higher levels of economic 
interdependence lead to lower rates of conflict, others have investigated whether higher 
rates of conflict diminish the overall level of economic interdependence.1 Despite the 
employment of highly sophisticated statistical techniques when analysing the relations 
between trade and conflict, for the most part findings remain inconclusive. 
 This context has led V. K. Aggarwal and Kristi Govella (2013) to posit that the 
operationalisation of the terms “trade” and “conflict,” on the one hand; and the 
identification of “relevant” cases, on the other, to influence the quality and type of results 
being generated by the studies. Such assertion is particularly true in terms of the 
contradicting results derived from dyad-level quantitative studies of the effects of trade 
with respect to international conflict behaviour. While some researchers find that 
bilateral trade increases the likelihood of militarized interstate disputes (MIDs), others 
offer evidence that bilateral trade reduces the probability of MIDs in economically liberal 
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See for example, Hiscox’s (2002) International Trade and Political Conflict: Commerce, Coalitions, and 
Mobility; Pevehouse’s (2004) ‘Interdependence Theory and the Measurement of International 
Conflict’; Mansfield and Pollins’ (2003) Economic Interdependence and International Conflict; Gerace’s 
(2004) Military Power, Conflict, and Trade; Kim and Rousseau’s (2005) ‘The Classical Liberals Were 
Half Right (or Half Wrong): New Tests of the Liberal Peace, 1960-88’; Ward et al’s (2007) ‘Disputes, 
Democracies, and Dependencies: A Reexamination of the Kantian Peace’; Maoz’s (2009) ‘The Effects 
of Strategic and Economic Interdependence on International Conflict across Levels of Analysis’; 
Coppolaro and McKenzie’s (2013) A Global History of Trade and Conflict Since 1500; Pettis’ (2013) The 
Great Rebalancing: Trade, Conflict, and the Perilous Road Ahead for the World Economy. 
2 
 
dyads.2 The primary source of inconsistency has been the subject of considerable debate 
– differences in data collection; econometrics and model specification; control variables; 
and the choice of temporal and spatial domain (Barbierie and Schneider, 1999; Gartzke 
and Li, 2003).  
 Erik Gartzke and Quan Li (2003: 567) have argued “discrepant results about 
interdependence and conflict can be explained by variable construction, even without 
data inconsistencies.” In other words, incongruent findings can be partly explained by 
features inherent in the variable constructions used by the competing approaches. 
Accordingly, the manner through which the researchers construct measures of dyadic 
interdependence determines the types of outcomes generated by their empirical analyses 
of the relationship between trade and conflict. However, Katherine Barbieri et al. (2009:  
488) questions such approach by illustrating how the issue of missing data distorts the 
analysis of the relationship between trade and conflict by generating results that “may 
paint a picture that stands in sharp contrast from reality.” Arguing that no one has found 
the optimal solution to the problem of missing data, they have introduced the Correlates 
of War (COW) Trade Data Set, which includes dyadic and national trade figures for state 
system members for the period 1870–2006.3  
 Meanwhile, Han Dorussen (2006) maintains that not all trade is the same and 
considers that trade in some goods have a bigger impact on the likelihood of conflict 
than trade in others. By studying trade per industrial sector, he is able to account for the 
heterogeneous (varying) effects of trade on conflict while simultaneously moving away 
from the assumption that nation-states act externally as unitary and rational actors on 
behalf of their constituents. In the words of Dorussen (2006: 104), “economic 
interdependence mobilizes a large number of interests that vary not only greatly in their 
influence on government but also in their preferred policies.” 
                                                 
2
 For the former argument, see Barbieri’s (1996) ‘Economic Interdependence: A Path to Peace or a 
Source of International Conflict?’; and Barbieri and Levy’s (1999) ‘Sleeping with the Enemy: The 
Impact of War on Trade.’ For the latter argument, see, Oneal et al., ‘The Liberal Peace: 
Interdependence, Democracy, and International Conflict’; Oneal and Ray’s (1997) ‘New Tests of the 
Democratic Peace: Controlling for Economic Interdependence’; Oneal, and Russett’s (1999) ‘Assessing 
the Liberal Peace with Alternative Specifications: Trade Still Reduces Conflict; see Bennett and Stam’s 
(2000) ‘Research Design and Estimator Choices in the Analysis of Interstate Dyads’; and Gartzke et al. 
(2001) ‘Investing in the Peace: Economic Interdependence and International Conflict.’ 
3
 The set includes three files: (1) dyadic trade statistics; (2) national trade statistics; and (3) a 
codebook that describes the variables and details about the collection procedures. The majority of 
the post-WWII data for the COW Trade Data Set was obtained from the IMF’s Direction of Trade 
Statistics (DOTS) (IMF CD-ROM, 2007. See, Barbieri et al. (2009) ‘Trading Data: Evaluating our 
Assumptions and Coding Rules.’  
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 Mixed results have also been generated with the analysis of impacts of conflict on 
aggregate levels of trade. While some experts have argued that the presence of conflict 
adversely affects trade, others have suggested that there is no evidence of systematic 
relations between the two variables. For example, Charles Anderton and John Carter 
(2001: 455) argue “trade promotes peace by raising the cost of war.” Although the results 
generated are far from being homogenous (or the same across all samples), nevertheless 
the weight of evidence supports the trade disruption premise. Hence, it underscores the 
liberal hypothesis that “war carries with it an opportunity cost of forgone trade” 
(Anderton and Carter, 2001: 455). Their findings were further substantiated by John 
Oneal et al’s (2003: 371) investigation of the causes of peace, whose argument was that 
“economically important trade does have a substantively important effect in reducing 
dyadic militarised disputes, even with extensive controls for the influence of past 
conflict.” Oneal et al. (2003: 387) is convinced “the pacific benefits of democracy and 
trade are statistically significant, substantively important, and robust.”  
 However, these conclusions have been criticised from various points. Katherine 
Barbieri and Jack Levy (2003) directly challenged Anderton and Carter’s findings by 
claiming that the latter have gone too far when suggesting that the weight of evidence 
favours the trade disruption premise. They cite three main reasons for arriving at this 
conclusion: (i) the lack of attention on the political dimension of either trade or war; (ii) 
the attribution of greater specificity to commercial liberal theory than what actually exists; 
and (iii) the mixed support for liberal theory generated by empirical findings (Barbieri 
and Levy, 2003: 619). 
 Another important dimension of the security-trade relationship that is relatively 
well explored is the role of military alliances and partners with respect to the trade 
activities of states. These studies assess whether the overall levels and patterns of trade 
are determined by alliances and partnerships. Based on Aggarwal and Govella’s (2013: 2) 
review, most findings imply “trade does not always follow the flag.” Put differently, the 
manner with which alliances and partnerships affect trade is contingent on other 
important factors including the type of trade and the form of grouping. For example, 
Joanne Gowa and Edward Mansfield (2004: 775) contend “alliances can support an 
optimal level of trade when scale economies rather than differences in relative factor 
endowments motivate it.”  
 Meanwhile, Andrew Long (2003: 537) demonstrates that “defense pacts are 
associated with higher trade among alliance members, but that trade between members 
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of non-defense pacts is statistically indistinguishable from trade between non-allies.” 
Long, together with his colleague Brett Leeds (2006: 445) offer a two-pronged hypothesis 
about the relation between trade and alliance formation. First, allies whose agreements 
include economic provisions tend to trade more than both non-allies and allies who have 
not indicated economic links as part of their alliance. Second, allies who decide not to 
tackle economic issues explicitly in their alliance treaties, trade neither more nor less than 
the non-allies. This is statistically insignificant.  
 A third and growing area of research focuses on the linkages between security 
and trade, particularly with respect to preferential free trade agreements (FTAs). One of 
the most recent studies is Aggarwal and Govella’s (2013) typology of issue-linkages based 
on the agenda-setting process linking security issues to trade. They argue “the notion of 
linkage nature reflects the intellectual basis for the issue connection” (Aggarwal and 
Govella, 2013: 10). They identify four types of linkages that fall into two general 
categories: substantive and tactical. On the one hand, substantive linkages refer to the 
economic-based linking of two highly related issues within a trade agreement, and, 
therefore have a significant degree of intellectual coherence. On the other, tactical 
linkages pertain to the power-based linking of distinctly unrelated issues within trade 
accords, and as such they may engender greater conflict between the initiator (or 
“offerer”) and the target (or “offeree”) states.  
  However, there are instances in which experts and policymakers may disagree 
concerning the nature of these linking efforts, and consequently, may fail to appreciate 
the real dynamics of the issue-linkages. Such problems lead to what Aggarwal and 
Govella (2013: 11-12) refer to as “failed substantive” and “failed tactical” linkages. Failed 
substantive linkages arise when policymakers move to link two unrelated issues within a 
free trade accord either due to domestic pressures coming from influential lobby groups 
or external pressures brought about by the asymmetric balance of power. Over time, 
these kinds of linkages may fully transform into substantive ones as various domestic 
players attempt to sway the decision makers’ views and opinions. At the same time, the 
continuous flow of ideas between countries and regions foster closer relations between 
initiator states and target states. Enhanced levels of stability and cooperation between 
initiators and targets significantly increase the potential for achieving the expected goals 
from these linking efforts. 
 Meanwhile, failed tactical linkages happen when policymakers view the two issues 
as substantively connected even though they are only tactically linked (Aggarwal and 
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Govella 2013). Yet, despite calls coming from experts to abandon such linkages, decision 
makers from the target state proceed to accept them, especially when they are presented 
as part of a package deal such as a bilateral FTA. However, the misconceived process 
through which such linkages have been developed, significantly threatens the general 
stability of the resulting policy agreements and may only last for as long as the power 
asymmetry between parties is maintained.   
 Furthermore, various scholars have examined the role of politico-strategic 
motives in the burgeoning popularity of preferential FTAs. For instance, John Ravenhill 
(2008) explores reasons behind the increasing interest in preferential FTAs in the 
Western Pacific Rim. He argues that their proliferation “reflects the perception that they 
have been successful in other parts of the world, and is reinforced by dissatisfaction with 
the region’s existing trade groupings” (Ravenhill 2008: 1). However, based on the 
findings of Ravenhill (2008), Western Pacific countries will be better off channelling the 
substantial amount of resources and energy required for negotiating bilateral FTAs into 
promoting multilateral trade liberalisation via the World Trade Organization (WTO). 
 Wesley (2008: 214) argues that, as a result, “both large and small powers have 
resorted to a range of instruments, including strategically-driven PTAs.” Eul-Soo Pang 
(2007) cites two other kinds of plausible rationale for the passage of the United States–
Singapore Free Trade Agreement (USSFTA), aside from economic considerations:  (i) 
security exigencies; and (ii) fear of diplomatic isolation or being left out. Michael Wesley 
(2008) identifies three important shifts in the international system that resulted in the 
decreasing utility of conventional security institutions and precipitated the search for 
novel forms of strategic trade negotiations: (i) an enduring crisis of security institutions; 
(ii) the rise of new great powers; and (iii) the arrival of non-state security threats. 
Meanwhile, Gregory White (2005) explores how the US policymakers have utilised 
preferential FTAs as a tool in the war on terror. That is, “as a means of winning the 
hearts and minds of people” both in the Middle East and northern parts of Africa 
(White, 2005: 616).  
 These findings underline Richard Higgott’s (2004) assumption about the 
“securitisation”4 of US foreign economic policy particularly in the aftermath of 11 
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 The Copenhagen school defines securitisation as a speech act that must satisfy three rhetorical 
criteria. The actor engages into a discursive process to (i) claim that a referent object is existentially 
threatened; (ii) demand the right to take extraordinary countermeasures to deal with that the threat; 
and (iii) convince an audience that rule-breaking behaviour to counter the threat is justified. In other 
words, securitisation is the process through which issues – whether politicised or non-politicised – are 
elevated to security issues that need to be addressed with urgency or exceptionality. This in turn, 
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September 2001. Higgott (2004: 147) argues “in the context of US economic and military 
preponderance in the world order, the United States has been unable to resist the 
temptation to link foreign economic and security policy.” Consequently, globalisation is 
now viewed through the lenses of the United States’ national security agenda. Thus it is 
not merely a “benefit” but a “security problem” that needs to be addressed.  
 Finally, some experts have also started looking into the relations between 
preferential FTAs and human security issues. For instance, Emilie Hafner-Burton (2005) 
explores the impact of preferential FTAs on human rights. Despite their incompleteness 
and imperfection, he asserts that preferential FTAs “are among the only existing 
international institutions with some capacity to enforce compliance, and they may prove 
to be one of the more effective available means of implementing very basic  humanbasic 
human rights values into practice” (Hafner-Burton, 2005: 624). Meanwhile, Jonathan 
Chow (2013) investigates connections between trade and human security in Southeast 
Asia based on the policies implemented by members of the Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations (ASEAN). Chow (2013: 85-86) concludes that for the most part, ASEAN 
members have been reluctant to link trade to traditional and human security issues 
mainly due to some of the values they wish to protect such as non-interference norms, 
respect for sovereignty, and regional unity. Lastly, Aggarwal and Govella’s (2013) broad 
analysis of trade connections to security considerations in Asia-Pacific highlights the 
relatively strong influence of state security issues on the creation of trade agreements at a 
preferential level vis-à-vis the minor impact of human security concerns. 
 The present study builds on this literature by investigating the linking of security 
interests and free trade activities in the twenty-first century. This is a particularly 
important path of inquiry given the changes in the nature of both trade and security. On 
the one hand, trade is no longer simply the exchange of commodities and finished 
products. Globalized production chains mean that trade in semi-finished goods within 
firms have become more common than before. On the other hand, understandings of 
security now encompass not just the survival of the state, but also considerations of 
human safety. Such considerations mean that reassessments of the relationship between 
trade and security are timely. 
                                                                                                                                            
legitimates the sidestepping of public debate and democratic procedures. See, Wæver ‘s (1995) 
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(1998); ‘Revisiting Copenhagen’; William’s (2003) ‘Words, Images, Enemies: Securitization and 
International Politics’; Emmer’s (2007) ‘Securitization’; McDonald’s (2008) ‘Securitization and the 
Construction of Security’; Balzacq’s (2010) ‘Constructivism and Securitization Studies’ and Peoples and 
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 To do this, I analyse the call so-called “statist” (traditional) and “humanist” (non-
traditional) forms of East Asian security-trade linkages at multilateral, minilateral, and 
bilateral levels. On the one hand, I examine how free trade is being utilised by small 
states in the region to promote, enhance, and secure the primary referents of their 
security policies and strategies at regional and domestic levels. On the other, I analyse the 
role of statist and humanist security interests in the continuing relevance and 
proliferation of free trade in the twenty-first century. The term “referent” in this study is 
defined as “things that are seen to be existentially threatened and that have a legitimate 
claim to survival” (Buzan et al., 1998: 36).  
 
1.2 RESEARCH GAPS, QUESTIONS, AND OBJECTIVES 
 
1.2.1 Research gaps 
The thesis addresses three existing gaps in the security-trade literature. First, the study 
examines how free trade (at bilateral, minilateral, and multilateral levels) is being used by 
small East Asian countries to promote, enhance, and secure their regional and domestic 
security referents. Conversely, it analyses how various forms of security threats and issues 
(traditional and non-traditional) influence the utility and outcome of free trade 
particularly with respect to the small powers in the region. In most cases, these security 
referents and interests have been aggregated into a single analytical category that prevents 
a more nuanced and in-depth analysis. Here, I analyse the East Asian security-trade 
linkages based on specific contexts, referents, and threats.  
Second, and in doing so, the study looks at the motives and rationales (at regional 
and domestic levels) behind the growing linkages between security interests and the free 
trade activities of small East Asian countries; the outcomes that they aim to achieve from 
such a strategy; as well as their relative efficiency and effectiveness in attaining these 
results. Thus, this study begins with the acknowledgement of the reality and materiality 
of free trade that draws discrete national economies with distinctive sociocultural features 
within interdependent regional and global arrangements. Here, I examine why small East 
Asian states continue to engage in various trade activities in the twenty-first century 
particularly those aligned with preferential bilateral and minilateral free trade. This is 
despite the adverse effects that can emanate  from free trade activities such as weakening 
the coherence and viability of existing regional organisations; exacerbating inter-state 
8 
 
rivalries and competitions; and widening power imbalances and development divides – 
among other examples.  
Finally, the study explores and explains the distinctive natures and types of East 
Asian security-trade linkages based on identified sets of security referents, contexts, and 
threats to highlight the statist (traditional) and humanist (non-traditional) elements of 
security in the twenty-first century. First, I examine statist linkages to assess the relations 
between free trade and traditional (state-centric) security referents of small East Asian 
countries. Second, I investigate humanist linkages to evaluate the relations between free 
trade and non-traditional (people-centric) security referents in these countries. A crucial 
part of this task is the examination of how the confluence between the internal and 
external environments affects the utility of free trade for promoting, enhancing, and 
securing the regional and domestic referents of East Asian security.   
  
1.2.2 Research questions 
Against this backdrop, the thesis asks the following sets of questions that are central to 
an analysis of East Asian security-trade linkages, both statist and humanist, in the twenty-
first century: 
 
1. Why do East Asian countries, particularly the periphery and semi-periphery 
powers link their security interests with their free trade activities? What are the 
main motives and rationales behind these security-trade linkages? And how 
effective are these states in promoting, enhancing, and securing their desired 
outcomes via the security-trade linking strategy?  
 
2. What role does free trade (bilateral, minilateral, and multilateral) play with 
respect to the primary referents (statist and humanist) of East Asian security both 
at regional and domestic levels? Conversely, how do statist and humanist security 
threats and issues influence the facilitations and outcomes of free trade activities? 
And what factors affect the utility of free trade for promoting, enhancing, and 
securing these domestic and regional referents of East Asian security?  
 
Before answering these questions, an operational security concept has to be established. 




3. How do East Asian countries define a security concept in the twenty-first 
century? What are the factors that have led to the rethinking and reformulation of 
security in East Asia both at regional and domestic levels? In addition, how does 
the evolution of East Asian security thinking affect the core values and elements of 
security, on the one hand, and the forms of security threats addressed, on the 
other?  
 
4. What are the primary referents of East Asian security policies and strategies both 
at regional and domestic levels? Which dimension of security do they represent? In 
addition, what are the main problems that limit and threaten these regional and 
domestic referents of East Asian security?  
 
1.2.3 Research objectives 
In order to tackle these questions, the thesis performs two main objectives. First, I 
theoretically reconfigure the security concept by amalgamating the statist and humanist 
dimensions of security to establish the “cohabitative security” framework that will serve 
as the operative definition of security for this project. Cohabitative security integrates the 
state-centric and people-centric referents to accommodate both traditional and non-
traditional security issues emanating from outside and within the territorial jurisdictions 
of states. Such formulation allows for the incorporation of non-state referents within a 
profoundly statist configuration of national vis-à-vis regional security.   
 Accordingly, this study reinforces the argument that the meaning and provision 
of security can neither be fully articulated nor substantiated without considerations for 
below-the-state actors and issues. However, unlike other non-traditional security 
discourses, it does not trivialise nor does it undermine the role vis-à-vis the power of the 
state in pursuing more holistic security policies and strategies. Therefore, rather than 
downplaying the state-centric security concept while highlighting a more people-centric 
model, I attempt to amalgamate the “high politics” of the state and the “low politics” of 
individuals, groups, and communities via the cohabitative security framework. The word 
“cohabitative” in this context refers to inter and intra-governmental efforts to 
amalgamate the statist and humanist dimensions of security when articulating and 
implementing their regional and domestic security rhetoric and agendas.  
 Second, I empirically analyse the linkages between cohabitative security referents 
(statist and humanist), on the one hand, and various forms of free trade arrangements 
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(multilateral, minilateral, and bilateral) on the other. Here, the examination of the 
security-trade nexus is two-tiered. At the regional level, I explore the general linkages 
between security referents and free trade using Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation 
(APEC) and Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) as case studies. In 
addition, at the domestic level, this study explores the specific linkages between security 
referents and free trade using Taiwan, Singapore, the Philippines, and Malaysia as case 
studies.  
 For most East Asian countries, free trade has become a vital platform for 
pursuing various components of their national interests. Thus, reversing back toward 
protectionism by implementing a “chainfire” policy that destroys existing geo-political, 
geo-economic, and geo-strategic networks is unlikely to be the preferred approach. The 
insecurities induced by the internal security environment, which a host of external factors 
amplify, compel East Asian states, especially the small ones to liberalise even further. 
Thus, the region as a whole provides an idyllic backdrop for testing theories and 
hypotheses about the linkages between statist and humanist security interests, on the one 
hand; and various forms of free trade arrangements, on the other.  
 
1.3 CONCEPTUAL AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS  
 
1.3.1 The cohabitative security model 
 
The referents of cohabitative security 
Figure 1.1 illustrates the cohabitation between the state-centric and human-centric 
dimensions of security to develop the thesis concept of cohabitative security model. As 
shown in Figure 1, the word “cohabitative” refers to an amalgamation between the “high 
politics” of state security and the “low politics” of human security when articulating and 







Figure 1: Cohabiting the state-centric and human-centric dimensions of security5 
 
The underlying assumption here is that the statist and humanist dimensions of 
security complement one another. On the one hand, state security does not always 
undermine human security nor does it deliberately compete with individuals and 
communities. On the other, human security does not necessarily threaten state security 
nor does it have to be in constant competition with state actors and agencies. In other 
words, human security and state security are mutually constitutive rather than mutually 
corrosive. Such a formulation enables states to have a more positive and nurturing image 
in the security narrative, and is particularly relevant in the context of the increasing 
recognition that human security is a necessary precondition for regional and domestic 
peace and stability.  
 Cohabitative security implies that the dichotomy between these two security 
dimensions is neither natural nor permanent. The invisible yet concrete divide between 
states and individuals vis-à-vis communities creates a rather misleading notion that the 
state does not acknowledge the multidimensionality of security in the contemporary era. 
Despite the claims made by state actors concerning their reconceptualised security, non-
state actors continue to defined security in purely militaristic terms that is bereft of 
human sensibility. Hence, while the government claims to have created a novel security 
vision that incorporates human security, the citizens continue to equate security to the 
anachronistic goal of preserving the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the state. 
Interestingly, it is the insecurity rather than security felt by individuals and states that is 
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 Based on the author’s own conceptualisation of amalgamating state-centric and human-centric 
security referents and issues. For in-depth discussions on ‘freedom from fear’ and ‘freedom from 
want and humiliation’, see UNDP’s (1994) Human Development Report. 
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transforming the traditional normative terrain of the Asia-Pacific into a region that is 
mindful of the need to incorporate both humanist and statist components of security. 
 Cohabitative security emerges in the context of a broadening and deepening 
language of security while being mindful of its impact on the theoretical and empirical 
utility of the concept. The security referent has become a central element of the larger 
security debate dominated by the “expansionists” (those who believe that the security 
definition must be comprehensive) and “non-expansionists” (those who argue that the 
security definition has to be limited).6  
 As far as the realists are concerned, the state remains the primary form of 
political community and the principal actor in both the domestic and global realms. 
Therefore, the state remains the chief provider and agent of security (Waltz, 1979; Gilpin 
and Gilpin, 1987; Alagappa, 1998; Krasner, 1999; Mearsheimer, 2003; Donelly, 2005). 
Given the state system’s role as the optimum security guarantor, on the one hand, and 
the primary determinant of state behaviour, on the other, the state is the primary referent 
of security. However, realist claims that the state is the “rightful” referent of security 
given its centrality both in domestic and international politics, faces several challenges.  
 First, the state’s capacity for fulfilling some of its key functions including the 
provision of national security, welfare, identity, and environment is constantly 
diminishing (Mitchell, 1991; Garland, 1996; Alagappa, 1998; Guéhenno, 2000; Rotberg, 
2003). The state is both too big and too small to satisfy basic human needs and address 
immense regional and global threats in an effective and efficient manner. Second, the 
state is ironically viewed more as a progenitor of insecurity than a security provider 
(Alagappa, 1998; Rotberg, 2003; Paul, 2010). In other words, there are instances where 
the state reinforces the insecurities and vulnerabilities felt by marginalised individuals and 
societies instead of improving their sense of security (Alagappa, 1998; Rotberg, 2003; 
Paul, 2010). Thirdly, the state is no longer viewed as an end goal in itself, but a tool for 
securing the life and freedom of people, on the one hand, and improving their 
socioeconomic welfare, on the other. Therefore, the ultimate goal of security should be 
the protection of individuals, groups and societies and not the state itself (Alkire, 2003; 
McFarlane and Khong, 2006; den Boer and de Wilde, 2008). This implies that the 
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See for example, Akaha’s (1991) ‘Japan’s Comprehensive Security Policy’; Radtke and Feddema’s 
(2000) Comprehensive Security in Asia; Hsiung’s (2004) Comprehensive Security: Challenge for Pacific 
Asia; Tambe and Ordonez’s (2009) ‘A Game Theoretic Approach for Allocation of Limited Security 
Resources’; Hameiri and Jones’s (2012) ‘The Politics and Governance of Non-Traditional Security’; 
Westing’s (2013) From Environmental to Comprehensive Security; Wu’s (2014) Non-Traditional 
Security Issues and the South China Sea. 
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referents of security rhetoric and agenda must be human-centric, rather than state-
centric. This is particularly relevant in cases where the legitimacy of the state vis-à-vis the 
government or regime is contested or absent (UNDP, 1994; Alagappa, 1998; OECD, 
2010; Silva, 2014).  
 The proposed cohabitative security model receives significant inspiration from 
the human security agenda that first appeared in the 1994 Human Development Report 
(HDR) by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). The Report tackled 
the two most fundamental forms of human freedoms – the “freedom from want” and 
the “freedom from fear.” The former refers to safety from chronic threats such as 
hunger, disease, and repression; while the latter pertains to protection from sudden and 
hurtful disruptions in patterns of daily life whether at home, work, or in communities.  
 Therefore, the concept of human security attempts to shift the referent of 
security – that which is to be secured – from state security to the security of individuals 
and social communities. As such, human security is viewed as a paradigm shift that goes 
beyond the State’s preoccupation with nuclear security (UNDP, 1994). However, the 
broad and all-encompassing formulation of human security results in a conceptual and 
theoretical ambiguity that significantly diminishes its theoretical and empirical utility 
(Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy, 2007; Frerks and Goldewijk, 2007; Goucha and Crowley, 2008; 
Kaldor et al., 2013). This implies that a certain type of political organisation is still 
necessary, even as the security concept gradually evolves to encompass people-centric 
security issues. The state continues to be the most critical mechanism for facilitating 
political allegiance and affiliation despite its many faults and limitations (Alagappa, 1998; 
Ripsman and Paul 2005, 2010). As such, the state remains the primary agent for the 
functions of security and welfare required in all societies and is expected to remain an 
important fixture of the international system in the twenty-first century (Alagappa, 1998; 
Ripsman and Paul 2005, 2010).  
 On the one hand, cohabitative security emphasises that the state has never been 
completely obsolete mainly due to inferred cultural support that buttresses the principle 
and practice of sovereign statehood at the global level (Jackson and Rosberg, 1982; 
Alagappa, 1998; Opello Jr. and Rosow, 1999; Rodrik, 2012). In addition, post-statist 
approaches to political organisation are neither well developed nor well grounded. As a 
result, the state continues to be the dominant actor of both local and international realms 
and remains the primary form of organised political community. In short, there seems to 
be no feasible alternative to the state system even in the twenty-first century. Given that 
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the meaning and subtext of security are a function of “historically specific forms of 
political community” (Alagappa, 1998: 33), the conceptualisation of security in terms of 
the state continues to be relevant.  
 However, on the other hand, cohabitative security also emphasises that the 
enduring relevance of the state does not make it the exclusive referent object of security. 
As argued, the contested legitimacy and limitations of some states suggest that 
government-defined security policies and strategies may be contradictory to the security 
interests of people and the communities. Hence, national security cannot be simply 
equated with state security. While it remains the most influential agent of political 
organisation, the state now has to co-exist with a host of inter and intra-state entities 
comprising an intricate web of authority and power configurations (Alagappa, 1998; 
Sahni, 2008; Wibben, 2011; Harada and Kimura, 2011; Watson, 2011). 
 Cohabitative security, therefore, integrates both statist and humanist security 
dimensions to accommodate traditional and non-traditional security issues emanating 
from outside and within the territorial jurisdictions of sovereign states. Such formulation 
enables the assimilation of non-state referents within an extremely statist national security 
agenda. In doing so, cohabitative security does not trivialise nor undermine the role and 
power of the state in formulating and implementing cohabitative security policies and 
strategies. Instead of restraining the state-centric security concept to highlight the 
human-centric model, cohabitative security amalgamates the “high politics” of the state 
and the “low politics” of individuals, groups, and communities.   
 
The scope of cohabitative security 
 An alternative use of the human security concept that is less politically 
encumbered has been introduced by Roland Paris (2001) in an attempt to utilise both its 
theoretical and empirical value. In this construction, human security serves as a label for 
a diverse group of research studies within the security studies domain. This novel brand 
of research focuses on non-traditional aspects of security and is concerned chiefly with 
the protection of societies, groups, and individuals against non-military threats. In other 
words, human security can have a pivotal role in the field by serving as a handy label for 
the categorisation of various kinds of research. Drawing on the ideas of broadening and 
deepening, Paris (2001) developed a matrix of security studies.  
 Figure 2 illustrates Paris’ four-cell matrix. Cell 1 includes scholarly works that 
focus primarily on national security – military threats to the security of the states based 
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on the classical realist approach. Cell 2 is comprised of works that concentrate on 
redefined security – non-military threats to states on top of the existing military threats. 
Cell 3 contains works that centre on intrastate security – military threats individuals, 
groups, and societies as opposed to states. Finally, Cell 4 constitutes works that 
essentially deal with human security – military and non-military threats to the security of 
individuals, groups, and societies. These four cells are not mutually exclusive but tend to 
overlap significantly, blurring the differences between threats that affect states and those 
that affect individuals, groups, and societies. Therefore, by definition, the “military” 
column singles out a key subset of the “both” columns (Alkire, 2003). 
 
Figure 2: A matrix of security studies 7 
 
 Based on this security matrix, Figure 3 presents the formation of the cohabitative 
security framework. As shown in this figure, cohabitative security is a two-dimensional 
model comprised of traditional, state-centric security and non-traditional, human-centric 
security. Each dimension has a set of security referents. On the one hand are state-
centric referents including sovereignty and territoriality; relative power and interest; 
military and defence; and government and regime. On the other, are human-centric 
referents such as economic, food, health, environmental, personal, political, cyber, socio-
community, and ethno-cultural security.8  
                                                 
7 
Based on Paris’ (2001: 98) ‘Human Security Roland Paris Paradigm Shift or Hot Air?’ 
8 
Economic security requires an assured basic income for individuals, usually from productive and 
remunerative work or, as a last resort, from a publicly financed safety net. Food security requires that 
all people at all times have both physical and economic access to basic food. Health security aims to 
guarantee a minimum protection from diseases and unhealthy lifestyles. Environmental security aims 
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Figure 3: Operationalising cohabitative security 9 
 
  The cohabitative security model indicates that national security is no longer 
exclusively devoted to the business of safeguarding the State but is now also concerned 
with the security of human collectivities and societies. Whereas state security refocuses 
                                                                                                                                            
to protect people from the short- and long-term ravages of nature, man-made threats to nature, and 
deterioration of the natural environment. Personal security aims to protect people from physical 
violence, whether from the state or external states, from violent individuals and sub-state actors, 
from domestic abuse, or from predatory adults. Political security is concerned with whether people 
live in a society that honours their basic human rights. Socio-community security aims to protect 
people from the loss of traditional relationships and values and from sectarian and ethnic violence, on 
the one hand; and the freedom from discrimination based on gender, age, ethnicity or social status, 
with access to safety nets, on the other. Ethno-cultural security is a social climate in which minority 
populations feel secure in expressing their cultural identity, on the one hand; and the psychological 
orientations of a society which enhance the ability to control uncertainty and fear, on the other. 
These definitions are mainly based on the UNDP’s (1994) Human Development Report; Buttedahl’s 
(1994) ‘Viewpoint: True Measures of Human Security’; Nef’s (1999) Human Security and Mutual 
Vulnerability.  
9 
The referents listed under state security and human security are illustrative not exhaustive. See for 
example, UNDP’s (1994) Human Development Report; Buttedahl’s (1994) ‘Viewpoint: True Measures 
of Human Security’; Nef’s (1999) Human Security and Mutual Vulnerability. Thomas’ (2000) Global 
Governance, Development and Human Security; Leaning and Arie’s (2000) Human Security: A 
Framework for Assessment in Conflict and Transition; Nussbaum’s (2001) Women and Human 
Development:  The Capabilities Approach; Sen’s (2000); ‘Why Human Security?’; DFAIT Canada’s 
(2001) ‘Freedom from Fear: Canada’s Foreign Policy for Human Security’; Hampson and Daudelin’s 
(2002) Madness in the Multitude: Human Security and World Disorder; and Atienza et al,  (2010) 
Developing a Human Security Index for the Philippines. 
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the attention on the security of state-oriented referents, human security underlines the 
security human-oriented referents. Whereas state security safeguards citizens from 
external threats, human security controls internal problems that imperil grassroots civil 
societies. Whereas a state-centric security agenda is intended to contain immediate and 
concrete threats, a human-centric agenda is designed “to safeguard the vital core of all 
human lives from critical pervasive threats, without impeding long-term human 
fulfilment” (Alkire, 2003: 23). In short, the statist and humanist dimensions of security 
are complementary not substitutes; mutually reinforcing not mutually exclusive; 
integrative not corrosive.   
 Varieties of actor, both internal and external, play significant roles ensuring the 
security of the state-centric and human-centric referents of Asian security. At the 
national level, these are: (i) state actors comprising national and local government units 
and agencies; (ii) non-state public actors composed of local non-government 
organisations, media, and academe; and (iii) non-state private actors made up of domestic 
business groups. At the transnational level, these are: (i) regional and trans regional 
organisations such as the APEC and ASEAN; (ii) international NGOs; and (iii) 
transnational and multinational corporations or TNCs and MNCs. The dotted arrows of 
Figure 3 indicate that national and transnational actors simultaneously influence one 
another, whereas the solid arrows indicate a two-directional relationship between internal 
security referents and the external environment. That is, the conducts of transnational 
actors and underlying external conditions influence domestic units, and vice versa.   
 Critics argue that if all issues that pose threats to life, in general, are conceived as 
threats to national security, the explanatory power of the term significantly shrinks (Paris, 
2001; Owen, 2004; Christie, 2014; Martin and Kostovicova, 2014; Tadjbakhsh, 2014). As 
such, there is nothing important to gain by attributing the word ‘security’ to a host of 
non-traditional, non-military issues considering their weakening effect on the theoretical 
and empirical utility of the term. Hence, linking security with various non-state concerns 
may only be appropriate within the context of regional and global conflicts where they 
are viewed as central elements that must be considered when assessing the impact of 
violent wars and conflicts (Krause and Williams, 1996; Alagappa, 1998; Alkire, 2003; 
Booth, 2008).  
 The impetus for cohabitative security is based on a number of considerations. 
First, the divisions between traditional and non-traditional security issues are hardly 
insurmountable. Rather than being diametrically opposed, these two dimensions can be 
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mutually reinforcing. Second, defining security mainly in terms of organised violence is 
misleading insofar as issues that do not entail or constitute force are not considered 
security threats (Alagappa, 1998; Gasper, 2014; Krause, 2014; Sen, 2014). Third, 
restraining security discussions at a nation-state level creates a false notion that security 
cannot be analysed at different levels with respect to diverging non-state referents 
(Christie, 2014; Martin and Owen, 2014; Tadjbakhsh, 2014). Fourth, averting the 
rethinking of the security concept despite the changing internal and external conditions 
also undermines its practical and analytical utility (Krause and Williams, 1996; Alkire, 
2003; Saleh, 2010; Martin and Kostovicova, 2014). Finally, the criticism that points to the 
fundamentally different expertise required for tackling nonconventional issues underlines 
the need for inter- and multidisciplinary approaches to security studies, rather than 
delimiting the boundaries of security on the basis of the expertise (Alagappa, 1998; 
Christie, 2014; Krause, 2014). 
 Determining and delineating the scope of security presents an intellectual 
paradox. On the one hand, labelling all issues as security threats without applying a 
specific guideline undermines the theoretical coherence and empirical utility of the 
concept. However, the very process of selecting a set of criteria is intrinsically linked to 
particular models. Therefore, identifying which issues are labelled as security threats 
becomes a highly subjective process. On the other, the traditional conception of security 
is becoming increasingly restricting and misleading. By strictly targeting the issues that 
relate to state defence, the other equally important dimensions of security that impact 
survival are ignored. Hence, the move to reconfigure the security concept outside the 
statist domain of force continues to gain momentum.  
 Admittedly, the cohabitative security framework does not provide a panacea to 
long-standing conceptual problems of security. Nevertheless, it serves as an alternative 
approach for reassessing governments' successes and failures in incorporating the 
individuals and societies within their respective national security rhetoric and agenda in 
the twenty-first century. By amalgamating state-centric and people-centric security issues, 
the role of the state with respect to human security is “unvilified.” Instead of being 
diametrically opposed, cohabitative security shows that traditional state-centric security 
can complement and supplement non-traditional human-centric security, and vice versa. 
To some extent, the invisible divide between the “high politics” of the states and the 
“low politics” of the people and communities is bridged, allowing state actors to realise 
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the multidimensionality of security. A collective understanding of security between 
governments and the citizens, therefore, is better realised.   
 
1.3.2 The security-trade linking process 
 
Establishing the relations between security and trade 
After developing the cohabitative security framework, the linkages between security and 
free trade can now be more systematically explored and analysed. Figure 4 indicates a 
two-way relationship between these two variables. On the one hand, it shows how free 
trade activities vis-à-vis agreements may affect security referents vis-à-vis interests. On 
the other hand, it shows how security referents vis-à-vis interests may influence the 
utitlity and implementation of free trade activities vis-à-vis agreements.  
 
Figure 4: Linking security and trade 
 
  As mentioned, the study specifically focuses on East Asian security-trade 
linkages in the twenty-first century both at regional and domestic levels. Using this basic 
conceptual approach, I examine alternative ways of understanding the following 
contexts: why small East Asian countries continue to engage in various forms of free 
trade activities despite the problems arising from them; how state-related (traditional) and 
human-related (non-traditional) insecurities might be alleviated by linking security 
interests with free trade instead of simply “bailing out of” free trade systems; and how 
the confluence between internal and external environments affect the utility of free trade 
for enhancing, improving, or securing the referents of East Asian security at both 
regional and domestic levels.         
 Figure 5 provides an illustration of the preliminary understanding of state 
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motives and rationales for linking security interests and free trade objectives, as well as 
the nature of these linkages. There are two general theories that can provide preliminary 
explanations concerning these linkages: the neoliberal variant of liberalism and the 
neorealist variant of realism. 
 
Figure 5: “Realist linking” versus “liberal linking.”10 
 
 Liberals in general argue that all states accrue substantial benefits from free trade 
(Bhagwati, 2003, 2008; Burchill, 2005; Irwin, 2009; Healey, 2014; Heywood, 2014). In 
particular, the neoliberal thesis underlines the role of free trade as a peace-enforcing 
apparatus in the international system by harmonising multifaceted and often conflicting 
national interests. This harmonisation of interests enables states to pursue their 
respective economic objectives while preserving a significant level of collective security 
necessary for maintaining the stability and predictability of the system. 11 Liberal 
internationalists, in particular, demonstrate the feasibility of cooperation among 
sovereign states even without a hegemonic player to enforce compliance with the rules of 
agreement (Gardner, 1990; Hoffman, 1995; Doyle, 2004; Linklater, 2005; Jahn, 2013). 
For example, Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye’s (1977) complex interdependence theory 
reveals how countries can considerably broaden their narrow self-interests via 
membership in international institutions that enhance inter-state cooperation. Moreover, 
from a neoliberal standpoint, the intensification of economic interdependence via free 
                                                 
10
 Based on the author’s conceptualisation of realist and liberal security linkages. 
11 
See for example, Howard’s (1978) War and the Liberal Conscience; Gardner’s (1990) ‘The Comeback 
of Liberal Internationalism’; Powell’s (1994) ‘Anarchy in International Relations Theory: The 
Neorealist–Neoliberal Debate’; Ohmae’s (1995) The End of the Nation State; Zacher and Matthew’s 




trade has substantially reduced the material value of territorial conquest (Burchill, 2005; 
Fridell, 2006; Slocum, 2006; Lang, 2011). 
  Therefore, the liberal project endorses free trade as a medium through which 
aggressive state actions can be constrained through the juxtaposition of economic 
benefits with the opportunity costs of war. The prospects for economic incentives 
motivate countries to pursue different types of trade agreements with one another. In 
doing so, concerns over relative gains are set aside in favour of absolute gains. Applying 
the cohabitative security model, “liberal linking” relates more to the non-traditional, 
human-centric dimension of security comprised of referents that enhance absolute levels 
of “freedom from want and humiliation” of individuals, groups, and societies as shown 
in Figure 1.5.  
 Meanwhile, realists stress the dangers that might arise from excessive economic 
dependency particularly with respect to smaller, weaker states (Chan, 2001; Donnelly, 
2005; Garcia, 2013; Elman and Jensen, 2014). While they do not deny the wealth-creating 
effect of trade, they argue that the inherent anarchic structure of the international system 
forces states to limit their level of interdependence in order to lessen vulnerabilities. 
Rather than a peace-enhancing apparatus, trade is considered by realists to be a 
constraining device that limits the capacity of independent states for governing their own 
domestic affairs (Waltz, 1979; Tarzi, 2004; Linklater, 2005; Dunn, 2009). Therefore, the 
realist thesis underlines the primacy of politico-strategic concerns over economic 
considerations.12 While the liberals argue that states should be concerned more with the 
maximisation of their absolute gains, realists contend that states should be more worried 
about their relative gains or the lack because of that.  
 Therefore, in contrast to the neoliberal claim that states will continue to 
cooperate for as long as their absolute gains are improved, neorealists predict that states 
will abandon cooperative measures when they expect to gain less than their counterparts 
(Burchill, 2005; Donnelly, 2005; Reus-Smit, 2005; Garcia, 2013; Elman and Jensen, 
2104). This fixation with relative gains severely undermines cooperation at regional and 
international levels as states become paranoid about two things: first, whether they can 
gain something from cooperative agreements or not; second, and more importantly, 
whether these gains are greater than those that can potentially go to other members. 
                                                 
12 
See for example, Carr’s (1939) The Twenty Years’ Crisis; Morgenthau’s (1948) Politics Among 
Nations; Waltz’s (1979) Theory of International Politics; Gilpin’s (1986) ‘The Richness of the Tradition 
of Political Realism’; Kahler’s (1997) ‘Inventing International Relations’; Grieco’s (1997) ‘Realist 




Hence, from a realist perspective, the main rationale for the pursuit of free trade is 
political and strategic, rather than economic. “Realist linking” relates more to the 
traditional, state-centric dimension of security when applying the cohabitative security 
model. This is comprised of referents that enhance relative levels of state “freedom from 
fear” as shown in Figure 1.5.  
 
Conceptualising the security-trade linking process 
 
Figure 6: Statist and humanist security-trade linkages 
 
 Figure 6 provides an illustration of the security-trade linking process that will be 
used as a basis for examining the impact of free trade activities on East Asian security 
referents, on the one hand; and the effect of security interests on the creation/utility of 
free trade agreements, on the other. Statist and humanist linkages are two types of 
security-trade linkages that are being explored in the study. The former focuses on the 
nexus between the state-centric dimension of cohabitative security and free trade while 
the latter focuses on the nexus between the human-centric dimensions of the two 
concepts. Hence, the states are the primary referents of security for statist linkages, 
whereas the main security referents for humanist linkages are individuals, groups, and 
societies. Accordingly, both statist and humanist referents of cohabitative security are 
explored in terms of their threats and then analysed respectively in terms of their statist 
and humanist security linkages.  
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 Here, security-trade linking is viewed as an approach or a strategy for promoting, 
improving, and securing referents that are facing “existential threats.” Barry Buzan, Ole 
Wæver, Jaap de Wilde (1998: 27) define existential threat as something that “requires 
emergency action or special measures and the acceptance of that designation by a 
significant audience.” In short, security means survival in the face of existential threats. 
Or, as interpreted by Ralf Emmers (2013: 132), security occurs “when an issue is 
presented as posing an existential threat to a designated referent object.” As the 
cohabitative security model suggests, these referents are not exclusively state-centric but 
are also human-centric. (As defined earlier, the word “referent” pertains to objects 
deemed to be facing existential threats and that have a legitimate claim to survival [Buzan 
et al., 1998].)  
 Accordingly, the security-survival logic is simultaneously maintained and 
extended beyond military security to encompass non-military elements. Therefore, the 
choice between a rush to freer trade and a rush to increased protection is significantly 
influenced by the States’ view with regard to the utility of free trade for enhancing, 
improving, and securing the primary referents of their security policies and strategies 
(traditional statist or non-traditional humanist) at both regional and national levels.  
 First, I analyse how the security-trade linking process occurs at the regional level. 
The assumption is that regional state and non-state referents are facing similar sets of 
security threats, both traditional and non-traditional. One way of dealing with these 
threats is by linking these reigional security issues with the free trade agendas of the 
APEC and ASEAN. The presence of shared perception and collective understanding 
with regard to these security issues enables the establishment of strong alliances and/or 
coalitions among independent governments that will allow for the ratification and 
implementation of binding agreements concerning these threats.  
 By agreeing to bestow legitimate power to regional institutions, the conventional 
form of sovereignty is transformed to include interstate responsibility and accountability. 
Thus, in an increasingly interdependent realm, it will be in the best interest of the 
governments to take cooperative measures seriously in order to combat security threats 
that jeopardise their national interest. Notwithstanding internal differences, the 
“collective” perceptions of regional security/insecurity are anchored on these shared 




 Second, I analyse how the security-trade linking approach is carried out at the 
national level. The assumption here is that the relativity of the security concept is crucial 
for identifying which issues are framed as existential threats and, therefore, are assigned 
as the primary referents of national security policies and strategies. One way of dealing 
with these threats is by linking these domestic security issues with the free trade agendas 
of national governments, in particular Taiwan, Singapore, the Philippines, and Malaysia. 
 The idea here is that different threats manifested in diverse spaces and at varying 
scales require unique cures given at distinctive dosages. Consequently, trade-offs between 
state-centric and human-centric elements of security are highly feasible. For instance, 
increasing state security through the acquisition of advanced military weaponry may lead 
to a corresponding decrease in human security by reducing the scarce government 
resources needed to produce other important non-military public goods such as social 
services and infrastructures among others. Therefore, an in-depth focus on domestic 
contexts in terms of factors that influence the configuration of national security policies 
and strategies across samples will be necessary for explaining differences in cross-
national security-trade linkages. 
 
1.4 RESEARCH DESIGNS, METHODOLOGIES, AND RATIONALES 
 
1.4.1 Comparative qualitative study 
To answer the main research questions and fulfil my primary objectives, I employ a 
comparative qualitative research design. In general, comparative research has four 
primary purposes: contextual description, classification, hypothesis-testing, and 
prediction (Lijphart, 1971; Marsh and Stoker, 2002; Landman, 2003; Pennings et al., 
2006; Burnham et al., 2008; Peters, 2013). These objectives are all mutually reinforcing 
and co-exist with each other in systematic comparative studies, although some might gain 
more emphasis depending on the primary goals set by the researcher (Landman, 2003). 
This study attempts to accomplish these objectives, albeit to varying degrees.  
 First, through contextual description, I describe the context(s) underpinning the 
research phenomenon in question: the linking of security interests and free trade 
objectives by East Asian countries, specifically with respect to periphery and semi-
periphery powers. While security issues may be “homogenised” at the regional level due 
to the presence of shared perceptions and collective understanding, nonetheless at the 
national level, the relativity of the security concept implies that security issues are 
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“heterogeneous.” Therefore, the contextual description provides the raw information 
necessary for higher levels of explanation (Landman, 2003; Pennings et al., 2006; Peters, 
2013).  
 Second, through classification, I establish conceptual differences between statist 
and humanist security-trade linkages. Using Taiwan, Singapore, Malaysia, and the 
Philippines as primary cases, the study can construct distinct categories based on their 
identifiable and shared characteristics. As such, classification is also a necessary 
component of systematic comparison and represents a higher degree of comparison by 
grouping separate descriptive units into simpler categories (Landman, 2003; Peters, 
2013).  
 Third, after describing the East Asian security context at regional and domestic 
levels, and classifying the cases between statist and humanist categories, I analyse factors 
that influence and explain what has been described and classified. Here, several 
important variables are identified, and the relationships between them are posited. The 
idea is to eliminate rival explanations and test hypotheses derived from competing 
theoretical perspectives (Lijphart, 1971; Landman, 2003; Pennings et al., 2006). By 
illustrating these relationships as comparisons, the study can contribute to the generation 
and building of comprehensive theories about security-trade linkages. In the words of 
Lawrence Mayer (in Landman, 2003: 6), “the unique potential of comparative analysis lies 
in the cumulative and incremental addition of system-level attributes to existing 
explanatory theory, thereby making such theory progressively more complete.” 
 Finally, to a lesser extent I aim to assist with predictions of the general flows and 
outcomes of security-trade linkages (both statist and humanist) in the countries that are 
currently being examined. These predictions will be based on the findings and 
observations derived from the four primary case analyses. Given the relatively small 
number of cases studied (small-N) and problems associated with the selection of indices 
that will measure security interests, on the one hand, and free trade objectives, on the 
other, the study performs a qualitative comparative analysis. The nature of the research 
questions demands a holistic, contextual view and analysis of the phenomenon, as 
opposed to abstracting the entity across cases. In other words, it is necessary to treat the 
cases as “wholes” or what Jonathan Hopkin (2002: 261) refers to as “complex 
combinations of variables.” For this reason, a qualitative approach is preferred over a 
quantitative approach. The former is more appropriate for negotiating the “difficult 
relations between empirical complexity and parsimonious theory” (Hopkin, 2002: 262).  
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 To this extent, the study may be viewed as an explanatory type of research as it 
attempts to explain why security-trade linking is progressing; interpret the cause-and-
effect relationship between these two main variables; and examine the differences in the 
four samples’ responses and outcomes albeit without numerical or statistical analyses. In 
contrast with analytic induction, this kind of explanatory strategy seeks to explicate the 
processes at work in a small number of cases “using in-depth intensive analysis and a 
narrative presentation of the argument” rather than “seeking regularities in the 
relationship between proposed explanatory factors and outcomes across cases” 
(Maxwell and Mittapalli, 2008: 324). 
 
1.5.2 Most-different systems design and the method of difference  
 
Figure 7: Methods of comparison 13 
 
 As the present study analyses only four cases, a middle level of conceptual 
abstraction is used (Figure 7). Consequently, the study is more intensive than extensive as 
it tackles the nuances specific to each of the four countries. Since the political outcomes 
that figure in such studies are the products of multiple causal factors acting together, they 
are considered to be “configurative” (Landman, 2003: 25). In addition, the State serves as 
a unit of analysis of the study and the primary emphasis is focused on similarities and 
differences among cases instead of the analytical relationships between variables. Charles 
                                                 
13 
Based on Sartori’s (1970) ‘Concept Misinformation in Comparative Politics’; Mair’s (1996) 
‘Comparative Politics: An Overview’; Landman’s (2003) Issues and Methods in Comparative Politics. 
27 
 
Ragin (1994) has termed this type of comparison “case-oriented,” where the purpose is 
to grasp the essence of an underlying complex unity as opposed to merely determining 
causality between distinct sets of variables. Arend Lijphart (1975) calls such approach a 
“comparable cases strategy” while Rod Hague et al. (1993) uses the term “focused 
comparison.”  
 The comparative method is divided into two types of system designs, namely: the 
“most similar systems design” (MSSD) and the “most different systems design” (MDSD) 
(Przeworski and Teune, 1970; Faure, 1994; Landman, 2003). MSSD compares political 
systems that share a range of common features in order to neutralise some differences 
while emphasising others. Drawing from John Stuart Mill’s (1843) “method of 
difference,” MSSD identifies different key features and characteristics among a set of 
similar countries, which can explain the political outcome that is under observation.  The 
number of potential explanatory variables is narrowed down which enables the empirical 
checking of explanations (Przeworski and Teune 1970; Hopkin 2002; Landman 2003; 
Burnham et al. 2008).  Variables that are held constant “cannot be adduced as causes of 
any differences between them” (Hopkin, 2002: 254). However, the main problem with 
MSSD is that it is difficult to determine which differences are crucial and which are not. 
This is because “there will always be enough difference between cases to over-determine 
the dependent variable” (Hopkin, 2002: 254).  
 On the other hand, the most different systems design (MDSD) compares 
countries that do not share exactly the same features aside from the political outcome 
that is being explained with one or two of the independent variables viewed to be 
significant for that specific outcome Przeworski and Teune, 1970; Faure 1994; Landman, 
2003). Drawing from Mill’s (1843) “method of agreement,” MDSD identifies similar 
features and characteristics among different countries in order to explain the political 
outcome that is under observation. In doing so, it searches for similarities between and 
among cases, despite their potentially puzzling differences (Hopkin, 2002; Burnham et 
al., 2008). If, for instance, the hypothesised relationship between two or more variables is 
reproduced then it can be argued that there is a relatively strong causal link between 
variables (Przeworski and Teune, 1970; Hopkin, 2002). Thus, focus shifts from the 
“inter-systemic” level to the “intra-systemic” level to establish generalisations that may be 




    Table 1: Comparative cross-national study of Asian security-trade linkages 14 
 
 Table 1 illustrates the application of MDSD in the study of twenty-first century 
East Asian security-trade linkages. The table is divided into three segments: the varying 
features of the four cases explored; the outcome explained; and the key explanatory 
factors examined. The four countries have been selected as case studies precisely because 
of their intrinsic differences. Taiwan, Singapore, Malaysia, and the Philippines are shown 
to have a number of contrasting features – economic, government, parties, power, 
referents, colonisers, ethnicity, and religion – but share a number of similar factors that 
can potentially explain the presence of the outcome being investigated.  Following the 
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For economic levels, see World Bank’s economic indicators as of 2014, available online at 
http://data.worldbank.org/about/country-and-lending-groups. For government types, see Central 
Intelligence Agency’s World Fact Book, available online at 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2128.html. For party systems, 
see Croissant and Völkel’s (2010) ‘Party System Types and Party System Institutionalization.’ For 
power status classifications, see Wallerstein’s (1974) The Modern World System; Chase-Dunn et al. 
(2000) ‘Trade Globalization since 1795: Waves of Integration in the World-System’; Babones and 
Alvarez-Rivadulla‘s (2007) ‘Standardized Income Inequality Data for Use in Cross-National Research.’ 
For colonizing countries, see United Nations and Decolonization, available online at 
http://www.un.org/en/decolonization/index.shtml; United Nations General Assembly Resolutions, 
available online at http://www.un.org/en/decolonization/index.shtml, For ethnicity and religion, see 
Central Agency Unit’s World Fact Book, available online at 
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logic of Mill’s method of agreement, the outcome explained derives from the presence of 
key explanatory factors in all four countries that are used as samples.  
 Thus, it may be argued, the security-trade linkages of small East Asian countries 
in the twenty-first century are being precipitated by the three main factors that they 
share, namely: high levels of internal and external insecurity; multidimensional and 
multidirectional security concepts, contexts, and threats; and marginal geo-economic size 
and geo-political position. Strategic disadvantage can force weaker states to take more 
innovative approaches to security although not all do so. Exploring how weaker states 
use trade to solve their security concerns and the trade-offs they make to do so can 
provide insight into when strategic innovation takes place and when such approaches are 
more or less effective 
 
1.4.3 Multiple case studies, elite interviews, and documentary analysis 
The comparative cross-national study of East Asian security-trade linkages involves an 
in-depth analysis of the four cases in order to achieve a relatively complete account of 
the political outcome explained and the key explanatory factors tested. This approach 
means that I am able to argue persuasively about the relationships between the variables 
and present causal explanations for the events and processes investigated. By applying 
the same conceptual framework to all four cases, I am able to comparatively analyse the 
rationales and motives behind the security-trade linkages of small East Asian countries, 
as well as their dynamics and effects with respect to specific security referents. Focusing 
on individual cases enables an understanding of intricate patterns of connection between 
the component parts of a multifaceted unit. Neil Smelser (1976) posits this is one way of 
becoming familiar with the ways that constituent parts fit together. Through a thorough 
and comprehensive analysis of the process of security-trade linking in each of the four 
case studies, the thesis is able to provide contextual description, develop new 
classifications, generate hypotheses, confirm theories, and where possible, explain 
occurrences of deviance within countries.   
 To provide a preliminary understanding of the outcome explained, I also conduct 
one-on-one interviews with several key informants from each of the four countries 
during six months of field research. Since the study emphasises the roles of state and 
non-state actors in the security-trade linking process the target groups for the interviews 
are the “elite” representing the government (public officials, policymakers, government 
think-tanks); civil society groups (academe, NGOs, independent think-tanks); and, where 
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possible, members of the political opposition parties. Elite interviewing is considered the 
most effective way to gather information about decision-makers (in relation to those who 
influence them) and the decision-making process itself (Burnham et al., 2008). Fiona 
Devine (2002) argues that this technique is particularly significant where explanation 
entails describing and acknowledging state and non-state actors as conscious and social 
human entities. By shedding light on the critical issues surrounding security and trade in 
East Asia, these discussions are able to highlight not only the congruence but also the 
discrepancy between government rhetoric and action, on the one hand; and state and 
non-state perceptions, on the other.  
 Finally, to assist the elite interviewing technique I also systematically analyse 
available documents – primary, secondary, and tertiary – related to the research.15 The 
most important primary sources examined here are official documents pertaining to the 
national security policies and free trade agreements of the four countries under 
investigation. In addition, secondary sources such as official government publications 
including bills, treaties, reports, and studies from various departments, committees, and 
commissions are also reviewed and consulted. They are scrutinised in conjunction with 
the security and trade documents, reports, and papers published by concerned regional 
(ASEAN, APEC) and multilateral (WTO, several branches of the United Nations) 
organisations and institutions. Lastly, tertiary sources are also surveyed and studied 
including books, academic journal articles, and theses focusing on the security and trade 
issues of East Asian countries (particularly with respect to Taiwan, Singapore, the 
Philippines, and Malaysia). 
 
1.5 RESEARCH SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS 
When investigating twenty-first century East Asian security-trade linkages, I focus on 
periphery and semi-periphery countries located in Southeast and Northeast Asia. The 
reason is that although security-trade linking is commonly identified as the superpowers’ 
strategy for extracting vital politico-strategic concessions from their respective targets, 
this study argues that small powers are also utilising these linkages to inform, constrain, 
and transform these countries’ behaviours and the wider context in which they are 
situated. This classification draws mainly from Immanuel Wallerstein’s (1974) world-
                                                 
15 
Burnham et al. (2008: 165) provides a system of classification for documentary materials: primary, 
secondary and tertiary. Primary sources consist only of evidence that was actually part of or produced 
by the event in question. Secondary sources comprise other evidence relating to and produced soon 
after the event. Finally, tertiary sources refer to materials written afterward to reconstruct the event. 
See also Lichtman and French’s (1978) Historians and the Living Past. 
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systems theory and has been developed further by other scholars such as Christopher 
Chase-Dunn, Yukio Kawano, and Benjamin Brewer’s (2000) research on waves of 
integration in the global system since the year 1975.16  
 One the most salient structures of the present world-system is the power 
hierarchy existing between the core and the periphery, where powerful and wealthy core 
societies tend to dominate and exploit weak and  poor, peripheral societies (Wallerstein 
1974; Chase-Dunn and Hall, 1997; Chase-Dunn et al. 2000). Acting as a buffer between 
these two groups are the industrialising and mostly capitalist semi-periphery countries.  
These countries have both core and peripheral organisational characteristics and are 
usually located between either core and peripheral regions, or two or more competing 
core regions (Chase-Dunn and Hall, 1997). According to the studies of these scholars, 
Taiwan and Singapore are classified as semi-periphery states, while Malaysia and the 
Philippines are categorised as periphery states (Table 1.1).  
 Moreover, I focus on one specific security referent for each of the four cases 
studied, based on the prevailing context present in these countries. By carefully analysing 
their respective national security policies and strategies, the study can determine their 
primary referents along with the main issues that directly or indirectly threaten them. In 
this way, I am able to thoroughly investigate how the process of security-trade linking 
affects the primary security referents and interests of small countries in East Asia, and 
conversely, how these primary security referents and interests influence the facilitations 
and outcomes of various free trade activities and agreements.  
 Table 1.2 provides a summary of the primary security referents, contexts, origins, 
directions, and dimensions of insecurity explored and analysed in each of the four 
countries. In the case of Taiwan, the primary security referent investigated is its shrinking 
de facto sovereign space against a backdrop of cross-strait security dilemmas engendered 
by the One China factor. The term “sovereign space” refers to Taiwan’s de facto 
domestic and interdependence sovereignty, as opposed to de jure international legal 
sovereignty, which represents the statist dimension of cohabitative security. Hence, the 
source of Taiwan’s insecurity is external – that is, China. 
 
                                                 
16 
Wallerstein (1974: 437) defines the world system as ‘… a social system, one that has boundaries, 
structures, member groups, rules of legitimation, and coherence. Its life is made up of conflicting 
forces, which hold it together by tension and tear it apart as each group seeks eternally to remould it 
to its advantage. It has the characteristics of an organism, in that is has a lifespan over which its 
characteristics change in some respects and remain stable in others … Life within it is largely self-
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  In the case of Singapore, the primary security referent is its shrinking defence 
space against the backdrop of a multidimensional security complex induced by 
geographic constraints. The term “defence space” refers to Singapore’s capacity, both 
military (hard power) and non-military (soft power) to defend its geo-economic and geo-
political viability, which also represents the statist dimension of cohabitative security. 
Hence, similar to Taiwan, the source of Singapore’s insecurity is external – that is, the 
Asia-Pacific. In the cases of Taiwan and Singapore, security-trade linkages are “statist” 
given the nature of their primary security referents, contexts, origins, and sources of 
threat. 
  Meanwhile, in the case of the Philippines, the primary security referent 
investigated is its diminishing development space against the backdrop of uneven 
economic development perpetuated by oligarchic forces. The term “development space” 
refers to the capacity of the Philippines government to independently and effectively 
pursue its economic development goals and objectives amid a deeply entrenched 
oligarchic system of patronage culture, which also represents the humanist dimension of 
cohabitative security. Hence, the source of the Philippines’ insecurity is internal rather 
than external – that is, the Filipino oligarchy.  
 Finally, in the case of Malaysia, the primary security referent is its diminishing 
diversity space against the backdrop of a one-sided domestic security dilemma generated 
by a Malay-centric political economy run and maintained by the ruling United Malays 
National Organisation (UMNO) party and the larger Barisan Nasional (BN) coalition. The 
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Based on the author’s analysis.  
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term “diversity space” refers to the capacity of all ethnic groups in Malaysia to participate 
freely in the country’s political and economic affairs, and thus represents the humanist 
dimension of cohabitative security. Hence, similar to the Philippines, the source of 
Malaysia’s insecurity is internal – that is, the perpetually ruling party regime. In the cases 
of the Philippines and Malaysia, security-trade linkages are humanist given the nature of 
their primary security referents, contexts, origins, and sources of threat. 
 Such classifications, however, do not imply that Taiwan and Singapore are 
exclusively concerned with the state-centric dimension of cohabitative security, nor do 
they suggest that the Philippines and Malaysia are entirely concerned with the human-
centric dimension. As posited in Section 1.3, these two dimensions are mutually 
constitutive and reinforcing, and therefore are crucial for the overall stability and security 
of all four countries. However, given their prevailing security contexts, Singapore and 
Taiwan tend to focus more on state-centric security while the Philippines and Malaysia 
tend to put more emphasis on human-centric security. Nevertheless, the human security 
dimension of Taiwan and Singapore, as well as the state security dimension of the 
Philippines and Malaysia are also given attention whenever necessary. Of course, these 
contexts, evolve over time and any one researcher will identify a different context within 
which the security-trade linking process in each of the four cases can be analysed, 
depending on their point of view. 
 Finally, the security-trade linking process cannot be complete without 
considering various forms of free trade activities. Several scholars and experts have 
attempted to classify these under three categories: preferential trade agreement or PTA; 
free trade agreement or FTA; and economic partnership agreement or EPA. Under PTA, 
contracting parties grant trade concessions to one another without completely liberalising 
trade. That is, tariffs are reduced, but are not entirely abolished.18 Signatories to an FTA 
agree to reduce substantially various trade restrictions such as tariffs, import quotas, and 
other forms of preference on most, if not all, goods and services traded between them.19 
Lastly, an EPA moves significantly beyond the traditional liberalisation of trade in goods 
and services. These are asymmetrical trade agreements designed to promote sustainable 
economic and social development in a way that also supports the successful integration 
                                                 
18 
For a more detailed and comprehensive definition of preferential trade agreements, see Bagwell 
and Mavroidis’ (2011) Preferential Trade Agreements: A Law and Economics Analysis; Chauffour and 
Maur’s (2011) Preferential Trade Agreement Policies for Development: A Handbook.  
19 
For a more detailed and comprehensive definition of regional trade agreements, see Harvie’s (2008) 
Regional Trade Agreements In Asia; Kawai and Wignaraja’s (2011) Asia's Free Trade Agreement: How 
Is Business Responding?;  Hicks and Kim’s (2012) ‘Reciprocal Trade Agreements in Asia.’ 
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of developing and least-developed trading partners into the global economy.20 Hence, an 
EPA is relatively more comprehensive than the PTA and FTA as it is not only limited to 
tariff reduction mechanisms, but also covers a number of non-traditional trade issues 
such as the elimination of restrictions on foreign investments; incorporation of a dispute 
settlement mechanism; and the protection of intellectual property rights.21 
 As shown in Figure 1.9, security-trade linking can be carried out at different 
levels – multilateral, minilateral, and bilateral. Multilateral trade pertains to the WTO 
agreements conceived from the 1986-94 Uruguay Round negotiations on the initiative of 
WTO-member countries and signed at the Marrakesh ministerial meeting in April 1994.22 
In January of the following year, the WTO replaced the GATT, which had been in 
existence since 1947, as the chief governing body directing the overall conduct of the 
multilateral trade system.23 The states that signed the GATT were referred to as “GATT 
contracting parties.”24 Upon signing, ratification, and enforcement of the new WTO 
agreements – which incorporates an updated version of GATT known as GATT 1994 – 
they officially became “WTO members.”25 
 The objectives of establishing the WTO go beyond the institutionalisation of a 
new and more comprehensive international trade regulation system. It was also created 
to serve as an indispensable multilateral platform, enabling greater efficacy and coherence 
in the formulation of global economic policies. This would be achieved by building 
closer relations with key international financial institutions such as the IMF and the 
World Bank, and other global regulatory bodies including the World Intellectual Property 
Organization (WIPO), International Telecommunications Union (ITU), and the 
International Organization of Standards (IOS).26 As such, the WTO resembles a “central 
intelligence unit” that is responsible for the creation of a strongly consolidated and 
significantly broadened regulatory framework designed to carry out three main functions. 
                                                 
20 
For a more detailed and comprehensive definition of economic partnership agreements, see 
Brenton et al. (2008) Economic Partnership Agreements And The Export Competitiveness Of Africa; 
Curran et al. (2008) ‘The Economic Partnership Agreements: Rationale, Misperceptions and Non-
Trade Aspects’; Meyn’s (2008) ‘Economic Partnership Agreements: A ‘historic step’ towards a 
‘partnership of equals’?’; and Patton’s (2011) ‘Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreements.’  
21
 Ibid.  
22
 See the WTO’s official website, available online at http://www.wto.org/.
    
23
 For more information about the history of the GATT, see 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/whatis_e.htm.  
24 
To view a full list of WTO members and date of accession, see 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm.  
25 
To view the official WTO documents, see http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/res_e.htm.  
26
 For more information about the WTO’s linkages with other multilateral institutions and 
organisations, see http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/coher_e/coher_e.htm.  
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These are: (i) to create and enforce a series of legal agreements covering trade in goods 
and services as well as trade-related intellectual property rights issues; (ii) to secure and 
manage resources required for the facilitation of litigation procedures concerning trade 
disputes arising between contracting parties; and; (iii) to provide and maintain a 
permanent forum which can be used as a vehicle toward further liberalisation (Dunning, 
2000; Bhagwati, 2001; Wilkinson, 2002; Wolfe, 2004; Steger, 2007; Jackson, 2008). 
 Over the years, however, regional trade has steadily increased in volume since the 
early 1990s. As of June 2014, 585 notifications of RTAs (regional trade agreements) – 
counting goods, services, and accessions separately – had been received by the WTO.  
Of these, 379 were in force.27 These RTAs are reciprocal trade agreements between two 
(bilateral) or more partners (minilateral/plurilateral). The so-called “rush for RTAs” has 
been widely observed all throughout the Asian region as the network of trade agreements 
outside the auspices of the WTO continuously expands (Hamilton-Hart, 2003; Dent, 
2006; Jackson, 2014). More and more countries are now starting to acknowledge the 
importance of establishing RTAs when facilitating wider and deeper economic 
integration within their respective regions. Meanwhile, experts and policymakers from 
various Asian states have begun to consider the “noodle bowl” composition of various 
RTA schemes. These are propelled by the active economic engagement of some of the 
biggest and most powerful trade players in the region including China, Japan, India, and 
South Korea as well as Australia and New Zealand (Hicks & Kim, 2012: 1-3).   
 In terms of the actor scope and geographical distribution of FTAs in the Asian 
region, Vinod Aggarwal and Seungjoo Lee (2011: 4-6) identify five different types of 
international economic arrangements. These are: (i) bilateral regionalism; (ii) bilateral 
trans regionalism; (iii) minilateral regionalism; (iv) minilateral interregional/trans regional; 
and (v) global arrangements.28 Bilateral regionalism refers to geographically concentrated 
agreements between a pair of adjacent countries that share profound historic and cultural 
relationships, as well as complementary industrial structures. 29 Bilateral trans regionalism 
                                                 
27




 Another version of these classifications can also be found in Vinod and Govella’s (2013) ‘The Trade-
Security Nexus in Asia-Pacific.’ Here, typology of trade agreements has been presented: unilateral, 
bilateral transregional, minilateral regionalism, minilateral interregionalism and multilateralism.  
29 
Examples of these are Canada-US FTA (CUSFTA, 1989); Mainland China Closer Economic Partnership 
Arrangement (MCCEPA, 2003) with Hong Kong and Macau; India-Sri Lanka Free Trade Agreement 
(ISLFTA, 2001); and the People's Republic of China-Taipei, China Economic Cooperation Framework 
Agreement  (ECFA, 2010). To some extent, both Republic of Korea-Singapore Free Trade Agreement 
(KSFTA, 2006); and Japan-Philippines Economic Partnership Agreement (JPEPA, 2008) may be 
classified under this category.  
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pertains to agreements between two contracting parties geographically dispersed from 
one another.30 Minilateral regionalism consists of several geographically interconnected 
countries implementing a trade agreement or an expanded bilateral regionalism.31 Trans 
regional or interregional trade arrangements include a limited number of geographically 
dispersed actors or minilateral arrangements that transcend physical regional borders.32 
Finally, global arrangements refer to broad-based multilateral agreements in the form of 
the WTO (1995) and its predecessor, GATT (1947). 
 However, the problematic nature of the term “regionalism” needs to be 
underlined. For instance, Aggarwal and Govella (2013) argue that the term is quite 
subjective since distance is clearly not the only important factor when determining the 
constitution of a geographic region. In spite of the huge volume of literature pertaining 
to regionalism, the term remains highly contested, thus highlighting its inherent 
conceptual ambiguity (Katzenstein, 1997; Mansfield & Milner, 1999; Aggarwal & 
Fogarty, 2004). Moreover, the term “interregionalism” also needs further delineation. 
The common practice among scholars and analysts is to lump their assessment of 
minilateral regional agreements (for example AFTA, NAFTA, and the EU) with those of 
minilateral interregional/trans regional accords (for example EU-Mercosur), despite the 
differences between causal factors driving each one of them (Aggarwal & Govella, 2013).  
Nevertheless, the term can be broken down into more specific types: purely 
interregional; hybrid interregionalism; and trans regionalism.33 These subdivisions are 
“based on the prevalence of PTAs and/or customs unions as constitutive units within 
interregional agreements” (Aggarwal & Govella, 2013: 8).  
 
                                                 
30
 Examples of these are, the United States-Israel Free Trade Agreement (USIFTA, 1985); United 
States-Jordan Free Trade Agreement (USJFTA, 2001); Taipei, China and Panama Free Trade Agreement 
(TPFTA, 2004); Japan-Switzerland Economic Partnership Agreement  (JSEPA, 2009); Singapore-Peru 
Free Trade Agreement (SPFTA, 2009); Republic of Korea-United States Free Trade Agreement 
(KUSFTA, 2012); Malaysia-Chile Free Trade Agreement  (MCFTA, 2012).  
31 
Examples of these are, the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA, 1993); North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA, 1994); Shanghai Cooperation Organization Free Trade Agreement (SCOFTA, 
proposed).  
32 
Examples of these are, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC, 1989); ASEAN Plus Three 
Cooperation (APT, 1997); East Asia Free Trade Area (ASEAN+3, proposed); Comprehensive Economic 
Partnership for East Asia (CEPEA/ASEAN+6, proposed).
  
33 
Based on Aggarwal and Govella’s (2012) analysis, an agreement is said to be ‘purely interregional’ 
when it formally links free trade areas or customs unions (e.g. EU-Mercosur). ‘Hybrid 
interregionalism’ takes place when a customs union negotiates with countries in various regions, but 
not with a customs union or free trade agreement (e.g. the Lomé Agreement). Lastly, 
‘transregionalism’ refers to agreement that links countries across two regions where neither of the 
two negotiates as a grouping (e.g. APEC). See also Aggarwal and Fogarty’s (2004) EU Trade Strategies 
Regionalism and Globalism.  
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1.6 PLAN OF THE THESIS 
In Chapter 1, I have provided an overview of the present research by discussing the 
context underpinning it and identifying the key theoretical and empirical gaps that I seek 
to address. I have also laid down my main research questions and objectives to highlight 
both the significance of, and rationale for, the study. Moreover, I have presented the 
main conceptual and theoretical tools that are used when exploring and explaining 
twenty-first century East Asian security-trade linkages with a particular emphasis on the 
experiences of periphery and semi-periphery countries. The research design is also 
presented along with methodologies and techniques employed to meet the primary 
research objectives successfully. Finally, I have detailed the study’s scope and limitations 
as well as defined key terms used throughout the research.   
 In Chapter 2, I offer a two-pronged review of the literature on security studies 
and free trade. The main objective here is to thoroughly flesh out the two main strands 
of the study – security and trade – by exploring already existing theories, the relationships 
among them, and the ways in which these theories have been examined. These two 
distinct yet deeply entwined fields of research are linked together in the process, thus 
highlighting the points where security interests and free trade objectives converge. This 
two-part chapter builds on the initial theoretical and empirical discussions on security 
and free trade provided in Chapter 1.  
 In Chapter 3, I present an overview of the security-trade linking process that is 
shaping East Asia’s geo-political and geo-economic landscapes. Here, I focus on the 
collective experience of East Asian countries through their membership in the two most 
important institutions in the region, namely APEC and ASEAN. I evaluate some of the 
key factors that have influenced and continue to influence the progression of security-
trade linking process in East Asia. Illustrative cases highlight the dimensions of 
cohabitative security that are being “co-habited” within APEC and ASEAN’s free trade 
activities and, therefore, drive the development of these FTAs. In addition, I investigate 
the critical problems encountered when linking contested security issues, specifically at 
bilateral and minilateral levels.  
 After providing an overview of regional East Asian security-trade linkages, I 
proceed to an analysis of individual case studies. These cases form two groups: statist 
security-trade linkages manifest in the experiences of Taiwan and Singapore; and 
humanist security-trade linkages understood in terms of Malaysia and the Philippines. 
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 In Chapter 4, I investigate the statist security-trade linking process in Taiwan.  I 
explain the process through which Taiwan utilises free trade when enhancing its 
shrinking de facto sovereignty against a backdrop of the ubiquitous “China factor.” 
Conversely, I also explore how domestic interests over this particular security referent 
have influenced the creation and utility of Taiwan’s twenty-first century free trade 
agreements. On the one hand, I argue that China’s “sinicisation” project creates a 
scenario where an increasing cross-strait stability ironically leads to a decreasing de facto 
sovereignty over Taiwan. Alternatively, I posit that such linkages induce a scenario akin 
to the prisoner’s dilemma that compels Taiwanese political parties to preserve the 
Chinese-dominated cross-strait status quo by adopting a parallel, watered-down approach 
to sensitive political issues, particularly with respect to Taiwan’s sovereignty status. 
Hence, Taiwanese leaders and policymakers are forced to preserve the island’s quasi-
independent statehood because of fears that they may lose their remaining de facto 
autonomy over domestic and foreign affairs. Put differently, Taiwan chooses to be “de 
facto free” by remaining “de jure unfree.” Taiwan’s de facto sovereign space, therefore, 
becomes a pivotal referent of its national security policies and strategies. This act of 
balancing between the two paradoxical interests of enhancing sovereignty and 
maintaining the Chinese-dominated cross-strait status quo, underlines the relentless 
games, changes, and fears that Taiwan confronts today.  
 In Chapter 5, I examine the statist security-trade linking process in Singapore. I 
explain the process through which Singapore utilises free trade to enhance its shrinking 
defence space against the backdrop of a multidimensional security complex induced by 
numerous geographic constraints. Conversely, I also explore how domestic interests over 
this particular security referent influence the creation and utility of Singapore’s twenty-
first century free trade agreements. I argue that Singapore’s geo-political identity as a 
modern city-state has compelled the government to adopt a comprehensive security 
strategy that highlights the central role of free trade to enhance its defence space amid 
strategic insecurities. The country’s rude awakening to independence has led to the 
creation of one of the most important and strategic entrepôts in the Asia-Pacific. 
Singapore’s scarce territorial lands and natural resources combined with huge per capita 
income, high population density, and sensitive racial mix, makes the island the 
quintessential pragmatic trading state. Here, I analyse the dynamics with which Singapore 
has embedded itself at the heart of the global trade system by exploiting free trade 
agreements that underpin its geo-political viability. In addition, I also assess Singapore’s 
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military (“hard power”) and non-military (“soft power”) capacities for developmentalism 
amid its insecurities.  Given the vulnerability fetish and siege mentality confronting both 
its leaders and citizens, the county’s pursuit of economic prosperity via free trade has 
been replete with security undertones.  
 In Chapter 6, I assess the Philippines’ humanist security-trade linking process. I 
explain the process through which the Philippines utilises free trade to enhance its 
shrinking development space against the backdrop of a deeply entrenched oligarchic 
system. Conversely, I also explore how domestic interests over this particular security 
referent influence the creation and utility of the Philippines’ twenty-first century free 
trade agreements. I argue that the country’s development riddle continues to undermine 
the government’s so-called human-oriented national security policies and strategies that 
underline the goal of securing democracy not only for the state, but more importantly, 
for individuals and societies. On the one hand, I analyse major threats to the country’s 
national security, which are primarily rooted in economic underdevelopment rather than 
state-centric military conflicts. On the other hand, I examine how various types of free 
trade activities have been utilised by the government in its attempt to secure the 
country’s continued economic development. Despite the government’s all-inclusive 
national security rhetoric that emphasises inclusive and equitable development, its 
security blueprint has intrinsic limitations that undermine this goal. These limits have 
significantly contributed to the country’s lacklustre experience with free trade and, 
largely, highlighted the multiple failures of the Filipino political economy.  
 In Chapter 7, I assess the humanist security-trade linking process in Malaysia. I 
explain the process through which Malaysia utilises free trade to enhance its shrinking 
diversity space against the backdrop of a bumiputra-centric political economy run and 
administered by the perpetually ruling Barisan Nasional (BN) coalition. Conversely, I also 
explore how domestic interests over this particular security referent influence the 
creation and utility of Malaysia’s twenty-first century free trade agreements.  I argue that 
rather than equal political and economic opportunities for all Malaysian ethnic groups, 
the country’s ruling political party as distinct from the coalition has utilised neoliberal 
economic policies, particularly those pertaining to free trade, when securing its 
supremacy by promoting and maintaining a Malay-dominated status quo. In doing so, I 
critically examine the impacts of deeply entrenched Malay-oriented affirmative action 
policies on Malaysia’s diversity space. On the one hand, I analyse Malaysia’s conduct of 
free trade when securing its contracting diversity space under such circumstance. On the 
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other, I explain why Malaysia continues to preserve its ethnic-based affirmative policies 
despite their political limitations and economic inefficiencies. Although affirmative action 
policies are not necessarily a zero-sum policy, nevertheless Malaysia’s experience with 
these has generated a one-sided security dilemma. That is, improvements in political, 
economic, and social security of non-bumiputras, have regrettably led to the heightened 
political, economic, and social insecurities of the bumiputras. 
 Finally, in Chapter 8, I summarise key results generated by the research and draw 
the thesis to its logical conclusion. I will review the key theoretical, conceptual, and 
methodological arguments presented in this study and present an analytical summary of 
the empirical results and findings generated from case studies to answer my main 
research questions. Furthermore, I will outline general outcomes in the light of specific 
inferences from case investigations and conclude with a reflection on key points and 
outlooks regarding the present problems and future prospects for East Asian linkages. In 
addition, drawing from limitations encountered in the thesis, I will provide some 
recommendations with the aim of furthering an understanding of the security-trade 
nexus both in Asia and the rest of the world. Lastly, I offer some final words about the 






















RETHINKING SECURITY AND RE-IMAGINING FREE TRADE 
 
OVERVIEW 
In this Chapter, I present a two-pronged review of the literature on security studies, and 
free trade. The main objective is to connect these two distinct yet deeply entwined fields 
of research by explicitly highlighting the nodes where security interests and free trade 
activities converge. By establishing already existing theories, the relationships among 
them, and the degree with which these theories have been examined, the two main 
strands of the current research – security and trade – can be thoroughly fleshed out. 
Together, the reviews on security and trade literature present a map of the research 
landscape and put into context the research gaps, questions, and objectives discussed in 
Chapter 1. 
 The review of security literature in Section 2.1 explores the main problems 
encountered when rethinking security. Here, I examine three important debates that 
shape the national security rhetoric and agenda of different states: security referents, 
security scope, and security approaches. A thorough investigation of these debates 
provides preliminary understandings of: (i) how states define security in the twenty-first 
century; (ii) the factors that have led to the reconceptualization of security; and (iii), how 
the evolution of security thinking influences the identification of the core security 
elements and threats.  
 I argue that the primary referents of security are multidimensional and 
multidirectional as they vary depending on the existing politico-economic and 
sociocultural contexts as well as on the level of analysis. At the regional level, the security 
concept vis-à-vis referent is being “homogenised” due to similarities in external factors 
that threaten regional security. At the domestic level, the security concept vis-à-vis 
referent can vary from one state to another depending on a number of pre-existing 
internal conditions such as differences with respect to regime type, level of economic 
development, as well as sociocultural values and expressions.  Accordingly, the scope of 
security has to be prudently broadened to prevent the complete erosion of its theoretical 
utility and empirical value. Nevertheless, survival is the ultimate goal for all security 
referents. This implies that the pursuit of security simultaneously requires competition, 
cooperation, and community building. 
 Meanwhile, the review of free trade literature in Section 2.2 explores some of the 
issues related to the configuration and conduct of free trade both at global and domestic 
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levels. Here I present a two-tiered debate that helps explain the continued relevance of 
free trade in the twenty-first century:  first, between realism and liberalism; and second, 
between economists and political scientists. An in-depth assessment of these debates 
offers initial understandings of: (i) why and how states link their security interests with 
their free trade activities; (ii) the main motives and rationales behind these linkages; and 
(iii) their relative effectiveness in promoting, enhancing, and securing their desired 
outcomes via the security-trade linking strategy.   
 I argue that beyond the traditional economic imperatives driving free trade are 
strategic security considerations that have serious implications for the global, regional 
and domestic configurations of political, economic, and strategic powers. Accordingly, 
countries continue to trade in the twenty-first century for two main reasons – economic 
motives and politico-strategic motives. These two motives are not mutually exclusive but 
are mutually reinforcing. On the one hand, the liberal thesis refocuses the attention of 
the states to the economic benefits of multilateral trade where people-centric interests 
trump state-centric interests. On the other hand, the realist thesis underscores the 
inescapable linkages between security and preferential trade where state-centric security 
interests subjugate all other forms of interests. 
 
2.1 RETHINKING SECURITY: REVIEW OF SECURITY LITERATURE 
In Section 2.1.A, I present the debate with respect to the primary referents of security – 
between traditional, state-centric security and non-traditional, people-centric security.  In 
Section 2.1.B, I discuss the debate with respect to the scope of security – between a 
comprehensive and a limited definition of security. In Section 2.1.C, I analyse the debate 
with respect to the types of strategic approaches to security – between competitive and 
cooperative approaches. Finally, in Section 2.1.D, I summarize the main arguments 
presented in the review of security literature and draw some conclusions based on my 
findings. The results from these discussions are pivotal to the study’s main research 
questions (specifically the third and fourth strands) that address the changing definition 
and nature of East Asian security in the twenty-first century.  
 
2.1.A PRIMARY REFERENTS OF SECURITY 
 
Traditional, state-centric security 
Security remains as one of the most highly contested concepts in international politics in 
the twenty-first century. The overarching security debate revolves around four key 
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dimensions: the primary referent objects (PROs) of security; the configuration of core 
security values and elements; the forms of security threats; and the types of strategic 
approaches to security. These conflicting interpretations of the security definition 
underline the absence of a collective understanding among scholars and policymakers. 
Therefore, rethinking the malleable concept of security has, therefore, become a central 
feature of the security debate. The debate has gravitated toward discussions between 
those who believe that the security definition must be comprehensive (“expansionists”) 
and those who argue that the security definition has to be limited (“non-
expansionists”).34 Several critics, however, argue that such method is largely inadequate as 
it only addresses the scope of the security concept while completely sidestepping the 
disputes concerning the primary referents of and strategic approaches to security.35 Given 
the centrality of the primary referents when determining the core values, nature of 
threats and the types of strategic approaches with respect to a particular security 
configuration, any initiative that aims to rethink security must start with the referent 
objects.  
 Realists argue that for as long as the state remains the primary form of political 
community and the principal actor in both the domestic and global realms, it will be the 
chief provider and agent of security (Waltz, 1979; Gilpin and Gilpin, 1987; Alagappa, 
1998; Krasner, 1999; Mearsheimer, 2001; Donelly, 2005). The state is the primary 
referent object of security when one considers the role of the state as the leading security 
guarantor, on the one hand; and the state system as the main determinant of state 
behaviour, on the other.  
 Within the internal domain, the state dictates and defends the rights, freedoms, 
properties and the very existence of individuals and societies through the construction of 
political, economic and social systems (Skocpol, 1979; Rosecrance, 1986; Berdal and 
Zaum, 2013). Within the external domain, the state guards the privileges and liberties of 
people from the imprudent actions of other states and non-state entities (Bull, 1979; Cox, 
1981; Waltz, 2001). In fact, even some of the more oppressive and inefficient 
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governments in the world provide ample security for the lives and possessions of their 
citizens (Devetak, 1995; Alagappa, 1998). In addition, the state plays a pivotal role in the 
formation of national identity and the creation of social welfare that is becoming more 
important amid intensifying cross-border relations (Reus-Smit, 1999; Rae, 2002; 
Guibernau, 2007). In the words of Muthiah Alagappa (1998: 29-30): “The sovereign state 
is deemed to separate the inside from outside, order from struggle, and us from them. In 
essence, it represents an in group with a defined territory and ultimate authority.”  
 Thus, insofar as the realists view the international system as anarchic, they 
likewise treat security as the overriding concern.36 Sovereign states attempt to amass 
much greater power and engage in power-balancing to deter potential rivals, and to 
enhance their relative security. Without an overarching authority to regulate state 
conducts and behaviours, moral aspirations are conveniently thwarted. Wars are 
launched and fought to prevent competing nations from achieving higher levels of 
security; according to the logic of security dilemma, the security measures taken by one 
state must be perceived by another state as a threat to its own security (Jervis, 1978; 
Collins, 1997; Glaser, 1997; Herz, 2003; Booth and Wheeler, 2007; Schweller, 2010). The 
paramount nature of strategic power and security in an insecure world supersedes the 
normative goals and ethical pursuits of states, irrespective of their domestic political 
complexions (Burchill, 2005; Montgomery, 2006).  
 However, these realist claims about the primacy of the state in domestic and 
international politics, and the “rightful” referent object of security, face several 
challenges. The first criticism points to the constantly diminishing capacity of the state 
for fulfilling some of its key functions including the provision of national security, 
welfare, identity and environment (Mitchell, 1991; Alagappa, 1998; Guéhenno, 2000; 
Rotberg, 2003). The state is either too big or too small to satisfy basic human needs and 
efficiently address immense regional and global threats. In terms of physical security, the 
state is hardly the most effective guarantor of external defence given the wherewithal of 
nuclear deterrence strategy for systematically obliterating the individuals and societies 
that it aims to protect.37  
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 In terms of economic welfare, the emergence of highly integrated global markets, 
reinforced by multinational and transnational networks, has substantially reduced the 
state’s autonomy over domestic economic policies and strategies.38 In terms of identity, a 
state-configured “national identity” undermines the multi-layered and intersecting 
identities of individuals and groups, on the one hand; and suppresses the growth of 
unique regional and local characters, on the other.39 Finally, in terms of the environment, 
the most pressing ecological threats today – from climate change to global warming; 
deforestation to declining biodiversity; water degradation to land rush; ocean system 
collapse to habitat loss; increased pollution to unsustainable human populations – cannot 
be effectively tackled at the state level given their significant range.  
 In short, the state now has to share some of its power and authority with other 
agents (Alaggapa, 1998; Arts et al., 2001; Milner and Moravcsik, 2009). However, in 
doing so, the state continues to lose some of its former relevance in international polity, 
although it this does not mean that the state is becoming an obsolete concept. 
Nevertheless, the fact that various non-state actors are now playing significant roles in 
“borderless” political, economic, social and environmental issues is an indication of the 
gradual devolution of state power in the twenty-first century. 
 The second criticism relates to the paradoxical role of the state as a progenitor of 
insecurity, rather than a security provider (Alagappa, 1998; Rotberg, 2003; Paul, 2010). 
This makes non-state actors innately antagonistic and hostile toward state actors. On the 
one hand, classical liberalism portrays the government as a necessary evil that must be 
strictly controlled and regulated; and on the other hand, traditional Marxism depicts the 
government as a mere proxy for the vicious ruling class.40 Both accounts view civil 
society as the source of earnest virtues while the state is considered the root of all 
irrational and detrimental conflicts.  
 Governments attempting to impose a state-sponsored identity and legitimise an 
arrangement that favours a certain elite group at the expense of the majority, adopt a 
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“national” security ideology that justifies their oppressive policy instruments (Adamson 
and Demetriou, 2007; Blum, 2007; Adams, 2010; Chong, 2010). Thus in some instances, 
the state reinforces the insecurities and vulnerabilities felt by the marginalised groups in 
the society, rather than improving their sense of security (Alagappa, 1998; Rotberg, 2003; 
Paul, 2010). To this extent, the concept of national security becomes an instrument for 
curtailing individual and societal security. Therefore, identifying the “correct” referent 
object(s) of security becomes problematic and contentious amid competing and often 
irreconcilable interests that demand urgent actions.  
 The third criticism asserts that the state should not be viewed as an end goal in 
itself. On the contrary, the state is an apparatus designed to secure the life and freedom 
of the people and ensure their socioeconomic welfare. Accordingly, the primary goal of 
national security should be the protection not of the state, but of the individuals, groups 
and societies constituting it (Alkire, 2003; McFarlane and Khong, 2006; den Boer and de 
Wilde, 2008). This implies that the primary referent object of national security policies 
and strategies must be people-centric, rather than state-centric, particularly in cases that 
contest the legitimacy (or the lack thereof) of the state, government or regime. In the 
absence of people’s consent and support, political institutions lose their legitimacy 
(UNDP, 1994; Alagappa, 1998; OECD, 2010; Silva, 2014). Likewise, without individuals 
and communities occupying and claiming a piece of land, a territory loses its worth and 
meaning (UNDP, 1994; Alagappa, 1998; OECD, 2010; Silva, 2014).  
 Imminent threats become relevant only when they pose tangible risks to the 
people and their means of support. In short, security is essentially about human beings 
(UNDP, 1994). However, because of the presence of systemic constraints induced by 
deeply embedded political constructs, the space of people in the security rhetoric and 
agenda is undermined. Humans become one of the sub-elements of the state along with 
sovereignty, territory and government. In some cases, this leads to the deliberate sacrifice 
of people and societies in the name of national interests. 
 
Non-traditional, people-centric security 
These three criticisms infer that the most fundamental weakness of a state-centric 
security concept relates to what it excludes as a security problem. Hence, identifying 
which among the laundry list of issues is framed as “security threat” becomes highly 
politicised and controversial as it determines which segments of the population either 
survive or perish. Since the inception of the United Nations in 1945, the organisation has 
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advocated for the equal treatment of state-centric and people-centric security. This 
aspiration was articulated in a report submitted by then US Secretary of State Edward 
Stettinius, Jr. to the White House (cited in Smith, 2005: 40-41): 
 
The battle of peace has to be fought on two fronts. The first is the security front where 
victory spells freedom from fear. The second is the economic and social front where victory 
means freedom from want. Only victory on both fronts can assure the world of an enduring 
peace. No provisions that can be written into the Charter will enable the Security Council to 
make the world secure from war if men and women have no security in their homes and 
their jobs. 
 
 The first major advancement in the human security agenda has finally come into 
view with the release of 1994 Human Development Report (HDR) published by the 
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), which stated that:  
 
The concept of security has for too long been interpreted narrowly: as security of territory 
from external aggression, or as protection of national interests in foreign policy or a global 
security from the threat of nuclear holocaust, forgotten were the legitimate concerns of 
ordinary people who sought security in their lives. 
 
 Therefore, what the concept of human security attempts to change is the referent 
object of security (that, which is secured). The emphasis shifts from state security to the 
security of individuals and social communities where global civil society is increasingly 
becoming an important security agent. To some extent, human security represents an 
evolutionary thinking – a paradigm shift that goes beyond a states’ preoccupation with 
nuclear security (UNDP 1994).   
 The report tackled what the United Nations deemed as the two most 
fundamental forms of human freedoms – freedom from want and freedom from fear. 
The former refers to safety from chronic threats such as hunger, disease and repression, 
while the latter pertains to protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in patterns of 
daily life whether at homes, jobs and within communities. Recognising that such 
definition entails an endless list of threats – both real and imagined – to human security, 
the United Nations has identified seven key sectors that would comprise human security. 
These are: economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community and political 
security (UNDP, 1994: 24-25).  
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 Although this broad and all-encompassing definition may be acceptable for most 
human security advocates, nonetheless, it leads to conceptual and theoretical ambiguities 
that substantially diminish its analytical utility (Tadjbakhsh  and Chenoy, 2007; Frerks  
and Goldewijk, 2007; Goucha and Crowley, 2008; Kaldor et al., 2013). A focal point in 
the human security rhetoric is the equal treatment of all human interests and objectives in 
order to develop an inclusive and holistic security paradigm. Because of wide-ranging 
formulations and sweeping definitions of human security, establishing a hierarchy of 
priorities becomes extremely contentious.  
 Such form of security conceptualisation underlines two important problems 
commonly encountered when assigning individuals and societies as the primary referent 
objects of security. First, deciding which among the issues presented as threats can be 
ruled out poses difficulties for government leaders, policymakers, and even security 
specialists since it ultimately leads to questions of differing value systems.41 Second, 
highlighting the general disinterest of the UN towards providing ‘human security’ a more 
coherent and measurable operational definition, because the concept derives much of its 
strength and intellectual rigor from a holistic and inclusive conceptual approach.42  
 Evidently, a certain type of political organisation is still necessary even as the 
security concept gradually evolves to encompass people-centric security issues. The state 
remains the most vital instrument for facilitating political allegiance and affiliation despite 
its numerous faults and limitations (Alagappa, 1998; Ripsman and Paul, 2005, 2010). 
Moreover, the state maintains its position as the primary agent of security and welfare 
functions required in any society. Given its role as a vital medium that interlinks local, 
regional and global networks, the state remains an important fixture of the twenty-first 
century international system.  
 Indeed, the usefulness and significance of the state as a primary unit of political 
community has frequently been questioned yet, it remains largely relevant.  There seems 
to be a tacit cultural support that reinforces the principle and practice of sovereign 
statehood at a global level (Jackson and Rosberg, 1982; Alagappa 1998; Opello Jr. and 
Rosow, 2004; Rodrik, 2012). This is partly due to the observation that post-statist 
approaches to political organisation are neither well developed nor well grounded. 
Hence, the notion that fundamental systemic transformations must be initiated to 
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mitigate dangers associated with sovereignty does not seem to bode well for most actors 
in the international system.  Consequently, the state persists as the dominant actor in 
local and international spheres, and the primary form of organised political community. 
However, this does not imply that the state has become a perpetual element of 
international politics as the possibility of facing demise and substitution by another entity 
remains. Given its continued resilience amid intensifying regional and trans regional 
integration, the state will remain that most powerful political organisation in the 
immediate future (Taylor, 1991; Hoffman, 1992; Ruggie, 1993; Krasner, 1995; Alagappa, 
1998). 
 In other words, there seems to be no viable substitute for the state system even 
in the twenty-first century. Since the meaning and subtext of security are deeply linked to 
“historically specific forms of political community” (Alagappa, 1998: 33) and “because 
other forms of political community have been rendered unthinkable” (Walker, 1990: 5), 
“the understanding of security continues to involve primarily the concerns of state 
security” (Alagappa, 1998: 33). Nevertheless, it is important to emphasise that the 
enduring relevance of the state does not make it the sole referent object of security. The 
limitations and contested legitimacy of some states imply that government-defined 
security policies and strategies may be contradictory to the security interests of people 
and communities. Thus, national security cannot be reduced to state security.  
 Moreover, the magnitude and range of interstate differences with respect to 
power capabilities; style of self-governance; level of internal political cohesion; degree of 
monopoly over legitimate use of forces; and the ability to participate in regional and 
global activities, greatly affects the primary referents of security and origins of insecurity 
(Alagappa, 1998; Sahni, 2008; Wibben, 2011; Harada and Kimura, 2011; Watson, 2012). 
In short, there is no “one-size-fits-all” model for determining the primary referents of 
security across countries and the elements that must comprise them. Both the referents 
of security and sources of insecurity may diverge from one state to another. While 
remaining the most influential agent of political organisation, the state now has to exist 
alongside other focal international, regional and subnational entities that comprise an 
intricate web of authority and power (Alagappa, 1998; Sahni, 2008; Wibben, 2011; 
Harada and Kimura, 2011; Watson, 2012). Consequently, a host of all other units or 
objects present across these levels can become a primary referent of security aside from 
the state. The nexus of these varying security referents are contingent upon prevailing 
contexts. This is also true for the relative meanings, positions and importance of these 
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security referents. Over time, security referents may change and transform. Therefore, 
they are neither prearranged nor assumed but are constantly being re-thought, re-
imagined and re-examined.  
  
2.1.B SCOPE OF SECURITY  
 
Limited national security 
The debate with respect to the scope of security touches several components: whether or 
not security must be redefined to encompass “below-the-state” or people-centric 
dimensions of security; whether or not orthodox formulations of security based on state 
survival and military power remain appropriate; and whether or not non-traditional 
forms of threats are to be incorporated in the revised security agenda. In general, the 
realist thesis tends to overlook internal aspects of security despite the pervasiveness and 
magnitude of violence and aggression within the domestic sphere.43  
 In particular, the neorealist assumption underlines a unitary sovereign state that 
acts and behaves rationally. This is based on the argument that within the national 
domain, there is legitimate government that has absolute control over the legitimate use 
of violence (Waltz, 1979; Katzenstein, 1996; Chatterjee, 2003; Coicaud and Wheeler, 
2008). In contrast to an anarchic and self-help international realm, the domestic realm 
resembles stability and order. Thus, while international politics is portrayed in Hobbesian 
terms, domestic politics is characterised by law, authority and administration (Waltz, 
1979; Katzenstein, 1996; Chatterjee, 2003; Coicaud and Wheeler, 2008). Reconceiving 
that state as a unitary, cohesive and sovereign naturally precludes internal security issues 
(Alagappa, 1998).  
 Therefore, the dichotomous distinction between global and domestic politics 
needs to be rethought and should not be the main basis for security analysis. Rather than 
using the concept of sovereignty as an analytic assumption, some scholars have argued 
that it is best to view it as a point of reference or simply a convention (Milner, 1991; 
Wendt, 1992; Krasner, 1995; Alagappa, 1998). Therefore, the state cannot always be 
assumed cohesive and legitimate. Governments in some states do not always possess 
monopoly over the legitimate use of violence, in the same manner that the people 
residing within existing national borders do not always identify and connect with the 
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state. In such instances, rather than being the chief provider and agent of security, the 
state has paradoxically become the main culprit of insecurity.  
 Wide-ranging internal security issues pose significant threats to the governments 
of different countries. For instance, in the case of failed states the domestic sphere can 
be considered as anarchic as the international sphere (Hameiri, 2007; Patrick, 2011; Starr, 
2013). The security problems generated by these states – mass genocides; racial violence 
and ethnic cleansing; internal displacements forcing out refugees; vicious competitions 
for scarce resources – not only affect their citizens but also the broader regional 
communities. When violent domestic conflicts induce externalities that transcend 
national boundaries, the distinction between internal and external politics becomes 
blurry. Nevertheless, presumptions about the nature of the domestic realm – law, order 
and authority – and the state’s supposedly unitary character, erroneously exclude 
domestic issues that have considerable effects on communal, national and global security 
(Alagappa, 1998; Newman, 2001; Huysmans, 2002; Farrell, 2002).  
 
Comprehensive national security 
The realist construction of security has been challenged from different angles. The first 
set of counterarguments comes from the neoliberal thesis. In particular, neoliberal 
institutionalists argue that international institutions can substantially reduce the adverse 
effects of anarchy, as suggested by neorealism.44 Thus, political survival does not always 
have to be presented as a dangerous pursuit since a comparatively high level of global 
governance is achievable (Keohane, 1986). As Barry Buzan has noted (1993), the 
international society is a natural consequence of international relations within anarchy 
just as the balance of power is. To this extent, it is inferred that while interdependence – 
an equally important structural feature of the international system – has been severely 
neglected, anarchy has been grossly overstated (Milner, 1991; Alagappa, 1998).  
 At the core of commercial liberalism theory is the assumption that the 
intensification of free trade and economic interdependence is progressively transforming 
the nature of international politics by mitigating the destructive impacts of anarchy 
(Brown et al., 1995; Press-Barnathan, 2006, 2009; McDonald, 2009; Doyle 2011). Based 
on this context, trade vis-à-vis economic interdependence is viewed as a vehicle to peace.  
The growing interconnection between domestic economic welfare and global markets 
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diminishes the salience of sovereignty and territorial concerns. Although military security 
will remain a vital component, state behaviour will be influenced more by the demands 
of interdependence and less by the insecurity associated with anarchy. 
  Among Western countries, for example, war has increasingly become obsolete as 
leaders begin to realise both its irrationality and ineffectiveness as an instrument for 
enhancing national economic well-being. As posited by the democratic peace theory, the 
realm of democratic states is inherently peaceful since democracies do not engage 
in armed conflicts and wars with other identified democracies (Russett, 1993; Maoz and 
Russett, 1993; Owen, 1994; Doyle, 2011). Put differently, the relations among democratic 
states are relatively more peaceful than the interactions among the non-democratic 
countries, on the one hand, and between democracies and non-democracies, on the 
other.  
 It is the regime type rather than the material composition of the international 
system that determines the probability of war.45  There are two interrelated factors that 
underwrite this conjecture: first, the presence of powerful institutional constraints such 
as checks and balances, and weight of public opinion within a democratic system; and 
second, the implantability of democratic values and ideals such as cooperation, 
compromise and peaceful conflict resolution from the domestic to the international 
realm (Russett, 1993; Maoz and Russett, 1993; Owen, 1994; Doyle, 2011).  
 Therefore, the material structure has become a weak factor for explaining state 
behaviour. The deepening economic interdependence, spreading democratic norms and 
institutions, and the increasing cost of war and its declining utility have all contributed to 
the proliferation of peace. Given the depth and range of these changes, as well as their 
mutually reinforcing nature, their impacts will be difficult to reverse. For these reasons, 
traditional security issues, specifically the military threats to state sovereignty and 
territory, are becoming less prominent.  
  The second set of criticisms pertains to the relegation of vital political, 
economic, social and cultural elements of security while disproportionately highlighting 
military elements. The main argument here is that human collectivities are also subject to 
traditional and non-traditional security threats. The disregard for people has resulted in a 
heightened militarisation of international relations, particularly with respect to security. 
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Thus, it is pertinent to acknowledge the presence and importance of these dimensions 
and incorporate them in the analysis of security in the twenty-first century.  
 Since the end of the Cold War, the security realm has gone through a twofold 
process of “broadening” and “deepening.” 46 The broadening process refers to the 
inclusion of non-military security threats such as widening inequality and exacerbated 
poverty; scarcity in natural resources and environmental exploitation; internal 
displacements and mass refugee movements; spread of diseases and transnational 
terrorism. The deepening process pertains to the increasing openness of the field to 
accommodate the legitimate security concerns of individuals, groups and collectivities 
driven by a wide range of non-military threats similar to those just mentioned (Ullman, 
1983; Paris, 2001).  
 The philosophical groundwork behind this reflective evolution in security 
thinking relates to the universalism of life claims. Universalism, according to the 1994 
Human Development Report is empowering people by focusing directly on human 
beings and demanding non-discrimination among everyone irrespective of gender, 
religion, race and ethnic origin. The collective stand pulls together present demands of 
human development with the exigencies of development in the future. It recognises the 
sanctity of national sovereignty and appreciates the integrity of territorial boundaries, but 
only for as long as the political leaders of these states provide security and respect the 
human rights of their people (UNDP, 1994). 
 As mentioned earlier, the notion of security has primarily been influenced by the 
propensity of individual states to wage destructive wars against one another. National 
security has always been narrowly defined in military terms by politicians and 
policymakers. This is partly because it is easier to direct the attention and interest of the 
inattentive public toward military threats as opposed to non-military dangers (Ullman, 
1983). Developing a consensus with respect to which types of military strategies can be 
deployed in solving existing international crises is far less complicated than reaching 
agreements on other non-military measures (Ullman, 1983).  
 Consequently, security has been conceived as military threats to states’ 
sovereignty and territorial boundaries.  As the UNDP (1994) has argued, conventional 
approaches to security have ignored the security of the voiceless, the marginalised and 
the poor across the globe. The security of these groups had been consistently 
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undermined by the traditionally ethnocentric definition of security.  The insecurity felt by 
the majority of the population is engendered by the uncertainties of daily life, rather than 
the fear of yet another catastrophic global occurrence. Hence, the referent object of 
security must include state actors since the critical question of “whose security” cannot 
be adequately answered in terms of the state (Booth, 2008; Saleh, 2010; Newman, 2010). 
 By disproportionately highlighting military threats, the attention and interest of 
the public is diverted from dangers taking shape within the national borders. Threats 
outside the conventional interpretations of security have equal or greater potential to 
destabilise the whole country, yet they are pushed on the backburner. Such an approach 
provides a misleading notion that external threats are far more dangerous than the 
threats that crop up internally (Ullman, 1983; Paris, 2001; Booth, 2008; Collins, 2009). 
When the concept of security is strictly defined as the threat of terrorism, military 
responses gain the upper hand and diminish the likelihood of achieving a more people-
centric security. Therefore, what is needed is a security paradigm that identifies poverty, 
social collapse and civil conflict as core components of a global security threat that must 
be dealt with accordingly (UNDP, 1994). 
 The Human Security Network headed by Canada, Japan and Norway, alongside a 
group of international non-governmental organisations (INGOs) pursuing various 
initiatives and different causes, propagates the human security maxim to create “a more 
humane world where people can live in security and dignity, free from want and fear and 
with equal opportunities to develop their human potential to the full” (HSN, 2013).  
Indeed, the coalition is able to successfully incorporate within its agenda a wide array of 
“noble” objectives based on overlapping moral aspirations by deliberately framing a 
flimsy operational definition and ambiguously establishing boundaries to human security. 
 Whereas state security concerns itself mainly with the security of state actors with 
governments and regimes as its main referent objects, human security focuses on the 
security of non-state actors with individuals, groups and societies. Whereas state security 
protects citizens from external threats, human security manages internal challenges that 
threaten the existence of grassroots civil societies. Whereas a state-centric security agenda 
contains immediate concrete threats, a human-centric agenda enriches human conditions 
in the end.  
 
Finding the middle ground 
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The significant bulk of current literature on human security provides comprehensive 
reviews of existing definitions and proposes several ways in which they can be narrowed 
down.47 A much smaller portion focuses on the feasibility of transforming a human 
security concept into an indispensable analytical framework with significant practical 
applications.48 Paris (2001) argues that efforts made toward honing an all-encompassing 
definition of human security are undermined by the notion that the concept’s intellectual 
dynamism and political influence rest largely on principles of inclusiveness and 
integration. A holistic approach to the human security concept sets an effective backdrop 
for strong cooperative measures pursued by the constituents of the Human Security 
Network. The concept’s malleable design allows all members of the coalition to pursue a 
wide array of objectives born out of different threats – both real and perceived – while 
espousing a myriad of ideologies and perspectives rooted in distinctive value systems.  
 However, such practice renders human security a sterile analytical tool for 
academic research and policymaking. While the explicit and unapologetic haziness of its 
definition makes human security an effective catchphrase for uniting a host of conflicting 
doctrines, nonetheless, it has also led to the substantial diminution of explanatory power. 
Hence, critics argue that the human security paradigm provides little guidance for both 
scholars and legislators due to its intrinsic definitional elasticity and built-in structural 
incoherence (Owen, 2004; Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy, 2006; Goucha and Crowley, 2008).  
 For legislators and public officials the most contentious debates arise from 
decisions concerning the allocation of scarce government resources to a broad range of 
human security issues - all deemed to be equally urgent and important (Paris, 2001; 
Alkire, 2003; McFarlane and Khong, 2006; Oberleitner, 2014). Establishing a hierarchy 
of priorities becomes highly contentious and problematic because of sweeping 
formulations and definitions of human security. As mentioned, a focal point in the 
human security ethic underscores both the inclusiveness and holism of the concept, 
which requires the audience to treat all interests and objectives encapsulated within the 
agenda as equally crucial and necessary (Owen, 2004; Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy, 2006; 
Goucha and Crowley, 2008).  
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 See for example, Owen’s (2004) ‘Human Security - Conflict, Critique and Consensus’; Tadjbakhsh 
and Chenoy’s (2006) Human Security, Concepts and Implications, London; Kaldor’s (2007) Human 
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(2014) ‘From Concept to Method: The Challenge of a Human Security Methodology’; Murshed’s 
(2014) ‘An Economist’s Perspectives on Human Security.’ 
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 Moreover, the ambiguity of the human security discourse allows it to cover both 
material and ideational aspects of security. This becomes problematic when one attempts 
to evaluate how specific variables lead to a relative increase or decline in the overall level 
of human security since the investigation of causal relationships demands a certain level 
of analytical partition which the concept evidently lacks (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy, 2006; 
Glasius, 2008; Wibben, 2008). Significant efforts, therefore, must be directed towards 
operationalising the human security concept by moving away from all-encompassing 
formulations to a more coherent interpretation of the term.   
 Adhering to this call, Gary King and Christopher Murray (2001) propose a 
human security model comprised of five indicators that are deemed significant enough to 
merit war among citizens in their quest for survival. These are poverty, health, education, 
political freedom and democracy. Such formulation is deemed necessary for the 
systematic and analytical approach to assessing relative levels of human security among 
different groups, individuals and communities. They argue that through such a 
conception of security, considerations for the welfare of below the state actors override 
those of sovereignty and territorial integrity. Put differently, human insecurity represents 
the point beneath the well-being threshold, which is the state of generalised poverty. 
 Similarly, a human security audit that incorporates measures of direct and indirect 
threats to personal safety and freedom was constructed by Kanti Bajpai (2000) to 
perform two related functions. First, draw the line around human security by highlighting 
the most critical threats confronting human collectivities across all regions. Moreover, 
second, provide an assessment concerning the nature and severity of these identified 
threats prior to deciding whether the threatened referents are capable of launching 
containment measures to deter them.  
 However, it can be problematic to categorise specific values as more important 
than others without offering any compelling rationalisation to establish a certain degree 
of credibility. As Paris (2001) argues, the validity and soundness of an operationalised 
definition of human security based on identified key components will be subject to 
criticisms by those espousing a different set of values as they vary from one society to 
another. The challenge goes beyond a straightforward act of narrowing down the 
concept to providing convincing justifications for highlighting certain norms and 
standards, while sidestepping the others. Therefore, the paradigm’s conceptual vagueness 
and flexible boundaries perform a strategic role in the human security enterprise by 
binding together a highly diverse and often unstable coalition of state and non-state 
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actors in order to capture the top political interests that attract the biggest financial 
resources (Alkire, 2003; Kaldor, 2007; McIntosh and Hunter, 2010; Fukuda-Parr and 
Messineo, 2012).  
 From the viewpoint of coalition members, greater ambiguity means greater 
“stability” at least in terms of resources (Paris 2001). The network can provide enough 
space to accommodate a broader scope of interests and objectives by downplaying 
individual differences, thereby extending its membership. These arguments infer that 
members of the human security network will have no incentive to tighten up this loose 
concept and remedy its definitional elasticity. It will not be possible to promote greater 
specificity; only individual differences will be magnified. Alienating specific members 
through certain criteria can potentially lead to the deterioration and potential demise of 
the coalition as a whole.   
 Thus, for some analysts, the linking of non-military issues and security represents 
a “muddled thinking” (Alagappa, 1998; Tadjbakhsh, 2014; Christie, 2014). There are 
several reasons for this assertion. Take for instance the issues of economics and security. 
First, defining the exact composition of economic and environmental security can be 
very problematic as these issues can be operationalised in multiple and conflicting ways.49 
Second, even when satisfactorily outlining the definition of economic and environmental 
security, identifying threats also presents huge challenges.50 Third, the idea of securitising 
economic and environmental concerns has the unintended consequence of nationalising 
and militarising economic and environmental relations, which make their resolutions 
even more challenging.51 Fourth, both economic and environmental problems are 
deemed ontologically different from military threats to states.52   
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 With respect to economic security, economists may define it as having high levels human 
development; maintaining global comparative and/or absolute advantage; free access to production 
resources and the markets for goods and services; or the protection of the international economic 
arrangement. See for example, Barnett (2001); Dalby (2002); ILO, 2004; Mesjasz (2008); Goldstein and 
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for example, UNECE’s (2003); Floyd and Matthews (2013); Chalecki (2013).  
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51 
For instance, the term ‘economic security’ may lead to calls for stronger protectionist measures and 
greater self-reliance to mitigate vulnerabilities. While the urgency denoted by the term 
‘environmental security’ may deprive critical environmental issues of the continuing attention they 
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 In short, nothing significant can be gained from ascribing the word security to a 
host of non-military issues given the lack of theoretical and empirical value for these 
linkages. When all issues that pose threats to life in general are perceived as threats to 
national security, the explanatory power of the term significantly shrinks. Therefore, the 
nexus between security and various non-traditional issues is only apposite in the context 
of regional and global conflicts where they are viewed as factors to be accounted for 
when gauging the impact of violent wars and conflicts.   
 Although these criticisms merit attention, they are also subject to some 
questioning. First, the distinctions between traditional and non-traditional security issues 
can be overcome. As argued earlier, politico-military threats to state sovereignty and 
territorial integrity are engendered both by internal and external factors. In this sense, 
regional and global cooperation vis-à-vis institutions are vital to the extenuation of state-
centric security issues (Alagappa, 1998; Glasius and Kaldor, 2006; Hoffstaedter, 2012; 
Martin and Owen, 2014). This is particularly relevant at a time when states face some 
serious constraints due the burgeoning benefits of global specialisation, on the one hand; 
and the viciousness and escalating costs of war, on the other. Thus, collective security is 
not necessarily antagonistic to the concept of national security. Rather than diametrically 
opposed, the two can be mutually reinforcing.  
 Second, defining security strictly in terms of organised violence leads to a false 
conclusion that issues that do not entail or constitute force cannot be security problems 
(Alagappa, 1998; Gasper, 2014; Krause, 2014; Sen, 2014). As discussed earlier, there is a 
whole range of other instruments employed to protect or challenge the traditional core 
values of the state. Third, limiting the discussion of security within a nation-state level 
creates a misleading notion that security cannot be analysed at various levels and with 
respect to various non-state referents (Christie, 2014; Martin and Owen, 2014; 
Tadjbakhsh, 2014). While tensions may seem inevitable given the competing approaches 
undertaken across different contexts and at different levels, the same will be true even 
when security problems are independently assessed and exclusively managed by domestic 
state actors (Alagappa, 1998).  
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 Fourth, preventing the rethinking and restructuring of the security concept 
despite the evolving domestic and international conditions can also undermine its 
practical and analytical utility (Krause and Williams, 1996; Alkire, 2003; Saleh, 2010; 
Martin and and Kostovicova, 2014). Given the innate tendencies of terms and concepts 
to evolve, the scope of national security will also change over time and across space. As 
such, security has to be conceptualised in a more flexible manner in order to reflect and 
adapt to a variety of changes. Fifth, criticism that points to the fundamentally different 
expertise required for tackling nonconventional issues underlines the need for 
interdisciplinary and multidisciplinary approaches to security studies, rather than 
deliniating the boundaries of security on the basis of an analyst’s expertise (Alagappa, 
1998; Christie, 2014; Krause, 2014). The argument is that the expertise of these so-called 
experts of national security only stretches as far as their respective fields of specialisation.  
 Clearly, the identification and delineation of security presents an intellectual 
paradox. On the one hand, categorising all issues as security concerns without following 
a specific criteria for doing so reduces the theoretical coherence and empirical utility of 
the concept. Yet, the very process of selecting a set of criteria pertains only to particular 
models. Thus, selecting which issues to label as security threats becomes highly 
subjective. On the other hand, the traditional conception of security is increasingly 
constricting and misleading. Focusing solely on the issues that relate to state defence 
overlooks other equally important dimensions of security that affect survival. Thus, calls 
to reimagine the security concept beyond the statist realm of force continue to increase.  
  
2.1.C STRATEGIC APPROACHES TO SECURITY  
 
Realist competition 
From the neorealist perspective, the absence of an overarching authority that ensures 
survival under anarchy implies a self-help system where states handle their security. This 
makes the pursuit of security inherently competitive (Brown et al., 1995; Mearsheimer, 
1994; Donnelly, 2005; Glaser, 2010). As Kenneth Waltz (1979: 118) has argued, states “at 
minimum, seek their own preservation and, at maximum, drive for universal 
domination.” To enhance the chances of survival, states, therefore, need to develop their 
national capabilities. Such a strategic approach to security results in heightened 
competition that is viewed as an inescapable consequence of an anarchic international 
system. Competition for security forces states to be concerned with relative advantage 
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rather than absolute gain. This results in a security dilemma. In other words, states are 
more interested to know whether the gains that they accumulate outweigh those of the 
others. States are predicted to baulk at cooperation if they expect to benefit less than 
their rivals. For as long as the international system is anarchic, analysts posit the influence 
of the security dilemma will remain (Keohane and Martin, 1995; Mearsheimer, 1994; 
Alagappa, 1998; Glaser, 2010).        
 Against this backdrop, self-reliance is deemed the most effective and efficient 
approach to ensuring national survival. Within hierarchic political orders – where units 
stand in relationships of authority and subordination – actors tend to “bandwagon” with 
the strongest and most powerful state to increase their gains while simultaneously 
reducing their losses.53 In contrast, under anarchy, the capabilities of states, particularly 
great powers, will always be a threat since there is no central authority to enforce order. 
Instead of the bandwagon, smaller, weaker states attempt to reduce risk by “balancing” 
against the stronger party since it is the latter that threatens them.54  
 Consequently, temporary alliances and alignments are formed in response to the 
power asymmetry in the system (Keohane and Martin, 1995; Donnelly, 2005; Glaser, 
2010). They are temporary since their construction is based primarily on the shifting 
distribution of power and varying calculations of national interest (Mearsheimer, 1994). 
Neorealists, therefore, are cynical toward cooperative approaches to security. While they 
accept that cooperation may exist, it is hard to achieve and even more difficult to 
maintain. Several factors such as the option to cheat, concern for relative gains, and the 
risk of neglecting national capabilities, significantly undermines the impetus for 
cooperation (Mearsheimer, 1994; Alagappa, 1998).  
 Not surprisingly, neorealists tend to downplay the power of norms and 
institutions, dismissing them as a “false promise” or a type of “organised hypocrisy.” 
They are mere extensions and reflections of the power amassed by the dominant players 
and have no autonomous impact on the conduct of the state system. In the words of 
John Mearsheimer (1994: 5-7) institutions “matter only on the margins” and “have no 
independent effect on state behaviour.” As far as the realists are concerned, collective 
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security is a weak approach to enhancing national security, as it requires the 
subordination of domestic interests to that of the wider communities.  
 Thus, from a neorealist perspective, both the problem of and the strategic 
approach to security are best explained using the logic of anarchy. Since its consequences 
are immutable, power and diplomacy are vital instruments of national survival (Rich, 
1991; Kissinger, 1993; Alagappa, 1998; Whiton, 2013). State behaviour is determined 
mainly, if not solely, by material structures underpinning the international system rather 
than ideas and institutions (Waltz, 1979; Kratochwil, 1993; Measheimer, 1994). For as 
long as the key agents of international politics are the sovereign states, anarchy will be the 
ordering principle.  
 The overwhelming pressure to be competitive and the need to survive in the 
international system will force small and weak states to emulate the policies, structures 
and systems of large and powerful countries. While the non-conforming states are bound 
to be socialised into the system and will eventually behave in a manner similar to the 
conforming states (Waltz, 1979; Alagappa, 1998). In essence, the system prohibits 
functionally differentiated units. As a result, differences with respect to functions will be 
minimised and disappear over time, causing states to exhibit common characteristics.  
 
Liberal cooperation 
Neoliberalism counters the neorealist hypothesis that cooperation is problematic and 
unsustainable and that norms and institutions influence only the periphery. In particular, 
liberal institutionalists argue that cooperation among states can be improved even in the 
absence of a hegemonic player that can administer compliance with agreements 
(Campbell and Pedersen, 2001; Leonard, 2005; Weiss and Wilkinson, 2013). Through 
regime formation and institutional cooperation, enhancing the levels of regularity and 
predictability in international politics softens the anarchic environment. Keohane (1984: 
57) defines international regimes as “sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules 
and decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given 
area of international relations.”  
 On the one hand, regimes restrain state action and behaviour by formalising the 
expectations of all parties to specific agreements involving shared interests. On the other 
hand, institutions facilitate cooperation and compliance among members while 
appropriating sanctions to defectors. Together, regimes and institutions reinforce the 
trust, stability and continuity of the international system against the backdrop of anarchy 
(Keohane, 1984, 1986; Kratochwil, 1993; Alagappa, 1998). 
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 However, although considerations of relative gains are justifiable as Robert 
Keohane (1993: 275) asserts, they are only important when “gains in one period alter 
power relations in another, and where there is some likelihood that subsequent advantage 
in power maybe used against oneself.” The relative importance of material capabilities in 
determining state behaviour depends on the extent of institutionalisation. The higher the 
level of institutionalisation, the less relevant power becomes in explaining state conduct 
(Keohane, 1989). Therefore, institutions are as fundamental and as crucial as capabilities 
when determining state behaviour (Owen, 1994; Burchill, 2005; Weiss and Wilkinson, 
2014).  
 Neoliberals emphasise the point that there are opportunities for interstate 
cooperation in both the economic and security realms, although cooperation in the latter 
is relatively less developed (Alagappa, 1998). Several factors can explain the differences 
between economic and security sectors, including: the propensity to view security in 
zero-sum terms; the opportunity for betrayal; and the difficulty in monitoring (Alagappa, 
1998). Despite these impediments, security cooperation among allies and even 
adversaries remains a viable option. For the main advocates of international cooperation, 
institutions fulfil three important functions: redefining and reconstituting national 
interests; regulating state conduct and behaviour by influencing incentives through rules 
and conventions; and enabling peaceful change by reconceptualising interests, managing 
expectations and mitigating qualms and suspicions (Keohane, 1989; Alagappa, 1998; 
Campbell and Pedersen, 2001; Chen, 2003; Duffield, 2007). 
 
Constructivist formulation 
However, constructivist theorists provide a more radical approach to conceptualising 
security. Constructivism emphasises three core ontological propositions about social life, 
which according to its main proponents better explain international politics than the 
rationalist assumptions posed by the neorealists and neoliberals. At the root of these 
ontological claims is the belief that norms, ideas and values demand an interpretive 
methodology that explains the relationship between self-defined and self-interpreted 
“intersubjective meanings,” along with the social practices where they are implanted and 
which they concurrently constitute.55 
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 First, normative or ideational structures are as vital as material structures in 
conditioning the behaviour of political and social actors. As Chris Reus-Smit (2005) 
argues,  “Where neorealists emphasise the material structure of the balance of military 
power, and Marxists stress the material structure of the capitalist world economy, 
constructivists argue that systems of shared ideas, beliefs and values also have structural 
characteristics, and that they exert a powerful influence on social and political action.” 
There are two main explanations for this: on the one hand, Alexander Wendt (1995:73) 
contends, “material resources only acquire meaning for human action through the 
structure of shared knowledge in which they are embedded”; and on the other hand, 
both normative and ideational structures shape the social identities of political agents 
(Neufeld, 1993; Wendt, 1995; Alagappa, 1998).  
 Second, nonmaterial structures or identities inform interests, which in turn 
inform actions. While rationalists are interested to explain how actors pursue interests, 
constructivists are interested to explore the origin and the development of these interests 
(Wendt, 1995, 1999; Reus-Smit, 2005; Guzzini, 2013). Consequently, constructivists 
focus on the social identities of individuals and states and argue that actors do not have 
pre-existing sets of preferences. And third, agents and structures are mutually 
constituted. Although ideational and normative structures condition the identities and 
interests of actors, nevertheless, such structures are by-products of the knowledgeable 
practices of those actors (Wendt, 1995, 1999; Reus-Smit, 2005). 
 Therefore, constructivists are optimistic about the possibility of developing a 
community security that is more durable than cooperative security as it prevents the 
occurrence of new power conflicts (Alagappa, 1998; Adler and Barnett, 1998; Acharya, 
2001; Adler, 2005; Paul, 2012). Under the system of community security, a country’s 
national identity and interest are cohabited with those of the wider community of states. 
Such an arrangement gives each state a stake in the security of other members of the 
community. The use of force as a policy tool for resolving disputes between members is 
proscribed and made illegal. As a result, debilitating concerns over political survival are 
significantly relaxed, thereby substantially diminishing the security dilemma.  
 The predisposition of constructivist theorists to study how norms shape 
behaviour, on the one hand, and their strong emphasis on the supervening power of 
structures, on the other, indicate that similar to the neorealists and Marxists, they too are 
structuralists (Reus-Smit, 2005). However, by stressing the impact of nonmaterial 
structures with respect to identities and interests, as well as the role of practices in 
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sustaining and altering those structures, constructivists may be better categorised as 
structurationists (Reus-Smit, 2005). As some scholars have put it, institutionalised ideas 
and norms “define the meaning and identity of the individual actor and the patterns of 
appropriate economic, political, and cultural activity engaged in by those individuals” 
(Thomas et al., 1987).  
 It is through mutual interaction that prevailing social structures – which interests 
and identities will be defined – are developed and epitomised (Wendt, 1992). In short, 
structures are socially constructed. As Robert Cox (1992: 138) succinctly puts it, “they 
become a part of the objective world by virtue of their existence in the intersubjectivity 
of relevant groups of people.” While the intersubjectivity of the structures implies that 
they do not have a concrete presence, nonetheless, they have tangible effects since 
“humans act as if they were real” (Cox, 1986: 242). The involvement of the human mind 
in the construction of the social world gives it a distinctive ontological status without 
negating its material reality (Cox, 1981; Wendt, 1992; Reus-Smit, 2005). 
 
 2.1.D CONCLUSIONS 
In the twenty-first century, the referents of security are multidimensional and 
multidirectional. The primary security referent varies depending on the prevailing social, 
political, economic and cultural contexts, as well the level of analysis. The state continues 
to play a significant role in shaping and implementing a country’s national security 
rhetoric, policies and strategies. However, as the whole chapter has argued, the state 
simultaneously cohabits and competes with other referents particularly those relating to 
non-traditional, people-centric dimensions of security. When the legitimacy and identity 
of the state is at question, humanist security referents may take priority over statist 
security referents. Consequently, the considerations for sovereignty, territorial integrity 
and other military-oriented concerns are moderated while regional and trans regional 
interactions are modified. However, arguing that the state will be superseded by non-
state referents in the near future might be a bit of a stretch.   
 For all security referents – both statist and humanist – survival is the ultimate 
goal. Nevertheless, the pursuit of survival does not always have to be ruthless and 
problematic. It will be contingent upon several factors such as the relative distribution of 
material capabilities, shared intersubjective understandings and dominant social practices 
(Alagappa, 1998; Hopf, 1998; Holton, 2011; Guzzini, 2013; Löhr and Wenzlhuemer, 
2013). As far as state actors are concerned, political survival, traditionally defined in 
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militaristic terms, is a minimum requirement. However, political survival is defined in a 
variety of ways and may include broader objectives that are crucial to the wider realm 
where inter-state interactions take place. To this extent, the political survival of the state 
may be challenged both internally and externally by issues that are not only military in 
nature, but also include sociocultural and politico-economic threats (Tanzi, 1998; 
Ripsman and Paul, 2005; Tow et al., 2013).  
 These non-military issues can be as dangerous as the traditional ones and in some 
cases could even be worse. Hence, the conceptualisation of security must incorporate 
state actors and issues, on the one hand, and amalgamate the supra and sub-national 
security problématique, on the other. In doing so, the scope of security has to be 
thoughtfully broadened to encompass a non-traditional, people-centric dimension 
comprised of economic, environmental, health, and social elements to name a few. 
However, this broadening and deepening of the security agenda, needs to be prudently 
executed to prevent the complete erosion of its theoretical utility and empirical value 
(Alagappa, 1998; Paris, 2001; Shinoda, 2004; Prezelj, 2008). 
 Therefore, the pursuit of security simultaneously requires competition, 
cooperation and community building (Majeski and Fricks, 1995; Alagappa, 1998; Kydd, 
2005; Kaufman, 2007; Lebow, 2007). Cooperative approaches to security are 
instrumental in alleviating the stifling conditions induced by a global security dilemma, 
enabling the establishment of diverse and multi-pronged security communities. 
Cooperative security is particularly relevant in the contexts of non-traditional, non-
military problems that can potentially undermine security such as the issues concerning 
economic interdependence and environmental degradation at national, regional and 
global levels. However, the idea of cooperative security does not render self-help strategy 
obsolete as the latter remains a crucial element of state survival (Møller, 1992; Frankel, 
1996; Mearsheimer, 2001; Snyder, 2002). Mixing one strategy with another is often 
necessary for enhancing, improving, and securing specific referents of national security. 
The wide range of plausible security contexts vis-à-vis referents and threats in the 








2.2 RE-IMAGINING FREE TRADE: REVIEW OF FREE TRADE LITERATURE  
In Section 2.2.A and Section 2.2.B, I examine the debates surrounding free trade in two 
levels. First, between realism and liberalism to understand how it is viewed and 
interpreted by state actors with respect to their relative positions in the international 
system. Second, between the economists and political scientists to understand the 
domestic political and economic underpinnings of free trade. In Section 2.2.C, I discuss 
the political economy of multilateral and preferential (bilateral and minilateral) free trade 
to illustrate their role with respect to security interests. Finally, in Section 2.2.D, I 
summarize the main arguments presented in the review of free trade literature and draw 
some conclusions based on my findings. The results from these discussions are pivotal to 
the study’s main research questions (specifically the first and second strands) that tackle 
the complex web of security and trade relationships permeating the East Asian region in 
the twenty-first century.  
 
2.2.A THE GLOBAL POLITICAL ECONOMY OF FREE TRADE 
 
(Neo) liberal thesis on free trade 
The liberal thesis underlines the appeasing consequence of well-orchestrated trade 
interdependency. As Norman Angell (1933) succinctly puts it, the economic utility of war 
is nothing but an illusion. Rather than creating new wealth for states, war destroys the 
economic lifeblood of any society that chooses to endorse it as an economic statecraft. 
Liberals, in general, argue that all states accrue substantial benefits from free trade 
(Bhagwati, 2003, 2008; Burchill, 2005; Riezman, 2013; Healey, 2014; Heywood, 2014). 
The pursuit of free trade is considered the more peaceful and humane strategy for 
accumulating national wealth for a number of reasons. It breaks down distortive artificial 
barriers that injure perceptions and complicate relations among culturally distinct 
individuals and communities. Moreover, free trade is viewed as a necessary peace-
enforcing mechanism in the international system as the economic interdependence it 
engenders harmonises competing national interests. As such, it compels states pursuing 
divergent objectives to preserve a substantial level of collective security to ensure stability 
67 
 
and predictability in the system. 56 In the words of Immanuel Kant (in Burchill, 2005: 63):
   
Trade … would increase the wealth and power of the peace loving, productive sections of 
the population at the expense of the war-orientated aristocracy, and … would bring men of 
different nations into constant contact with one another; contact which would make clear 
to all of them their fundamental community of interests.  
 
 For instance, David Ricardo (1911) argued that free trade unites the universal 
society of nations across the civilised world through a common thread of interest and 
interaction. Robert Powell (1994) commented that in one state after another, farsighted 
state leaders recognise that they now have greater chances of revitalising their economies 
through opening borders once thought to be impenetrable and sacred. Meanwhile, 
Kenichi Ohmae (1990) as a so-called “hyper-globalist,” declared the end of the nation-
state and the emergence of a borderless world.  
 On the other hand, liberal internationalists seek to demonstrate the possibility of 
gaining cooperation among sovereign states even in the absence of a hegemonic player to 
enforce compliance with the rules of agreement (Gardner, 1990; Hoffman, 1992; Doyle, 
2004; Linklater, 2005; Jahn, 2013). Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye’s (1977) complex 
interdependence theory shows how independent states can substantially broaden their 
narrowly defined self-interests to enhance cooperation through membership in 
international institutions. The strict compliance with organisational rules has the intended 
effect of diminishing the influence and significance of state sovereignty, thereby 
discouraging the quest for myopic national interests. Orthodox liberals give standing 
ovation to developing countries that have been unilaterally opening their domestic 
economies, while offering them the assurance that the most significant gains are captured 
by those who liberalise in accordance with the prescribed policies and timetables 
formulated by the most powerful players in the international system.  
 From a neoliberal standpoint, the intensification of economic interdependence 
via free trade has considerably diminished the material value of territorial conquest 
(Burchill, 2005; Fridell, 2006; Slocum, 2006; Lang, 2011). Given the current configuration 
of the international system where the trading state rather than the military state is the 
primary referent object, the additional colonial territory does not automatically enhance 
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the competitive advantage of the imperial state. Thus, national wealth has increasingly 
become a function of the total share in the world market. Such postulation underlines 
two important inferences that do not fit quite well with the realist notions of free trade: 
first, that the era of self-sufficient state is over; and second, that territorial conquest has 
become an expensive, risky business (in short, a bad investment) (Rosecrance, 1986; 
Strange, 1996; Dean, 2012).       
 Thus, the liberal project endorses trade interdependency as an effective medium 
through which aggressive state actions can be successfully contained by juxtaposing its 
economic benefits with the opportunity costs of war. Such prospects for economic 
incentives motivate countries to pursue deeper and wider forms of trade with one 
another, thus setting aside concerns over relative gains while highlighting the values of 
harmony of interests. To this extent, trade serves as an effective deterrent against 
interstate wars and conflicts, thereby enhancing state security.   
 
(Neo) realist thesis on free trade 
In stark contrast to the liberal formulations of free trade, the realist thesis stresses the 
dangers posed by excessive economic dependency, particularly with respect to smaller, 
weaker states (Chan, 2001; Donnelly, 2005; Garcia, 2013; Elman and Jensen, 2104). 
Although they do not reject the wealth-creating effect of trade, the inherent anarchic 
structure of the international system compels state actors to limit state interdependencies 
to mitigate vulnerabilities. Accordingly, states still reserve the right to wage war whenever 
trade relationships engender intolerable levels of insecurity, whether real or perceived. 
From a realist standpoint, this “Hobbesian fear” justifies the use of war to reduce the 
sense of vulnerability emanating from disproportionate trade interdependence since 
politico-strategic concerns always supersede economic considerations.57  
 Neorealists and contemporary Marxists, for example, view trade as a pernicious 
activity by arguing that extreme interdependence vis-à-vis economic specialisation 
inevitably lead to vulnerability to external pressures and ultimately results in heightened 
state insecurity (Waltz, 1979; Tarzi, 2004; Linklater, 2005; Donnelly, 2005; Dunn, 2009). 
In this context, trade is seen as an exploitative instrument that constrains the capacity of 
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independent societies to govern their internal affairs, thereby resulting in unnecessary 
political tensions.  
 The most fundamental disagreement between neoliberals and neorealists lies in 
their differing conceptions of what should constitute national interest. While the former 
argues that countries are primarily concerned with the maximisation of absolute gains, 
the latter contends that countries are mainly worried about relative gains. Nevertheless, 
as Kenneth Waltz (1979: 106) argued, the existence of power imbalance compels states 
to “be more concerned with relative gains than with absolute gains.” Thus, while 
neorealists expect countries to abandon ongoing cooperative dialogues where they gain 
less than their counterparts, liberal internationalists are confident that countries will 
continue to cooperate as long as their absolute gains are improved. They are not solely 
concerned with the size of pie that goes to rival states (Burchill, 2005; Donnelly, 2005; 
Reus-Smit, 2005; Garcia, 2013; Elman and Jensen, 2014). Such preoccupation with 
relative gains severely hampers prospects for cooperation since countries need to worry 
about two main things: whether they can gain something from cooperative measures or 
not; and whether these gains significantly outweigh those that accrue to other members. 
From Scott Burchill’s (2005: 38) perspective, “states may be satisfied with conflicts that 
leave them absolutely worse off – so long as their adversaries are left even worse off.” 
 Neorealists point out to two fundamental problems encountered when using the 
term free trade – its benign symbolism, and the evident disconnect between rhetoric and 
praxis on the part of its most ardent advocates (Burchill, 2005; Duménil and Lévy, 2011; 
Overbeek and van Apeldoorn, 2012; Durand, 2014). Its critics usually dismiss free trade 
as a justifying mechanism arbitrarily applied by powerful states to secure their respective 
politico-strategic goals by exploiting the weaker countries. It significantly diminishes the 
effective control of small countries over national policy making processes as they are left 
exposed to the vicissitudes of the world market, thus making them susceptible to 
manipulations by big players. Therefore, once the playing field is skewed to their 
advantage, the most rational objective for the developed world is the abolishment of all 
forms of state interventions in the developing world (Gilpin, 2002; Burchill, 2005; 
Durand, 2014). 
 Furthermore, the critique of free trade imperialism highlights the prevalent 
double standards practiced by its progenitors and the degree with which the global 
economic configuration promoted by neoliberals ironically demands government 
interference for its realisation (Gallagher and Robinson, 1953; Semmel, 2004; 
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Cunningham, 2014). Economic doctrines endorsed by rich and powerful states as 
“universal principles” are specifically designed for the more effective and efficient 
exploitation of poor and vulnerable states. No advanced economy willingly embraces 
these conditions unless they happen to provide interim benefits.   
 Thus, the neorealist responses to neoliberal claims that economic 
interdependence via free trade is pacifying international relations can be summarised into 
two points (Grieco, 1997; Donnelly, 2005; Burchill, 2005; Elman and Jensen, 2104). First, 
the insecurity engendered by an anarchic environment always takes precedence over the 
pursuit of economic security since survival remains the ultimate goal of any sovereign 
state. Second, the notion of existing economic interdependence provides illusory 
perceptions of parity and shared vulnerability to external economic forces in the 
international economy given the lopsided distribution of power throughout global trade 
and financial institutions.         
 As Jonathan Kirshner (2003: 274) concisely puts it, “what distinguishes realists 
[from the liberals] is that they can be placed on that end of a continuum which stresses 
the likelihood of war, threats of war, and the need for states to shape their policies in the 
light of this consideration.” E. H. Carr’s (1964) image of potential war is a crucial factor 
when explaining why countries choose to ignore activities that threaten to undermine 
state security despite their huge economic incentives. The trade-off between wealth and 
power is always decided in favour of the latter since the pursuit of strategic political goals 
constantly demands economic sacrifices.58 
 Thus, from a realist perspective the main objectives of powerful countries when 
pursuing free trade are not necessarily driven by economic considerations, but by 
politico-strategic motives. By influencing the developing and least developed countries to 
reassess and reconfigure their national interests in ways that complement those in the 
developed world, the rich and powerful countries can advance their politico-strategic 
goals by maintaining these asymmetric trade relations. In negotiating and implementing 
trade agreements with underdeveloped economies, the developed countries are 
essentially trading off portions of their economic advantages in exchange for wider 
politico-strategic agendas. The subordination of economic gains to politico-strategic 
gains reflects linkages between security interests, on the one hand, and trade objectives, 
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on the other. Therefore, trade is not only defined in neoliberal terms, but also in realist 
terms. 
 
2.2.B THE DOMESTIC POLITICAL ECONOMY OF FREE TRADE 
On the one hand, economic experts have directed much of their effort to studying trade 
behavioural patterns and explaining the impacts of trade barriers in the overall conduct 
of international trade. While there is no consensus among economists regarding the 
definitive effect of trade liberalisation on domestic economies, the general agreement is 
that free trade can serve as an engine for growth. Thus, it is considered the most 
attractive economic policy tool for both developed and developing countries (Thirwall, 
2000; Rodrik, 2001; 2002; Bhagwati, 2003, 2008; Shafaeddin, 2005; Wacziarg and Welch, 
2008; Kiyota, 2012; Falvey et al., 2012).  
 On the other hand, political scientists have devoted much of their attention to 
studying the changing nature of protectionist measures over time. They then develop 
systemic theories that challenge the notion of “rush to free trade” such as dependency 
theory and hegemonic stability theory (Kitson and Michie, 1995; Grossman and 
Helpman, 1995; Milner, 1999; Bello, 2003; Schott, 2004; Goldstein and Mansfield, 2012; 
Naoi and Urata, 2013). Thus, while economists highlight the positive relationship 
between tariff reduction and economic development, political scientists, emphasise the 
political significance of protectionism.  
 Despite the failure of laissez-faire economics in the 1980s to bring about economic 
growth comparable to previous decades, it remains a core component of domestic 
economic development agendas. Contemporary trade theories underscore the primacy of 
trade liberalisation coupled with a non-interventionist principle. The number of 
developing and least developed countries implementing drastic institutional reform 
programs to participate in various free trade activities reflects a paradigm shift in 
domestic economic policymaking. Dani Rodrik (1998: 62) called this “rush to free trade” 
a political anomaly: 
 
Since the early 1980s, developing countries have flocked to free trade as if it were the Holy 
Grail of economic development. Together with the historic transformation and opening of 
the Eastern European economies, these developments represent a genuine revolution in 





 There are at least three interconnected “shifts” that can help explain this rush to 
free trade puzzle: (i): shifts in domestic trade policy preferences by state and non-state 
actors; (ii), shifts in domestic political institutions; and (iii) shifts in the international 
political system (Milner, 1999, Kingstone, 2001; Milner and Kubota, 2004; Dent, 2006; 
Mansfield and Milner, 2012). 
 
Shifts in domestic trade policy preferences 
The earliest models explaining trade policy preferences have traditionally focused on the 
significant role of pressure group politics with respect to the governments’ decisions to 
either promote free trade or implement protectionist policies (Milner, 1999; Weintraub et 
al., 2004; Hanson 2010). The subsequent observation that the degrees of impact and 
requirements for protectionist policies differ across sectors and states prompted the 
formulation of factoral and sectoral preference theories (Beaulieu, 2002; Mayda and 
Rodrik, 2005). In both scenarios, preferences are mutually construed as the outcomes of 
income distribution among independent players. This occurs when policy shifts from 
intensified liberalisation to increased protectionism, and vice versa. Determining both the 
causes and effects of this variance has been the central theme of much of the economic 
literature on trade.  
 The factoral theories of trade preferences are based on the Stolper-Samuelson 
theorem designed by Wolfgang Stolper and Paul Samuelson (1941). The theorem states 
that an increase in the relative price of a particular commodity increases the returns to 
the factor most intensively used to produce that commodity, and diminishes the real 
earnings of other factors of production. The theorem rests on several critical 
assumptions including the presence perfect competition, complete inter-industry mobility 
of the factors of production, as well as constant returns to scale. When these conditions 
are absent, shifts in relative prices could affect people differently, even when they possess 
the same factor of production. Nevertheless, despite such limitations, the Stolper-
Samuelson model remains a standard when analysing the political economy of 
protectionism.59  
 Meanwhile, the sectoral or firm-based theories of trade preferences are based on 
the Ricardo-Viner model, also known as the specific-factors model. While the Stolper-
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Samuelson theorem posits that factors of production are entirely mobile across 
industries, the Ricardo-Viner theorem assumes that at least one factor is immobile. 
Consequently, the theorem indicates that an increase in the relative price of a commodity 
increases the returns to all immobile factors used to produce that commodity, while 
simultaneously diminishing the returns to all immobile factors used to produce other 
commodities.60 Thus, in both instances, preferences are deduced as the outcomes of the 
variations in income that accrue to different actors as policy shifts from protection to 
free trade and vice versa.  
 Several models reflecting individual choices were established to determine how 
they influence the rush to freer trade including voters’ attitudes and the policy makers’ 
ideational preferences. For example, the assessment of individual voters’ attitudes toward 
protectionism or free trade is particularly important in democratic governments where 
elections are customarily linked to trade policy choices (Caplan, 2007; Mansfield and 
Milner, 2012). With respect to voters’ attitudes, some trade experts have posited that 
individual voters consider their preferences in terms of their role as consumers.61 Thus, 
as the removal of protectionist barriers leads to lower prices for consumers and a 
corresponding increase in consumer surplus, they are more likely to vote in favour of 
free trade.          
 However, some models of individual preference reject this proposition by 
introducing an electoral component to trade policy determination. These experts have 
argued that trade policies are largely determined by the median voter’s preferences based 
on his given factor endowments.62 Thus, the better endowed the median voter is in the 
factor used intensively for the manufacturing of import-competing products, the more 
protectionist he will be. Still, other models incorporate asset ownership as a factor that 
affects trade policy choices. These experts have shown how voters’ preferences are 
influenced by the ways that free trade affects the net value of their assets.63 For instance, 
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individual voters in regions that host import-competing industries tend to oppose free 
trade given the adverse effect of increasing imports on economic activities in these 
regions that inevitably diminish asset values. Furthermore, the negative impact of import 
competition with respect to local employment may also drive individual voters to 
respond negatively toward free trade, mainly out commiseration for workers who stand 
to lose their jobs (Milner, 1999; Milner and Kubota, 2005; Irwin, 2009; Mansfield and 
Milner, 2012). 
 Meanwhile, with respect to ideational preferences, some trade specialists have 
argued that trade policy decisions are significant functions of policymakers’ ideational 
preferences and less of the preferences of various interest groups.64 In other words, 
material considerations are only secondary to ideational factors in the formulation and 
implementation of trade policies. Hence, the impact of economic recessions on 
government decisions to either intensify trade protectionism or promote liberalisation is 
conditioned by existing factors such as dominant ideas on trade, degree of openness, and 
systemic pressures brought about by increasing interdependence (Krueger, 1997; Milner 
and Kubota, 2005; Dent 2006, 2010; Daugbjerg and Swinbank, 2009).  
 
Shifts in domestic political institutions  
Beyond individual differences giving rise to varying preferences are political institutions 
that consolidate personal choices to create distinctive trade policy choices. Within the 
domestic context, some scholars have commented that different institutions give power 
to different players. Although some institutions enable particular interest groups to 
display strong lobbying efforts that influence policymakers, other institutions provide 
sufficient insulation that allows legislators to function more independently.65 However, 
providing greater insulation does not automatically translate to increased support for 
freer trade. Hence, the respective preferences of each member of the policy-making elites 
cannot be ignored when assessing the role of political institutions in their decision-
making processes (Milner, 1999; Milner and Kubota, 2005; Mansfield and Milner, 2012). 
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Accordingly, the administrative competence of a particular government affects the 
development and implementation of trade policies. Economic development is viewed as 
directly correlated to institutional capacity, which in turn, reduces government 
dependence on import taxes as a means of revenue generation.66 As such, advanced 
economies tend to impose fewer trade restrictions than developing economies. 
 Similarly, significant institutional variations among existing political regimes also 
play a crucial role creating trade policy profiles. For instance, some scholars have 
contended that democratic governments are more likely to establish protectionist 
measures against one another and abandon the project of free trade due to probable 
political conflicts that may arise between them.67 Therefore, the quest for free trade will 
only be meaningful when intra-industry trade controls the bulk of trade flows.  
Meanwhile, other experts have suggested that autocratic regimes are more likely to 
sustain long-term protectionist measures compared with democratic states since the 
former view protectionism as a necessary source of rent-seeking activities, whereas 
democracies enter into FTAs whenever there is mutual reciprocity among signatories.68 
 Thus, the debates over the effects of democracies alongside party systems and 
internal government structures fundamentally rest on assumptions about the actors’ own 
sets of preferences (Milner, 1999, 2004; Boettke and Fink, 2011; Mansfield and Milner, 
2012; Francois and Manchin, 2013; Liu and Ornelas, 2014). Interpretations of such 
interplay highlight the mutually reinforcing and constitutive relationship between 
preferences and institutions. On the one hand is the argument that institutions are 
shaped by the preferences of actors that have come into power; on the other hand, is the 
assertion that institutions influence the manner in which actors define their preferences. 
Although the debate over which comes first – preferences or institutions – remains 
problematic, there is an acknowledgment of the importance of incorporating both 
variables when explaining the “rush to free trade” thesis. From a historical perspective, 
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significant changes in trade policies have been induced by radical transformations in 
domestic political regimes. Although not all regime changes have embraced the free trade 
philosophy as a means for economic development, drastic changes in customary trade 
policy are accompanied by such transformations (Grossman, 2002; Mansfield and 
Pevehouse, 2006; Mansfield and Reinhardt, 2008; López-Córdova et al., 2008; Cheibub et 
al., 2012).  
 
Shifts in the international political system 
Beyond national frontiers lie a number of factors that can also influence the 
configuration of domestic trade policies. Some scholars have hypothesised that the 
distribution of capabilities in the international system has underlying impacts toward the 
general conduct of free trade. For instance, the application of the hegemonic stability 
theory (HST) suggests that when the international system vis-à-vis global economy is 
dominated by a single, most powerful country – that is, a hegemon – free trade is likely 
to advance.69 However, others have criticised the theoretical and empirical soundness of 
the HST. Some of them have argued that large, powerful states must always favour 
optimum tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade, while others have postulated that small 
numbers of powerful states could also establish and maintain an open trade system aside 
from a single hegemon (Keohane, 1983; Milner, 1999; Kurtz, 2002). Still others have 
suggested that a hegemonic power is neither essential nor adequate for managing a 
liberalised trading environment (Krasner, 1976; Keohane, 1984; Mansfield, 1994; Lobell, 
2005; Norrlof, 2010; Lieber, 2012).  
 Understandably, scholars and experts have tried to analyse the actions of the 
United States as the world’s prevailing hegemon. While some of them have underscored 
the enduring primacy of American hegemony in the twenty-first century, others have 
warned about the imminent effects of the weakening of US influence over the current 
arrangement of the international system. On the one hand, “optimists” argue in favour 
of the steady proliferation of Western ideals and values encapsulated in the free market 
economy permeating various regions across the globe including the former communist 
governments.70 The continued presence of dominant American powers in the 
                                                 
69
 See for example, Krasner ‘s (1976) ‘State Power and the Structure of International Trade; Gilpin’s 
(1987) Political Economy of International Relations; Yarbrough and Yarbrough’s (1992) Cooperation 
and Governance in International Trade;  Gowa’s (1994) Allies, Adversaries, and International Trade.
 
70
 See for example, Kiely’s (2006) The New Political Economy of Development; Norrlof’s (2010) 
America's Global Advantage; Edelman’s (2010) ‘A Special Relationship in Jeopardy’; Drezner’s (2012) 
‘Predictions about the death of American Hegemony.’  
77 
 
international system provide the impetus for the progressive removal of various 
protectionist measures, specifically within developing and least developed regions where 
bilateral pressures to open up have been staunchly supported by the US government 
(Milner, 1999; Norrlof, 2010; Desai, 2013). On the other hand, “sceptics” predict the 
impending decline of American hegemonic power that might result in the breakdown of 
the global economy into competing regional blocs and ultimately resurrect protectionist 
policies and principles.71  
 Meanwhile, proponents of liberal institutionalism focus on the influential role 
played by different international institutions. While most debates primarily challenge the 
importance of establishing international institutions and whether or not conferring a 
considerable degree of legitimacy and authority to them can be justified, the discernible 
willingness of countries to comply with codified rules of conduct underscores their 
intrinsic value.72 As a whole, international institutions fulfil three main functions: as a 
compliance monitoring system; as a dispute settlement mechanism; and as a norm-
building framework (Ruggie, 1982; Keohane, 1984; Milner, 1999; Rosendorf and Milner, 
2001; Goldstein et al., 2007; Mansfield and Reinhardt, 2008).  
 Another important dimension of indiscriminate free trade that affects the general 
course of free trade relates to distinct variations with respect to the trade performance of 
individual countries that usually results in widening growth and development inequalities. 
On the one hand, are powerful trading players enhancing their market competitiveness 
by exploiting the accruing economies of scale; and on the other hand, are weak trading 
players failing to sustain the balance of payments equilibrium amid increased economic 
activity, and resorting to deflationary measures to secure external balance. 73 A weak trade 
performance coupled with domestic deflationary measures results in further diminution 
of economic growth as countries fail to take advantage of increasing returns that coincide 
with heightened levels of economic activity (Levy, 1997; Gomes, 2003; DeDarosa and 
Gilbert, 2006; Unger, 2010). The existence of virtuous cycles of growth and vicious 
cycles of decline implies that free trade benefits are not evenly distributed among 
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participants. Therefore, critics of free trade have argued that the global trading system 
must take into consideration the ex-ante conditions of its members.74 Thus, establishing a 
system equipped with vital instruments to support the balanced development of the 
international economy is crucial to ensuring that small nations are provided with the 
necessary policy space. 
 Historical structuralists study the inexorable problem of power hierarchy between 
core and periphery states where powerful and affluent core economies dominate and 
exploit the weak and poverty-stricken periphery economies (Charusheela, 2004; Devetak, 
2005; Cimoli and Porcile, 2010). They argue that both developing and least developed 
countries have become the most vigorous participants in the international trading system 
even if it is against their own will. These periphery states are being constrained from 
undertaking the same development path that enabled the rich and powerful countries to 
grow economically and develop over time. Instead, they are compelled to adopt one-size-
fits-all policies even when they are counterintuitive to their development agenda and 
strategy.75  
 It is from this perspective that the inequality embedded in international trade 
rounds becomes evident. While the developed countries of the North continue to reap 
tangible benefits in trade in services and intellectual property rights, the developing and 
least developed countries of the South are forced to resign themselves to the promises of 
probable future gains in sensitive sectors such as agriculture and textiles (Dunning, 2000; 
Wolfe, 2004; Weis, 2005; Steger 2007; Jackson, 2008). As Make Poverty History (MPH), 
an international non-government organisation concerned with the global management of 
trade, states in its manifesto: 
 
The rules of international trade are stacked in favour of the most powerful countries and 
their businesses. On the one hand, these rules allow rich countries to pay their farmers and 
companies, subsidies to export food - destroying the livelihoods of poor farmers. On the 
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other, poverty eradication, human rights and environmental protection come a poor second 
to the goal of eliminating trade barriers. We need trade justice not free trade.76 
       
 The most salient criticism of free trade rhetoric perhaps is the commonly held 
view among smaller, weaker states that process is structurally biased in favour of the 
powerful, developed countries. After securing their respective advantage positions 
through the employment of policies that severely constrained global trade in the past, the 
same group of countries are demanding the rest of the world to completely eliminate all 
forms of barriers to trade (Rodrik, 1998, 2002, 2011; Thirwall and Pacheco-Lopez, 2008; 
Irwin, 2009;). This implies that the distinctive interests pursued by individual countries in 
free trade are also a function of their relative positions in the existing international order.  
 These observations underline the utility of protectionism, particularly during the 
early stages of economic development. For instance, some scholars have argued that 
protectionist policies cushion the impact of external shocks on human and physical 
capital by giving infant industries the necessary space to adapt to the new market 
conditions engendered by free trade. In doing so, it might be imperative to throw some 
sand in the wheels of aggressive market liberalisation in order to balance the seemingly 
contradicting objectives of achieving global economic stability, on the one hand, and 
maintaining domestic policy autonomy, on the other (Bhagwati, 1990; Krueger, 1996; 
Roberts, 2006; Watson and James, 2013). Accordingly, national governments are advised 
to exercise caution in the process of indiscriminate trade liberalisation as prevailing 
economic conditions vary between states and across time. Policy mechanisms need to be 
conceptualised based on the existing economic contexts by providing greater room for 
flexibility than usual within orthodox free trade theories.  
 
2.2.C MULTILATERALISM VERSUS PREFERENTIALISM   
 
The multilateral free trade 
As far as the pro-free trade scholars are concerned, preferential FTAs – both bilateral 
and minilateral – are designed to transform participating countries into multilateral free 
traders.77 As the WTO’s former secretary-general Pascal Lamy (2006) has noted:   
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Those taking part in bilateral agreements should be prepared to lead the way and show 
support for multilateralism by narrowing the gap between regional trade agreement 
commitments and GATS [General Agreements on Trade in Services] offers. In any event, 
the benefits that developing countries can get in return for their service commitments, is 
much greater in the WTO than in bilateral agreements. 
 
 While the current impasse of the Doha negotiation rounds provides a rational 
justification for WTO members to engage more in preferential FTAs, these should not 
be viewed as an easy escape. Walking away from the WTO where preferential FTAs find 
positive meanings does not offer any long-term solution to the problem considering the 
political, economic and systemic values of multilateral trade (Tandon and Allardice, 2005; 
Dupont and Elsig, 2012). Thus, “if the multilateral system dies away, so does the positive 
potential of regional trade agreements” (Lamy, 2006).   
 Several scholars focusing on the impacts of preferential FTAs on multilateralism 
have argued that they weaken the much needed political support for maintain a healthy 
and effective multilateral trading system (Ito and Krueger, 1997; Bhagwati, 2008; 
Karacaovalia and Limão, 2008; Baldwin and Freund, 2011; Krishna, 2014). The revival of 
regionalism is viewed as a rather unfortunate event but is expected to steadily gain 
momentum given its strong political appeal. The greater the political popularity a 
particular preferential FTA has, the greater its propensity to weaken the political will 
necessary for broadening the multilateral trade. Provisional agreements offering very 
large gains at very low costs, such as bilateral and plurilateral FTAs, significantly 
undermine the political support base for multilateralism.  
 Some economists and trade experts have developed models for assessing the 
contribution of regional trading blocs to the undermining of the multilateral trade 
system. Their studies revealed that if global trade is divided into several symmetrical 
trading blocs, where each bloc has the wherewithal to set its terms of trade to take 
advantage of its market power, overall welfare is reduced even as they enhance the 
welfare of individual members.78 According to these studies, the net effect of 
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regionalisation is the reduction in aggregate levels of global welfare. These observations 
further reinforce the widespread concerns over the increasing regionalisation of 
international trade agreements.        
 Furthermore, when bilateral FTAs provide disproportionate gains and benefits to 
major agents in any state, their reservation utility is pushed above the multilateral FTA 
levels agreements (Levy, 1997; Limão, 2006; Albertin, 2008; Baldwin and Fruend, 2011; 
Aggarwal and Urata, 2013). This makes multilateral agreements politically infeasible, 
thereby impeding further multilateral trade negotiations. Such undermining is more likely 
to occur in bilateral FTAs between two countries with comparable factor endowments 
and relatively indifferent median voters. A country anticipating future bilateral trade deals 
with its preferred trading partner(s) may choose to withdraw from its future multilateral 
commitments and sign these bilateral agreements before the conclusion of the 
multilateral agreements. In the process, countries tend to lose incentives from pursuing 
multilateralism to the next level.  
 Under a two-good Hecksher-Ohlin model, for example, when multilateral 
agreements produce relative prices that are similar to those in bilateral agreements, the 
motivation to trade on a multilateral basis is undercut (Gomes, 2003; Findaly et al., 2006; 
Aggarwal and Urata, 2013). Introducing product varieties and increasing returns to scale 
in the model – such that median voters adversely affected by inimical price shifts are 
compensated through enhanced variety gains – enables the passage of agreements that 
otherwise would not have been politically feasible. Further, the types of bilateral FTAs 
that can be expected to strengthen political support for multilateral trade are those that 
leave the median voter’s utility unchanged by combining price shifts with variety gains. 
That is, bilateral FTAs between two countries that have different capital-labour ratios 
(Levy, 1997; Itoh and Negishi, 2001; Chauffour and Maur, 2011).   
 Not surprisingly, the WTO has argued that excessive preferential FTAs not only 
create confusion and disorder in the world trade system given their complicated rules of 
origin and convoluted administrative rules, they also help facilitate new channels for 
corruption (Crawford and Laird, 2001; Low, 2011). At the same time, the World Bank 
(2004) has warned about the built in externalities that FTAs might pose to the general 
health of the multilateral trading environment. Such impediments to multilateralism can 
be overcome if states are encouraged to maintain strong commitments to multilateral 
trade liberalisation while controlling their dependence on preferential FTAs. However, 
these multilateral institutions bend to accommodate much of the wishes and desires of 
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their most powerful members to sustain their power and relevance in the international 
arena.  
 Some studies have examined the extent to which highly industrialised states make 
room to move under the WTO. The findings suggest that developed countries have 
formulated global rules that not only regulate their actions but also grant them adequate 
space for implementing policies that help expand their respective comparative advantages 
(Smith, 2004; Weiss, 2005; Brown and Pauwelyn, 2010; VanGrasstek, 2013). In other 
words, members do not simply find space to manoeuvre, but set in motion innovative 
strategies to recreate that space. Therefore, the WTO is viewed by critics as an upgrading 
mechanism designed for the further advancement of the interests of wealthy, developed 
economies. For the rest of the developing world, it acts as a development-constraining 
device that prevents poor countries from exploiting their comparative advantages (Peet, 
2003; Hoekman and Mavroidis, 2007; Drabek and Woo, 2010; Joseph, 2013). 
 Professor Jack Jackson – considered by many as the father of trade law – has 
identified seven mantras religiously recited in the WTO to prevent their members from 
discussing the more pressing issues plaguing the institution. They are the following: 
government to government organisation; member-driven organisation; decisions taken 
by consensus; preservation of national sovereignty at all costs; single undertaking; MFN 
as sacrosanct principle; and the requirements for early deliverables (in Steger, 2007: 487-
488). This constellation of mantras provides a theology or explanation for the way 
decisions are made in the WTO. Consequently, they undermine the discussions of more 
relevant issues including the WTO’s proper mandates; its relationship with the outside 
world; the role of development organisation’s trade rounds and agendas; and the effects 
of proliferating regional FTAs on the multilateral trading system. Thus, from the 
perspective of the disillusioned members – mostly countries from the developing and 
least developed regions – the closed and non-transparent nature of the WTO perpetuates 
the inequalities embedded in a multilateral trade system (Rodrik, 2001, 2002; Stiglitz, 
2002; Weiler, 2009; Burri, 2010). 
 The existing WTO rule is “one country one vote,” with members having the 
right to veto proposals that they do not agree with. To this extent, that WTO may be 
seen as “egalitarian” since its decision-making procedures disregard individual financial 
contributions of its members unlike in other international institutions such as the IMF 
and the World Bank (Woods and Narlikar, 2001; Langely, 2004; Woods and Lombardi, 
2006; Thirkell-White, 2007). In practice, however, the existing asymmetrical power 
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relations among members determine the final form of WTO agreements. Some states are 
simply more capable than others when manipulating trade agendas according to the 
dictates of their respective national interests. In addition, factors relating to the 
differences in institutional capacity among members to pursue their trade objectives 
underscore some of the fundamental inequalities within the WTO (Smith, 2004; Weiss, 
2005; Gallagher, 2008; Jackson, 2008). 
 Success negotiating multilateral trade agreements that encapsulate national 
interests largely depends on the member’s overall competencies and access to technical 
know-how as it engages in multifaceted, across-the-board dialogues with other countries. 
Howevery, due to resource constraints the developing world is under-represented, and, 
therefore disadvantaged by the system. For instance, while moves toward the 
establishment of binding, third-party arbitration in international law – as in the case of 
Appellate Body under WTO’s Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) – is expected to 
favour small, weak countries, ironically, the loudest oppositions and most radical reforms 
proposed have come from this very same group (Smith, 2004; Goldstein et al., 2007; 
Davis and Bermeo, 2009; Shaffer and Ortiz, 2010). Moreover, the quasi-judicial nature of 
the Appellate Body may sometimes interfere with the objectives of developing and least 
developed countries. When it does, it further aggravates existing inequalities. While 
conventional wisdom hints that legalisation benefits the developing world by exposing 
opportunistic behaviours and conducts of the developed world, its distributive impact 
largely depends on details of institutional design and evolution (Smith, 2004; Janow et al., 
2008; Shaffer and Ortiz, 2014).  
 Thus, critics argue that it is high time for the WTO to undergo a major overhaul 
to rescue multilateralism from the encroaching effects of preferential FTAs (Georgiev 
and van der Borght, 2006; Sampson and Chambers, 2008; Bohne, 2010; Hoekman, 
2012). In doing so, members are encouraged to free themselves from the irrelevant 
mantras that hamper the effectiveness of the multilateral trade system. Substantial 
institutional reforms must be adopted to transform it into a relevant and responsive 
international organisation amid shifting government preferences with regard to their 
“most-favoured” forms of trade arrangements. Until then, countries are compelled to 
continue to invest in preferential FTAs.  
 Overall, multilateralism represents a jubilant liberalism spearheaded by 
international institutions – a biting sting that realism cannot simply ignore. Through the 
WTO, (neo) liberals can show how the adoption of and emphasis on ideological 
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consensus can facilitate cooperation among competing states despite their preoccupation 
over relative gains. At the same time, the experience with multilateral free trade reveals 
that the liberal thesis does not entirely reject the critic that conflicts and disagreements 
can also arise from the unequal distributions of economic gains. Under multilateralism, 
tensions are heightened more by concerns for optimal economic growth than the zero-
sum security dilemma. To this extent, it can be inferred that traditional economic factors 
drive and sustain the multilateral trade system more than geopolitical and/or geo-
strategic considerations. In other words, the security-trade linkages under multilateralism 
highlight the primacy of economic motives over the politico-strategic ones.  
 
The preferential free trade 
Empirical studies using ex-ante data such as the comparative general equilibrium analysis 
(CGE) have revealed preferential FTAs generating a small net positive effect on welfare. 
This is particularly true when large, developed economies are excluded from these trade 
agreements.79 Meanwhile, econometric studies using ex-post data such as the gravity 
model have shown that geographic distance between two prospective trading partners is 
statistically significant in determining the flow of trade between them.80 For instance, 
some have estimated that trade flow decreases by one percent for every two percent 
increase in distance between trade partners (Frankel et al., 1997; Martinez-Zarzoso and 
Nowak-Lehmann, 2003; Carrillo-Tudela and Li, 2004).  
 Both the CGE and gravity models, however, suffer crucial limitations that make 
their findings hardly conclusive: they exclude other important non-economic variables 
such as political and strategic factors in their analysis of FTAs. The results generated 
from these econometric techniques, therefore, provide incomplete information about the 
causes and effects of preferential FTAs both at bilateral and minilateral levels. 
Nevertheless, based on various statistical analyses conducted on preferential trade, 
economically advanced members, in general, enjoy a higher-than-average trade expansion 
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from FTA creation. Although preferential FTAs have the capacity for increasing trade as 
a whole, the distribution of economic gains and benefits among members is highly 
asymmetrical. That said, why does the number of countries engaging in preferential 
FTAs continue to increase despite the disproportionate gains that accrue to members? 
Similarly, why do small, weak countries seem to accommodate and put up with the trade 
policies and agreements designed and imposed by large, powerful countries despite being 
short-changed?   
 Countries actively searching for greater market access are logically drawn to the 
enticing prospects of signing preferential FTAs, particularly at a time of multilateral trade 
impasse in the WTO. Several economists and trade experts have long argued that 
preferential FTAs promote deeper economic integration by performing a unique dual 
locking function of “locking-out competition and locking-in investment” (Krueger, 1997; 
Hertel, 1999; Baier and Bergstrand, 2004, 2007). The “locking in” function refers to 
sensitive issues annexed to specific bilateral and/or minilateral FTAs that are not tackled 
multilaterally such as trade in services, investments, environment and labour standards. 
The feasibility of incorporating these non-traditional issues makes them particularly 
attractive to countries interested in pursuing such aspects of free trade. The “locking 
out” function relates to the discriminatory impact inherent in both bilateral and 
minilateral FTAs. For instance, the less efficient countries included in a minilateral FTA 
are able to secure huge gains from sectors where they do not have comparative 
advantages, and capture large portions of foreign direct investments (FDIs) coming from 
the developed members since they have preferential access.   
 Paradoxically, the locking-out effects of preferential FTAs underline their 
fundamental limitations that can either reverse or nullify their positive contributions to 
the world economy. There are several reasons for such argument against FTA 
proliferation. First, the self-erosion of promised preferential access is a serious problem 
that is typically associated with the mushrooming of bilateral and minilateral FTAs. The 
identical market preferences and concessions offered by an FTA initiator to a number of 
potential trade partners under different FTAs undermine the preferential treatment that 
it has initially offered to the original partner under the first FTA (Bhagwati, 2008; Kawai 
and Wignaraja, 2009, 2010; Mansfield and Milner, 2012). 
 Second, preferential FTAs are notorious for their trade diversion effects that 
enable inferior products coming from uncompetitive markets to dislodge more superior 
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products produced elsewhere.81 The convoluted rules of origin and continued 
implementation of restrictions on sensitive products force exporters to adopt the 
multilateral instead of the plurilateral rates. In essence, the number of preferential FTAs 
resulting into “complete” free trade among members is very small (Crawford and Laird, 
2001; Baldwin and Freund, 2011; Saggi and Yildiz, 2011; Francois and Manchin, 2013). 
Moreover, despite the issues surrounding the multilateral Dispute Settlement Mechanism 
(DSM) of the WTO, there are no bilateral or plurilateral counterparts that can match the 
benefits derived from the general application of its rulings (Jo and Namgung, 2012; 
Chase et al., 2013).  
 Third, the intensification of regional and transregional FTAs also creates four 
types of discriminatory effects: “bandwagon effect”; “domino effect”; “spaghetti bowl 
effect”; and “addictive regionalism.” The bandwagoning effect of FTAs is demonstrated 
when countries hastily conclude FTAs upon learning that other countries have already 
signed their own (Bhagwati, 1991, 2008; Katada and Solis, 2008; Solis, 2009). The 
domino effect underlines the contagious impact of FTAs that drives countries into 
signing FTAs that they have formerly rejected to counter the threat of further exclusion 
and prevent impending discriminations (Baldwin, 1997; Ravenhill, 2008; Baldwin and 
Jaimovich, 2010). In the process, the marked increased in the number of FTAs driven by 
bandwagoning and domino effects produce complicated tariff differentiation procedures 
designed to accommodate domestic preferences.  
 These crisscrossing lines of FTAs can be likened to strands of spaghetti tangled 
in a bowl, hence the term spaghetti bowl effect (Bhagwati, 1995; Horaguchi, 2007; Kawai 
and Wignaraja, 2010). Finally, the seemingly insatiable appetite for FTAs can be a 
symptom of addictive regionalism where countries indiscriminately forge preferential 
trade relations with all possible trading partners (Baldwin, 2006; Baldwin and Jaimovich, 
2010). This scenario can be very threatening particularly to periphery and semi-periphery 
countries in the developing world with no huge markets to offer, leading to their further 
marginalisation and discrimination in the international system. Such infatuation with 
preferential FTAs conveniently justifies the neglect of WTO rules and procedures by 
some of its key members, particularly the wealthy and powerful ones.  
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 Overall, numerous scholars have asserted that the economic benefits derived 
from preferential FTAs are sub-optimal compared to those that can be gained via 
multilateral trade. They must be viewed as positional goods since their expected worth is 
based on the theoretical assumption that they come in limited supply (Hirsch, 1945; 
Bhagwati and Panagariya, 1999; Nesadurai, 2003 Higgott, 2004; Karacaovali and Limão, 
2008). Therefore, the continuous proliferation of FTAs has “diminishing marginal 
utility” effect particularly for smaller trading countries since their relevance depends on 
the condition that the rest of the world do not have them.  
 However, beyond the economic considerations for pursuing preferential FTAs 
are strategic motives for establishing political alliances. Such prospect does not come 
cheap since the price paid by small countries for entering into a preferential FTA with a 
powerful country is full commitment and support to border policy positions of the latter. 
Thus, preferential FTAs do not necessarily recalibrate power imbalances between 
partners since the bilateral advantage is much smaller than what countries are afforded 
under multilateral trade.  
 There are a number of vital politico-strategic concerns that influence 
governments’ decision to either pursue or defer preferential FTAs: consolidating peace 
and enhancing regional security; augmenting bargaining power in multilateral 
negotiations; establishing good governance; averting relapse on significant politico-
economic reforms already made; and forging vital geopolitical coalitions through 
strengthening of diplomatic ties.82 These objectives highlight the politico-strategic 
impetus for the continuous proliferation of regional and transregional FTAs where 
strong political support is rewarded by improved preferential access to huge markets. 
Such motivations tend to eclipse the role of economic incentives as drivers of 
preferential FTAs.   
 So why do small, weak countries willingly accept the rules and regulations at 
regional or transregional levels that they are not ready to accept at the multilateral level? 
For the critics of multilateralism, the answers are not hard to find. For instance, Walden 
Bello (2003) has used the term “multilateral punishment” to describe a remorseful 
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experience of developing and least developed members of the WTO. These poor 
countries continue to witness their interests hijacked by powerful WTO members during 
trade negotiations. This compels them to enter into preferential FTAs where they hope 
to secure part of those interests previously discarded at multilateral rounds (Smith, 2004; 
Weiss, 2005; Gallagher, 2008; Jackson, 2008; Joseph, 2013).  
 Furthermore, there is an important policy phenomenon that is currently shaping 
American foreign policies, causing the shift away from multilateralism to preferential 
FTAs. Richard Higgott (2004, 2006) calls this the “securitisation” of foreign economic 
policy.83 In doing so, the US has utilised its remaining hegemonic power in consolidating 
foreign economic and security policies toward the securitisation of economic 
globalisation that is now increasingly viewed as a security problem rather than a benefit. 
Following this logic of securitisation, free trade – widely regarded as the engine for 
economic globalisation – is now interpreted as a security issue that needs to be 
securitised (Higgott, 2004, 2006; Paniagua and Hernandez, 2011). 
 One way through which the rich and powerful countries, particularly the US, 
securitise free trade is by developing preferential FTAs and offering them to select 
targets preferably their small allied partners. In this context, bilateral and minilateral 
FTAs are like “brownie points” that are being awarded to countries pledging support for 
their wider politico-strategic agendas. Juxtaposing Buzan et al’s (1998) securitisation 
theory vis-a-vis Higgot’s (2003) securitisation of economic globalisation thesis, the 
security-trade linkages under preferentialism is a story of periphery and semi-periphery 
countries responding to the increasing consolidation of security and trade policy domains 
initiated by the core countries to counter both traditional and nontraditional security 
threats engendered by the post-September 11 international arrangements.  
 Based on this conceptualisation, preferential FTAs are now considered vital 
components of the core countries’ artillery of influence. They usefully contain potential 
threats against state security vis-à-vis human security and thus, go beyond their 
archetypal role as instruments of economic statecraft. The whole process of free trade is 
now framed as a security agenda and at its core are preferential bilateral and minilateral 
FTAs. Accordingly, the free trade rhetoric is embedded into the wider security logic. This 
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implies that free trade objectives are examined not only through the economic lens, but 
through the security lens as well.  Through the consolidation of security interests and free 
trade objectives, preferential FTAs acquire a vital politico-strategic dimension aside from 
their traditional economic dimension.  
 In the post- September 11 world order, there has been a widespread perception 
that the US is increasingly deviating away from a multilateral track as it seeks to define its 
national interests mainly in security terms (Krishna and Mitra, 2003; Higgott, 2004; 
Prestowitz, 2004; Schaefer, 2007; Brewster, 2009).  The shift toward a more 
unilateralist approach with respect to policy positions is evident in the reforms 
introduced by the prominent multilateral economic institutions including the World 
Bank, the IMF and the WTO.84 Even prior to 11 September 2001, the unilateralist stance 
of the US had already been manifested when it walked away from a number of 
controversial multilateral dialogues such the Kyoto Protocol, International Criminal 
Court, Germ Weapons Ban, and the Trade in Light Arms Treaty.  Thus, under the Bush 
administration, American foreign economic policies were designed to manipulate the 
forces of globalisation rather than reignite the economic dictum of laissez-faire. By 
adopting a more nationalist stance in managing economic globalisation, the US was 
poised to energise its weakening politico-economic hegemony at the expense of others 
using the pretext of “war on terror” (Fandl, 2003; Prestowitz, 2004; Higgott, 2004; 
White, 2005; Lang, 2006).  
 This “paradigm shift” in US foreign economic policy making is reflected in the 
government’s increasing ambivalence toward multilateral institutions, particularly with 
respect to the WTO. There are at least two intertwined reasons that prompt such 
attitude: first, within the WTO, the collective power of EU members is viewed to be 
closely at par with that of the US; and second, the establishment of the WTO-DSM has 
severely constrained America’s propensity to act according to its terms (Jackson, 1997; 
Higgott, 2003, 2004; Brown, 2004). There is a looming concern within trade policy 
communities in the United States that by agreeing to the rules and regulations set by the 
WTO-DSM the government is virtually trading off its aggressive unilateralist trade 
strategy in exchange for the multilateral assertiveness of the said body (Elliott and 
Hufbauer, 2002; Patrick and Forman, 2002; Howse, 2007).  
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 In short, the US now has to deal with more restrictions than ever, which 
effectively curtail its unilateral power. Although traditionally America’s commitment to 
multilateralism has been resolutely articulated in its economic policy agendas, its 
prevailing unilateralist stance has triggered the proliferation of preferential FTAs, which 
it started to offer as bargaining chips to the so-called “coalition of the willing.”85 
Although the US has never ceased in expressing its strong rhetorical commitment to 
multilateral trade negotiations, the imposition of emergency tariffs in its sensitive 
domestic sectors, as well as the expansion of agricultural subsidies has emphasised the 
disconnect between theory and practice (Moore, 2003; Brown and Stern, 2011; Becroft, 
2012). Stephen Krasner (1999) has described such practice as a form of “organised 
hypocrisy.” 
 The manner in which preferential FTAs have proliferated is a clear indication of 
the intensifying unilateral stance in US foreign policymaking. At present, the US is 
investing more time and effort in securing bilateral trade deals rather than working to 
gain consensus on sensitive trade issues in the WTO. Consequently, such practice casts 
doubt on America’s intentions for saving multilateralism. As former US Trade 
Representative Robert Zoellick (in Higgott, 2003: 26) succinctly puts it, an FTA is not a 
guaranteed right but a privilege that can be earned by prospective partners by pledging 
support for American foreign policy objectives particularly with respect to its wider 
security agenda. The rewarding of bilateral FTAs to allied countries is a strategy for 
building a “coalition of liberalisers” that allows the US to maintain a central role in the 
expansion of free trade enterprise and other neoliberal values.86   
 The current inclination of developing and least developed countries toward 
securing preferential FTAs with the US or with other powerful countries, cannot be 
dismissed as plain “economic irrationality.” In some cases, policy elites in small countries 
are being compelled to enter into uncoordinated bilateral decision-making processes with 
advanced countries if only to create a false impression of control over their national 
policy proceedings despite the expected mediocre results (Bhagwati, 2003; Panagariya, 
2004; Medvedev, 2006; Aggarwal and Koo, 2008). There is a growing desire among poor 
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nations to solidify their ties with the current superpowers given the ever-increasing 
scepticism toward any meaningful reforms in the multilateral trading system. In this 
context, preferential FTAs can be interpreted as “statements of sovereignty” by small 
countries, particularly at a time when they have little to no influence in WTO 
negotiations. Hence, while the “hubs” view preferential FTAs as strategic devices for 
encouraging and incentivising loyal followers in their pursuit of wider politico-strategic 
agendas such as the war on terrorism, the “spokes” on the other hand, treat them as 
valuable policy tools.87 
 Overall, the manner in which powerful countries, particularly the US, have 
managed their preferential FTAs after the September 11 events reveals how fundamental 
politico-strategic motives drive and sustain preferential bilateral and minilateral FTAs 
more than traditional economic considerations. As such, security-trade linkages under 




Countries continue to trade in the twenty-first century for two main reasons – economic 
motives and politico-strategic motives. The two are not mutually exclusive but are 
mutually reinforcing. Against the backdrop of free trade, economic motives are not 
purely and exclusively “economics” but are politico-strategic motives as well. Similarly, 
politico-strategic motives are not purely and exclusively “politico-strategic” but are 
economic motives as well. On the one hand, the balance between economic and politico-
strategic motives within the ambit of multilateral trade tilts in favour of the former, 
which represents the non-traditional, human-centric security dimension of cohabitative 
security. On the other hand, the balance between economic and politico-strategic 
motives in the context of preferential trade tilts in favour of the latter, which represents 
the traditional, state-centric security dimension of cohabitative security.  
 The liberal thesis refocuses the attention of states to the economic benefits of 
free trade where human-centric interests trump state-centric interests. The realist thesis 
emphasises inescapable linkages between security and trade where state-centric security 
interests subjugate all other forms of interests. The decision of states about how they 
want to view the utility function of their free trade activities (economic tool versus 
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politico-strategic tool) depends on their relative positions in the international arena (core 
versus periphery or semi-periphery). However, as shown in this chapter, that decision 
does not seem to be in the hands of the developing and least developed countries, but is 
the responsibility of developed countries. Under both multilateral and preferential free 
trade, the rich, powerful states that have absolute political, economic and strategic 
advantages over the poor, weak states that have absolute political, economic and strategic 
disadvantages.  
 Regardless of how advanced economies frame the rhetoric of free trade (whether 
substantive or tactical), the developing and least developed states are left with only one 
choice. That “choice” is to accept and follow the terms and conditions that apply to 
these free trade accords unless they are willing to be left behind. The reason for this 
behaviour is that they need the developed countries more than the developed countries 
need them. Hence, countries that consider themselves as part of the “coalition of the 
willing” must be prepared to embrace and adapt to these security-trade dynamics in order 























OVERVIEW OF EAST ASIAN SECURITY-TRADE LINKAGES 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
The framing of East Asian security-trade nexus requires a detailed assessment of the 
present conditions that are shaping the region: from the rise of new “Asian tigers” to the 
gradual setting of the Japanese red sun; from China’s highly anticipated “second coming” 
to the impending second-best position of the US in the international scene; from the 
barrenness of Singaporean and Taiwanese islands to their astonishing transformations 
into global city-hubs; and from the damp sick-beds of Malaysia and the Philippines to 
their patchy rides toward “first-worldism.”  These constantly shifting geo-political, geo-
strategic, and geo-economic dynamics play a crucial role in understanding the linking 
efforts and strategies of East Asian countries in the twenty-first century.  
 In this Chapter I present an overview of the security-trade linking process that is 
being carried out under the purview of the two most prominent regional institutions in 
East Asia, namely, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and the Association 
of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).88 In Section 3.2 I identify some of the most 
crucial factors that have come to shape East Asian security-trade linkages in general: (i) 
changing views toward free trade; (ii) lethargic multilateral trade forum; (iii) from rush to 
free trade to rush to preferential FTAs; (iv) the Asian crisis’ contagion effect; and (v) the 
need for strategic diplomacy. In Section 3.3 I examine in greater details the dynamics 
involved in linking security interests and free trade activities at the regional level using 
APEC and ASEAN as primary cases, and highlights the specific dimensions vis-à-vis 
elements of cohabitative security that drive these linkages. Finally, in Section 3.4 I 
conclude by arguing that both APEC and ASEAN members tend to apply a double-
standard when linking security issues with their respective free trade agendas: their 
willingness to annex state-centric security issues vis-à-vis their reluctance to incorporate 
people-centric security concerns. 
 
3.2 KEY FACTORS UNDERPINNING THE EAST-ASIAN LINKAGES 
 
3.2.1 Changing views toward free trade 
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During the 1980s, East Asian countries began to break free from their long-standing 
neo-mercantilist tradition of promoting and protecting strategic export industries as they 
gradually embraced neoliberal policies (Beeson and Islam, 2005; Dent, 2006). For 
instance, the “de-securitisation” of American foreign economic policy at the end of the 
Cold War has put significant pressure on these countries to liberalise their domestic 
markets that have become heavily reliant upon the rapid growth induced by industrial 
protectionist policies under the American nuclear umbrella program (Koo, 2013). Since 
then, the initiatives for free trade agreements have started to gain momentum and by the 
1990s, a significant number of Asian countries have embraced the idea of developing and 
implementing new forms of trade agreements. However, such observation does not hold 
true for the entire region since it did not result in an absolute neglect of nationalistic 
preferences as reflected by the reluctant attitude of both developed (Japan and South 
Korea) and developing countries (Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines) toward 
complete abolishment of tariff and non-tariff barriers particularly in sensitive sectors. 
 Second, concerning the optimal approach to free trade, Asian countries in general 
have traditionally preferred the multilateral trading system to bilateral and plurilateral 
arrangements (Dent, 2003; Bergsten, 2007; Urata, 2013). There was a widely held view 
that trade liberalisation at the multilateral level was the best path toward economic 
growth and development. Efforts directed toward the creation of preferential free trade 
were initially sidetracked as they were believed to undermine the necessary multilateral 
trade environment, and as such, were deemed inferior alternatives. This shift to a 
neoliberal trade paradigm has consequently transformed East Asia’s security realm given 
that any attempt at regional integration will only be successful if the plan carefully 
integrates the overarching security domain.  
 While the intensifying webs of complex interdependence have propagated the 
notion of harmony of interests among independent states, ironically, it has also generated 
“collective insecurities” that threaten not only the territorial boundaries of the states 
(traditional state security) but also the welfare of people and their communities (non-
traditional human security). These new forms of insecurities provided an impetus for 
launching comprehensive regional dialogues to discuss the feasibility of developing 
cooperative security frameworks anchored in the efficient facilitation of free trade. The 
pre-existing levels of economic interdependence among Asian countries with respect to 
trade, commerce, and flows of resources have served as preliminary building blocks for 
the statist and humanist linking of security interests and free trade activities.  Before the 
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1990s, a few unsuccessful security dialogues were launched in the region including the 
Asia and Pacific Council (APC) and the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SATO), 
which collapsed in 1975 and 1977 respectively.  Nevertheless, the efforts put into these 
initiatives were not entirely wasted as they paved the way for the development of other 
sub-regional forums such as the ASEAN that was established in 1967 and has since 
evolved into an ASEAN Community.89 The creation of the ASEAN Free Trade Area 
(AFTA) in 1992 and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in 1994 under the auspices of 
the AEC and the APSC respectively have consolidated efforts toward the linking of 
security and trade realms. Although the intensification of free trade was clearly not the 
main objective of the ARF, in the same way that security was not the utmost concern of 
the AFTA, nonetheless, the changing regional landscape has muddled the lines that 
separated them. Aside from the ASEAN, several regional institutions designed to 
enhance regional cooperation have also been established including APEC in 1989 and 
the East Asian Summit (EAS) in 2005. As mentioned earlier, this Chapter particularly 
examines the present APEC and ASEAN cases and analyses the dynamics involved in 
the linking of security interests and free trade activities at the regional level.  
 
3.2.2 Lethargic multilateral trade forum 
The sluggishness of the WTO to adopt crucial trade and nontrade-related reforms has 
resulted in a loss of appetite for intensified multilateralism. One of the most highly 
contested issues confronting the institution aside from classical economic considerations 
relates to the incorporation of non-traditional security issues into the multilateral trade 
agenda (Axworthy, 1997; Dosch, 2003; Caballero-Anthony, 2004; Cooper et al., 2007). 
The balancing of diverse and often conflicting national interests pursued by all members 
has proved to be the biggest obstacle in moving forward with the new multilateral 
negotiation rounds. The so-called “north-south” and “east-west” divides between 
developed and developing countries that led to the infamous Seattle debacle in 1999 
underlined some of the fundamental difficulties in maintaining a mutually satisfying 
multilateralism. On the one hand, the affluent members argue for the annexation of non-
trade issues pertaining to human security such as environment, labour and human rights. 
On the other, the poor members argue that greater attention must be placed on 
improving the market access to the developed world’s labour-intensive industries 
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particularly the agricultural and textile sectors in which they have the comparative 
advantage instead of incorporating these non-trade related issues.  
 Such tension significantly contributed to what Christopher Dent (2006) refers to 
as “WTO inertia.” The freezing of multilateral trade processes represents a “double 
whammy” for all members specifically with respect to Asian members. From an 
economic perspective, the export-led growth of East Asian economies is largely 
anchored in a well-functioning multilateral trade system. In the face of looming 
uncertainties that threaten the future of multilateralism, states are pressured to look for 
other alternatives – bilateral and/or minilateral free trade agreements – in order to secure 
their access to new markets (Dobson, 2001; Pauwelyn, 2008; Baldwin, 2011).  WTO 
members expect these alternative markets to help in the recuperation of some of the 
forgone economic benefits due to a lethargic multilateral trade, thereby minimising the 
estimated opportunity costs of WTO inertia. Likewise, the dismal neglect of 
environmental, labour, and human rights issues in trade negotiations in the midst of 
Doha impasse compelled the developed world to forge new types of trade agreements 
that can accommodate these concerns on top of the standard trade matters. In the case 
of the US and the UE, for example, bilateral free trade agreements are also used as 
rewards for states that are observing good labour and human rights practices as well as 
compliance with business ethics similar to those implemented by the OECD countries.90  
 Therefore, it can be inferred that bilateral free trade serves as proxy for the failed 
multilateral linking of security issues and free trade agendas within a lethargic WTO. 
States, particularly those in the developed world are actively searching for new channels 
through which these issue linkages can be fully cemented. In the words of David Vogel 
(2013: 46), these new agreements “represent a form of forum shifting or an end run 
around the WTO by advocates of linkages between trade and [particularly] human 
security.” Due to the relative inability of the WTO to effectively implement trade 
agreements that tackle various security issues vital to its members, the said multilateral 
institution no longer seems to be the most attractive platform for countries linking their 
security interests and free trade objectives The coalescence between statist and humanist 
security interests, on the one hand, and various types of free trade, on the other, is a 
practical indication that security-trade linkages are alive and dynamic in the twenty-first 
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century, and help explain the ongoing rush to regional and trans trans regional free trade 
activities. 
 
3.2.3 From “rush to free trade” to “rush to preferential FTAs” 
The mounting anxiety being brought about by the proliferation of FTAs in different 
parts of the world – the European Union (EU), European Free Trade Association 
(EFTA), North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the Southern Common 
Market (MERCOSUR) among others – has forced East Asian countries to engage in 
these activities in order to secure and maintain access to huge markets particularly in the 
developed world. Bleak predictions on trade and investment diversion effects resulting 
from these major FTAs have caused unrest among various policy circles in the region. 
Catching up with the rest of the world in terms of FTA development has become a huge 
area of concern among East Asian leaders (Dent, 2006; Tow, 2009).  
 One way to pull alongside is by incorporating non-trade related issues that have 
been previously ignored at the WTO (Dent, 2006, 2010; Aggarwal, 2013; Aggarwal and 
Govella, 2013).  The US and the EU are the two most powerful FTA initiators on this 
new playing field, while East Asian countries are viewed as strategic targets along with 
the other smaller and less powerful actors in other regions. The intensifying albeit highly 
disproportional relations between “initiators” and “targets” have set in motion the rush 
to preferential FTAs. 
 On the one hand, the US approach to security-trade linking process highlights 
the relative importance of security considerations over economic prospects. As posited 
earlier Americna foreign policymakers are using traditional and non-traditional security 
issues as raison d'être for developing and implementing preferential FTAs. From an 
economic standpoint, pursuing deeper trade liberalisation via FTA creation can only 
generate marginal gains for the US given that in most cases, its partners are either already 
too open (Singapore) or too small (Bahrain).91 Therefore, Washington’s motives for 
offering FTAs to prospective targets can be explained more meaningfully by looking at 
its security considerations.  
 First, in terms of traditional security, Washington’s series of FTA launch after 
9/11 was primarily meant to sustain and enhance the old allies’ support while 
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simultaneously enlisting new partners in its “war on terror” agenda (Fandl, 2003; Desker, 
2004; White, 2005; Tow, 2009; Aggarwal, 2013). Although these FTAs are economically 
insignificant, however, vital security considerations on the part of the US have been 
paramount in their negotiations and eventual implementation.92 Similarly, the US 
balancing against other rising superpowers specifically China – or even the EU for that 
matter – via preferential trade underscores the politico-strategic utility of American FTAs 
(Dent, 2006, 2010; Tellis and Wills, 2006; Aggarwal, 2013; Tow and Stuart, 2014). Its 
respective FTAs with Chile (2004), Singapore (2004) and Australia (2005) are driven by- 
security considerations which are necessary for containing China’s continuous rise to 
global hegemony in the Asia-Pacific (Dent, 2006, 2010; Aggarwal, 2013). Moreover, the 
active participation of the US in various trans regional economic arrangements that 
involve the Asia-Pacific such as the APEC and the impending Trans-Pacific Partnership 
(TPP) is propelled mainly by its strategic security outlook rather than commercial 
interests (Capling and Ravenhill, 2011; Ahnlid, 2013; Tow and Stuart, 2014).   
 Second, in terms of non-traditional security, issues relating to the promotion of 
democracy and human rights have proved to be difficult to negotiate although certain 
labour standards and environmental-related provisions have been tackled quite 
considerably and are now gradually being cohabitated into its bilateral FTAs.93 To do 
this, the US has introduced legally binding commitments that require a target state to 
incorporate specific labour and environmental standards in domestic law and subject 
them to dispute settlement (Gynberg and Qalo, 2006; Aggarwal, 2013; Vogel, 2013). As 
part of its TPP proposal, -Washington calls for members to adopt the rights included in 
the 1998 International Labour Organization Declaration on the Fundaments Principles 
and Rights at Work.94  
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 In addition, the US has also urged member countries to adopt measures that will 
reduce the volume of trade in products that use forced and child labour and suggested 
that national labour laws be strictly applied even in export processing and free trade 
zones (Capling and Ravenhill, 2011; Aggarwal, 2013). Meanwhile, with respect to 
environmental issues, the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) has 
included in their TPP outlines the promotion of environmental protection.95 Hence, 
although the nature of American FTAs may seem to be driven both by economic and 
security imperatives, a closer examination of the expected economic costs and benefits of 
these accords suggest that the US approach to security-trade linkages underlines their 
politico-strategic rather than their economic utility (Dent, 2006, 2010; Aggarwal, 2013; 
Tow and Stuart, 2014).  
 On the other hand, the EU’s approach to security-trade linking process highlights 
the importance of institutionalising these linkages, specifically the political clauses that 
constitute its core values and principles, rather than applying them arbitrarily whenever 
deemed necessary. As such, the EU is mandated by the Lisbon Treaty to uphold and 
promote its values and interests when conducting external relations with other 
countries.96 In particular, it states that EU foreign policymaking vis-à-vis its trade 
objectives must be carefully incorporated to “promote respect for human rights, labour 
standards, environment and good governance.”97 This specific legal provision of the EU 
Constitution compels its members to propagate the organisation’s core values, and 
principles as a means for achieving pacifying levels of security within and outside its 
borders. It does so by designing EU trade policies that serve as “an instrument for fair 
trade that can bring into general practice the effective inclusion and implementation of 
social and environmental standards with all EU trade partners” (European Parliament, 
2010). In short, inclusion of these vital non-traditional security clauses – specifically 
those that relate to the protection of human rights as well as the non-proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction – must be non-negotiable in all EU international 
agreements.   
 Whether these security-trade linkages will result in a stable issue area or not will 
depend largely on how the target states interpret them. For instance, if the EU’s trade 
                                                 
95
 See, USTR Trans-Pacific Partnership website, available online at https://ustr.gov/tpp.  
96
 For the full text of the Treaty of Lisbon see EUROPA’s official website, available online at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=OJ:C:2007:306:TOC.  
97
 Ibid.  
100 
 
partners agree that the incorporation of the so-called “Copenhagen Criteria”98 has 
sufficient intellectual basis (read as substantive), then stable outcomes are likely to 
emerge.99 The EU’s decision to suspend the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area 
(DCFTA) with the Ukraine underlines the strength of its resolve for pursuing a value-
based approach to security-trade linkages.100 Meanwhile, in some other cases particularly 
with respect to the EU-Africa, Caribbean and Pacific countries (ACP), target states have 
consented to the issue linkages to secure the trade benefits they expect to gain from the 
EU despite their view that such initiatives are merely tactical.101 Nevertheless, as far as the 
EU is concerned the goal of achieving a more equitable and sustainable development has 
been its main impetus for engaging in asymmetric FTAs with the ACP countries under 
the Cotonou Agreement.102 The ACP countries are well aware that without agreeing to 
the political clauses espoused by the EU, there will be no trade concessions.103  
 However, if the target states shall view these issue linkages as part of the EU’s 
covert protectionist agenda (read as tactical), then unstable results will emerge.104 In 
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asymmetric relations where the EU is the stronger partner, agreements to such linkages 
may not even be necessary (Ahnlid, 2013). However, when power relations are relatively 
equal, success will be less certain. For instance, it will be interesting to see how the EU 
will react if a major economy such as India decides to reject the political clauses that are 
expected to be included in the prospective EU-India FTA considering the considerable 
economic opportunity that may derive from it (Khorona and Perdikis, 2010; Wouters et 
al., 2013).   
 Hence, from the EU’s perspective, these fundamental values and principles 
enshrined in the organisation’s constitutions are inviolable and fixed. Consequently, the 
EU demands that all target countries agree to these issue linkages before any agreement 
can be concluded and ratified (Aggarwal and Govella, 2013; Ahnlid, 2013). Any violation 
or disregard of these mandated clauses can lead to either suspension or termination of 
the agreement under consideration and even those which are currently in effect. Thus 
far, the EU has been successful at framing security issues as necessary preconditions for 
the target countries that wish to gain access to its trade concessions. While the EU 
approach may seem to be less interventionist compared to the US process, nonetheless, 
it meets the standards of various political stakeholders in the member countries and the 
European Parliament (Anhlid, 2013).  
 Overall, regional and trans regional FTAs have become the vital platforms for the 
security-trade linking efforts of both the US and the EU amid a lethargic WTO. Given 
the current deadlock in multilateral trade negotiations, the emergence of preferential 
FTAs is a timely opportunity for the intelligent articulation of these security-related 
issues within the respective free trade agendas of the world’s two most powerful FTA 
initiator states.  
 
3.2.4 The Asian crisis’ “contagion effect” 
The 1997/98 financial crisis provided another significant impetus for the linking of 
security issues and free trade agendas in Asia. For example, the AFTA created in 1999 
was hailed as the premiere institution for pursuing the region's core trade liberalisation 
objectives. However, the unexpected Asian financial crisis engendered serious political 
                                                                                                                                            
the political clauses remain high, especially when the latter continues to implement protectionist 
measures, notably on imported agricultural products.  An example is the FTA included in the EU-
Central America (Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and Panama) Agreement 
that has been agreed to in 2010, but is yet to be signed and ratified.  For more information on the said 





and economic upheavals, which thwarted the efforts and commitments of the members 
as they became distracted by their domestic affairs. While Singapore's proposal for 
speeding up the AFTA process met strong oppositions from the Philippines and 
Indonesia (these countries unilaterally postponed liberalisation in their respective 
petrochemical industries), Malaysia's decision to temporarily cancel the implementation 
of its tariff schedule on automotive product imports under AFTA for another three years 
created frictions with Thailand (Dent, 2006, 2010).  
 This constant push and pull with respect to AFTA commitments proved to be 
detrimental to the ASEAN’s institutional coherence and overall economic utility, thereby 
making it a less attractive platform for rolling out new trade initiatives. The mounting 
disappointments on the part of Singaporean leaders and policymakers had forced them 
to consider other trade alternatives aside from AFTA, and it did not take long before 
they discover the opportunities that they derive from entering into bilateral FTA (Dent, 
2006, 2010; Leu, 2011). The active involvement of Singapore in bilateral FTAs was 
noticed as critical ASEAN members particularly Malaysia became wary of their effects on 
the long-term operation and significance of the AFTA. Furthermore, Singapore's 
initiatives to incorporate non-trade related issues such as labour and environmental 
clauses in its FTA with the US had marked the beginning of a new approach to 
negotiating trade agreements in the region (Liang, 2005; Pang, 2007; Kuik, 2008). Despite 
the members' scepticism toward Singapore's new approach to economic cooperation in 
general, let alone the cohabitation of humanist security issues into preferential FTAs, 
Thailand – and later on Malaysia and the Philippines – have decided to pursue their own 
bilateral accords with non-ASEAN countries amid growing fears of further isolation and 
marginalisation (Desker, 2004; Dent, 2006, 2010).  
 Beyond Southeast Asia, the financial crisis also compelled East Asian countries 
particularly Japan to formulate a new model that could significantly improve regional 
cooperative frameworks by embedding FTAs within its so-called “economic partnership 
agreement” (EPA). From Japan’s standpoint, the main rationale behind the EPA is the 
cultivation of an economic community that strengthens communal bonds between 
signatory members.105 Therefore, any future crisis can be more appropriately addressed 
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and effectively managed with the launch of an EPA model.106 Hence, the financial crisis 
resulted in East Asia’s deeper engagement with preferential FTAs. It served as a catalyst 
for overcoming the long-standing domestic opposition to crucial economic reforms, on 
the one hand, and for facilitating necessary domestic political restructurings, on the other 
(Dieter, 2007; Drysdale and Terada, 2007; Kawai and Wignaraja, 2010: Chin, 2014). Grim 
forecasts about region's future politico-economic viability led to the promotion of FTAs 
as vital elements of wider EPAs with prospective target states (Dent, 2006; Kawai and 
Wignaraja, 2010).  
 Since robust politico-diplomatic ties necessarily underpin the effectual 
governance of regional interdependence, critical linkages between security and trade once 
again feature in the discussions of FTA agendas in post-Asian financial crisis setting. In 
general, East Asian countries’ linking strategies complement those of Southeast Asian 
states. The general trend is for big countries to attract small countries and for small 
countries to attract big countries (Dent, 2006, 2010; Koo, 2013; Lee, 2013). In this 
context, the East Asian countries are the “great power” initiators while the Southeast 
Asian countries are the “small power” targets. Somewhat akin to the magnetic laws of 
attraction and repulsion where like poles repel each other while opposite poles attract 
each other, the powerful and affluent East Asian attracts the weak and poor Southeast 
Asia, and vice versa. Hence, East Asian countries try to lure Southeast Asian countries 
into signing FTAs with them to boost their number of allies and undercut the influence 
of other great power competitors. Similarly, Southeast Asian governments also try to 
entice their East Asian counterparts to enter into these agreements in the hope of 
enhancing their economic gains while reducing their security vulnerabilities.  
 This is particularly relevant in the context of deteriorating Sino-Japanese 
relations. The intensifying rivalry between China and Japan vividly demonstrates the 
process with which security issues are being cohabited within preferential FTA agendas. 
The politico-strategic motives of both countries – aggravated by their bitter memories of 
the past – hinder the development of an East Asian regional FTA. The declining 
Japanese influence vis-à-vis the ever-increasing Chinese dominance has led to significant 
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shifts in their respective regional economic and politico-strategic agendas and 
subsequently reconfigured Asian institutional dynamics (Katzenstein, 1996; Pempel, 
2005). Both countries have observed the delicate balance between collaboration and 
opposition while developing and implementing their respective FTA agendas. On the 
one hand, such behaviour explains why Japan refuses to conclude a bilateral FTA with 
Taiwan to avoid offending China despite the Taiwanese government’s aggressive 
courtship of Japan. On the other, it also explains why a bilateral FTA between China and 
Japan seems impossible given the desire of both countries to achieve a regional 
“hegemonic” status (Lee, 2013).   
 The creations of the ASEAN-Japan Comprehensive Economic Partnership 
(2008), ASEAN-China Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement (2010) and 
the ASEAN-Korea Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement (2010), cogently 
exemplify this general approach to East Asian security-trade linkages.107 Despite the 
enormous economic incentives from forming a trilateral FTA among China, Japan and 
South Korea, vital politico-strategic considerations compel these countries to go head to 
head on a “trade courtship” with the ASEAN instead. Outside of East Asia, the ASEAN 
also concluded trans regional agreements with other countries such as the ASEAN-
Australia and New Zealand Free Trade Agreement (2009) as well as with the ASEAN-
India Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement (2009).108 These accords 
further highlight the extent of security-trade linkages in the post-Asian crisis setting.  
 
3.5.5 The need for strategic diplomatic exercises      
As previously mentioned, politico-diplomatic exercises buttress regional 
interdependence. Here, FTAs are viewed as necessary instruments for forging strategic 
diplomacy with inter-regional and trans regional partners. There are several ways in 
which FTAs can help enhance a country’s strategic diplomacy; through cooperative 
diplomacy, security alliance, competitive bilateralism and isolation avoidance. 109. 
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 Cooperative diplomacy is best illustrated in the context of the 1997/98 Asian 
financial crisis discussed in the previous subsection. Following the liberal thesis 
particularly its liberal institutionalist variant, the proliferation of Asian FTAs sets the 
backdrop for closer regional integration and improved facilitation of related proceedings. 
While increasing interdependence enhances and promotes the concept of shared interests 
among cooperating countries, ironically, it also exposes them to mutual threats 
(Copeland, 1996; Dent, 2006, 2008; Tellis and Wills, 2006; Goldstein and Mansfield, 
2012). The formulation of preferential FTAs is viewed as a necessary platform through 
which regional efforts can be consolidated in deterring potential threats particularly those 
that undermine economic considerations.  
 Meanwhile, alliance diplomacy stems from the realist thesis specifically its neo-
realist variant. It is best captured in the discussion of American securitisation of 
economic globalisation in Chapter 2 where FTAs serve as politico-strategic instruments 
for advancing underlying tactical state-centric agendas rather than substantive human-
centric objectives (Higgott, 2004; Gallegos-Paniagua and Vargas-Hernandez, 2011; 
Goldstein and Mansfield, 2012). Within the Asia-Pacific, the conclusions of the 
Australia-US and US-Singapore FTAs reveal that America’s intention for maintaining its 
politico-diplomatic relevance in the region is to balance effectively the ever-increasing 
power of China. The decisions to reward Australia and Singapore bilateral FTAs were 
largely based on their strong commitments to America’s “war on terror” launched during 
the Bush Administration (Higgott, 2004; Dent, 2006, 2008; Cooper et al., 2007). 
 Similarly, competitive bilateralism also projects a neo-realist view of FTAs by 
treating them as objects of inter-state competition for achieving economic and politico-
strategic dominance (Dent, 2006, 2008; Corning, 2011). This is best illustrated in earlier 
analyses of FTA formations between great powers in East Asia and small Southeast 
Asian countries. For instance, China, Japan and South Korea’s individual FTAs with 
ASEAN expose the triad’s strategic interests in expanding their respective politico-
diplomatic advantages over the region as well as in spreading their preferred norms and 
customs when conducting regional dialogues and consultations (Tellis and Wills, 2006; 
Corning, 2011; Kahler, 2013). 
 Finally, and as a corollary of competitive bilateralism, the decision of small East 
Asian countries, particularly those that are not successful in convincing great powers to 
strike a deal with them, hastily conclude preferential FTAs with the “most available” 
partner to avoid further isolation and marginalisation (Dent, 2006, 2008; Low and 
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Baldwin, 2009; Corning, 2011). As mentioned earlier, the initial critical stance of several 
ASEAN members toward Singapore’s active involvement in FTAs outside the AFTA 
proved to be short-lived as they all gradually embraced the very same mechanism for 
securing comparable trade preferences and offsetting the adverse impacts of trade 
diversion. Meanwhile, within the Anglo-Pacific sub-region, New Zealand is currently 
trying to negotiate a bilateral FTA with the US after the latter has implemented the same 
agreement with Australia.110 The asymmetrical trade preferences provided by the US 
between Australia and New Zealand, along with the trade diversion effects created by the 
AUSFTA, places New Zealand at a disadvantaged position. Concluding an FTA with the 
US, however, will be more challenging and complicated for the New Zealand 
government because of its longstanding politico-diplomatic issues with Washington such 
as the barring of American nuclear-powered ships from docking in its harbours and a 
general disinterest in joining the US-led “war on terror” (Dent, 2006; Vaughn, 2012). 
 Together, these five key factors provide a preliminary understanding of the 
dynamics and extent of East Asian security-trade linkages in the twenty-first century. The 
next section analyses these linkages more closely by examining them within the APEC 
and ASEAN contexts. It evaluates the core security dimensions vis-à-vis elements that 
drive the regional security-trade linking process and investigates some of the major issues 
and implications concerning these linkages.  
 
3.3 REGIONAL LINKING EFFORTS IN THE APEC AND ASEAN 
 
3.3.1 The APEC Way of linking security and trade 
The linking of security interests and free trade activities within APEC is propelled by the 
liberal economic thesis underlining the importance of healthy inter-state trade relations in 
curbing the incidence of regional and global conflicts. The constructivist notion of 
community-building – through enhancing mutual trust and confidence among members, 
and socialising government elites into preferred policy-making norms and behaviours – 
emanated from the early notion of pursuing economic interdependence to harmonise 
competing national interests (Aggarawal and Morrison, 1998; Tow, 2009; Ravenhill, 
2013). APEC leaders recognised that such a vision would not materialise without 
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sufficient collaboration among member countries to address domestic and international 
crises that hamper regional economic integration. Yet, from the viewpoint of some 
APEC leaders, extending the agenda to encompass statist security issues would threaten 
the very existence of the organisation. Therefore, APEC must prohibit itself from 
delving further into the security realm (Bergsten, 2007; Ravenhill, 2007, 2013). 
  Similarly, APEC members were prevented from slotting in various non-
traditional security concerns since the primary mission of the organisation is to open the 
way “for business to do business” (Spero, in Ravenhill, 2013: 50).  In short, the 
organisation’s security function has been restricted to ensuring the smooth facilitation of 
free trade. APEC has explicitly expressed its interest in managing only the economic 
facet of the “division of labour” among key regional institutions in Asia. Hence, it should 
not be in the business of pursuing non-traditional security agendas as they unnecessarily 
strain business operations in the region. For example, the human security rhetoric that 
underscores the protection of individuals and communities from threats emanating both 
internally and externally is deemed to violate the principle of non-interference in the 
domestic affairs of the members specifically by the ASEAN leaders (Nishikawa, 2009; 
Emmers, 2012, 2013; Caballero-Anthony, 2005, 2012). National political and social 
policy domains remained forbidden terrains during the APEC dialogues (Feinberg, 2003; 
Soesastro, 2003; Ravenhill, 2013). Therefore, linking human security issues and regional 
trade agreements to boost further economic interdependence would constitute a “red 
flag” among members.     
 Nevertheless, APEC was familiar with the concept of comprehensive security 
specifically concerning issues of energy security. The creation of APEC’s Energy 
Working Group (EWG) in 1990 provided a strong platform for discussing the 
securitisation of energy supply since the region is home to some of the top energy 
importing and exporting countries in the world.111 While APEC ministers had initially 
agreed that the best way to administer non-binding energy security policies was to allow 
independent initiatives by the national governments, later on they recognised the 
importance of monitoring regional capabilities for managing sudden disruptions in the 
supply chain, which could eventually lead to a full-blown crisis (Fesharaki, 1999; 
Samuelson, 2014).  
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 In 2001, APEC leaders approved EWG’s proposal for establishing the Energy 
Security Initiative (ESI) designed to developed strategic plans for resolving temporary 
disruptions in the energy supply of the region.112 Moreover, in 2008, the EWG also 
formed the Energy Trade and Investment Task Force (ETITF) mandated to promote 
transparency, flexibility and efficiency in the operation of energy markets in the APEC 
region, along with some key environmental policies for combating global warming such 
as curtailing greenhouse gasses through the adoption of a carbon pricing mechanism.113 
The great emphasis placed on energy vis-à-vis environmental security reflects some of 
the earlier efforts made by APEC members to incorporate some of the most 
fundamental security issues into their regional free trade agendas. But despite such an 
impressive array of cooperative measures in the field of energy security, the consortium 
still failed to initiate any meaningful joint actions with regard to other equally if not more 
important security issues that threaten the region.   
   The 9/11 attacks on the US, however, provided the much-needed catalyst for 
expanding APEC’s official agendas to include both traditional and non-traditional 
security issues in the region (Song, 2003; Aggarwal and Lee, 2010; Ravenhill, 2013). This 
remarkable paradigm shift within the organisation’s decision-making body highlights its 
changing perceptions toward the importance of linking security interests and free trade 
activities. For one, the artificial divide between economics and security has been 
completely shattered. The terrorist attacks launched against the world’s superpower 
demonstrated the catastrophic effects of undetected security threats to economic growth 
and development. In addition, the resulting anti-terrorism agenda reinvigorated APEC’s 
diminishing influence over Asian free trade in general amid the rush to bilateral FTAs. A 
single “successful” terrorist act against members can swiftly nullify all the positive gains 
derived from APEC trade negotiations. For example, IMF estimated the cost of the 9/11 
Al-Qaeda terrorist attacks on the US to be roughly 0.7 percent of its GDP. Contrast this 
to the country’s gains from the GATT trade negotiations during at the Uruguay Round 
that ranged between 0.4 and 0.6 percent only. Such figures illustrate how a terrorist 
attack even within just twenty-four hours can undo a decade’s worth of arduous trade 
negotiations (Bram et al., 2002; Looney, 2002; Rose and Blomber, 2010; Ravehill, 2013).  
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  Inevitably, the US has once again taken the driver’s seat promoting APEC’s new 
agenda after some of its most prominent members including Australia and Japan became 
fully aware of the organisation’s deteriorating influence over vital economic policy 
objectives. Considering its difficulty promoting trade liberalisation to the next level, in an 
attempt to revitalise the organisation the US introduced various initiatives such as the 
Free Trade Area of Asia-Pacific (FTAAP) and the Trans-Pacific Partnership programme 
(TPP). Given the aggregate economic size of the TPP’s foremost members – Brunei, 
Chile, New Zealand and Singapore – the US was clearly not motivated by market access 
concerns. However, it does view the TPP as a prototype for the FTAAP since the former 
is considered a first-rate FTA that aims to abolish tariffs on all goods by 2015 (Kim et al., 
2013; Koo, 2013).  
 The creation of Secure Trade in APEC’s Region (STAR) served as the 
organisation’s primary instrument for securing trade by adopting various counter-
terrorism strategies to safeguard supply chains at minimum costs.114 While APEC 
members view its security agenda as a strategy for enhancing trade facilitation against the 
backdrop of terrorism, Washington sees it as another channel through which its “war on 
terror” project might be carried out (Dent, 2006; Tow, 2009; Tow and Stuart, 2014). As 
discussed earlier, such misconception leads to failed linkages, which destabilise the 
organisation’s pursuit of economic and politico-strategic interdependence. Nevertheless, 
Asian countries are aware of the continuing relevance of the US presence in the region 
since no other country or alliance of countries can effectively balance both the military 
and economic preponderance of China when push comes to shove (Goh, 2004; Tow, 
2009; Ho and Wong, 2011).    
 However, APEC’s increasing focus on state security has induced polarising 
opinions about its implications on the organisation’s original economic thrust and started 
to worry some of its members. Therefore, its leaders decided to reconceptualise APEC’s 
security discourse by framing it within the context of human security. The term was 
formally adopted in the 2003 APEC Leaders’ Declaration, which endorsed a people-
centred security agenda designed to counter trans-boundary threats to people and 
communities: 
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APEC's agenda emphasises the economic dimensions of human security: it recognises that 
threats may potentially undermine APEC's efforts to raise living standards and reduce 
poverty in the region. APEC's agendas for human security and the economy are 
complementary: human security is essential to growth and prosperity. Conversely, 
economic stability enables better preparation for, more efficient responses to, and quicker 
recovery after attacks or disaster.115 
 
 Since its first appearance in the 2003 “A World of Differences: Partnership for the Future 
Declaration” Declaration, human security has become a staple feature of the APEC agenda 
in the years that followed. In 2004, the  “One Community, Our Future Declaration” 
Declaration expanded the scope of APEC’s human security agenda by consolidating 
government efforts for strengthening public health systems to effectively respond to 
regional health security threats including SARS and HIV/AIDS.116 Meanwhile, the 2005 
“Towards One Community: Meet the Challenge, Make the Change” Declaration reiterated 
APEC’s stance regarding terrorist activities threatening the organisation’s goal of 
advancing prosperity while emphasising security’s position as ‘complementary mission’ in 
the agenda.117 In addition, it also made reference to collective efforts toward countering 
pandemic diseases specifically influenza.118 In 2006, the “Towards a Dynamic Community for 
Sustainable Development and Prosperity” Declaration noted the value-added role and 
cooperative efforts necessary for ensuring emergency preparedness and disaster response 
against the backdrop of large-scale natural disasters adversely affecting the economy and 
the people.119 Moreover, it restated the intertwined roles of energy and environmental 
security when achieving sustainable economic development on top of the usual emphasis 
given to terrorist acts.120  
 In 2007, the “Strengthening Our Community, Building a Sustainable Future” Declaration 
addressed the challenges relating to climate change, energy security and clean 
development.121 In addition, APEC has begun to endorse issues relating to food security 
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such as the voluntary Food Defence Principles in protecting the food supply against 
deliberate contamination.122 The 2008 “A New Commitment to Asia-Pacific Development” 
Declaration refocused APEC’s attention back to its fundamental neoliberal economic 
ideals when confronting the most recent global financial crisis. 123 It underlined the 
importance of securing regional trade by implementing various non-traditional security 
components, including: counter-terrorism; disaster risk reduction, preparedness and 
management; climate change, energy security and clean development. In the aftermath of 
the global economic crisis that was unprecedented in severity since the Great Depression 
and the devastating natural calamities that struck several member countries, the 2009 
“Sustaining Growth, Connecting the Region” Declaration had once again underlined the need 
to enhance human security vis-à-vis free trade to better promote the region’s key thrusts:  
 
We reaffirm the importance of enhancing human security and reducing the threat of 
disruptions to business and trade in sustaining economic growth and prosperity in the Asia-
Pacific region. We recognise the importance of building capacity to counter terrorism and 
welcome APEC's work in areas such as trade security, aviation security, anti-terrorist 
protection of energy infrastructure, countering terrorism financing, fighting cyber-
terrorism, protecting the food supply against terrorist contamination and emergency 
preparedness.124 
 
 In 2010, the “Change and Action” Declaration laid out the plan for developing an 
APEC community, one in which: 
 
…trade and investment are freer and more open; supply-chains are better connected; doing 
business is cheaper, faster, and easier; growth is more balanced, inclusive, sustainable, 
innovative, and secure; and we are better able to cope with threats to human security and 
economic activity.125 
 
 It called for the protection of the fundamental tenets of human security 
throughout the region and appealed for the continuous improvement of collective ability 
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to provide for this security. 126 Strangely, from 2011 up to the most recent APEC Summit 
held in Beijing in 2014, the Declarations did not only lack separate sections or 
subheadings for human security but also dropped the term completely.127 Nevertheless, 
the discussions on various security provisions included in the previous APEC 
Declarations from 2003 to 2010 highlight the organisation’s concrete contributions to the 
advancement of Asian security in the twenty-first century.  
 APEC’s espousal of the human security rhetoric and agenda can be interpreted in 
three ways:  first, as an attempt to regain the trust and confidence of members being 
threatened by traditional security issues (Dent, 2006, 2010; Aggarwal and Govella, 2013); 
second, as an attempt to re-establish its diminishing relevance in the region amidst the 
continuous growth of preferential FTAs (Findlay et al., 2003; Hsieh, 2013); and third, as 
an attempt to address what John Ravenhill (2013: 61) refers to as a “legitimacy deficit” 
arising from the perception that the organisation was largely indifferent and unresponsive 
to the concerns of other important domestic actors aside from the large and powerful 
business conglomerates.   
 Despite these serious attempts to maintain relevance, APEC’s linking of humanist 
security issues with free trade agendas poses a serious problem for the organisation. 
Considering that some human security-related issues can significantly delay the process 
of eliminating the barriers to business activities in the region, some government leaders 
have questioned the appropriateness of adopting a more people-centric policy 
framework. Accordingly, APEC members have displayed a “paralyzing caution” when 
discussing politically sensitive topics such as the rights of workers with respect to wages 
and other benefits, as well as the free movement of people within the region (Aggarwal 
and Govella, 2013; Hsieh, 2013; Ravenhill, 2013).  
 Furthermore, the adoption of an across-the-board human security framework 
violates the very basic tenet of non-interference enshrined in the ASEAN Constitution 
(Nishikawa, 2009; Emmers, 2010, 2012; Caballero-Anthony, 2012). The idea of 
protecting individuals and communities from traditional and non-traditional security 
threats emanating both outside and within their respective countries entails an arbitrary 
interpretation and application of the non-intervention principle. Hence, APEC’s official 
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statement on human security stresses the term “trans-boundary” as opposed to 
“internal” when referring to threats to people and societies that need to be contained.128  
 Another important dimension that prevents the effective linking of human security 
issues and free trade matters in APEC relates to the lack of proper dialogue between 
APEC leaders, on the one hand, and other relevant non-state actors such as international 
NGOs, on the other. As Ravenhill (2013) points out, the relationship between APEC 
and the NGOs has been adversarial at best. Various NGOs have voiced out their strong 
opposition to the organisation’s indiscriminate pursuit of trade liberalisation, denouncing 
its “APEC is all about business” mantra as antipodal to basic human rights and 
environmental concerns (Doucet, 2001; Ravenhill, 2013). The method adopted by APEC 
members for dealing with human security issues is limited to the consolidation and 
endorsement of best practices through a variety of voluntary and non-binding action 
plans (Evans, 2009; Peou, 2009; Lee, 2013; Ravenhill, 2013). To this extent, it may be 
argued that APEC’s efforts toward linking human security interests and free trade 
agendas are a lip service to the cause.   
 Overall, although both the traditional, state-centric and non-traditional, human-
centric issues have brought a new dimension to the APEC mission and vision 
statements. However, the organisation has remained largely committed to its original 
mandate to ensure the smooth operations of economic activities in the Asia-Pacific. 
Hence, regardless of whether APEC would fully embrace these issue linkages or not – to 
either appease its nervous members or maintain its relevance in the region – the primary 
thrust of the “APEC Way” is economic integration within a secure trading environment.  
 
3.3.2 The ASEAN Way of linking security and trade 
A key feature of the ASEAN Way is the organisation’s conservative attitude toward 
formal institutionalisation, which may be indicative of the members’ penchant for 
avoiding “excessive institutionalisation” (Acharya 1997: 184). While the Western brand 
of diplomacy is defined by binding agreements that require formalistic solutions and 
legalistic procedures, the Asian approach to diplomacy is driven by non-binding ground 
rules of informality, inclusivity and consensus (Solidum 1981; Pomfret, 1996 Acharya, 
1997). The so-called “ASEAN Way” has inspired some observers to invent various terms 
that highlight the organisation’s lack of binding commitments: “organisational 
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minimalism”; “soft regionalism” or “soft dialogue”; and “thin institutionalism” (Capie 
and Evans, 2007: 10). The ASEAN members’ preference for “sports shirt diplomacy” 
over “business shirt diplomacy” suggests that the ASEAN is not like the EU or any other 
European institution that was established after the Second World War (Razak, in Haas 
and Rowe, 1973: 504).    
     As mentioned earlier, the EU has adopted the Copenhagen criteria – comprised of 
democracy, the rule of law, human rights and economic liberalism, among others – for 
evaluating a country’s application for accession. It then translated these values into 
political clauses that were annexed to its trade agreements. The Southeast Asian region, 
however, is characterised by diverse politico-economic and socio-cultural conditions that 
make the prospect of arriving at a unified political entity highly unlikely. Furthermore, 
the “sovereignty-enhancing” feature of the ASEAN has resulted in the development of 
institutional norms that emphasise a principle of non-interference in the domestic affairs 
of individual members, thereby effectively undermining meaningful attempts at 
embedding non-traditional security interests within its political and economic agendas. 
Highly contentious human security issues that result in heated arguments and severe 
disputes among members are hastily dropped from the agenda without proper evaluation 
(Caballero-Anthony, 2005, 2012; Nishikawa, 2009; Emmers, 2012, 2013). 
 The ASEAN formation in 1967 immediately came after the Indonesian–Malaysian 
Confrontation or Konfrontasi , which took place between 1962 and 1966.129 The 
undeclared guerrilla war led by Indonesia’s former President Sukarno was directed 
against the creation of a Malaysian Federation comprised of West Malaysia, East Malaysia 
and Singapore. It ended in the removal of President Sukarno from office through a 
military coup. The events of Konfrontasi created a sense of vulnerability and mistrust 
among Southeast Asian leaders. Hence, the establishment of ASEAN can be interpreted 
as an extraordinary measure that was implemented by the member countries to secure 
the region’s most critical security referent – that is, state sovereignty – against the 
existential threats “posed by subversion to stability, thus strengthening national and 
ASEAN resilience” (ASEAN, 1976).  
 Economic cooperation in the ASEAN context was geared toward enhancing self-
sufficiency rather than encouraging interdependence among members (Aggarwal and 
Govella 2013). The high level of competition at producing similar commodities among 
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members signified artificial rather than natural economic complementarities (Ba, 2009; 
Chow, 2013). The 1977 ASEAN Preferential Trade Agreements (APTA) were adopted 
to intensify intra-regional trade on goods using positive lists.130 Alongside various 
industrial cooperation initiatives employed to take advantage of the economies of scale131 
were examples of the artificial complementarities that had been administered to enhance 
political cohesion among members (Amer, 2013; Chow, 2013). In short, the primary 
objective was to ensure that a considerable level of political rather than economic 
integration existed among members. However, the ramifying communist threats from 
China and the former Soviet Union at that time had brought back some of the lingering 
traditional security threats which ASEAN members thought could not be effectively 
deterred by simply investing in regional economic cooperative measures such as trade 
liberalisation or other forms of industrial collaborations. Nonetheless, such measures had 
certainly helped lay down foundations for post-Cold War economic integration within 
the region (Amer et al., 2013; Chow, 2013; Koo, 2013; Pempel, 2013).   
 Furthermore, during the early stages of the ASEAN, the concept of human 
security was virtually non-existent. Consequently, when human security-related issues 
started to emerge – for instance, during the Soviet-aligned Vietnamese invasion of 
Cambodia in 1978, which was then followed by China’s retaliatory attack on Vietnam – 
the ASEAN members viewed these series of events as threats to state rather than 
individual or communal security. The main existential threat from the ASEAN 
perspective was the rapid influx of Cambodian refugees into their respective borders and 
how they could potentially destabilise existing political, economic, social and cultural 
arrangements. For example, Thai leaders worried about the presence of Cambodian 
resistance fighters that might be moving along with the refugees coming into Thailand, 
whereas Singaporean and Malaysian officials feared the negative impact that Chinese 
refugees might have with respect to internal ethnic relations (Ganesan, 1999; Yahuda, 
2006; Nesadurai, 2009). That Singapore’s former Deputy Prime Minister Sinnathamby 
Rajaratnam labelled these refugees, particularly the Chinese, as ticking “human bombs” 
greatly emphasised ASEAN’s belief in the principle of non-interference (Haacke, 2003; 
Chow, 2013). Such acts were hardly surprising given that the idea of a Cold War-inspired 
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ASEAN cooperation articulated in the 1976 Bali Concord was directed toward the 
pursuit of political stability. In this instance, development and social justice agendas were 
mere instruments for securing the state.132  
 However, the Soviet Union’s collapse in 1991 had signalled the end of the Cold 
War that lasted for more than four decades. It paved the way for the emergence of a new 
security environment that significantly transformed the ASEAN’s view of regional 
economic and politico-strategic cooperation. Parallel to Mikhail Gorbachev’s glasnost 
(openness) vis-à-vis perestroika (restructuring), ASEAN leaders started to refocus their 
attention away from traditional security threats that dominated the previous bi-polar era 
to classical economic considerations anchored in free trade. Several key factors had 
contributed to the reconfiguration of the ASEAN Way. The first one relates to the 
deteriorating influence of the economic nationalists over national policymaking 
procedures due to the slow recovery of key ASEAN members from the 1985/86 
economic recessions (Buszynski, 1992; Nesadurai, 2009; Chin and Stubbs, 2010).  
 For example, Indonesia and Malaysia began opening their doors to embrace 
neoliberal economic thinking that emphasised openness and restructuring of the 
domestic markets. The second one has to do with the investment-diversion threat to 
various ASEAN members of China’s exorbitant economic growth fuelled by Deng 
Xioping’s reform programs (Chin and Stubbs, 2010; Lakatos and Walmsley, 2012; Chow, 
2013). Third, and perhaps the most important, the results of GATT Uruguay Round 
negotiations sent a clear message to ASEAN leaders that a rush to freer and deeper trade 
liberalisation was the only way toward a successful recovery (Chin and Stubbs, 2010; 
Chow, 2013).  
 In response to these new developments, ASEAN members formed the ASEAN 
Free Trade Area (AFTA) in 1992, which replaced the old APTA. AFTA members have 
made significant contributions to the reduction of intra-regional tariffs by adopting the 
so-called Common Effective Preferential Tariff (CEPT) Scheme. As of 2014, more than 
99 percent of products in the CEPT Inclusion List (IL) of the ASEAN-six – Brunei 
Darussalam, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand – have already 
been brought down to a 0-5 percent tariff range.133 Meanwhile, the newer ASEAN 
members – Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam – are also not very far behind 
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implementing their CEPT commitments. Almost 80 percent of their products have 
already been moved into their respective CEPT Inclusion Lists.134 Interestingly, even the 
1997/98 financial crisis did not persuade the ASEAN governments to undo the trade 
liberalisation process. On the contrary, it acted as a stimulus for speeding up regional 
economic integration in efforts to recover and retain the forgone FDIs (Dent, 2006; 
Pempel, 2013).   
 Therefore, the post-Cold War era has stirred ASEAN members to re-evaluate the 
organisation’s main thrust and begin highlighting the importance of forging greater 
economic cooperation via greater free trade. However, unlike their EU counterparts that 
have successfully embedded both traditional and non-traditional security issues into their 
trade agendas, ASEAN nations continue to treat security and economics as two separate 
realms. This can be partly explained by the intrinsic nature of the ASEAN’s institutional 
framework, which emphasises the primacy of sovereignty and territorial integrity. In 
addition, the region’s heavy reliance on agricultural exports along with its competitive 
labour sectors justifies the leaders’ opposition against plans to further expand ASEAN’s 
agenda to encompass a wide array of non-trade matters such as human rights, labour and 
environmental practices (Nishikawa, 2009; Chow, 2013; Howe, 2013). ASEAN leaders 
have pointed that “these issues should not be used as conditionality for aid and 
development financing,” otherwise “ASEAN cannot but view it as added conditionality 
and protectionism by other means” (ASEAN 1991). As explicitly stated in the 1991 Joint 
Communiqué of the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting:  
 
The Foreign Ministers exchanged views on the issue of human rights and noted with 
concern its tendentious application in inter-state relations. They agreed that while human 
rights is universal in character, implementation in the national context should remain within 
the competence and responsibility of each country, having regard for the complex variety 
of economic, social and cultural realities. They emphasised that the international application 
of human rights be neither narrow and selective nor should it violate the sovereignty of 
nations.135 
 




For the full copy of the Joint Communique of the twenty-fourth ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, see 






 Not surprisingly, earlier initiatives for linking security issues with AFTA suffered 
outright rejection from some members, blocking representations from business and non-
government sectors that were actively campaigning for their inclusion in the ASEAN 
agenda. The West, particularly the US under the former Clinton administration had 
aggressively campaigned for the incorporation of environmental and labour protection 
issues within the FTAs (Aggarwal, 2013; Ahnlid, 2013). Given that trade liberalisation 
cannot proceed without necessary domestic support, the former US Trade 
Representative Charlene Barshefsky had argued that such support could only be possible 
if the concerns of the working class were seriously addressed to show that trade was the 
right path to grassroots prosperity (WTO, 1996).  
 From the US standpoint, there was an obvious substantive connection between 
these non-traditional issues and free trade. For ASEAN members, such linkages were 
purely tactical and could only lead to volatile issue areas that restrain cooperation at the 
multilateral level (Aggarwal, 2013; Chow, 2013). The disinclination of ASEAN members 
to link non-traditional security issues and trade agreements underscores what Jurgen 
Haacke (2003: 1) calls the “collective understandings and interpretations of a shared 
normative terrain” comprised of six norms: (i) sovereign equality; (ii) non-recourse to the 
use of force and the peaceful settlement of conflict; (iii) non-interference and non-
intervention; (iv) non-involvement of ASEAN to address unresolved bilateral conflict 
between members; (v) quiet diplomacy; and (vi) mutual respect and tolerance. 
 For instance, with respect to human rights, ASEAN members were unanimous in 
their decision to not incorporate these issues into their trade policy agendas. Instead, the 
organisation has invoked its right to implement an alternative set of societal norms and 
behaviours espoused by some successful Asian economies and collectively known as the 
“Asian Values” (Haacke, 2003; Tan, 2011; Davis, 2013; Roberts, 2013). However, while 
Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore openly criticised America's “universalist” approach, 
Thailand and the Philippines were less antagonistic to human rights and democratisation 
principles given the Thais' un-colonised past and the Filipinos' decentralised democratic 
government. Amid such differences among members, compromises were made to 
achieve an ASEAN consensus.   
 Meanwhile, in the case of labour, ASEAN members particularly Indonesia, 
Malaysia and Singapore viewed their incorporation into trade agreements as substitutes 
for protectionist measures that had been previously abolished (Mah, 1998; Chow, 2013). 
As Malaysia's former Minister of International Trade and Industry, Rafidah Aziz put it:  
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WTO and the Secretariat [must] give due priority to the existing work before them and not 
to be preoccupied with the new issues being introduced by interested parties. The WTO 
cannot be regarded as a multipurpose organisation that can be called upon to debate and 
address the range of social issues affecting Members, and the various social ills of the 
world.136 
 
 Concerning environmental protection, ASEAN members did acknowledge the 
substantive connection between sustained economic growth and effective management 
of environmental issues. The 1994-1998 Strategic Plan of Action on the Environment 
aimed at assessing the impact of AFTA on the environment and implementing initiatives 
that “integrate sound trade policies with sound environmental policies.” 137 The 2007 
ASEAN Declaration on Environmental Sustainability, which underlined the reality of 
global warming, further supplemented this.138 Nevertheless, ASEAN members had 
strongly argued that solving environmental problems should not lead to the imposition 
of new barriers to trade, investment and socio-economic initiatives (Elliott, 2012; Koh, 
2012; Sasaoka, 2014). 
 Thus, before the creation of the ASEAN Community, member countries had been 
highly sceptical about linking non-traditional security issues and free trade matters as a 
part of their agenda. Such attempts had been dismissed as mere tactical strategies by the 
rich and powerful countries that aimed to develop further their comparative advantages 
by imposing additional burdens on the rest of the developing world. The reverse 
approach of “de-linking” security and trade was partly the result of the organisation’s 
elite type of management and the huge pressure that drives its leaders to arrive at a 
consensus (Chow, 2013: 78).     
 Nevertheless, the continued pursuit of ASEAN members for deeper regional 
economic integration in the twenty-first century has posed significant challenges to the 
ASEAN Way. The emergence of new threats has gradually transformed the ASEAN's 
practice of strictly separating non-traditional security issues from its free trade activities. 
The Bali Concord issued by the ASEAN members in 2003 finally acknowledged the 
fundamental link between security and economics by stating that, “sustainable economic 
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development requires a secure political environment based on a strong foundation of 
mutual interests generated by economic cooperation and political solidarity.”139  
 Following this accord, ASEAN members agreed to establish an ASEAN 
Community constituted of three interconnected and mutually reinforcing pillars, namely: 
the ASEAN Political and Security Community (APSC); the ASEAN Economic 
Community (AEC); and the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community (ASCC).140 The APSC is 
mandated to “ensure that countries in the region live at peace with one another and with 
the world in a just, democratic and harmonious environment.”141 Meanwhile, the AEC 
represents the materialisation of the “end-goal of economic integration as outlined in the 
ASEAN Vision 2020: a single market and production base; a highly competitive 
economic region; a region of equitable economic development; and a region fully 
integrated into the global economy.”142 Finally, the ASCC “seeks to forge a common 
identity and build a caring and sharing society that is inclusive and where the well-being, 
livelihood, and welfare of the peoples are enhanced.”143 As a whole, the ASEAN 
Community is envisioned to ensure durable peace, stability and shared prosperity in the 
region.   
 The development of the ASEAN Community represents a remarkable paradigm 
shift on the part of ASEAN leaders as it signals the emergence of a people-centred 
ASEAN where non-traditional, human security issues can now be openly discussed and 
properly managed. Furthermore, the adoption of the ASEAN Charter in 2007 has 
transformed the organisation from a loose regional grouping into a rules-based 
institution that possesses an independent legal personality with legally binding 
agreements.144 Yet, despite advances made, the ASEAN's predilection toward its non-
negotiable principles of non-interference and non-intervention implies that in practice, 
members might still be inclined to treat security and trade as if they were two unrelated 
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spheres, thereby preventing their full co-habitation. Not surprisingly, the creation of the 
ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR)145 in 2009 –
responsible for the release of the organisation’s Human Rights Declaration146 – had met a 
lot of criticism not only from sceptics but also from the human rights activists 
themselves, calling it a hollow promotional tool void of any effective power to reprimand 
and punish an abusive member (Tan, 2011; Chow, 2013; Davis, 2013; Roberts, 2013). 
  Overall, ASEAN members have displayed limited interest in linking security 
issues, especially the non-traditional ones, into their free trade activities. Regional 
economic cooperation has always been subordinated to the overarching goal of 
preserving political stability (Haacke, 2003; Aggarwal and Govella, 2013; Chow, 2013). 
Nonetheless, the post-Cold War era has significantly transformed the organisation’s 
pessimistic view toward incorporating the human security concept into its agenda. In 
spite of the relative weakness of the organisation’s compliance mechanisms, the fact that 
some of the prevailing non-traditional security issues are now embedded in the regional 
agenda underscores the progress that it is currently making with respect to these linkages. 
  However, Southeast Asia’s pursuit of regional integration faces a crucial paradox 
– ASEAN regional unity requires both deference to the principles of non-interference 
and non-intervention, on the one hand, and the continuous growth of economic and 
political convergence, on the other (Caballero-Anthony, 2012; Emmers, 2012; Chow, 
2013). The tension that arises from such a contradiction limits the breadth and depth of 
ASEAN integration. Without the necessary shift toward the ASEAN leaders and 
policymakers’ interpretations of the effects of issue linkages on political stability, both 
internal and external, their governments will continue to treat human security and free 
trade as two distinct problems (Aggarwal and Govella 2013; Chow 2013). 
 
3.4 CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter has provided an overview of East Asian security-trade linkages at the 
regional level by examining the evolving agendas of both APEC and ASEAN. To do so, 
I explored the key factors that have come to shape these general linkages. I argued that 
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the changing views toward free trade; the lethargic multilateral trade forum; the rush to 
preferential FTAs; the Asian crisis’ contagion effect; and the need for strategic 
diplomacy, are all crucial to the analysis of the political economy of East Asian linkages 
in the twenty-first century.  
 The examination of regional security-trade linkages both in the APEC and ASEAN 
contexts underlines critical insights regarding the types of security issues that are being 
incorporated into their respective trade policy agendas. On the one hand, APEC’s 
humanist linking strategy focuses on the non-traditional, economic motives, and on the 
other, ASEAN’s statist linking approach focuses on traditional, politico-strategic 
motives. However, the shifting geopolitical, geo-economic, and geo-strategic landscapes 
have compelled APEC and ASEAN members to expand their respective agendas to 
maintain their relevance in the region. As discussed in this chapter, such an expansion is 
not easy for any institution that has exhibited some signs of “institutional sclerosis” 
(Olson, 1982; Bischoff, 2007; Tow, 2009).  
 Both APEC and ASEAN have shown a considerable degree of difficulty 
“reforming structures and practices that explicitly confer relative benefits and 
prerogatives to particular members,” despite their relative adeptness at “acquiring new 
areas of responsibility, and in developing new mechanisms for coordination and 
information-sharing” (Tow, 2009: 51). This is particularly true for members which have 
acquired relatively powerful positions since the onset, and therefore, are sceptical about 
the proposed reforms that threaten to undermine their privileges even though they are 
necessary for preserving the relevance of these institutions amid a changing milieu (Tow, 
2009; Kappel, 2011; Postel-Vinay, 2011). Often, these relatively more powerful members 
are threatened by rising rival powers. To mitigate their insecurities, they rely on the 
structural power that emanates from their privileged status within the institutions to 
sustain their gradually diminishing influence (Tellis and Wills, 2006; Nolte, 2011).  
 Indeed, balancing between the old and new agendas proved a delicate process for 
APEC and ASEAN given their members’ predilection toward certain norm-based 
procedures such as informality, inclusivity and consensus, and reverence for principles of 
non-interference and non-intervention. In the end, it is hard to look beyond the popular 
notion that the efforts being made by APEC and ASEAN toward the linking of statist 
and humanist security issues into regional free trade agendas are nothing but a token 
gesture on the part of the member governments. Nevertheless, the twenty-first century 
has brought along significant changes in existing global and regional arrangements that 
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have altered the institutions’ approach toward different security issues especially those 
that relate to the non-traditional human security. Despite the shortcomings of APEC and 
ASEAN’s compliance mechanisms or even the lack of them in some issue areas, the fact 
that both traditional and non-traditional security issues are now being discussed in terms 
of trade underlines the ongoing progress toward East Asian linkages. These are practical 
































TRADING IN SHADOWS: TAIWAN’S STATIST SECURITY-TRADE LINKAGES 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
Given the ubiquitous “China factor” shrouding the international system, one of the 
primary referents of Taiwan’s national security is its diminishing sovereign space. The 
term sovereign space in this context particularly refers to Taiwan’s de facto domestic and 
interdependence sovereignty, as opposed to any de jure international legal sovereignty.147 
As Stephen Krasner (2009) has succinctly put it, sovereignty is “the golden ring that 
political leaders hope to grasp.” However, the complexities surrounding politico-
diplomatic relations between the ROC and the PRC prevent the former from claiming de 
jure sovereignty.148 This results in the continued non-diplomatic recognition of Taiwan as 
a legitimate state in the international arena. Consequently, Taiwan is forced to resign 
itself to the vulnerabilities and vicissitudes stemming from its insecure and incomplete 
sovereignty, which continuously contracts as China’s “sinicisation”149 project progresses.  
In an attempt to prevent the complete co-optation of Taiwan within Beijing’s 
One-China trajectory - and therefore, the complete obsolescence of its de facto 
sovereignty, the chapter argues that Taiwanese officials and policymakers are increasingly 
turning to various forms of free trade activities.150 Taiwan’s experience with free trade 
underlines the complementary roles of multilateral and preferential trade agreements in 
preserving and enhancing its sovereign space. For instance, when Taiwan was barred 
from the General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade (GATT),151 its bilateral trade with the 
US ensured that the country’s trade regime was complementary to the existing 
multilateral framework. Conversely, when tensions across the Taiwan Strait escalated, the 
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WTO served as an avenue for reconnecting Taiwan and China (Hsieh, 2005, 2011; 
Huang, 2009). 
However, these two types of free trade agreements engender unique power 
dynamics. At the bilateral level, for instance, between the US and Taiwan or China and 
Taiwan – Taipei is unable to adopt a more assertive strategy with respect to Washington 
and Beijing (Bhagwati, 1990, 1991; Collie, 1997; Huang, 2009). Meanwhile, at the 
multilateral level, specifically within the WTO, smaller and weaker countries like Taiwan 
are able to forge strategic coalitions that enhance their collective bargaining power in a 
way that is crucial during negotiation processes (Cho, 2005; Hsieh 2005; Charnovitz, 
2006; Huang, 2009). Hence, Taiwan’s active participation in both bilateral and 
multilateral trade is necessary for the enhancement of its de facto sovereignty. To this 
extent, free trade may be viewed as a sovereignty-upgrading mechanism. However, the 
ongoing sinicisation project carried out by Beijing through the aggressive promotion of 
its One-China policy significantly undermines Taiwan’s capacity for engaging in these 
sovereignty-enhancing FTAs.   
Accordingly, proper attention must also be given to Taiwan’s domestic politics, 
which is characterised by a condition that is akin to the prisoner’s dilemma. Taiwanese 
officials and policymakers themselves have largely contributed to the perpetuation of 
Taiwan’s politico-diplomatic “imprisonment” within the ever-progressing sinicisation 
project. An underlying assumption is that the preservation of the cross-strait status quo 
continues to imprison ROC within the PRC’s One-China trajectory. At the heart of the 
problem lie the uncertainties about the real impact of cross-strait economic relations on 
Taiwan’s de facto sovereignty. On the one hand, the ruling Kuomintang (KMT) Party 
believes that in order to protect Taiwan’s remaining political freedom the government 
must facilitate closer economic cooperation with China (Lee, 2010; Wang et al., 2010; 
Zhao and Liu, 2010; Chow, 2011). On the other, the major oppositionist group, the 
Democratic Progress Party (DPP), argues that such strategy inevitably pulls Taiwan 
toward political unification with China (Clark and Tan, 2010, 2012; Rigger, 2010; Hsieh, 
2011).  
Meanwhile, from the point of view of non-state actors – from the elite business 
sectors worrying about their profits, to grassroots societies fearing for their jobs – 
revisionist policies are welfare-threatening. As such, political parties promoting an 
extreme approach to managing cross-strait relations in ways that subvert the status quo 
are at risk of losing an electoral support base (Kastner, 2006, 2013; Clark and Tan, 2010, 
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2012). Consequently, Taiwanese parties tend to veer away from the debates and dialogues 
that require them to give direct comments about Taiwan’s de jure independence. Instead, 
a watered-down version of cross-strait rhetoric stripped of One-China or “Two Chinas” 
undertone is much more preferred. However, by doing so, Taiwan is perpetually caught 
within Chinese politico-diplomatic confinements.   
This chapter critically analyses Taiwan’s use of free trade to secure and enhance 
its de facto sovereignty amid the presence of a cross-strait dilemma engendered by One-
China constraints. These sections explore the different facets of the existing cross-strait 
dilemma vis-à-vis the preservation of the country’s de facto sovereignty in the twenty-
first century. Taiwan’s unique geopolitical status forces its leaders to resign themselves to 
the instability surrounding the cross-strait environment in the hope of preserving their 
leftover sovereign space that underpins their de facto autonomy. Put differently, the only 
way for Taiwan to be de facto free is by remaining de jure “unfree.”  
However, as mentioned earlier, this type of engagement approach engenders a 
prisoner’s dilemma that compels Taiwan’s state managers to balance their geo-political 
strategies with their geo-economic interests. Therefore, the Taiwanese dilemma is two-
directional. On the one hand, recalibrating the current arrangement by promoting either 
political unification or de jure independence invariably reduces Taiwan’s sovereign space 
given China’s aggressive promotion of the One-China policy. On the other, pursuing 
either “warm” or “cold” economic relations with China also inevitably results in 
shrinking sovereign space given the potential for overdependence. Either way, the 
Chinese-dominated cross-strait status quo is perpetuated and further legitimised.  
In light of this, I attempt to answer the following sets of questions. First, why 
does Taiwan link its statist security interests with its free trade activities? Given the 
existing One-China factor, how does free trade (at bilateral, minilateral and multilateral 
levels) affect Taiwan’s remaining de facto sovereign space? Second, why does de facto 
sovereignty seem to be more conducive to Taiwan’s politico-economic diplomacy as 
opposed to de jure sovereignty? What are the implications for Taiwan’s domestic 
politics? Moreover, third, what are the factors that limit the capacity of free trade for 
securing and enhancing Taiwan’s de facto sovereign space? How do they influence its 






Plan of the chapter 
The chapter is divided into six sections. In Section 4.1, I have provided the context 
through which Taiwan’s statist security-trade linkages in the twenty-first century will be 
examined. I have argued that against the backdrop of omnipresent China factor, one of 
the primary referents of Taiwan’s national security is its diminishing de facto sovereign 
space. When preserving Taiwan’s remaining sovereignty, the Taiwanese government 
actively participates in various multilateral and bilateral (and to a much lesser extent, 
minilateral) free trade activities. However, the island’s inevitable economic entanglements 
with the Mainland have generated a condition similar to the prisoner’s dilemma that 
forces Taiwanese officials to preserve the Chinese-dominated cross-strait status quo.  
In Section 4.2, I briefly examine Taiwan’s politico-diplomatic history by tracing 
the roots of its quasi-sovereign status, which in turn drives the island’s relentless battle 
for international recognition. I provide preliminary insights about the importance of 
economic engagements, mainly via free trade. This is within the context of Taiwan eking 
out a wider space for participation in international politics, despite its non-formal 
recognition as a sovereign state.  
In Section 4.3, I discuss the results of the key informant interviews (KIIs) 
conducted with Taiwanese officials as part of research fieldwork. The objective is to 
provide a general understanding of why Taiwan’s statist security interests and trade 
activities are linked together, and how these linkages influence the political and economic 
engagement strategies of Taipei, with respect to Beijing. The interviews have focused on 
three main aspects of Taiwan’s security-trade nexus: (i) its national securities policy and 
strategies; (ii) its free trade activities and agreements; and (iii) the relationships between 
these two variables. These dialogues are crucial to determining discrepancies (if any) 
between the Taiwanese government’s rhetoric and action, on the one hand, and state and 
non-state perceptions, on the other. 
In Section 4.4, I evaluate the impacts of Taiwan’s free trade activities on its 
overall level of de facto sovereign space. First, I analyse the role of multilateral trade with 
respect to Taiwan’s capacity for strengthening its politico-diplomatic presence at the 
global scale. Then second, I examine the role of preferential trade with respect to the 
island’s capability for improving its politico-diplomatic ties at the regional level.  
In Section 4.5, I identify some of the key factors affecting the utility of FTAs for 
securing and enhancing Taiwan’s remaining de facto sovereignty. I analyse the internal 
(domestic politics) and external (engagement strategy) factors that restrict the 
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sovereignty-upgrading capacity of Taiwan’s FTAs. The objective is to find out the 
potential consequences and ramifications of these factors on Taiwan’s statist security-
trade linking efforts and from there, evaluate the country’s capacity for escaping from 
China’s politico-diplomatic entrapment. In doing so, I explain why de facto sovereignty is 
deemed more favourable than de jure sovereignty when enhancing Taiwan’s external 
security. 
Finally, in Section 4.6, I conclude by arguing that the warming of cross-strait 
relations is reminiscent of the old story about the frog being frayed with warm water. 
The normalisation of cross-strait relations without the legal recognition of Taiwanese 
sovereignty inexorably absorbs the island within the Mainland’s One-China trajectory, 
thereby placing it under what appears to be a perpetual sovereignty dilemma. 
Diminishing political frictions across the Taiwan Strait have the paradoxical effect of 
further reducing the available political and diplomatic options for Taiwan, including its 
quest for de jure independence. In other words, greater cross-strait rapprochement 
ironically leads to lesser de facto autonomy for Taiwan.  
Such a scenario is aggravated by the Taiwanese government’s lack of political 
freedom, if not will, to cancel existing economic engagements, even when Beijing’s 
behaviour continues to violate prior conditions. Neither major political party in Taiwan is 
interested in adopting policies that can potentially destabilise the “normal” conduct of 
cross-strait relations. On the one hand, a highly China-centric approach is criticised by 
citizens who denounce political unification with the Mainland. On the other, various 
groups that would like to exploit the economic opportunities being offered by Beijing 
condemn an extremely nationalistic approach. Such a dilemma inevitably leads to calls 
for the “normalisation” of cross-strait relations, even at the expense of Taiwan’s de jure 
sovereignty.  
 
4.2 THE GENESIS OF TAIWAN’S SOVEREIGNTY DILEMMA 
Analysing Taiwan’s cross-strait engagement policies and strategies requires an 
understanding of significant events that took place after the Second World War. 
Washington and Beijing’s important decisions about Taipei’s international status 
significantly influenced its statehood as a “floating” de facto sovereign territory. Japan’s 
defeat in World War II (WWII) left Taiwan under the temporary leadership of the 
Republic of China – Kuomintang (KMT) party (Hsieh, 2005; 2011; Huang, 2009; Rich, 
2009). Strong support provided initially by the US in the aftermath of WWII enabled 
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Taiwan’s accession to the United Nations (UN), becoming of one of its founding 
members (Huang, 2009). In 1945, Taiwan was granted a permanent seat on the United 
Nations Security Council (UNSC) and two years later it became a GATT contracting 
party while still in control of Mainland China (Hsieh, 2005, 2011; Huang, 2009).  
The ensuing political crises and social unrests, however, had drastically 
transformed this status quo when the KMT was defeated by the Communist Party of 
China (CPC) in 1949 (Hsieh, 2005, 2011; Huang, 2009; Rich, 2009). This forced the 
KMT to relocate its government in Taiwan and revoke its GATT membership in the 
following year. On 8th September 1951, Japan officially renounced its rights to Taiwan 
under the San Francisco Peace Treaty without formally endorsing a party successor 
(Huang, 2009). Although the KMT and CCP had both agreed that Taiwan was part of 
the Mainland, however, both parties also claimed legitimate authority over the whole 
China.  
Fearing that a CPC-led China might further reinvigorate communist sentiments 
in the region, the US intervened by pressuring Japan to enact another treaty with the 
KMT (Huang, 2009). In April of 1952, Japan and Taiwan signed a new agreement known 
as the Treaty of Peace between ROC and Japan, which effectively undermined CPC’s 
claims.152 Upon the treaty’s ratification, Taiwan was immediately absorbed within the 
United States’ anti-communist regional alliance in the Asia-Pacific. Taiwan enjoyed a 
number of valuable concessions as a member of this elite circle, including economic aid 
as well as political and diplomatic support from 1950 until the mid-1960s. In 1967, 
Taiwan re-joined the GATT after obtaining observer status (Huang, 2009).  
However, in the late 1960s American foreign policy took a dramatic turn as it 
began to consider the inclusion of the communist PRC into its anti-Soviet coalition 
(Huang, 2009). This bargaining with China had produced three joint communiqués 
which sealed the fate of Taiwan as a “non-existing” state, namely: (i) the Shanghai 
Communiqué of 1972; (ii) the Normalisation Communiqué of 1979; and (iii) the Arms 
Sales Communiqué of 1982.153 These three separate communiqués had one underlying 
                                                 
152 
For a full copy of the document, see the Taiwan’s Document Project’s website, available online at 
http://www.taiwandocuments.org/taipei01.htm. 
153
 For a full copy of the ‘Joint Statement Following Discussions with Leaders of the People's Republic 
of China,’ see United States Department of State’s Office of the Historian, available online at, 
http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v17/d203. For a full copy of the ‘Joint 
Communiqué on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations’, see Taiwan’s Document Project website, 
available online at http://www.taiwandocuments.org/communique02.htm. For a full copy of the 
‘Communiqué on Arms Sales to Taiwan’, see the Taiwan’s Document Project’s website, available 
online at http://www.taiwandocuments.org/communique03.htm.  
130 
 
theme: that is, a “One-China” policy, which the US had to recognise in exchange for 
China’s support (Huang, 2009; Lee, 2010; Wang et al., 2010). Consequently, the PRC 
took over the ROC’s seat in the UN in 1971, forcing the latter to withdraw again from 
the GATT during the same year (Huang, 2009).  
With the recognition of the PRC as the seat of Chinese government, the US had 
to terminate its diplomatic relations with Taiwan, which gave birth to Taiwan’s Relations 
Act of 1979.154 The said Act had formally denounced Taiwan’s bid for independence by 
officially endorsing a position that there was but one China and that Taiwan was a part of 
China. Nonetheless, the said document had also underscored America’s intention of 
maintaining its strong but unofficial relations with the island as a means of promoting 
peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific. This new mandate required the establishment of 
the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT), a non-profit corporation responsible for 
handling official policy-related dialogues and exchanges between the US and the ROC.155 
Responding to this, in 1979 Taipei instituted its counterpart to the AIT, the Coordination 
Council for North American Affairs (CCNA) under the purview of the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs (Huang, 2009). The said body handled the administration and 
coordination of bilateral matters between the two countries. Although these “unofficial” 
economic and politico-strategic exchanges had redefined the US-Taiwan diplomatic 
relations, the other states decided to formally end their diplomatic ties with Taipei. By 
2013, the number of its political allies had shrunk to 22.156  
Given the ROC’s significantly reduced political clout, economic engagements – 
particularly via free trade – have become a crucial element of Taiwan’s strategy for 
carving out a wider space in the global setting amid the insecurities and uncertainties 
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4.3 TAIWAN’S SECURITY-TRADE NEXUS: VIEWS FROM THE TOP 
 
Table 3: Summary of key informant interviews in Taiwan 157
 
4.3.1 On Taiwan’s national security 
Three key points have emerged from the discussions concerning Taiwan’s national 
security: the cause of insecurity; the effect of insecurity; and the goal of security. Before 
2008, Taiwan adopted some politically sensitive programs that deviated from the general 
principles of the One-China policy. Psychological barriers resulting in mutual distrust and 
disengagement aggravated the segregating effect of physical distance between Taiwan and 
China. These three “Ds” – distance, distrust and disengagement – had significantly 
contributed to the paranoia experienced by both the Taiwanese and Chinese officials due 
to behavioural uncertainties emanating from both sides of the strait. This mutual 
paranoia and suspicion have had tremendous influence on the PRC’s attitude toward the 
ROC’s economic activities, which the former considers a means of fortifying the latter’s 
claims to sovereignty. As Roy Chun Lee pointed out: 
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The Taiwanese government believes that the country must enjoy its freedom to pursue 
regional economic integration with other countries. The Chinese government, however, felt 
that a dialogue with Taiwan will be a necessary preliminary step. While Taiwan argues that it 
is not obliged to seek for permission from China regarding this issue, nonetheless, it 
recognises the importance of accommodating the latter’s concerns with respect to One-
China policy. Taiwan, therefore, makes the case that its pursuit of preferential trade, for 
example, must not be interpreted as a rejection of One-China policy, and that the best way 
to prove this is to show by example. The idea of ‘normalisation’ of cross-strait relations is a 
non-political label that neither challenges nor accepts the One-China policy.158   
 
Hence, Taiwan’s insecurity is largely induced by fears over the volatility of cross-
strait interactions. It is believed that Beijing hijacked Taipei’s foreign economic policies 
to force the latter to comply with the former’s One-China doctrine, thereby preventing 
the emergence of “Two Chinas.” Critics argue that such forceful exertion of Chinese 
influence over Taiwan’s foreign affairs, in general threatens the latter’s national security. 
Accordingly, for most Taiwanese officials and policy elites, the One-China factor remains 
a serious impediment to Taiwan’s economic policymaking procedures. As Kristy Hsu 
stated:  
 
China's meteoric economic rise has made it difficult for other countries to conduct any type 
of business with Taiwan as they are now facing an ‘either-or’ situation – either they are with 
China or with Taiwan. The reluctance of third countries to engage Taiwan demonstrates the 
extent to which the Chinese economic influence is altering the former’s foreign economic 
policy options while simultaneously constraining the latter’s.159  
 
Obviously, the way out for Taiwan is both challenging and difficult given China’s 
seemingly uncompromising views toward proper cross-strait management. While the 
island’s economic statecraft is designed to limit its excessive dependence on the Mainland 
to the extent of offering asymmetric concessions to prospective partners other than 
China, nevertheless, Beijing’s overwhelming presence significantly undermines Taipei’s 
freedom to navigate even within its limited diplomatic space. In the words of Tsai-Lung 
Hong:   
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Liberty and freedom are the ultimate expressions of national security. The freedom and 
liberty to choose instead of being dictated by external forces can only be achieved through 
democratisation of the political processes in the country. Taiwan is governed by law, by 
constitution. The DPP as a liberal party upholds liberal values and principles. It pushes the 
government to observe and implement the fundamental covenants of the United Nations 
including civil and political rights, as well as economic, social and cultural rights. The present 
government, however, is sidetracking the goal of achieving sovereignty from China.160 
 
Overall, based on the statements made by the Taiwanese officials, China’s 
expanding zone of influence is contracting Taiwan’s de facto sovereign space. Taipei’s 
failure to pursue its political and economic agendas independently threatens the 
foundations of its national security. Securing Taiwan’s sovereign space, therefore, 
becomes crucial to achieving the freedom and liberty to realise its national objectives 
without the interference of other states particularly China. 
 
4.3.2 On Taiwan’s free trade activities 
As argued earlier, China’s encroachment of Taiwan’s sovereign space poses significant 
threats to the latter’s national security. Moreover, for Taiwanese officials, free trade has 
been increasingly viewed as a key strategy for cultivating diplomatic relations with other 
countries and mitigating the island’s overdependence on the Mainland. The freedom to 
engage with prospective partners other than the PRC in various types of trade 
arrangements is deemed crucial for the expansion of Taiwan’s sovereign space. Based on 
the interviews conducted, free trade performs three important functions: as a platform 
for regional economic and political integration; as a key to cross-strait normalisation; and 
as a tool for minimising overdependence on China. These functions underline free 
trade’s sovereignty-upgrading effect amid the threats induced by the One-China policy. 
Concerning trade’s role as a platform for regional economic and political integration, Lee 
commented that:  
 
Economic integration must be differentiated from political integration. With respect to free 
trade agreements, for example, some may be politically motivated, while others are 
economically motivated. In the case of China, the FTAs being negotiated and concluded are 
designed to achieve political and strategic objectives rather than economic ones. In that 
sense, all Chinese FTAs are meant to serve political objectives, after all, everything is meant 
to protect the political agenda. In the case of Taiwan, however, this is not necessarily true. 
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For instance, under the proposed US-Taiwan FTA, the US is only asking Taiwan to match 
its tariff rates.  In doing so, Taiwan needs to harmonise its regulatory regimes to improve 
the transparency necessary for maximising its benefits while minimising the costs of 
concessions. The Taiwanese policymaking circles have agreed that although external political 
pressures play a crucial role in the inception of US-Taiwan FTA, however, expected 
economic benefits justify the need to enforce the said bilateral trade agreement. Taiwan’s 
chief economists as well as political analysts are very optimistic about China’s relaxation of 
its policies in relation to Taiwan in light of Hong Kong’s successful conclusions of bilateral 
FTAs with Chile and New Zealand.161  
 
In other words, limiting bilateral trade with China is similar to putting too many 
eggs in one basket, which inevitably creates dependency problem for Taiwan. The risk of 
being captured by China in an economic sense is quite high. Lee further highlighted 
Taiwan’s unique case by comparing it with Mexico’s bilateral trade relations with the US: 
 
In the case of the US-Mexico bilateral trade, although eighty per cent of Mexico’s total 
exports go to the US, the absence of geopolitical tension between the two makes it less 
risky. The opposite is true in the case of Taiwan and China since we have to prepare for the 
rainy days. We clearly need to reduce the high level of dependency on China by diversifying, 
that is, joining more bilateral and plurilateral FTAs.162  
 
Meanwhile, the role of free trade in normalisation of cross-strait relations is viewed 
in the context of Taiwan’s WTO membership.  Before the country’s accession, much of 
Taiwan’s economic insecurities emanated from the most-favoured-nation (MFN) status 
accorded by WTO members to one another. The Taiwanese government, therefore, has 
deemed free trade as a national security issue that could be effectively addressed through 
WTO accession. During the negotiations, several trade experts had expressed scepticism 
toward the WTO, citing the discouraging results from various econometric simulations 
made by several think tanks.  Ten years after its controversial entry to the WTO in 2002 
as a separate customs territory, new empirical studies have shown free trade’s positive 
impacts on the Taiwanese political economy.163 Similar to other countries that have 
adopted neoliberal economic policies, however, not all sectors in Taiwan have 
experienced growth including agriculture.164 Nevertheless, Hsu asserted that Taiwan’s 
acceptance to the WTO was a significant milestone in the country’s foreign affairs 
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history, especially when viewed in the context of Beijing’s tight grip on Taipei’s 
diplomatic manoeuvrings:  
 
On the one hand, Taiwan’s accession to the WTO facilitated the normalisation of cross-
strait relations. But while the WTO is aware of Taiwan’s discriminatory practices against 
Chinese products, the latter does not file complaints to the Dispute Settlement Mechanism 
(DSM) since doing so would implicitly validate Taiwan’s claim as a legitimate sovereign 
state. On the other, the intensification of East Asia’s desire for establishing regional 
economic integration via FTAs has given China a new tool for further isolating Taiwan from 
vital political and economic activities in the region. At the same time, the implementation of 
the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (EFCA) between the two countries has 
resulted to Taiwan’s overdependence on China.165  
 
While multilateralism is still largely viewed as the optimal tool for economic 
statecraft, Taiwan’s relatively small size substantially limits its influence over multilateral 
trade negotiations. Therefore, the second-best option for Taiwanese policymakers is to 
engage more in bilateral and minilateral FTAs. However, the ubiquitous Chinese 
influence in the region and throughout the rest of the world has been a significant 
obstacle to Taiwan’s bid for preferential FTAs with other prospective partners.166 As Hsu 
further claimed:     
 
Taiwanese officials expected that the passage of ECFA would pave the way for more FTAs 
with different countries. However, this failed to materialise immediately due to the 
ambiguity surrounding the country’s sovereign status. In short, sovereignty still matters. 
Attempting to establish diplomatic relations with other countries seems futile when a 
powerful neighbour opposes it. The WTO is becoming less and less of an issue when 
compared with preferential FTAs.167  
 
Within Taiwan’s policy circles, the consensus is that the country must continue to 
engage China while it attempts to establish FTAs with neighbouring countries. Although 
cross-strait relations have significantly improved after the restoration of three direct links 
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in 2008 – postal, transportation, and trade – critics warn that this should not give the 
Taiwanese leaders a false sense of security. As Hong stressed out:  
 
While the DPP does not oppose normalisation of cross-state relations, nonetheless, it wants 
to establish relations with other states other than China. And interestingly, although the US 
is adhering to One-China policy, however, it does not have a Once China principle since it 
does not support Taiwan’s unification with China for some politico-strategic reasons.168 
 
These comments made by the Taiwanese officials suggest that free trade is a critical 
element of Taiwanese statecraft. Beyond classical economic considerations, FTAs are 
fuelled by vital politico-strategic motives that help broaden and deepen Taiwan’s 
sovereign space. To this extent, the whole process of free trade acquires a new “utility 
function,” that is, as a sovereignty-upgrading mechanism. The last section of the 
interviews discusses the policy positions endorsed by these various institutions. It is 
concerned with Taiwan’s efforts to link security issues and free trade objective in efforts 
to preserve its remaining de facto sovereign space. 
 
4.3.3 On Taiwan’s security-trade nexus 
Lee argued that to preserve Taiwan’s national security, cross-strait dialogues must 
promote peace with China, closer integration with the US, and friendship with Japan.169 
Taiwanese think tanks believe that one way to achieve these conditions is to vigorously 
incorporate the world’s three biggest economies to create the ROC’s foreign trade 
policies at the multilateral and regional levels. Lee made a case for Taiwan’s active 
involvement in WTO processes, because of its status as a serious partner for preferential 
trade: 
 
There are two types of WTO members: rule makers and rule followers. This has always been 
the unwritten rule. Taiwan is definitely not a rule making country. Rules are drafted by the 
G8 countries. Since Taiwan depends on trade with the rule making countries, the objective 
is to make money instead of distorting the money-making process. Therefore, it is a 
systematic issue and not a trade issue per se for as long as subsidies are kept at minimum. 
With respect to regional FTAs, it will be more advantageous to join the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership (TPP) than the ASEAN since we should always aim higher in order to facilitate 
domestic reforms. Higher standards must be used as benchmarks to solve for inefficiencies. 
In terms of coverage, the ASEAN+N and the TPP are almost the same, while the passage 
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of an East Asia free trade will undermine Taiwan’s need to join the ASEAN+N. Despite the 
proliferation of regional and transregional FTAs, the WTO remains the optimal choice. It is 
important to stress that the Doha impasse does not mean the death of the WTO.170   
 
Meanwhile, Hsu argued that policy recommendations need to identify the real 
stakeholders. In the case of the ECFA, communication between the government and the 
public was unsuccessful. This was evidenced by contrasting views and a lack of 
consensus concerning ECFA significance across different sectors.171 Hsu also made hints 
about the influence of economic and strategic incentives derived from trade agreements 
toward Taiwan’s prevailing political climate: 
 
For members of the opposition, the ECFA is a politically sensitive topic affecting the 
country’s national security. For the local farmers, it is an economic issue threatening their 
livelihoods due to their lack of capacity to compete against imported products. For ordinary 
citizens, it is a looming social concern that vindicates their distrust toward China. Although 
in general, the concern about China’s aggressive policy stance toward Taiwan has 
considerably declined over the past few years, the return of the Democratic Progressive 
Party (DPP) to power might once again aggravate cross-strait relations due to their explicit 
rejection of the One-China policy. Despite President Ma’s declining popularity, the 
likelihood of the DPP replacing the KMT as the dominant political party in Taiwan remains 
slim given the significant strategic and economic considerations which are at stake.172  
 
However, Hong questioned these statements and claimed that the DPP had a 
strong chance of replacing the KMT given the significant decline of the incumbent 
president's popularity.173 He argued that the One-China policy is both an impetus for and 
a constraint to Taiwan’s trade diplomacy agendas. As such, the DPP is formulating 
policies that are more amicable and less defiant toward the PRC (this is contrary to 
popular beliefs that it is still espousing radical anti-Sino principles). Moreover, according 
to Hong, the DPP espouses a people-centred understanding of national security: 
 
Human security in the domestic context is the security in income, gender equality and labour 
rights. It puts more emphasis on the rights of the people and the communities. It places 
more attention on equality issues between men and women. The biggest security concern 
among Taiwanese is still economic insecurity, although relatively speaking they have better 
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social security system as opposed to other countries. The continuous decline in government 
tax revenues, however, adversely affects the different sectors of the population quite 
differently.174 
 
The comments provided by the informants, suggest that security considerations 
and free trade agendas are fundamentally interlinked. This is particularly relevant in the 
case of Taiwan given the geopolitical context that determines the country’s domestic and 
international political economy. The overarching One-China factor significantly restrains 
Taiwan’s de facto, sovereign space, thereby undermining the latter’s national security. 
Therefore, harnessing the geo-political and geo-economic utility of FTAs becomes a 
central element of Taiwan’s foreign economic policymaking. That said, the One-China 
framework governing cross-strait relations can simultaneously stimulate and constrain 
Taiwan’s sovereign space. On the one hand, it can motivate Taiwan to enhance its 
diplomatic ties with other countries through the creation of FTAs, which minimises any 
dependence on China. On the other hand, China’s wherewithal to effectively employ a 
“diplomatic blackmail” against any country that violates its One-China principle by 
establishing state-to-state relations with Taiwan, implies that Taipei’s foreign economic 
policies can only be mobilised in Chinese terms. This present dilemma confronts 
Taiwanese political parties and their leaders, and partly explains why the parties have 
taken a collective decision to freeze their pursuit of de jure independence.  
 
4.4 TRADING IN SHADOWS: TAIWAN’S STATIST SECURITY-TRADE LINKAGES 
 
4.4.1 Taiwan’s security-trade linkages at the multilateral level  
 
The road to the WTO 
Taiwan’s accession to the WTO in 2002 under the official name of “Separate Customs 
Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu” (TPKM) was considered a diplomatic 
triumph by Taipei in the light of its isolation from the international arena (Hsieh, 2005, 
2011; Huang, 2009; Lee, 2010; Zhao and Liu, 2010). The Taiwanese government has 
proudly emphasised the diplomatic significance of its accession to the WTO, highlighting 
its supposed benefits to local industries and firms as well as to the ordinary citizens. 
Given Taiwan’s limited natural resources, it is imperative for the government to actively 
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engage with trade liberalisation processes. Free trade has been an important component 
of Taiwan’s economic statecraft particularly after reorienting its trade strategy in the late 
1950s when it shifted from import substitution to export promotion activities (Hsieh, 
2005, 2011; Huang, 2009; Lee, 2010; Zhao and Liu 2010).  
However, while the country’s economy had managed to grow rapidly over the 
past decades without the benefits of GATT membership, Taiwanese officials decided 
that membership with international organisations would better enhance these gains. This 
was especially important for a small island like Taiwan (Hsieh, 2005, 2011; Huang, 2009; 
Lee, 2010; Zhao and Liu 2010). For instance, accession to the WTO was expected to 
improve the overall economic efficiency necessary for increasing the country’s trade 
volumes and income levels. Such initiatives led to a number of structural reforms 
including: the abolishment of quantitative restrictions to trade; the depreciation of the 
Taiwanese dollar; and the fixing of a convoluted multiple exchange rates system (Chou et 
al., 1997). The range of forbidden and controlled imports had also been substantially 
reduced and licensing procedures had been adopted to ensure health and safety standards 
(Chou et al., 1997). It is worth noting that even before Taiwan’s accession it had already 
implemented WTO-consistent reforms and policies. The positive results that Taiwan has 
reaped from WTO membership can be attributed to its exceptional preparation for the 
adoption of high levels of economic liberalisation. For example, Taiwan’s average 
nominal tariff, a year before its official accession, was already at six percent – a level that 
was comparable to those of highly developed WTO members (Charnovitz, 2006; Chang 
and Goldstein, 2007; Yang, 2007; Huang, 2009). 
Taiwan’s experience in the WTO vividly illustrates the extent of Chinese power 
permeating the system. Although the Taiwanese government had filed its application in 
January 1990, it took another twelve years before it was finally approved. Under ordinary 
circumstances, three common factors prevent applicants from immediate accession to 
the WTO. These are: more complicated WTO rules; non-market economies; demands 
for greater concessions; and aggressive commitments from existing members 
(Langhmmaer and Lücke, 1999; Huang, 2009). However, Taiwan had completed all of 
these WTO requirements as early as 1998. In fact, at the time of its application, Taiwan’s 
trade regime was far more liberalised than most of the developing WTO members 
(Liang, 2002; Yang, 2007; Huang 2009). Therefore, the amount of time it took to 
approve Taiwan’s application should have been significantly shorter.   
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In Taiwan’s case, the biggest delaying factors were politically motivated. There 
were issues relating to its contested sovereignty, as well as concerns about its volatile 
relations with China (Hsieh, 2005; Charnovitz, 2006; Yang, 2007; Huang, 2009). When 
China renegotiated its WTO membership with the US after its temporary withdrawal 
following the 1989 Tiananmen Square incident, the two parties agreed that Beijing would 
not block Taipei’s accession (Liang, 2002; Huang, 2009). In exchange for this, China 
would be granted membership before Taiwan. This was explicitly broached during the 
GATT Council Meeting on 29th September 1992 where the members had implicitly 
acknowledged the One-China principle. As stated in the UN General Assembly 
Resolution 2758: “Many contracting parties, therefore, had agreed with the view of the 
People’s Republic of China (PRC) that Chinese Taipei, as a separate customs territory, 
should not accede to the GATT before the PRC itself.”   
This proved a painful process for Taiwanese officials, because despite their 
preparedness WTO members chose not to conclude any agreements with them since 
Beijing’s application was still in pending (Liang, 2002; Yang, 2007; Huang, 2009). 
Consequently, all negotiations with Taipei had to remain open and were sometimes 
repeated, even when there was nothing more to add or discuss. China’s inefficiency 
implementing the required structural reforms into its non-market economy, and its 
ineffectiveness bargaining with other members, had mired Taiwan’s own negotiation 
activities (Huang, 2009). Then finally, a day after China’s accession to the WTO on 10th 
November 2001, Taiwan was granted membership status as a separate customs 
territory.175 
 
A bilateral path toward multilateral trade 
In essence, Taiwan was given a window of eight to twelve years to synchronise its 
economic policies with the WTO rules and obligations. This policy space was enough for 
Taiwan to fulfil its commitments under multilateral agreements. In fact, many of these 
commitments – liberalisation of agricultural and industrial goods (GATT); opening of 
service-sector markets (GATS); and the implementation of the Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) – were already been 
implemented in Taiwan before 2002 (Liang, 2002; Hsieh, 2005; Yang, 2007; Huang, 
2009). This highlights the “trickle down” effect of Taipei’s bilateral trade talks with 
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Washington between the 1970s and 1980s, which had paved the way for the latter’s 
participation in the multilateral trade environment.   
Multilateralism has indeed provided Taipei with a new platform for enhancing its 
diplomatic relations with other countries, but this did not supersede its prior asymmetric 
bilateral deals with Washington (Hsieh, 2005; Huang, 2009). In the light of Taiwan’s 
WTO membership, US officials demanded greater concessions than those offered to 
other incumbent members (Charnovitz, 2006; Huang, 2009). Taiwanese negotiators 
accommodated these requests by providing “advance payments” to the US, believing that 
these were the last crucial requirements for its accession (Huang, 2009: 53). The incident 
illustrated a lack of effective negotiating skills by Taiwanese trade officials, which is very 
common among developing member countries. However, unlike their counterparts from 
other small countries, Taiwanese representatives have also had to deal with another huge 
political hurdle - China. 
From the Taiwanese perspective, countering the paralyzing Chinese pressure 
would require strong American involvement in cross-strait affairs. However, drawing in 
the United States would entail even greater bilateral trade concessions and more 
aggressive commitments. Such dynamics underline the role of the “new bilateralism” 
strategy adopted by Washington during the first Bush Administration in 2001 (Ravenhill, 
2003; Desker, 2004; Dent, 2006). As the former US Trade Representative Robert 
Zoellick (2002) had stressed:  “The United States has been falling behind the rest of the 
world in pursuing trade agreement [hence] prompt action is needed to clear the way for 
America's international trade leadership and economic interests.” As a result, the US 
started to actively formulate and offer various Trade and Investment Framework 
Agreements (TIFAs) with individual countries, particularly to East Asian states (Dent, 
2006, 2010; Huang, 2009; Dent and Dosch, 2012).   
Therefore, Taiwan’s bilateral trade experience with the US must be examined 
against the backdrop of its inability to access both the UN and the GATT. The power 
asymmetry between Taipei and Washington enabled the latter to manipulate and exploit 
the former’s policy mechanisms (Hsieh, 2005, 2011; Huang, 2009; Lee, 2010; Zhao and 
Liu, 2010). Consequently, bilateral trade relations between the two governments were 
more unilateral than bilateral given America’s dual role as both negotiator and arbitrator. 
This kind of setup enabled the US to act “manipulatively” and “exploitatively” toward 
the ROC (Hsieh, 2005, 2011; Huang, 2009; Lee, 2010; Zhao and Liu, 2010). Taiwan’s 
proposals for creating a dispute settlement mechanism for resolving trade issues were 
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rejected by the US since bilateral agreements do not allow for it (Charnovitz, 2006; 
Huang, 2009). Accordingly, throughout the negotiation processes Taiwanese 
representatives adopted a defensive strategy, acknowledging their lack of control over 
trade matters raised by the US (Huang, 2009).   
Although Taiwan’s contested statehood was a critical factor for explaining its 
weak bargaining leverage, it was the island’s excessive dependence on Washington and 
lack of access to the multilateral trade system that further aggravated its position (Huang, 
2009; Lee, 2010; Bush, 2011). Given the Taiwanese government’s passive and defensive 
posture, some critics argued that it failed to utilise this new US bilateralism for 
promoting its politico-diplomatic objectives. Its real and perceived powerlessness has 
prevented it from demanding greater concessions from the US. Thus, it has failed to 
influence the trade agenda to its advantage (Huang, 2009; Tucker, 2009; Lee, 2010).  
Despite Taiwan’s mediocre performance in the US-Taiwan trade talks, several 
important lessons were learned which assisted the government in its successful bid for a 
WTO pass. For one, Taiwan’s experience with US bilateralism had made it a lot easier for 
the country to adjust well to the GATT framework, which could be very tricky for the 
new members (Hsieh, 2005; Cho, 2005; Charnovitz 2006; Huang, 2009). The country’s 
trade regime was in line with regulations and procedures followed in the WTO, thereby 
making the transition from bilateralism to multilateralism. Therefore, Taiwan’s prior 
bilateral engagements with the US assisted the former to prepare for its eventual 
accession to the WTO. As Vincent Siew affirmed (in Huang, 2009: 49):  
 
 Taiwan’s connection to the international regime and the rules of the game were established 
in the period of US–Taiwan trade negotiations. Without such experience, the Americans 
would not like to help Taiwan join the GATT/WTO while under the pressure from the 
PRC. 
 
Despite Taiwan’s limited capacity for effectively balancing the US power, the 
asymmetric bilateralism between the two countries was instrumental in the successful 
integration of the former within the multilateral trade system. This milestone has 
significantly contributed to the development of Taipei’s diplomatic scope. With its entry 
into the WTO, Taiwan was able to conduct positive diplomatic activities through various 
multilateral mechanisms, thereby expanding its limited sovereign space.  
These included: (i) the application to other multilateral institutions such as the 
World Health Organization (WHO) and the Organization for Economic Cooperation 
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and Development (OECD); (ii) the participation in several negotiating groups within the 
WTO such as the group of Very Good Friends on Service, Anti-dumping Friends, 
Friends of Environmental Good, G10; and (iii) the establishment of diplomatic dialogue 
with other countries applying for accession after 2002 (Huang, 2009: 54-55).  
 
The ubiquitous China factor 
Unlike any other existing international institution, the WTO does not require prospective 
members to be fully recognised as a sovereign state before granting them an accession. 
This unique constitutional feature of the WTO has enabled some level of co-existence 
between the ROC and the PRC within the same multilateral space by treating both 
governments as “co-equal” or parallel members (Cho, 2005; Hsieh, 2005; Charnovitz 
2006; Bush, 2011). Hence, while Taipei’s WTO accession cannot be regarded as a formal 
bilateral accord with Beijing, nonetheless, it helped to facilitate some semblance of the 
rule of law between the two parties. In addition, the organisation’s Dispute Settlement 
Understanding (DSU) allows the Taiwanese government to stand in an international 
tribunal when disagreements over WTO rules and procedures with other members arise 
(Hsieh, 2005; Charnovitz, 2006). As stated in the 2001 MAC report (in Cho, 2005: 743):  
 
Taiwan and mainland China will be two independent, parallel, and equal members. The 
WTO mechanism offers the two sides a new channel for communication, dialogue, and 
consultation. The two do not have to set any preconditions or prerequisites. They can 
conduct dialogue and consultation on mutually concerned issues based on the WTO rules 
and framework. 
 
However, questions remain about whether or not China intends to acknowledge 
Taiwan’s co-equal status within the WTO given China’s repeated claims for legitimate 
sovereignty over the island, along with long-term plans for reintegrating Taiwan with the 
Mainland. From the Chinese perspective, Taiwan remains a province of China with or 
without “peaceful unification” (Lee, 2010; Zhao and Liu, 2010; Clark and Tan, 2012). 
Accordingly, Beijing promotes a WTO framework with “One-China gestures” by 
rejecting anything that connotes the presence of two Chinas (Cho, 2005: 751). Such 
gestures are intended to cast off any political implications that might arise from China’s 
compliance with WTO rules about Taiwan’s global legitimacy. Furthermore, China 
emphasises that its adherence to multilateral agreements does not,nullify its One-China 
principle. Beijing’s display of One-China gestures is meant to remind the rest of the 
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world that interactions with Taipei within the WTO should be perceived as an internal 
rather external matter (Cho, 2005).   
A concrete example of these One-China gestures is the “nomenclature war” 
launched by China against Taiwan as a subtle form of protest over their parallel status in 
the WTO. For instance, China uses the name “Chinese Taipei” instead of TPKM to refer 
to Taiwan and insists that all members must follow the same protocol (Cho, 2005; 
Charnovitz, 2006). It did not hesitate to call attention to representatives from other 
countries that make the mistake of using the name “Taiwan” during formal and informal 
sessions (Cho, 2005; Charnovitz, 2006). Moreover, China prefers to use Chinese language 
when preparing official WTO documents that pertain to Taiwan and rejects any 
Taiwanese documents that bear the name “Republic of China” (Cho, 2005). These 
gestures are meant to send the message that the island is part of China’s separate customs 
territories, similar to Hong Kong and Macao. Hence, from a Chinese standpoint, the 
WTO dialogue between Beijing and Taipei is the domestic concern of a single country 
that happens to have several subsidiaries.  
However, in July 2005 CNA Taiwan reported China’s formal acceptance of the 
island’s TPKM title, but demanded the cancellation of diplomatic titles used by members 
of the Taiwanese mission (in Charnovitz, 2006: 417). The WTO Secretariat granted the 
appeal and removed these titles from the updated version of its Members Directory, 
provoking Taipei officials to accuse the organisation of “throwing away its neutrality 
under pressure from China” (Bishop, 2005). At present, only the top two officials of 
Taiwan’s Permanent Mission to the WTO are identified by their respective titles, while its 
lower-ranking representatives only have their names and areas of expertise listed (Cho, 
2005; Charnovitz, 2006). 
However, the fact is that Taiwan’s claim for autonomous standing in the WTO has 
strong legal basis. In 1992, Taiwan was granted an observer status by all contracting 
parties when the GATT Council established a working group to evaluate its application. 
This remained valid even after the WTO formally replaced the old GATT system in 
1995. Article 33 of the GATT Constitution states that: 
 
A government not party to this Agreement, or a government acting on behalf of a separate 
customs territory possessing full autonomy in the conduct of its external commercial 
relations and of the other matters provided for in this Agreement, may accede to this 
Agreement, on its own behalf or on behalf of that territory, on terms to be agreed between 
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such government and the CONTRACTING PARTIES. Decisions of the 
CONTRACTING PARTIES under this paragraph shall be taken by a two-thirds majority.    
 
Ironically, it is China’s claim that the island is one of its separate customs territories 
that does not seem to have a legal basis. To maintain an equal status with their Chinese 
counterparts, the Taiwanese representatives have to constantly battle Beijing’s attempts 
at sidestepping bilateral consultations with them (Cho, 2005; Charnovitz, 2006). Beijing’s 
resort to the “nomenclature war” was intended precisely to undermine the legitimacy of 
Taiwan’s parallel status. As far as Beijing is concerned, Taiwan’s WTO membership is 
solely based on its status as one of China’s separate customs and territories (Cho, 2005; 
Charnovitz, 2006). Therefore, it cannot, and should not have a legal status while within 
the said organisation. By framing the issue in such a manner, Beijing can effectively 
portray its relations with Taipei as a strictly local affair.  
Overall, Taiwan’s participation in the WTO has been beneficial to its limited de 
facto sovereign space, despite the challenges posed by China. The country’s accession to 
the WTO and its denial of entry to other multilateral forums such as the UN and its 
umbrella organisations, indicates the “appreciation” and “devaluation” of its sovereign 
status. Nevertheless, the sovereignty-enhancing effect of multilateral free trade 
concerning Taiwan underlines the utility of free trade for securing and enhancing one of 
the primary referents of its national security: that is, its de facto sovereign space.  
 
4.4.2 Taiwan’s security-trade linkages at the bilateral level 
 
“Not too quick”, says China 
A critical glitch in Taiwan’s foreign economic policymaking stems from the statehood 
dilemma induced by China’s continual rejection of its sovereign status. This creates 
serious diplomatic constraints, which limit the trade policy options available for the 
Taiwanese leaders since they are unable to develop either substantive or tactical FTAs 
with prospective partners. As one of the biggest export-oriented economies in the region, 
forging bilateral and minilateral FTAs with other countries is crucial for securing 
Taiwan’s preferential access while the WTO Doha Round staggers to a stalemate (Dent, 
2006, 2010; Hong, 2012). The “bandwagoning effect” induced by FTA proliferation 
compels Taiwan to hastily negotiate and conclude trade agreements to avert the risks of 
146 
 
further marginalisation from intensifying regional integration.176 More importantly, FTAs 
are increasingly being viewed by Taiwanese leaders as strategic platforms through which 
the island’s sovereignty can be more positively expressed, thereby expanding its China-
centric diplomacy track (Hsieh, 2005; Dent 2006, 2010; Hong, 2012; Bush, 2011).  
Given the debilitating effects of the One- China factor, Taiwan has begun to link 
its security motives and FTA agendas, aligning economic interests with politico-strategic 
objectives. Taiwan’s FTA initiatives, therefore, are not only substantively informed, but 
are also tactically linked to its national security. Preferential FTAs provide Taiwan a 
heightened sense of security by minimising its degree of dependence on China (Dent 
2006, 2010; Hong, 2012). To this extent, FTAs are viewed as an attractive medium of 
escape from the Chinese stranglehold.  To fully utilise such medium, Taiwan’s policy 
elites have to create economically lucrative FTAs that will entice potential partners to 
look beyond the country’s contested statehood.  
Inadvertently, the proliferation of FTAs has presented China a new instrument 
for undermining Taiwan’s de facto autonomy. By further hijacking its diplomatic space, 
the country is systematically relegated from important global interactions. Beijing’s 
insistence on a strictly state-to-state FTA negotiation has severely diminished Taiwan’s 
international legal status. China has been persuading Taiwanese policymakers to adopt 
the Hong Kong and Macau model for developing the so-called Closer Economic 
Partnership Arrangement or CEPA as an alternative (Dent 2006, 2010; Hong, 2012). 
Such proposition is deemed unacceptable by the ROC government as it not only 
contracts its remaining sovereignty but also leads to a dead-end One-China situation that 
it so desperately prevents.  
 
ECFA: Boon or Bane? 
Since the KMT’s return to power in 2008 under the leadership President Ma Ying-jeou, 
several observers have claimed that Taipei has begun to downplay the importance of its 
sovereignty dispute with Beijing (Hsieh, 2010; Chow, 2012; Clark and Tan, 2012; Hong, 
2012; Hwang, 2012). President Ma launched the ECFA in November 2008 and became a 
law in January 2011, an act that was warmly welcomed by China’s President Hu Jintao.177 
From the viewpoint of the ruling ROC government, the ECFA fulfils three main 
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objectives: (i) promoting normalisation of cross-strait economic and trade relations; (ii) 
preventing Taiwan’s marginalisation from regional economic integration; and (iii) 
enhancing Taiwan’s status as a regional investment hub.178   
The ratification of the ECFA affects several facets of Taiwan’s cross-strait 
relations with China. The deepening asymmetric interdependence between the ROC and 
PRC because of the ECFA can be interpreted both in economic (“sensitivity 
interdependence”) and politico-strategic (“vulnerability interdependence”) contexts.179 
From an economic context, sensitivity interdependence occurs when economic events in 
China create externalities that ramify across Taiwan such as the large shifts in prices and 
disruptions of supply chains, and vice versa (Kahler and Kastner, 2006; Hong, 2012; 
Kastner, 2006, 2013). In other words, the economic fates of both states become 
inextricably linked together. Meanwhile, from a politico-strategic context, vulnerability 
interdependence arises when imbalanced cross-strait relations allow the stronger party to 
utilise its power to transform the weaker party’s trade policies to its uncontested 
advantage such as in the case of ECFA (Kahler and Kastner, 2006; Kastner, 2006, 2013; 
Hong, 2012). Once dependency has been established the dominant partner begins to 
introduce extra conditionality, which cannot be refuted by the weaker party since the 
risks of termination are already too high. 
On the one hand, the preferentiality and exclusivity derived from the ECFA 
integrates Taiwan and China more deeply, which considerably increases the costs of 
defection. For ardent supporters of the ECFA, the agreement offers an added layer of 
protection against Taiwan’s further relegation from the international trading system 
(Chow, 2012; Hong, 2012; Wu, 2012). It enhances the country’s industrial 
competitiveness by attracting more FDIs, thereby strengthening its position in the rapidly 
expanding Chinese market. In short, it is the prototype for Taiwan’s future FTAs with 
other prospective partners aside from China. Beijing had promised to support Taipei’s 
plans for negotiating FTAs with other small powers such as Singapore and New Zealand 
upon the implementation of the ECFA. This will enable Taiwan to start carving out its 
international space while still operating within the purview of the One-China principle 
(Dent, 2006, 2010; Hong, 2012). However, because of China’s politico-strategic motives 
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the possibility of Taiwan forming FTAs with other powerful nations such as the US, 
Japan, EU members and the ASEAN as a whole will remain highly unlikely. 
Politically, the ECFA is both a cause and an effect of cross-strait pacification. 
Accordingly, it can either reinforce or threaten stability across the Taiwan Strait. 
However, the main argument against the ECFA is that it ultimately results in the cession 
of Taiwan’s de facto autonomy in exchange for limited economic benefits. Critics point 
to the ambiguous, secretive and undemocratic process through which the ECFA has 
been negotiated and ratified by the two governments, thus rousing suspicions about the 
selling of Taiwan’s national interests (Chen, 2012; Chow, 2012; Dittmer, 2012; Hong, 
2012; Hwang, 2012). Although adoption of the ECFA does not necessarily lead to 
unification, the preferentiality that it affords to China may contribute to that end goal. In 
fact, the idea of normalising cross-strait relations via the ECFA seems to be very much in 
line with Beijing’s unification agenda.  
Therefore, arguments for protectionism typically underscore the threats of the 
ECFA to ROC’s national security. Interestingly, despite Taipei’s discriminatory treatment 
of Chinese products, Beijing remains patient and compromising as it views the ECFA 
negotiations as a positive function of its One-China vision (Chen, 2012; Chow, 2012; 
Hong, 2012). Some nationalist observers have increasingly thought of such behaviour as 
an obvious indication of China’s attempts at exploiting cross-strait economic 
engagements to fully capture Taiwan’s remaining autonomy (Chen 2012; Dittmer 2012; 
Hong 2012; Muyard 2012; Wu 2012). 
Overall, China’s regressive stance toward Taiwan’s FTA activities has forced 
some of the latter’s potential partners to suspend their bilateral talks (Hong 2012; Dent 
2006). As a newcomer to the game, Taiwan does not enjoy a first-mover advantage and 
cannot afford any further delay in negotiation processes. Beijing’s insistence on a “one 
country, two systems” approach for facilitating the ECFA does not bode well for 
Taiwanese policymakers who favour the normalisation of the status quo over political 
unification (Chen, 2012; Dittmer, 2012; Hong, 2012; Muyard, 2012; Wu, 2012). The 
manner with which China has been managing the ECFA sends a strong message that 
Beijing’s officials view it more like a domestic than an international agreement.  
The fact that the ECFA’s legal documents do not include definite plans and 
schedules could only imply that both parties may not be able to comply fully with the 
WTO rules regarding the proper implementation of preferential FTAs. Consequently, 
Taipei still considers multilateral trade under the WTO as the most preferred channel for 
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asserting its sovereign claims and enhancing national security given the constitutionally 
guaranteed equal rights that mitigate discrimination and preclude favouritism among 
members.  
 
Glimpse of silver linings 
As argued in the previous sections, developing international linkages through active 
involvement in global economic affairs, specifically free trade, has been the main thrust 
for securing Taiwan’s vulnerable sovereign space. Immediately after the ECFA signing, 
Taiwanese officials vigorously explored other possibilities for developing FTAs with 
other nations.  In fact, even before Taiwan’s WTO accession, the government had 
already established the 2001 FTA Task Force, conducting feasibility studies on bilateral 
trade with partners such as Japan, New Zealand, Singapore and the United States 
(MOFA, 2010).       
 Although preliminary assessments seemed encouraging, it did not take long 
before China issued warnings to countries that were considering FTAs with Taiwan. This 
led to Singapore’s reassessment of its FTA plans with Taiwan, arguing that any 
agreement between the two countries must be pursuant to the One China principle 
(Dent, 2006, 2010). In addition, while both parties deemed these decisions regrettable, 
the FTA negotiations eventually led to an indefinite suspension. Even the announcement 
made by the Taiwanese government about the official title used to sign FTA documents 
in order to downplay its contested statehood – “Chinese Taipei” instead of Taiwan – did 
not elicit a positive response from prospective partners (Dent, 2006; Hong, 2012). 
Therefore, Beijing discovered yet another effective mechanism for constraining Taiwan’s 
diplomatic space by deliberately blocking its efforts to join regional and/or trans regional 
FTA activities.  
However, Taiwan did manage to conclude bilateral FTAs with four of its twenty-
two official diplomatic allies, namely: Costa Rica in October 2002; Guatemala in March 
2003; Panama in August 2003; and Nicaragua in April 2004 (MOFA, 2014). The net 
economic benefits of Taiwan’s bilateral trade deals with these Central American countries 
– estimated at around US$324 million in 2004 – were relatively small, especially when 
taking the associated costs for negotiating these FTAs into consideration (Dent, 2006; 
Chow, 2012). Nevertheless, by signing these agreements, Taiwanese officials and experts 
have gained vital first-hand experience of formulating and negotiating for FTAs (Cai, 
2005; Dent, 2006). These accords have also set the stage for Taiwan’s goal of expanding 
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its de facto sovereign space amid strong pressures from Beijing to uphold the One-China 
principle. To this extent, it may be argued that Taipei’s economic motives for concluding 
these bilateral agreements were only secondary to its politico-strategic motives. 
Amid the PRC’s constant threats to the ROC’s FTA plans with non-diplomatic 
partners, the latter has implicitly retaliated by adopting a stealthy approach to conducting 
preferential trade negotiations. The lack of huge media attention on Taiwan’s bilateral 
involvement is a key component of the government’s strategy for capturing economically 
and politically strategic FTAs (Dent, 2006). The first concrete results from these efforts 
were the signing of bilateral FTAs with New Zealand and Singapore in 2013, three years 
after the ECFA’s enactment. These events had somewhat ended the looming 
speculations on Beijing’s plan to abandon its promise of allowing Taiwan to conclude 
FTAs with other countries even after the passage of the ECFA. Taiwan achieved major 
diplomatic milestones with the successful conclusions of its first two bilateral FTAs with 
non-diplomatic partners. 
On the 10th of July 2013, Taiwan and New Zealand signed the Agreement between 
New Zealand and the Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen, and 
Matsu (TPKM) on Economic Cooperation or ANZTEC.180 The said agreement is 
Taiwan’s first FTA with a non-diplomatic partner that also has an existing trade 
arrangement with China. Taipei officials maintain that the ANZTEC provides Taiwan 
with the much-needed thrust for pursuing wider regional economic integration by 
opening new doors for similar agreements against the backdrop of warming cross-strait 
relations (Chu and Lowmaster, 2013). To avoid an unnecessary diplomatic row with its 
second largest trading partner, the New Zealand government took a low-profile 
approach to negotiations (Craymer and Liu, 2013).  
Neither of the two governments sent their senior ministers to witness the signing 
of ANZTEC so as not to imply a “state-to-state” affair. Instead, the agreement was 
concluded via a webcast, enabling Taiwanese officials to witness its signing without 
having to set foot in New Zealand’s territory (Craymer and Liu 2013). Technically 
speaking, the ANZTEC is not a “state-to-state” agreement since the New Zealand 
Commerce and Industry Office in Taipei, and the Taipei Economic and Cultural Office 
in Wellington signed it. This was confirmed by the spokesperson of China’s Foreign 
Ministry, Hua Chunying at a press conference held in Beijing on the 10th of July 2013:  
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The China – New Zealand relations are now in good shape. Committed to the “One China” 
policy, New Zealand handles relevant issue properly, which is conducive to a healthy China 
– New Zealand relationship…Our position on the issue of Taiwan's foreign exchanges is 
consistent and clear. We have no objection to non-governmental business and cultural 
exchanges between foreign countries and the region of Taiwan but oppose the development 
of any official ties between them. Fair and reasonable arrangement could be made for 
Taiwan's participation in international activities through practical consultation across the 
Straits on the premise of not creating “two Chinas” or “one China, one Taiwan.”181 
 
Following its game-changing FTA with New Zealand on 7th November 2013, 
Taiwan signed another bilateral agreement with Singapore called the Agreement between 
Singapore and the Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu 
(TPKM) on Economic Partnership or ASTEP. 182 It is Taiwan’s first bilateral FTA with a 
non-diplomatic partner in Asia and represents the country’s hope to trigger a domino 
effect by encouraging other states to negotiate with it on similar trade accords without 
antagonising Beijing. As with the ANZTEC, both parties of the ASTEP maintained a 
low-profile approach throughout the negotiation process to avoid offending Chinese 
sentiments (Wang, 2013). Similar to the ANZTEC, the deal was signed between 
the Singapore Trade Office in Taipei and the Taipei Representative Office in Singapore, 
thereby implying a non-government to government agreement (Wang, 2013).  
Taiwan’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, David Lin is optimistic that both the ASTEP 
and ANZTEC will enable the country to accede to minilateral trade agreements 
particularly the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and the Regional Comprehensive 
Economic Partnership (RCEP) (Shih, 2013). Meanwhile, China threw caution to 
Singapore over its FTA activities with Taiwan, urging its government to recognise the 
existing One-China policy: “Our position on Taiwan's foreign interactions remains 
consistent and clear. And we hope Singapore could abide by the One-China policy and 
deal with its economic ties with Taiwan in a prudent and proper manner” (Hsu and 
Poon, 2013).  
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The coming into fruition of both the ANZTEC and ASTEP can be an indication 
that cross-strait relations are improving. The PRC is now more comfortable in giving the 
ROC some room to navigate in the international arena which increases the latter’s 
diplomatic capabilities. However, the extent to which the observance of the One-China 
principle will influence Taiwan’s capacity for bilateral interactions in various international 
platforms remains ambiguous. Notwithstanding these uncertainties, these newly 
established accords represent a significant development as far as Taiwan’s “inexistence” 
in the global arena is concerned and could mark the beginning of thawing political 
barriers to its sovereign statehood.  
Overall, preferential FTAs in the form of bilateral agreements are vital tools for 
securing Taiwan’s de facto sovereign space by enhancing the country’s relations with 
non-diplomatic partners. While the bandwagoning and domino effects of FTA have 
manifested in various states in the Asia-Pacific, however, Taiwan has remained relatively 
idle due to its existing geopolitical issues with China.183 Moreover, while the recent events 
may have revealed a more positive Chinese attitude toward Taiwan’s FTA goals, there are 
still no guarantees that such behaviour will last even in just the short run. Therefore, the 
Taiwanese government tries to efficiently utilise the benefits of its WTO membership. 
However, unfortunately, the current WTO impasse poses yet another problem for the 
island, requiring it to play a more pro-active role in helping the members reach consensus 
on problematic trade issues. Hence, in the context of an overarching China factor, 
Taiwan is essentially facing a two-way free trade stalemate that ultimately curtails its 
remaining de facto autonomy.   
  
4.5 LIMITS TO TAIWAN’S STATIST SECURITY-TRADE LINKAGES  
Several factors influence the capacity of Taiwanese political parties and their respective 
leaders for thawing the politico-diplomatic barriers that are emanating from Beijing’s 
One-China policy. These are: (i) limits of institutional mechanisms and procedures; (ii) 
limits to nationalist objectives; (iii) limits of export-led growth; and (iv) limits of 
engagements strategies. The first and second factors represent the internal constraints 
that sustain Taiwan’s sovereignty dilemma, whereas the third and fourth factors deal with 
the external constraints that are reinforcing it. However, it is worth noting that these 
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factors are all interconnected and overlap with each other. Together, they undermine the 
sovereignty-upgrading utility of Taiwan’s free trade activities by exacerbating further the 
underlying One-China factor.  
 
4.5.1 Limits of institutional mechanisms and procedures 
In May 2011, President Ma delivered a speech about Taiwan’s national security strategy 
and its implication on ROC-PRC vis-à-vis US-ROC relations. During his speech, the 
President discussed the three pillars of cross-strait security strategy, namely: (i) 
institutionalisation of cross-strait rapprochement; (ii) enhancement of contributions to 
international development; and (iii) alignment of defence with diplomacy.184 
The first pillar is anchored on the “Three No’s Policy” rolled out in 2008 – no 
unification, no independence, and no use of force (Lee, 2010; Morse, 2011; Clark and 
Tan, 2012). Alluding to Paul Schroeder’s idea that “one must have a change of thought 
before one can have a change of action”, President Ma argues that the institutionalisation 
of bilateral conducts between Taipei and Beijing create diplomatic structures necessary 
for advancing cross-strait political and economic dialogues (Morse, 2011: 2). A concrete 
example of this strategy is the creation of the ECFA itself. While the Chinese officials 
view the agreement as a form of “soft power” diplomacy, nonetheless, some of the 
nationalist leaders in Taiwan deem it as yet another tool for institutionalising the cross-
strait interactions (Clark and Tan, 2010, 2012; Gold, 2010; Wang et al., 2010; Zhao and 
Liu, 2010). On the one hand, the PRC expects the ECFA to produce strong incentives 
that will convince the island to reunite with the Mainland. On the other, the ROC is 
optimistic that the agreement will be instrumental in achieving mutual understandings 
with Beijing through the facilitation of norm-sharing and confidence-building measures.  
The second pillar utilises Taiwan’s “soft” economic power for enhancing its 
national security agenda that centres on the preservation and enhancement of its de facto 
sovereign space. Taiwan’s awareness of the intrinsic link between its security and 
responsibility as an international stakeholder compels the government to provide 
financial concessions and aids as part of its global outreach policies (Morse, 2011). By 
increasing its contribution to international development, Taiwan hopes to increase the 
economic costs of upsetting the prevailing cross-strait status quo order, thereby 
providing an additional layer of security protection.   
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The third pillar amalgamates Taiwan’s defence and diplomacy strategies to 
achieve the twin goals of earning credibility and trust from the allies while improving its 
defence against the Chinese incursions (Morse, 2011). In other words, Taiwan needs to 
strategically balance the soft and hard elements of its national security policies and 
strategies to secure one of its primary referents – its diminishing de facto sovereign 
space. Taiwanese officials have always been cautious about the implications of their 
foreign policy stance toward Beijing. As an added measure, the Taiwanese government 
has staunchly argued for strong military and diplomatic support when negotiating with 
their Chinese counterparts regarding the management of cross-strait relations (Morse 
2011). Accordingly, President Ma consistently urges the US to continue backing Taiwan’s 
military build-up amid China’s hegemonic rise in the region but only to the extent that it 
does not provoke Beijing (Bush, 2005; Lee, 2011). Through its “defensive” diplomacy 
approach, Taiwan is aiming to enhance the level of predictability when it comes to cross-
strait interactions (Swaine, 1999; Lee, 2011; Morse 2011).   
However, Taiwan’s effectiveness enhancing its national security is still largely 
contingent upon the state of its remaining de facto sovereign space. The country’s lack of 
de jure inter-agency mechanisms and procedures necessary for creating and executing its 
security policies and strategies poses even more threat to this space. In fact, Taiwan’s 
national security agenda is developed either through a de facto fragmented approach 
between the responsible government agencies, or the president’s independent 
consultations with his military officials and civilian leaders, instead of an institutionalised 
and legalised body (Swaine, 1999; IBP-USA, 2009, 2011). Aside from the president’s pre-
eminent role deciding the contents of its NSPS, several elite state actors including the 
National Security Council’s (NSC) secretary-general, foreign and defence ministers, and 
the premier also have critical voices in the process (Swaine, 1999; IBP-USA, 2009, 2011). 
Such practice inevitably results in the poor coordination of top-level management, and 
the military and civilian elites.  
An absence of definitive and clear-cut proposals for guiding the country’s 
national defence and foreign policy objectives underlines the limitations of this approach 
in two ways. First, initiatives undertaken in the foreign policy realm may not necessarily 
be complementary to the larger national security agenda. Second, programmes launched 
under the defence policy realm are sometimes anchored on narrow military defence plans 
judged effective by the military chief himself. Consequently, Taiwan’s national security 
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seems to be detached from the objective of having unequivocal policy strategies as 
evidenced by President Ma’s Three No’s Policy. 
The fact that the present Taiwanese government favours the current status quo 
order over independence or unification with China is indicative of its inability to forge a 
unifying national security vision. This results in further deterioration of its de facto 
sovereign space, which in turn leads to an outsiders’ perception that the country’s 
national security rhetoric and agenda is simply a function of the incumbent president’s 
vested interests and interpretations of events. Therefore, what is crucially missing is an 
overarching security doctrine that systematically incorporates myopic strategies into a 
broader national policy framework for containing any threats to Taiwan’s problematic 
statehood. 
 
4.5.2 Limits of nationalist objectives 
Different political actors have different views regarding the impacts of cross-strait trade 
relations on Taiwan’s de facto sovereignty. The pan-green forces depict cross-strait trade 
engagements as threats to national security, and pan-blue forces highlight the security-
enhancing features of such engagements.185 Despite the DPP’s warnings about imminent 
threats posed by deeper economic engagement with the Mainland, the KMT still actively 
campaigns for an enhanced Sino partnership to take advantage of the economic boom in 
China (Lee, 2010; Wang et al., 2010; Zhao and Liu, 2010; Chow, 2011).  
Thus, it is interesting to see how ordinary Taiwanese citizens view ever-increasing 
cross-strait economic relations. Based on the survey conducted by the National Chengchi 
University (NCCU) in April 2007 (during the tenure of then President Chen Shui-bian of 
the DPP), cross-strait relations were seen as a threat rather than reinforcement to 
Taiwanese sovereignty. Of the total number of survey respondents, 61.0% demanded 
tighter regulations on cross-strait relations compared to 35.0% that requested for fewer 
restrictions and another 4.0% that favoured the present status quo (Wang, 2009). Upon 
the KMT’s return to power in 2008 under President Ma’s leadership, the percentage of 
the Taiwanese population that called for stricter regulations increased to 71.0%, while 
those who favoured softer policies decreased to 21.0% (Wang, 2009). These results 
highlight the pessimistic views concerning Taipei’s engagement strategies with Beijing, 
specifically after the reopening of the so-called three direct links to cross-strait relations. 
                                                 
185 
The pan-green force is comprised of consisting of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), Taiwan 
Solidarity Union (TSU), and the minor Taiwan Independence Party (TAIP). The pan-blue force is 
consisted of the Kuomintang (KMT), the People First Party (PFP), and the New Party (CNP). 
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To some extent, these findings reflect the persistence of Taiwanese nationalism amid 
mounting fears over the island’s complete absorption into China’s sinicisation project. 
Nevertheless, the ECFA’s passage and implementation had seemed to alter the 
Taiwanese perception toward China, but not without a deep polarisation of local 
opinion. Influential business groups along with some of the country’s political elites are 
largely supportive of the ECFA, emphasising its important economic benefits as the 
primary impetus for passing the agreement (Wang et al., 2010; Hsieh, 2011; Clark and 
Tan, 2012). Parties that are strongly opposed to reunification plans with China, along 
with local firms that are adversely affected by the agreement argue that the ECFA 
symbolises President Ma’s long-standing goal of selling Taiwan’s sovereignty by ceding 
all of its political and economic authority to the Mainland (Tien and Tung, 2011; Hong, 
2012). Despite this division, the results of surveys conducted by the Mainland Affairs 
Council (MAC) in 2010 indicated a favourable attitude toward the ECFA. Of the total 
number of respondents, 60.0% agreed that the ECFA creates long-term positive impacts 
on the economy compared to the 23.0% that expressed less optimism about its promised 
impacts and the remaining 11.0% that showed neutral support for the agreement.186  
The ECFA supporters argue that the citizens’ favourable view toward the 
agreement is driven by the satisfying conditions that it generates. 67.0% of survey 
participants expressed clear satisfaction with the ECFA while only 33.0% claimed 
dissatisfaction (MAC, 2010). Concerning the ECFA’s latent security threats against 
Taiwan’s remaining de facto sovereignty, 66.0% of respondents downplayed the veracity 
of these issues while only 34.0% believed otherwise (MAC, 2010). With respect to the 
ECFA’s role in Taiwan’s FTA promotion, 71.0% of the participants viewed the 
agreement as a necessary precursor for capturing more FTAs in the future (MAC, 2010), 
thus underlining its capacity for enhancing the island’s sovereign space. These results 
suggest that Taiwan’s management style with respect to cross-strait relations is more fluid 
than initially thought. Taipei’s pragmatic engagement approach concerning China has 
substantial influence over the politico-diplomatic climate surrounding the two 
governments. The island’s speedy recovery from the global recession in 2009, coupled 
with the failure of the DPP to accurately predict the ECFA’s impact on Taiwan’s 
sovereignty, helped to improve the Chinese image quite considerably (Clark and Tan, 
2010, 2012). 
                                                 
186
 For a full copy of the survey, see Mainland Affairs Council’s website, available online at 
http://www.mac.gov.tw/public/Attachment/07141750425.pdf.   
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However, for members and leaders of the DPP, pro-Taiwan policies – 
specifically, the quest for de jure sovereignty – must be interwoven with the country’s 
democratisation agenda (Rigger, 2010; Clark and Tan, 2012). Fighting authoritarianism 
with democracy demands the propagation of Taiwanese nationalism that can resist an 
overweening Chinese presence and declare its non-negotiable autonomy from the 
Mainland (Gold, 1986; Wachman, 1994). DPP officials expected that by leading the 
nation in its pursuit of complete independence, citizens would award them with the 
required number of votes to govern (Clark and Tan, 2010, 2012). Conversely, KMT 
leaders relied mainly on the spill over effects of Taiwan’s economic miracle to justify a 
position that favoured the normalisation of cross-strait relations (Clark and Tan, 2010, 
2012). Hence, while the DPP was adamant about endorsing a state-to-state approach 
when dealing with China, the KMT was cautious when implementing its own version of 
the One-China principle despite its reinstatement of Taiwan as the legitimate government 
of all China. 
However, the results of the general elections, particularly in 1991, compelled the 
DPP to take a more restrained rhetoric on Taiwanese sovereignty after suffering a 
landslide defeat against the KMT. Since the explicit denouncement of the One-China 
policy proved to be electorally costly and politically infeasible, the DPP started to relax 
its policy on sovereignty and crafted a new discourse emphasising the country’s de facto, 
rather than de jure, independence from China (Rigger, 2010; Clark and Tan, 2012). This 
resulted in internal conflicts among various factions within the DPP and eventually led to 
defection of its pro-independence members who then established the Taiwan 
Independence Party in 1996 (Wang, 2000; Rigger, 2010; Clark and Tan, 2012).   
The failure of nationalist goals and objectives to bring about electoral success 
highlights their limits for improving Taiwan’s remaining sovereign space. Revisionist 
propositions concerning the island’s contested statehood yielded a low number of votes 
for the respective parties espousing them. This reflects the public’s fear that proposals 
for either complete unification or absolute independence invariably undercut the existing 
cross-strait stability. Intriguingly, a significant segment of the voting population preferred 
the preservation of the status quo or the so-called normalisation of cross-strait relations 
(Hsieh, 2002; Huang, 2009).  
As a result, Taiwan’s major political parties were compelled to soften their 
nationalist stance by taking the middle ground in order to placate sceptical voters (Wang, 
2000; Lin, 2001; Clark and Tan, 2012). Thus, it would appear that a consensus for 
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adopting a moderate approach to pursuing nationalist agendas between the two 
competing parties had been reached. While general sentiments toward each other may be 
as capricious as the Taiwan-China relationship, nonetheless, both have consistently 
applied the norm of moderation in the conduct of cross-strait affairs.  
The risks of espousing a nationalistic agenda were once again highlighted during 
the 2012 general elections when the DPP’s presidential candidate, Tsai Eng-wen, failed 
to convince the Taiwanese voters that cross-strait relations would remain stable under 
her leadership. Tsai’s defeat had forced the DPP to reformulate its engagement policies 
and strategies with the Mainland (Kastner, 2013). Therefore, it may be predicted that in 
the long run, there will be no more incentives for Taiwanese political parties and their 
politicians to launch strong pro-independence campaigns given their huge electoral risks. 
This makes the freezing of claims over Taiwan’s de jure sovereignty an attractive choice.  
 
4.5.3. Limits of export-led growth 
That the ever-increasing economic interdependence between Taiwan and China 
engenders security threats due to the latter’s claims of sovereign authority over the 
former is reminiscent of Albert Hirschman’s (1945) analysis of Eastern Europe’s 
economic dependence on Nazi Germany in the 1930s. Cal Clark and Alexander Tan 
(2012) cite three interrelated factors that led to intensified cross-strait economic relations 
in the early to mid-1990s: economic complementarity, cultural and language ties, and 
political compatibility. First, China’s export-oriented industrialisation happened to focus 
on the industries that Taiwan was shedding as it headed toward economic maturation, 
thereby creating economic complementarity. Second, such complementarity was 
enhanced by the geographic proximity vis-à-vis cultural symbiosis between the two 
countries, thereby leading to mutual economic attraction. Third, the respective politico-
strategic motives of the two governments had a strange harmonising effect that created 
some semblance of political compatibility. While Beijing viewed economic integration as 
a tool for political unification, Taipei’s pragmatic diplomacy neither accepted nor rejected 
such a view except for the assurance that it was promoting the final separation of Taiwan 
from Mainland China.  
Unfortunately, the harmony of interest created by the awkward political 
compatibility between the two governments had been ephemeral. During the second half 
of the 1990s, provocative exchanges between Taipei and Beijing led to heightened 
hostility and tension across the Taiwan Strait. President Lee’s visit to his alma mater at 
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Cornell University in June 1995 was interpreted as a subtle assertion of Taiwanese 
independence, eliciting strong military contestations from Beijing through missile 
diplomacy (Lee, 2010; Zhao and Liu, 2010). President Lee’s further statements regarding 
Taiwan’s “state-to-state relations” with China in 1999 had roused even greater suspicions 
in China (Clark and Tan, 2012, 2010; Lee, 2010).  
In response to these actions, Beijing had issued grave warnings about the possible 
repercussions of electing a pro-independence candidate as president. Nevertheless, this 
did not prevent a DPP contender in the person of Chen Shui-bian from occupying the 
presidential seat in 2000 (Lee, 2010; Wang et al., 2010; Zhao and Liu, 2010). After two 
years of failed attempts to court China, a ‘one country, one side’ rhetoric was adopted, 
provoking yet another cross-strait crisis. China responded with the passage of its Anti-
Secession Law directed toward Taipei in March 2005 and reignited tensions across the 
Taiwan Strait (Wang et al., 2010; Zhao and Liu, 2010). President Chen then utilised the 
China factor when consolidating domestic support for his nationalist agendas while 
freezing the National Unification Council and Guidelines in 2006 (Lee, 2010; Rigger, 
2010). Over the years, the level of perceived Chinese hostility toward Taiwan has 
remained considerably high, averaging between 50% and 55%, from the sides of the 
government and citizens (MAC, 2013; Tan, 2013). As a result, cross-strait relations have 
continued to be erratic and unstable until the KMT’s return to power in 2008 with 
President Ma taking over the presidency and promising a more China-friendly approach 
(Gold, 2009; Tucker, 2009; Rigger, 2010).  
Despite the constant diplomatic bickering, economic interactions between the 
two countries remained relatively stable and, in fact, grew even higher. The successful 
insulation of cross-strait trade relations during these tumultuous periods can be 
attributed to different factors. First, major collaborative business projects between 
leading Taiwanese and Chinese firms, such as the $6.5 billion joint venture for Shanghai 
semiconductor plants in May 2000, was an indication of a relatively “normalised” cross-
strait relation (Clark and Tan, 2012). Second, the dwindling economic conditions 
engendered by the global recession in 2000 forced several domestic firms to expand 
operations to China in order to recover the losses incurred during the crisis (Cooke, 
2006; Clark and Tan, 2012). Third, upon Taiwan’s recovery from the crisis, cross-strait 
economic activities were revitalised, with China comprising 30% of its total exports 
between 2007 and 2010 (MAC, 2011; Clark and Tan, 2012).     
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However, the imbalanced trade between Taiwan and China had some serious 
implications, both positive and negative depending on whether one generates a surplus 
or a deficit. The first half of the 1990s saw Taiwan as a consistent net exporter with the 
help of import restrictions on Chinese merchandise vis-à-vis cross-strait commodity 
chains where Taiwan was a component producer and China was a product assembler 
(Wang et al., 2010; Zhao and Liu, 2010). During the second half of the 1990s to the 
present, the tides had started to shift. China’s trade volume had substantially eclipsed 
Taiwan’s, indicating the formation of trade dependence (Wang et al., 2010; Zhao and Liu, 
2010). This generated strong disquiet among the nationalist sectors in Taiwan, 
particularly the DPP members who argued that trade dependence was hallowing out 
national sovereignty.  
Arguments regarding the adverse effects of Taiwan’s trade dependence on China, 
particularly in terms of its contested statehood, highlight the limits of the ROC’s export-
led growth. Given the engulfing China factor, Taiwan’s pursuit of economic interests 
threatened to undermine its vital politico-strategic objectives. However, for the current 
Ma administration, forging mutual trust and understanding through deeper economic 
partnership with China was the key to ensuring peace and stability in cross-strait relations 
(Lee, 2010; Wang et al., 2010; Zhao and Liu, 2010). In the words of President Ma (in 
Kastner, 2013: 6): “It is only by more contact, more understanding, more exchange [can] 
we reduce the historical hostilities across the Taiwan Strait.” Such statement implies 
President Ma’s adherence to a softer version of the One-China policy by insisting on 
closer economic integration with the Mainland while trying to maintain Taiwan’s de facto 
independence.  
Meanwhile, the staunchest critics of cross-strait economic engagement 
considered that Taiwan’s increasing dependence on China would inevitably lead to 
political unification (Kastner, 2006, 2013; Lee, 2010; Hong, 2012). This could happen in 
two ways. First, Beijing may use economic sticks or carrots to either lure or coerce Taipei 
into unification. Second, Taiwanese beneficiaries of economic interdependence in general 
may develop a positive outlook toward unification knowing the importance of stable 
political relations when securing their interests.  
However, supporters of President Ma’s policy claim that there are a few good 
reasons to question the assumption that economic integration will inexorably lead to 
political unification. For one, although Taiwan’s closer economic relations with China 
may enhance the latter’s coercive power, its application can be economically and 
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politically costly not only for the island, but also for the Mainland (Kastner 2006, 2013; 
Clark and Tan, 2012). The imposition of economic sanctions on Taiwan, for instance, 
hurts local business groups that favour political unification, and as such, are 
counterproductive to China’s strategic motives.  
In addition, there is no compelling statistical evidence that would suggest great 
enthusiasm on the part of Taiwanese citizens toward unification projects (Kastner 2006, 
2013; Clark and Tan, 2012). In fact, the percentage of the Taiwanese population 
demanding to expedite the unification process has dropped to 3% over the past decade, 
while those advocating for a “one country, two systems” framework were reduced to 
8.1% (MAC, 2012). To some extent, these trends are reflective of the increasing number 
of self-identifying ‘full-blooded Taiwanese’, and the decreasing population of “exclusively 
Chinese” citizens (NCCU, 2012). In short, at present there is no strong evidence to 
support the claims that intensifying economic interdependence is increasing domestic 
support for the unification project.  
Finally, the salience of the Taiwanese dilemma at least from the Chinese 
standpoint, also depends on the ROC’s ruling party. A more daring ROC government 
that pushes the envelope on sovereignty issues is expected to elicit aggressive reactions 
from the PRC, which may simply ignore the economic costs of war if only to prevent the 
emergence of two Chinas (Kahler and Kastner, 2006; Clark and Tan, 2012; Kastner, 
2013). Financial considerations for waging war are becoming less of an issue given the 
rate at which Chinese economic wealth and military power is expanding, especially when 
launched against smaller enemies like Taiwan. While strengthening cross-strait economic 
ties may bring about a new economic miracle for Taiwan, its overdependence on China 
blocks the fundamental politico-diplomatic objectives that are necessary for a completely 
sovereign statehood.    
 
4.5.4. Limits of engagement strategies 
Although economic engagement, particularly in terms of trade, is commonly framed as 
the superpowers’ strategy for extracting politico-strategic concessions from their 
respective targets, small powers also utilise these linkages to inform, constrain and 
transform the latter’s behaviour (Kahler and Kastner, 2006; Kastner, 2006). Such is the 
case of Taiwan and China. Two types of engagement strategies strongly capture the 
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dynamics of cross-strait relations between these two countries: conditional (or tactical) 
and unconditional (or substantive/structural).187  
Under conditional engagement, the initiator adopts a quid pro quo approach by 
compensating the target for every policy change that it makes through increased 
economic exchanges, rather than punishing it with sanctions. However, there are a few 
reasons why conditional engagement strategies, in general, are deemed less popular than 
economic sanctions. First, in terms of their economic costs, inducements are costlier 
than sanctions. While sanctions are carried out only when the target fails to initiate the 
expected policy change, inducements are paid when a policy shift does take place and will 
continue for as long as the target maintains its favourable behaviour (Drezner, 
1999/2000; Kahler and Kastner, 2006). Second, offering inducements not only creates a 
perception that the target’s resolves are stronger than the initiator’s, but also strengthens 
the former’s military capacity thereby raising the incentives for maintaining the policy 
status-quo (Drezner, 1999/2000; Kahler and Scott, 2006). And third, the uncertainties of 
market conditions undermine credible commitments on the parts of both initiators and 
targets with respect to policy reforms that must carried out once economic payoffs have 
been made (Drezner, 1999/2000; Kahler and Scott, 2006). Nevertheless, despite these 
limitations, conditional engagement can still induce a desired policy change, particularly 
between democratic nations given their strong credibility for complying with agreed-
upon commitments.  
Meanwhile, an initiator state employing unconditional engagement strategy does 
not rely on tit-for-tat. Rather, this state relies on the capacity of economic 
interdependence to influence the target’s policy behaviour, and in this respect its stategies 
are more passive. The idea is to entangle the target into the initiator’s economic activities 
up to a point where cessation becomes extremely costly for the former. In general, 
unconditional engagement performs three crucial functions: (i) informing the target of 
the initiator’s precise level of resolve without resorting to militaristic actions; (ii) 
constraining the target’s policy dominion; and (iii) transforming the target’s policy 
behaviour and attitude (Mastanduno, 1992; Drezner, 1999/2000; Gartzke et al., 2001; 
Kahler and Kastner, 2006). As such, the breadth and depth of economic 
interdependence, particularly with respect to trade, determines the likelihood of conflict 
between the initiator and target states when promised policy changes do not occur.  As 
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For further discussions of conditional and unconditional engagements, see Drezner (1999/2000); 
Kahler and Kastner (2006). For tactical and substantive linkages, see Aggarwal and Govella (2013); and 
for tactical and structural engagements, see Mastanduno (1992). 
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mentioned earlier, Taiwan’s case provides a vivid illustration of these two forms of 
economic engagements with respect to China. The signing of the ECFA and the re-
opening of direct links to cross-strait relations highlights the ROC’s attempts at 
conditional and unconditional engagements designed to inform, constrain and transform 
the PRC’s One-China policy.188 China’s refusal to rule out the threat or actual use of 
force when pursuing its unification objective underlines the importance of Taiwan’s 
effective management of economic engagements when ensuring its survival as a de facto 
sovereign state. Indeed, the Taiwanese government has utilised the existing cross-strait 
economic interdependence as a bargaining chip for deciding its contested statehood. 
With attempts to harness the transformative effect of economic engagement as an 
antidote against Chinese nationalistic goals, Taiwanese officials have set out specific 
preconditions for the re-opening of cross-strait links to trade, transit and 
communications. These include: (i) the withdrawal of threat or actual use of force against 
Taiwan; (ii) the removal of barriers to Taiwan’s diplomatic space; and (iii) the political 
liberation vis-à-vis democratisation of the Mainland.189   
However, China’s military and economic preponderance engenders a scenario 
where cross-strait economic relations continue to intensify with or without the fulfilment 
of the aforementioned conditions. Notwithstanding the high levels of political risk 
involved, Taiwanese firms have continued to trade with and invest more in China, 
replacing the old ‘go slow and be patient’ approach with ‘active opening’ and ‘effective 
management’ mantras (Kahler and Kastner, 2006; Clark and Tan, 2012;). Accordingly, 
strong lobbying efforts from influential local business communities in Taiwan have 
placed enormous pressure on the government to abandon these prerequisites to the 
legalisation of direct cross-strait links (Wang et al., 2010 Zhao and Liu, 2010; Clark and 
Tan, 2012).  
To a certain extent, these calls have resulted in the convergence of cross-strait 
policies, specifically with respect to economic issues espoused by rivalling political parties 
in Taiwan. There are two main factors that have led to this convergence: the increasing 
enmeshment of Taiwan’s business interests with Mainland Affairs; and the rise of 
Taiwanese electorate favouring the present status quo over independence and unification. 
Consequently, concerns over the adverse effects of excessive Sino-dependence on 
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 For a detailed discussion of  cross-strait’s three direct links, see Wu (2012); Wang et al., (2010); and 
Zhao and Liu (2010); Chen (2012); Chow (2012); Clark and Tan, (2012); Dittmer (2012); Huang (2012); 
Muyard (2012); Wu (2012). 
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 For more information on the reopening of cross-strait links, see the Mainland Affairs Council’s 
website, available online at http://law.wustl.edu/chinalaw/twguide.html.  
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national security have gradually diminished in importance across Taiwan’s political 
spectrum, thus forcing political parties to embrace a modified two-state method for 
managing cross-strait affairs (Wu, 2001; Wang et al., 2012; Wong, 2012). Despite 
significant efforts to moderate the country’s reliance on the PRC, cross-strait trade and 
investment flows have continued to expand as Taiwanese officials themselves begin to 
realise the cost of restraining local business activities. Hence, even without gaining 
significant political concessions, Taipei’s economic compensations to Beijing have 
continued to roll over.    
Furthermore, Taiwan’s democratic society also makes it easier for China to link 
its politico-strategic motives with cross-strait economic interdependence.190 Beijing’s 
willful assertion of influence over business matters to undercut local support for the pro-
independence party, such as the DPP, highlights such linkages. The imbalanced trade 
relations between the PRC and the ROC generate asymmetric political effects that are 
further reinforced by institutional differences. On the one hand, Beijing is waiting for 
cross-strait economic relations to weaken Taiwanese nationalism and identity, which will 
then diminish local resistance against its One-China policy (Chow, 2012; Lee, 2010; and 
Zhao and Liu, 2010). On the other, Taipei is optimistic that Beijing will soon realise that 
its regional “hegemonic” power is fuelled more by economic imperatives and less by 
nationalist rhetoric and agendas (Kahler and Kastner, 2006; Kastner, 2013). This will 
then enable the government to replace its militaristic approach with a more pacifist 
method for handling cross-strait interactions. If economic engagements lead to the 
relaxation of China’s nationalist objectives and the peaceful settlement of politico-
ideological differences, Taipei’s gamble with Beijing would have paid off  
Lastly, multilateralism also imposes significant constraints on Taiwan’s capacity 
for launching a conditional engagement strategy (Kahler and Kastner, 2006; Kastner, 
2006). The reason behind this is that China’s economic dynamism enables it to attract 
other countries that are willing to cultivate economic interdependence without linking 
any politico-diplomatic issue. The constraints engendered by Taiwanese conditionality 
are compelling the government to adopt unconditional engagement procedures where 
the unrestricted cross-strait economic interdependence acts as a pre-emptive measure 
against China’s military diplomacy. However, the authoritarian nature of the PRC’s 
political institutions implies that Chinese officials can easily circumvent the rules and 
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For detailed discussions on economic interdependence between democratic states and its impact 
on liberal peace, see; Pollins (1989): Oneal and Russett (1997); Papayanou (1999); Mansfield and 
Pollins (2003); and Gelpi and Grieco (2003). 
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procedures of cross-strait relations (Chow 2012; Hong 2012; Wu 2012; Zhao and Liu 
2010). This can only imply that Taiwan’s policy linking strategies are not always effective 
and efficient.  
Such observation is particularly popular among Taiwanese oppositionist groups 
predominantly represented by the DPP. Despite the perceived “harmony” of economic 
agendas between rivalling political parties, the reality is that there are still segments of the 
Taiwanese population that have reservations toward deeper and wider economic 
integration with China. This is clearly illustrated by the dramatic turn of events that took 
place after the KMT’s “blitzkrieg” passage of the Cross Strait Services Trade Agreement 
(CSSTA) with China on the 17th of March 2014.191 President Ma’s decision to cut-short 
the crucial deliberation process over the controversial agreement resulted in the 
occupation of parliament by a multi-sectorial coalition led by student groups on the 19th 
of March 2014.192  
Demonstrators have demanded several conditions from the Taiwanese president: 
(i) to hold an inclusive citizens constitutional conference; (ii) to reject the CSSTA in lieu 
of a monitoring mechanism for cross-strait agreements; (iii) to pass a monitoring 
mechanism for Cross-Strait Agreements in the current legislative session; and  (iv) have 
legislators from both parties address people’s demands.31 Thus, while big local business 
groups support unconditional economic engagement, grassroots civil societies insist on 
the maintenance of regulatory conditions for facilitating cross-strait relations. The 
conflicts between these two segments of the population further sidetracks the respective 
policy strategies of Taiwanese political parties on issues surrounding Taiwan’s quasi-
sovereign statehood in the twenty-first century. 
 
4.6 CONCLUSIONS 
Taiwan’s re-opening of cross-strait links with China, along with the successful 
enactments of its new bilateral FTAs with non-diplomatic partners, has sparked renewed 
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optimism amongst Taiwanese officials. However, the fact that these agreements are 
anchored on the One-China principle implies the continued illegitimacy of Taiwan’s 
independence. Hence, although a détente approach toward cross-strait relations may 
have helped in expanding the country’s de facto sovereign space, it is largely inadequate 
for legitimising Taiwan’s sovereign existence in the twenty-first century.  
The deep entanglements between Taiwan and China’s national security interests 
and free trade objectives are coercing Taipei officials and policymakers to preserve the 
prevailing cross-strait status quo. In attempts to enhance their political appeals during 
national elections, the major political parties in Taiwan are compelled to “cooperate” 
with each other by promoting pro-status quo policies. Consequently, both pro-China and 
anti-China political factions are restrained from adopting and implementing policies that 
have the potential to destabilise the “normal” conduct of cross-strait relations. While 
citizens opposed to political unification with the Mainland condemn a highly China-
centric policy, an extremely nationalistic policy is rebuked by sectors that see 
opportunities from healthy economic relations with Beijing. Such tension inevitably leads 
to calls for the “normalisation” of cross-strait relations. Therefore, it would appear that a 
consensus for adopting a moderate approach to pursuing Taiwan’s national interests has 
been reached between the competing political parties.  
While general sentiments toward each other may be as capricious as the Taiwan-
China relation itself, both the KMT and the DPP have been consistent when applying 
the norm of moderation with respect to their cross-strait agendas. This leads to the 
progressive homogenisation of their respective policy postures toward the freezing of 
Taiwanese sovereignty issues. The result is the continued “imprisonment” of the island 
within the One-China trajectory. Indeed, President Ma’s rapprochement policy with 
respect to China has resulted in the easing of tension across the Taiwan Strait. However, 
the widespread belief that his government is recklessly selling out Taiwan’s national 
interests to Beijing has ruffled the feathers of those who staunchly oppose reunification 
plans with the Mainland. Amid China’s continual rejection of Taiwanese statehood, 
intensified economic engagements, particularly via free trade, act as mediums for 
conquering the island’s remaining de facto sovereign space.  
Evidently, there is a huge trade-off between Taiwan’s competing goals of 
pursuing economic interests, and preserving its politico-diplomatic viability. Taiwanese 
officials have decided that it would be best to rekindle their relations with China to 
prevent such a dilemma from leading to an internal impasse. Taiwan’s decision to either 
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accelerate or decelerate the pace of cross-strait economic interdependence largely 
depends on the level of insecurity that is induced by China. Success rests on the degree 
of importance that China places on cross-strait economic relations as well as on Taiwan’s 
resolves for terminating the agreements when the desired policy changes concerning 
cross-strait politics do not materialise. Yet unfortunately, Taiwan’s efforts for securing its 
sovereign space via economic engagements are thwarted by the lack of political freedom, 
if not the will to cancel payoffs even when Beijing’s behaviour continues to violate set 
conditions.  
Finally, the spread of the One-China rhetoric is clearly damaging for Taiwan’s de 
facto sovereignty as it helps to facilitate the complete sinicisation of the country. By 
treating cross-strait affairs as domestic rather than international matters, China is 
effectively reducing Taiwan’s statehood into a special administrative region similar to 
Hong Kong and Macau. This significantly curtails Taiwan’s diplomatic recognition in an 
international scene, which ultimately erodes its remaining sovereign space. The abstruse 
customary practice observed when signing Taiwanese FTAs – between government 
institutions as opposed to a state-to-state approach – reinforces the idea that Taiwan is 
merely a local government unit of China. Hence, Taiwan is trapped in what appears to be 
a perpetual prisoner’s dilemma induced and preserved by the omnipresence of China.  
These observations underline the risks involved in Taiwan’s attempts at 
facilitating FTAs to secure its sovereign space against the backdrop of China’s 
sinicisation vision. Diminishing political frictions across the Taiwanese Strait has the 
paradoxical effect of reducing further the available political-diplomatic options for 
Taiwan including its quest for de jure independence. Put differently, greater cross-strait 
rapprochement ironically leads to lesser Taiwanese autonomy. Moving toward the 
institutionalisation of cross-strait relations without acknowledging the legitimacy of 
Taiwanese sovereignty inexorably absorbs the island within China’s sinicisation 
trajectory: from short-term economic to long-term political. That is, effectively fraying 










TRADING IN PARANOIA: SINGAPORE’S STATIST SECURITY-TRADE LINKAGES 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION   
A recurring theme in Singapore’s national security narratives is the concern for survival 
within a Hobbesian-like environment, particularly in the immediate years following its 
brusque separation from Malaysia in 1965. This highlights the “vulnerability fetish”193 
that continues to hound Singaporean leaders and policymakers and has come to shape 
the islands’ security policies and strategies. By embracing a competitive outlook that sees 
global politics as a zero-sum game and sovereignty as a sacred principle that must be 
gallantly guarded, Singapore’s security concept reinforces the realist principles of power 
balancing (through regional alliance and/or partnership-building) and self-help (through 
the development of national means) (Ganesan, 1998, 2005, 2010; Leifer, 2000; Acharya, 
2008; Tan, 2009, 2012). 
 The government’s recourse to pragmatism, however, does not automatically 
imply that its security rhetoric and agenda is non-ideological. In contrast, Singapore’s 
fixation for survival has also become a national ideology that shapes the island’s internal 
and external policies (Ganesan, 2005; Chong, 2007; Tan, 2009). In the words of Chan 
Heng Chee, Singapore’s former ambassador to the United States: “Survival was adopted 
by Singaporean leaders as a one-word slogan as well as a main theme underlying all 
analyses of problems and statement of policies and intent” (in Tan, 2009: 24). This was 
further stressed by Singapore’s former Prime Minister, Lee Kuan Yew when he 
compared the country’s position in the international system to the place of a small animal 
in the jungle: “The meek may not have inherited the earth, but neither have the strong. 
Small animals survive and thrive in the jungles, as do small states in the international 
order. The price of their survival is eternal vigilance” (in Ganesan, 1998: 579).   
 Over the years, Singapore’s realist disposition has been tempered by intensifying 
economic interdependence, particularly among the Asia-Pacific countries. A distinction is 
made between the government’s realist-informed security strategy and its liberal-oriented 
economic policy and practice. The amalgamation between these two images of a 
realpolitik security state, on the one hand, and a liberal trading state, on the other, 
provides the basis for Singapore’s strategic planning both internally and externally 
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 Sudhir Thomas Vadaketh (2014) defines the term ‘vulnerability fetish’ as the belief that ‘Singapore 
is a small, vulnerable nation that must do all it can to defend and protect itself against potentially 
hostile Muslim neighbours.’ 
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(Ganesan, 1998, 2005, 2010; Leifer, 2000; Acharya, 2008). The island’s scarce territorial 
lands and natural resources coupled with high population density, huge per capita income 
and sensitive racial concoction make Singapore the quintessential pragmatic trading state 
(Dent, 2001, 2002; Chong, 2007; Pang, 2007; Tan, 2009). Ironically, despite the 
constraints created by its sub-optimal geographic features, Singapore’s physical location 
has transformed it into a vital economic hub that links the developed and developing 
economies across the globe. Such a strategic position is responsible for Singapore’s 
remarkable success with free trade, which usually accounts for more than three times its 
annual GDP (WTO-TPR, 2014; World Bank, 2014). 
 Furthermore, the creation of regional norms and institutions has significantly 
helped to foster a more benign and stable environment necessary for the continued 
economic development of Singapore. However, it must be noted that this condition has 
not completely undermined the value of national self-help as it continues to play a critical 
part in the security psyche of Singapore’s policy elites. To this extent, it may be argued 
that the Singaporean approach to economic progress vis-à-vis development is also being 
viewed and defined in defensive, realist terms. For instance, the government’s adherence 
to comprehensive security, as exemplified by its Total Defence doctrine, underlines the 
prevailing notion that economic liberalism in practice is not exclusively liberal.194 In the 
words of See Seng Tan (2009: 29), “more likely, [Singapore’s] commitment to economic 
liberalism does not preclude reliance, at times robust, on economic realism and/or 
mercantilism.”  
 Similar to any other modern nation-state, Singapore faces internal and external 
security challenges that have the potential to jeopardise the defence space necessary for 
its survival amid serious geographic predicaments. The term ‘defence space’ in this 
context specifically refers to Singapore’s capacity, both military (hard power) and non-
military (soft power), to defend its geo-political and geo-economic viability. Despite 
overcoming a post-independence trauma, Singapore’s continued predilection toward 
state survival underscores a highly pragmatic perception of security.   
 External threats to sovereignty vis-à-vis territoriality are largely a product of the 
regional landscape in maritime Southeast Asia (Ganesan, 1998, 2005; Leifer, 2000; 
Acharya, 2008), and at first glance, one can argue that Singapore’s current security milieu 
is more benign. The Cold War vis-à-vis threat of communism has been consigned to 
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history; Vietnam has gained accession to ASEAN, and globalisation now binds key 
regional countries including China into a complex web of interdependence.  However, as 
far as Singaporean leaders and policymakers are concerned, the Asia-Pacific remains a 
dangerous place with many potential flashpoints. Examples of these are the standoff 
between China and Japan over the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands; North Korea’s unstable 
nuclear programme; and the South China Sea territorial disputes.  
 In addition, the structural condition generated by the city-state’s geographic 
proximity with two Islamic neighbours – Malaysia (considered a “medium power” in the 
region) and Indonesia (the “dominant power”) – makes Singaporean officials extremely 
cautious about the undercurrents of tensions that may arise from time to time (Ganesan, 
1998, 2005; Crump, 2007; Vasil, 2000). The long-standing association of communist 
insurgencies with the Chinese (that happened to be the predominant ethnic group in 
Singapore) also invites threats from the outsiders. At various points in their respective 
histories, both the Malaysian and Indonesian political elites have considered ethnic 
Chinese communities as major security concerns (Ganesan, 1998, 2005; Leifer, 2000; 
Acharya, 2008). As such, nationalism in these two states has been customarily expressed 
in anti-Chinese terms even when Singapore has consistently and strongly condemned 
Communism (Ganesan 1998; Nathan 1998).   
 On the other hand, internal threats to the Singaporean government (read PAP 
government’s hegemony) mostly originate from liberal democratic ideologies espoused 
by the West such as press freedom, political contestations and human rights (Ganesan, 
1998, 2005; Mauzy and Milne, 2002; Velayutham, 2007). Although the government has 
successfully weakened the political appeal of communist philosophy through its efficient 
delivery of basic socio-economic services, the spread of so-called universal values present 
yet another ideological threat. The West is generally averse to dominant-party systems 
because of their tendency to terminate at fascism and totalitarianism, which poses a 
significant challenge to the legitimacy of the PAP government. While political 
participation, particularly during the election season, is an essential feature of 
Singaporean democracy, political contestation remains an anathema to the ruling party.  
 Moreover, the potential for press freedom to subvert the PAP’s corporate 
monopoly over the media and telecommunications industry compels the government to 
impose its statutory authority (Velayutham, 2007; HRW, 2010). Meanwhile, liberal 
interpretations of human rights challenge the legality of the city-state’s Internal Security 
Act (ISA), which grants executive power to enforce “preventive detention, prevent 
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subversion, suppress organised violence against persons and property, and do other 
things incidental to the internal security of Singapore.”195 This chapter critically 
examines Singapore’s use of free trade to secure and enhance its defence space amid the 
presence of a security complex engendered by geographic factors.196 Each section 
explores the different facets of the existing security complex vis-à-vis the preservation of 
the country’s geo-political and geo-economic viability in the twenty-first century. 
Strategic issues confronting Southeast and East Asia have heightened the level of security 
complex experienced by the island. As a result, survival has been the central creed of 
Singapore’s domestic and foreign policies since its first day of independence. As then 
Deputy Prime Minister Tony Tan (2004) claimed: “Without security, there can be no 
economic development. Conversely, stability and security are in serious jeopardy without 
economic development. This is the basis for the priority that Singapore has placed on 
ensuring our defence.” Hence, to counter the threats to its vulnerable defence space, 
Singapore has deliberately grafted its security requirements into free trade agendas.197 The 
goal is to enhance and preserve regional peace and stability by substantially reducing the 
likelihood of conflicts via free trade (Leifer, 2000; Ganesan, 2005; Acharya, 2008).  
 In light of this, I attempt to answer the following sets of questions. First, why 
does Singapore link its statist security interests with its free trade activities? Given the 
existing geographic factor, how does free trade (at bilateral, minilateral and multilateral 
levels) affect Singapore’s remaining defence space? Second, why does a dominant-party 
system seem to be more conducive to Singapore’s survival as opposed to a multi-party 
system? What are its implications for Singapore’s domestic politics? Third, what factors 
limit the capacity of free trade for securing and enhancing Singapore’s defence space? 
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 This security complex according to Christopher Dent (2001: 7-8) is characterised by the state’s 
ceaseless and chronic ‘securitisation’ of various dimensions of economic security (supply, market 
access, finance credit and techno-industrial), and socio-economic security (trans border community, 
systemic and alliance). Such ‘all around securitisation’ via communal, collaborative and continuous 
mobilisation of the Singaporean citizenry toward corporate vigilance has become the trademark of 
Singapore’s national security policies and strategies.   
197
 Appendix 3 provides an up-to-date list of Singaporean FTAs. 
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Plan of the chapter 
The chapter is divided into six sections. In Section 5.1, I provided the context through 
which Singapore’s statist security-trade linkages in the twenty-first century will be 
examined. I argue that against the backdrop of geographic factor that engenders a 
multidimensional security complex, one of the primary referents of Singapore’s national 
security is its vulnerable defence space. To preserve the island’s geo-political and geo-
economic viability, the Singaporean government actively participates in free trade 
activities at multilateral, minilateral and bilateral levels. Hence, it is in the best interest of 
Singaporean leaders and policymakers to preserve the general stability and predictability 
of the trading environment that buttresses its national security. However, the PAP virtual 
control of Singapore’s security rhetoric and agenda has some serious implications for the 
island’s identity as a realist cum trading state.  
 In Section 5.2, I briefly examine Singapore’s geo-political history by tracing the 
roots of its “unwanted” sovereign status, which in turn, drives the island’s ceaseless and 
chronic securitisation of its internal and external affairs. I provide preliminary insights 
about the importance of economic engagements – mainly via free trade – in eking out a 
wider defence space that is crucial for Singapore’s geo-political and geo-economic 
viability amid its strategic paranoia.  
 In Section 5.3, I discuss the results of the key informant interviews (KIIs) 
conducted with Singaporean officials as part of research fieldwork. The objective is to 
provide a general understanding of why Singapore’s statist security interests and trade 
activities are being linked together, and how these linkages influence the survival of the 
island nation in the twenty-first century. The interviews have focused on the three main 
aspects of Taiwan’s security-trade nexus: (i) its national security policies and strategies; (ii) 
its free trade activities and agreements; and (iii) the relationships between these two 
variables. This dialogue is crucial for determining the discrepancies (if any) between the 
Singaporean government’s rhetoric and action, and state and non-state perceptions. 
 In Section 5.4, I evaluate the impacts of Singapore’s free trade activities on its 
overall level of defence space. First, I analyse the role of multilateral trade with respect to 
Singapore’s capacity for strengthening its geo-political and geo-economic viability by 
significantly alleviating any potential threats to its internal and external security. Second, I 
examine the role of preferential trade with respect to the island’s capability of fortifying 
its insecure defence space undermined by the geographic predicaments of the country.  
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 In Section 5.5, I identify some of the key factors affecting the utility of FTAs for 
securing and enhancing Singapore’s existing defence space. I analyse the internal 
(domestic politics) and external (engagements strategies) factors that restrict the defence-
upgrading capacity of Singaporean FTAs. The objective is to find out the potential 
consequences and ramifications of these factors on Singapore’s statist security-trade 
linking efforts and from there, evaluate the country’s capacity to overcome its engulfing 
security complex and vulnerability fetish. In doing so, I explain why the dominant-party 
system sovereignty is deemed more favourable than the multi-party system when 
enhancing Singapore’s external security. 
 Finally, in Section 5.6 I conclude by arguing that Singapore’s pursuit of economic 
prosperity has become replete with security undertones as a consequence of the siege 
mentality and vulnerability fetish that envelops the island-state. The Singaporean 
government has constantly emphasised robust economic performance as the cornerstone 
of national security. Blocking the country’s entry into key international markets will 
obliterate its export-oriented, entrepôt-operating economy. On the one hand, Singapore 
has courted the regional powers, specifically China and Japan, to deflect security threats 
occasionally posed by relatively large Islamic neighbours. On the other, Singapore has 
also been very active forging bilateral trade relations with great powers outside of its 
region such as the United States in an attempt to keep China’s increasing powers in 
check. Behind Singapore’s every move and decision is the ever-dominant PAP regime. 
The regime has promoted itself as the single most qualified entity that can secure the 
city-state’s collective interests amid these uncertainties by eliminating factional conflicts. 
Thus, it has successfully promoted the idea that only a dominant-party system can 
guarantee Singapore’s survival.  
 
5.2 SINGAPORE’S RUDE AWAKENING TO INDEPENDENCE 
Singapore’s unexpected independence after its bitter separation from the Malaysian 
Federation in 1965 highlights the origin of the city-state’s profound security complex 
(Ganesan, 1998, 2005; Dhume, 2000; Dent, 2001). The former British colony was 
granted home rule in 1959, but it was not until 1963 that it first achieved formal 
independence as part of the then Malaysian Federation. However, within two years 
Singapore was ejected from the Federation amid widespread tensions emanating from its 
political and ethnoreligious differences with the rest of the population. In the aftermath 
of its newfound sovereignty, the PAP government has found itself confronting an 
174 
 
enormous sense of vulnerability, which resulted in a siege mentality (Ganesan, exace1998, 
2005; Dent, 2001; Kamaludeen and Turner, 2014). Consequently, “survival” has become 
a fear-mongering catchphrase that routinely used for mobilising public support. Given 
the absence of a contiguous hinterland, the Singaporean government is well aware of the 
limitations for carving out an independent future for the city-state. Thus, “defence for 
survival,” aggressively implanted into the Singaporean psyche, has become the underlying 
theme of the PAP’s security rhetoric and agenda (Ganesan, 1998, 2005; Dent, 2001). 
 Historical precedents for the long-term feasibility of city-states further intensify 
this underlying sense of defencelessness. Although the observed patterns indicate 
possible unification with the adjacent locality to establish a larger territory, Singapore’s 
complicated history with Malaysia rules out any chance for reunification (Ganesan, 1998, 
2005; Leifer, 2000; Acharya, 2008). Hence, despite the lack of preparation for its abrupt 
expulsion from Malaysia, Singapore has been forced to fend for itself. The result is a city-
state that gravitates around the paramount nature of sovereignty, emphasising survival in 
the construction and implementation of its domestic and foreign policies. Ironically, this 
attitude has also engendered a deep-rooted security complex that has come to determine 
the city-state’s national interests and objectives (Leifer, 2000; Dent, 2001, 2002; Ganesan, 
2005). Singapore’s former foreign minister Wong Kan Seng (in Acharya, 2008: 16) 
provided a compelling explanation for the country’s security complex: 
 
The vulnerability of a small state is a fact of life. Singapore’s independent existence is today 
widely recognised. But to answer our basic security, we can never allow tests to our 
sovereignty and internal affairs, even when well intentioned, to go unchallenged. Even today 
we have had to occasionally remind other countries to leave us alone to be ourselves.  
 
 Clearly, the realist principles of sovereignty and territoriality have come to 
dominate Singapore’s national security policies and strategies. In response, the city-state 
has progressively resorted to free trade agreements to secure the defence space 
underpinning its geo-political and geo-economic survival. To do this, it has conveniently 
embedded itself at the heart of the global trade system. Thus, preserving the general 
stability of the free trade environment – the lifeblood of the Republic – has become 






5.3 SINGAPORE’S SECURITY-TRADE NEXUS: VIEWS FROM THE TOP  
 
Table 4: Summary of key informant interviews in Singapore 198 
 
5.3.1 On Singapore’s national security       
There are three main themes that have emerged from the discussion of national security 
in Singapore during the interviews: (i) the need to move beyond the traditional, state-
centric conception of national security to encompass non-traditional, people-centred 
dimensions; (ii) the centrality of economics in ensuring the viability of the Singaporean 
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 Singaporean representatives from three different sectors participated in interviews to provide 
comments and insights on Singapore’s security-trade nexus in the twenty-first century. The selected 
participants are all practitioners and experts in their respective fields  While their views do not 
necessarily encapsulate the whole gamut of arguments, nevertheless, they are crucial for painting a 
more general understanding of Singapore’s security-trade linking efforts. Interviews were conducted 
with: (i) Dr. Mely Anthony-Caballero, former Director of the External Relations, ASEAN Secretariat (ii) 
Dr. Ralf Emmers, Associate Dean and Associate Professor at the S. Rajaratnam School of International 
Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University (NTU); and Dr. Chee Soon Juan, Secretary-General of 
the Singapore’s Democratic Party (SDP). Several government officials and members of the People’s 
Action Party (PAP) had also been invited to participate in the interviews, but declined stating in their 
letter that a good amount of open source information was available on the internet, including policy 
speeches by Singapore’s leaders on various policy issues. They referred to the official Singapore 
Government website: www.gov.sg. These resources, according to them, reflect the PAP’s official 
stand on the key issues tackled in the interviews. In the first part of the interviews, the participants 
discussed their general views on the concept of national security in Singapore. In the second part, 
they discussed this security concept in relation to the country’s participation in various free trade 
activities. In the last part, the informants discussed the linkages between the country’s security 
considerations and free trade objectives. This section does not provide an in-depth analysis on each 
statement provided by the participants. The main arguments presented in this section are thoroughly 
discussed in Section 4 and Section 5. As mentioned, the main objective of this section is to present an 
overview of Singapore’s security interests and predicaments, as well as free trade initiatives and 
engagement strategies.    
176 
 
state; and (iii) the multidimensional insecurity confronting Singapore. In conceptualising 
Singapore’s national security, Mely Anthony-Caballero argues that: 
 
Security is not just confined to military threats but to threats to jobs, housing, education and 
even migrants. Economic insecurity is still the biggest problem. Freedom from want 
underpins freedom from fear. And there is no need to pretend that these are not security 
issues. We have to say it as it is.  What we need to emphasise is that nontraditional security 
does not only privilege the needs of the society. It also acknowledges the role of the state. 
The state is a problem but it is also a part of the solution. Therefore, it is not just a hot air. 
How can it be hot air in Singapore when it is the main issue here? Why relegate it to 
something less? Even the idea of “criminalising” an issue is merely an approach. 
“Securitisation,” on the other hand, is a process although admittedly beyond that we do not 
know. So with the human security approach, instead of criminalising you look for ways on 
how to counter insecurity and at the same time protect the people.199 
 
 Through highlighting the state’s role as part of the solution rather than the 
problem, the government has developed a robust defence strategy based on its so-called 
three rings of national security – prevention, protection and response (MINDEF, 2014; 
NSCS, 2014). In efforts to preserve the nation’s lifeblood, an eclectic military doctrine 
comprised of forward defence, pre-emptive strike, and strategic mobility has been put 
forward to keep the battlefield away from its global market and prevent negative 
externalities from ramifying into the economic sector (MINDEF, 2014; NSCS, 2014). In 
doing so, it has vigorously pursued the establishment of modernised air, naval, and 
amphibious forces to improve its military wherewithal for balancing against larger 
enemies. Hence, a pivotal characteristic of Singapore’s national security framework 
underscores the preservation of economic security by invoking a defence philosophy 
based on the development of highly trained forces with technologically advanced 
weaponry.  
 Moreover, Singapore’s defence policy also emphasises the consolidation of its 
total security doctrine. The emergence of non-traditional security issues – such as 
terrorism, transnational crime, climate change, public health epidemics, disaster relief, 
and information security – has muddled the demarcated lines of authority and 
responsibility between bureaucratic agencies in charge of crafting the national security 
agenda. The government’s response to these changes is the implementation of a modern 
approach to national security administration directed toward the convergence of various 
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government sectors vis-à-vis their respective functions.200 By explicitly linking the issues 
and conducts of one particular agency to those of the others, the government can roll out 
its total security strategy in a way that emphasises numerous expressions of national 
strength. As noted by then Coordinating Minister for Security and Defence and now 
Singapore’s president, Tony Tan Keng Yam (2004):  
 
The traditional approach of delineating the boundaries between ministries and agencies so 
that each is solely responsible for a particular area, will no longer work. The experience of 
other countries since the 9-11 attacks, as well as our own, shows the inadequacy of the 
stovepipe approach. The separation of responsibilities between the Ministry of Home 
Affairs for internal security and the Ministry of Defence for external defence leaves gaps in 
the defence of Singapore against transnational threats. Furthermore, no ministry or 
government department has developed the full range of competencies or capabilities to deal 
with these threats. The resources needed to deal with terrorism reside in many agencies. 
 
 Therefore, apart from the standard pursuit for military power, Singapore’s 
comprehensive national security framework promotes economic competitiveness by 
enhancing internal stability through national consensus, on the one hand, and cultivating 
amicable inter-state relations through regional and international dialogues, on the other 
(MINDEF, 2014; NSCS, 2014). This approach to NSPS is strongly supported by Ralf 
Emmers, asserting that: 
 
If you are a small city-state like Singapore, the notion of “total security” totally makes sense 
as it makes the people feel less insecure. With respect to Singapore’s relations with Malaysia 
and Indonesia, for example, the country’s sense of vulnerability is deterred by developing a 
highly sophisticated and modern military complex – land, navy and air. In addition, there are 
also those “non-traditional” security issues, particularly those that threaten the supply of 
natural resources like energy fuels and water. Thus, everything has become a security issue 
since you get more attention by labelling an issue as a security threat but you have to be 
careful in deciding who should be part of the “securitisation” process. To begin with, who 
should define what the “existential threat” is? It is very easy to abuse the word securitisation. 
Multiple security doctrines are coexisting and competing for space. But at least in that sense 
we are not keeping the eggs in the same basket, although it clearly adds up to the complexity 
of achieving a common security outlook. But that is life. It is complicated.201 
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 See, Singapore’s National Security Coordination Secretariat website, available online at 
http://www.nscs.gov.sg/public/content.aspx?sid=23. 
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 The Singaporean government claims to recognise that both traditional and non-
traditional security issues have the capacity to impede the country’s economic growth 
and development, injure its already fragile collective identity, and destroy the relatively 
peaceful and harmonious relations among its multiracial citizens. And as far as the PAP 
officials are concerned, the Singapore story boasts a triumphant “hermit island” that has 
prevailed over debilitating security crises and has risen above its inherent vulnerabilities 
to become one of the most developed and advanced countries of the twenty-first 
century. However, Chee Soon Juan is not entirely convinced:  
 
We know that security has two sides, the freedom from want and the freedom from fear. 
They are two sides of the same coin. All the problems that we have concerning guns and 
butter arise because we do not have a political say. What is GDP growth anyway? It says 
nothing about the resilience of the state. GDP does not equate with happiness. Security, on 
the other hand, is happiness. So rather than retaining the intellectuals, the Singaporean 
government lets them go and brings in foreign talents instead to replace them. But from the 
perspective of an ordinary Singaporean, there is not much incentive from reviving political 
life in Singapore. You cannot eat political freedom. Democracy does not put food on the 
table. It is all about prosperity. This leads me to believe that Singaporeans are the unhappiest 
people in the world. Look at the more realistic and genuine progress indicators, the more 
inclusive and comprehensive ones. Singapore is definitely not an egalitarian society. Its 
income inequality is highest among the OECD members. Unfortunately, in Singapore as 
GDP increases so does the GNI.202  
  
 Overall, based on these comments made by experts and practitioners, it can be 
inferred that Singapore’s security sector has become increasingly reliant on ceaseless and 
chronic securitisation. Because of Singapore’s deep-seated security complex, the various 
dimensions of both public and private lives have been encumbered with profound 
security implications. On the one hand, non-state actors argue that a stronger emphasis 
be given to non-traditional security issues that undermine the quality of life in Singapore. 
On the other, state actors are of view that their national security framework has been 
very effective in ensuring Singapore’s survival by developing a very reliable defence 
establishment that can protect both its strategic interests and economic objectives along 
with a whole host of other human security aspirations. Despite Singapore’s image as a 
security state, critics argue that no amount of top-to-bottom institutional repair would 
suffice without the adequate support coming from the public. Notwithstanding the 
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efforts being exerted by the PAP government toward the realisation of its total security 
ideology, its success (as inferred from the interviews) fundamentally rests upon the 
ordinary Singaporeans’ view of security that allows them to commit to self-discipline, 
formation and governance.  
 
5.3.2 On Singapore’s free trade activities 
As mentioned earlier, Singapore is commonly portrayed as a global city-state akin to the 
city-states of medieval Italy and the ancient Greece. Over the decades, Singapore has 
progressively transformed itself into a modern-day regional hub with a relatively high 
level of economic freedom that enables commercial and technological innovation. Given 
its export-driven economy and strategic entrepôt role, Singapore is essentially a trading 
state whose viability depends largely on the continued operation of the liberals’ free trade 
enterprise.  
 Three main themes have emerged from the discussion of free trade in Singapore 
during the interviews: (i) its role in mitigating economic insecurity, both state-centric and 
human-centric; (ii) its implication with respect to Singapore’s status as a “realist cum 
trading” state; and (iii) its limits as an instrument for addressing Singapore’s security 
complex vis-à-vis vulnerability fetish. With regard to free trade’s role alleviating 
economic insecurity in Singapore, Emmers argued that: 
 
In Singapore’s case the integration of economics into state security is crucial to the city-
state’s survival. The engine to optimum security is economic growth and development in 
which trade liberalisation is a key strategy. This way, the government will not be forced to 
choose between guns and butter. In the beginning economics via free trade is the core of 
Singapore’s foreign policy but it is not about the individuals. It is about regime survival. 
That is, using free trade economics to promote regime security rather than human security. 
At the end of the Cold War, the new concept of nontraditional security – an extension of 
comprehensive security – has emerged. It is messy. Nevertheless, for once we need to give 
credit to the human security rhetoric and start looking at the glass half-full instead of half-
empty. Ten years ago, the notion itself was unimaginable. Ten years later, it is now openly 
being promoted. Hence, symbolism need not be neglected. It does matter up to a point. The 
region is entering the period of constructivism fuelled by norms and soft laws. While the 
idea of using free trade to pursue human security may be difficult to implement, 
nonetheless, it is not merely hot air. Philosophically, there is really no problem as it is not 
completely a paradigm shift. Human security should be a part of every chapter of security 
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but at the same time it should not be a stand-alone theory. It must be incorporated. In other 
words, it must be an ethos rather than an agenda.203 
 
 It is important to note that in the case of Singapore, the state still has the 
monopoly over the form and substance of its foreign economic policies, specifically 
those relating to free trade activities (Leifer, 2000; Dent, 2001; Ganesan, 2005; Acharya 
2008). In other words, the process is still largely state-centric rather than people or 
society-centric. As such, the state remains the most crucial intervening factor for 
developing Singapore’s foreign economic strategies. It is in this context that Anthony-
Caballero called for a human-centric approach to security policymaking, particularly with 
respect to economic security: 
 
Economic insecurity is still the biggest problem and can be mitigated, for instance, through 
human-centric free trade policies. In doing so, a speech act is used to present something 
such as economic insecurity as an existential threat. In the case of economic security, the 
speech act is an extraordinary measure in itself. It has been employed as a form of argument 
– that security policy should be human-centric. But the problem of course is that human 
security is still not a common security policy, not in Singapore, and not in other Southeast 
Asian countries. And that is because of the prevailing notion that human security is merely 
an academic exercise. Hence, the most that the region could do is to come up with a 
regional charter such as the ASEAN Charter without an effective implementing body. But 
although the language of human security has not been explicitly used in ASEAN, however, 
if we look at the organisation’s blueprint, its components relate to human security. Instead, 
the ASEAN uses the term “non-traditional security”, which in essence refers to human 
security issues. Nontraditional security really touches on the basic needs of individuals and 
societies such as food, health, and energy which are all underpinned by economics.204 
 
 As mentioned earlier, security and economic policy dialogue in Singapore is 
heavily monopolised by a small group of political heads and bureaucratic officials 
representing the PAP leadership. Thus, the process of developing and implementing 
security and economic strategy is left unchallenged. The reason for this may be quite 
simple. During the 2011 general election, the PAP returned to power after winning a 
credible 60.1% of the popular votes.205 The party that has ruled Singapore for more than 
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five decades still managed to win 81 out of the 87 parliamentary seats.206 Although the 
2011 results yielded the smallest margin of popular votes since 1965, nonetheless, it 
underscored the PAP’s continued electoral mandate.207 Interestingly, the PAP’s political 
supremacy relies on neither electoral fraud nor physical intimidation. Its dominance has 
been nearly absolute ever since Singapore emerged as an independent city-state. This 
could only imply a lack of significant challenge to the PAP’s formulation of national 
security rhetoric and agenda, something that Chee strongly laments:  
  
The structure of Singapore’s economy is based on foreign trade and investments. The only 
way to maintain its economic power is to keep labour costs very low. The government’s 
solution is to bring more foreigners to work in Singapore who will be paid cheaper wages. 
The legitimate problem to ask is how will the island cope with this increase in the number of 
people? Such policy has direct impacts on socio-economic dimensions – from infrastructure, 
to public housing, to transportation, and to ethnic tensions. Increasing the population size is 
a strategy for keeping the party’s dominance. In other words, to preserve the PAP’s political 
hegemony. Singapore has very low fertility rate due to the very high cost of living coupled 
with relatively small wages. The purchasing power parity, therefore, is very low. There is no 
incentive for young couples to start a family. Why have children if you cannot take care of 
them and not have a good quality of life? Such “solution” also creates social ramifications. A 
good example is the xenophobia that has never cropped up until the last ten years. We 
cannot blame the locals. There is also the problem of national identity. Who is the 
Singaporean? More and more Singaporeans are leaving the country in search of other places 
to live. Is Singapore a home or just an office? Hence, immigration is not the problem per se, 
and should not be a problem. Given Singapore's present political economy, however, it 
becomes a problem. 
 
 Overall, Singapore’s key foreign economic policies – specifically those concerning 
free trade activities – are designed, first and foremost, to alleviate state insecurities 
engendered by its profound security complex. The roots of this security complex can be 
traced back to the earliest phases of Singapore’s nation-building process, which to a large 
extent, has been exacerbated and preserved by the PAP regime to legitimise its political 
perpetuity (Ganesan, 1998, 2005; Leifer, 2000; Acharya, 2008). Rationally, the 
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government’s pursuit of economic prosperity has been replete with security undertones 
given the siege mentality and vulnerability fetish enveloping the city-state. It has 
constantly emphasised robust economic performance as the basis of Singapore’s national 
security and survival. By doing so, the PAP leadership has effectively set in motion its 
goal of “reinforcing a nation's cohesion, regime legitimacy and world prestige through 
economic prosperity” (Dent, 2001:  6). To this extent, concerns for economic security 
may be viewed as the outcome of Singaporean leaders’ high-level of security 
consciousness.  
 
5.3.3 On Singapore’s security-trade nexus 
For the critics of the ruling PAP regime, the pursuit of economic growth and 
development via free trade is a mere strategy for further legitimising its political 
stronghold.208 To justify the restriction of public participation in domestic and foreign 
policymaking, PAP officials have presented themselves as the only political entity that is 
capable of securing the society’s collective interests.209 Therefore, the larger public is 
discouraged from engaging in highly divisive and polarising political activities to prevent 
factional conflicts. The PAP leadership has long argued that the distinctive features of 
the environment surrounding the city-state more than justifies its non-adherence to 
democratic processes when national secury issues are concerned (Ganesan, 1998, 2005; 
Leifer, 2000; Dent, 2001; Acharya, 2008). Meanwhile, critics have argued that the 
technocratic and non-ideational character of the government led by the PAP propagated 
government-linked companies (GLCs) and statutory boards designed not just to seize 
economic opportunities, but also to procure and distribute largesse to the ruling party, 
thereby reinforcing patronage politics (Ganesan, 1998, 2005; Chong, 2007). In the words 
of Chee:  
 
The idea of total security is to create a siege mentality among the people so that they may 
rally behind the PAP, believing that the ruling party is the only one who can perform vital 
state roles such as maintaining a secured external environment to protect free trade. So there 
is obviously a political angle to it. National security must be defined as the ability of the 
people to decide their own future. If you give people the information, in the long run, 
decisions coming from the people will lead to rationality. In other words, without political 
minds, freedom of speech and assemble; there is no chance to change the language of guns 
and butter debate. Thus, political security or the lack of democracy is also an important 
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problem that needs to be addressed. In the end, economic security means nothing without 
political freedom. Those who try to prevent peaceful revolution would end up facing a 
violent revolution. The idea that money or the material wealth is the answer to everything 
may be the right thing to do in the short-run, but it is not always the most important thing 
to consider. The PAP should be and would be replaced without a doubt. It is just a matter 
of when or how. The problem, however, is that the people are still very afraid to step into 
the unknown. They may not like the present but the uncertainty of the future makes it hard 
for them to move and decide in favour of the other alternatives.210 
 
 By presenting its leadership style to the public as the rational management of 
collective good as opposed to narrow sectorial and ethnic interests, the PAP is essentially 
equating itself – along with the core values and principles it is espousing – with a 
Singaporean identity (Ganesan 1998, 2005; Barr and Skrbis, 2008). Such a paternalistic 
method of governance, implanted within the vernacular of meritocracy, offers a very 
limited room for political contestation and opposition (Mauzy and Milne, 2002; Barr and 
Skrbis, 2008; Lee, 2008). As a result, strategic collaborations among various social groups 
pushing for different platforms have been stunted as they are often barred from 
accessing state power. Emmers echoes some of these sentiments:  
 
In the case of Singapore, the so-called securitising actor is definitely not the public. As far as 
securitisation of issues in Singapore is concerned, it is the exclusive affair of the prime 
minister’s office. What we have to understand is that security is what matters to you. In that 
sense, we are all constructivists. The state is still the primary actor. Is the state the right actor 
to response? Well, I do not expect civil society to solve free trade disputes and global 
warming.  
 
 Hence, government policies, particularly those that relate to security and trade, 
ultimately rest in the hands of the state. The possible channels for substantive 
modification are all virtually blocked. By accepting that security matters are strictly state 
affairs, the government has complete control over its security vision for Singapore. From 
the viewpoint of the ruling elite, defending the Singapore city-state against all forms of 
security threat is the primary objective of national security. Anthony-Caballero notes that:  
 
Consequently, Singaporean policymakers need to rethink its state-centric security agenda. 
The government needs to find innovative ways to address the new security challenges that 
are likely to inflict harm on a greater number of people rather than the traditional threats of 
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interstate wars and conflicts. At the same time, what we need to emphasise is that non-
traditional security such as economic securit does not only privilege the needs of the society. 
It also acknowledges the role of the state, particularly in the operation of free trade as an 
instrument for economic growth and development. Again, the state is both part of the 
problem and the solution. 211 
 
 Overall, for a small pragmatic state like Singapore, the means to survival is mainly 
through sustained economic growth and progress. Here, free trade acts as a defence-
upgrading mechanism that is necessary for enhancing and preserving the island’s geo-
political and geo-economic viability in the twenty-first century. Maintaining high-level 
market access is a major concern considering its heavy reliance on foreign markets to 
keep the economy running. Blocking Singapore’s entry into key international markets 
obliterates its export-oriented, entrepôt -operating city-state. Thus, the Singaporean 
government does not only adhere to the principles of free trade but also zealously 
endorses it. As Ganesan (2005: 2) puts it:  
 
A clear core of realist self-reliance is layered with the demands of a competitive trading state 
that requires a liberal international trading regime. Hence, both competitive and cooperative 
philosophies undergird Singapore’s foreign policy. Accordingly, whereas Singapore’s 
preoccupation with vulnerability is an enduring feature of policy output, it is arguable that 
cooperation and prosperity are better obtained through liberal arrangements. 
 
5.4 TRADING IN PARANOIA: SINGAPORE’S STATIST SECURITY-TRADE LINKAGES  
 
5.4.1 Rationales for linking Singaporean security and trade 
The PAP government’s concern for the geo-economic and geo-political viability of 
Singapore depends on an important factor that is virtually non-existent in the island-
state: natural resources. Singapore is completely stripped of natural endowments except 
for its strategic location at the centre of international shipping lanes and air traffic. 
Because it is unable to produce basic needs such as food, water and energy supplies, 
Singapore heavily depends on the efficient operation of the global economy and its 
rather awkward relations with neighbouring Islamic states. Taking these factors into 
consideration – scarce natural resources, small market size and aggressive neighbours – 
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Singapore’s survival is largely contingent on its capacity to conduct and participate in 
various economic dialogues and arrangements both regionally and internationally.  
 As such, the city-state is extremely dependent on the external markets, 
international investments and foreign labour. Therefore, economic diplomacy becomes a 
vital instrument for securing Singapore’s geo-economic and geo-political objectives by 
smoothening out some of the tensions encountered in a globalising economy.The PAP 
government exploits its limited but superior technocratic resources to help shape the 
global economic system underpinning Singapore’s security interests. The country’s top 
officials and policymakers vigorously promote a multilevel approach to economic 
diplomacy by simultaneously pursuing bilateral, minilateral and multilateral trade, which 
helps to stabilise its relations with other states. As stated in the Singapore’s 2012 Trade 
Policy Review: 
 
Singapore's trade policy goals are to: expand the international economic space for 
Singapore-based companies; seek a fair and predictable international trading environment; 
and minimise impediments to the flow of imports. It seeks to achieve these goals by 
engaging with its trading partners multilaterally, regionally and bilaterally. The authorities 
affirmed that the multilateral framework of the WTO remains the bedrock of Singapore's 
trade policy. 
 
5.4.2 Geo-economic rationale  
Singapore’s small domestic market and scarce natural resources have forced the 
government to plug the city-state into the international economy at the early stages of 
nation-building. After Singapore’s abrupt separation from Malaysia, the island had lost 
the economic safety net provided by its former hinterland. Thus, it had no other option 
but to quickly implement an export-oriented industrialisation policy characterised by 
substantial reductions in both tariff and non-tariff trade barriers, as well as the significant 
accumulation of much-needed foreign investments. Such economic strategy has led to 
Singapore’s average growth rate of 10.0% between 1965 and 1979 (Peebles and Wilson, 
2002; Liang, 2005). In fact, during its first year of independence, Singapore’s total trade 
had already amounted to US$6.8 billion (Peebles and Wilson, 2002; Liang, 2005). Since 
then, the significance of trade to Singapore has continued to grow. Between 2008 and 
2011, the city-state registered the highest trade to GDP ratio in the world at an estimated 
400.0% (ADB, 2014; World Bank, 2014).  
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 During the same period, the service sector comprised 75.0% of the country’s 
GDP and 70.0% of its total employment, whereas the manufacturing sector accounted 
for 21.0% of the former and 16.0% of the latter (WTO-TPR, 2012). In 2011, Singapore 
was ranked ninth among the merchandise exporters and importers and sixth among 
service exporters and importers (WTO-TPR, 2012). As of 2013, the county’s GDP per 
capita was estimated to be US$55,182 and averaging at US$36,283 per annum since 2000 
(ADB, 2014; World Bank, 2014). The real GDP in the city-state also grew at an average 
annual rate of 5.75% over the last thirteen years (ADB, 2014; World Bank, 2014). 
Logically, Singapore has been a staunch advocate of free trade, paying special attention to 
multilateralism, as it has become the island’s primary weapon for survival amid all its 
insecurities.  
 However, the city-state’s deep entanglement with the international economy has 
the paradoxical effect of exposing it further to the vicissitudes and vulnerabilities of the 
external environment. Consequently, despite its relatively short history as an independent 
nation, Singapore has already experienced several global economic recession such as the 
1997-1998 Asian financial crisis. After more than twenty years of economic boom, the 
financial crisis had plunged Singapore and the whole of Southeast Asia into an economic 
downturn and political turmoil. Given the level of economic interdependence existing 
among them, not a single state had escaped unscathed. Singapore’s real GDP growth had 
significantly contracted to 0.3% in 1998 from 8.9% of the previous year (Liang, 2005).  
 Despite the sharp decrease, the city-state performed comparatively better than 
most of its neighbours that registered negative growth rates for the first time in more 
than a decade (Peebles and Wilson, 2002; Liang, 2005). Nevertheless, the government’s 
sound macroeconomic strategies, combined with its policy of openness, allowed the 
country to recover quickly from the adverse impacts of the crisis. Between 1999 and 
2000, Singapore’s economy bounced back after achieving GDP growth rates of 6.9% and 
9.7% respectively (ADB, 2014; World Bank, 2014). This newfound growth was, largely 
driven by the expansion in IT spending resulting from the enlargement of the so-called 
“dot.com” industry (Peebles and Wilson, 2002; Liang, 2005).  
 The road to recovery, however, had been short-lived as the city-state was 
subjected to a series of external shocks between 2001 and 2003. The September 11 
attacks in 2001 and subsequent terrorist and counter-terrorist activities had cast a haze of 
geo-political and geo-economic insecurity across all continents. The post-9/11 global 
economic downturn soon penetrated the Singaporean economy, dragging it into another 
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recession. In 2001, the city-state suffered its worst recession since independence as the 
economy hit a -1.9% growth rate (ADB, 2014; World Bank, 2014). A combination of 
external factors – global downturn in the electronics industry, the American recession, 
weaker regional growth, and the harsh impact of 9/11 on the global airline industry – led 
to sharp declines in international demand and resulted in a contraction (WTO-TPR, 
2004; Liang, 2005).  
 In 2002, the economy showed some signs of recovery as it managed to expand by 
2.2% despite a tough year (ADB, 2014; World Bank, 2014). However, during the first 
half of 2003, Singapore's economy was simultaneously hit by the Severe Acute 
Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) outbreak and the war in Iraq, which badly affected 
tourism (WTO-TPR, 2004). Nonetheless, the government’s capacity for rapidly 
containing the epidemic coupled with the gradual re-emergence of a more positive 
external environment enabled the economy to grow by 1.4% by the end of that year 
(WTO-TPR, 2004). 
 Over the years, Singapore has learned to adapt to these economic shocks, as 
evidenced by another period of high economic performance between 2004 and 2007. 
The city-state’s real GDP in 2004 climbed to 9.0%, highlighting the substantial 
improvements in domestic and global demands (ADB, 2014; World Bank, 2014). In 
2005, the economy grew by another 7.3%, which was primarily due to healthy levels of 
foreign demand (ADB, 2014; World Bank, 2014). With a more auspicious global 
economic environment and more accommodating domestic policies, this positive trend 
continued in 2006 and 2007 as the economy achieved robust growth rates of 8.2% and 
8.9% respectively (ADB, 2014; World Bank, 2014). On average, Singapore’s real GDP 
grew by 8.4% per annum during this period and was accompanied by a low inflation rate 
of 1.3%, decreasing unemployment, and stable external indicators (ADB, 2014; World, 
Bank 2014).   
 However, Singapore’s economy took another dive due to another global 
recession that started in the second quarter of 2008. Real GDP was 9.0% lower than pre-
crisis, marking the country’s biggest output decline in twenty years (ADB, 2013; World 
Bank, 2014). Once again, Singapore’s economic flexibility enabled it to adjust rather 
quickly through monetary easing and large countercyclical fiscal stimulus (WTO-TPR, 
2012). The city-state’s robust economic fundamentals, openness to foreign trade and 
investments and labour market flexibility have provided the necessary cushions against 
economic shocks (WTO-TPR, 2014). Thus, Singapore’s recovery was as swift as the 
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contraction. Such resilience was illustrated by its average real GDP growth rate of 5.4% 
per annum between 2007 and 2013, with a record high of 15.2% in 2010 after 
contracting by less than 1.0% in 2009 (ADB, 2014: World Bank, 2014). The broad-based 
growth across private and public consumption and investment, on the one hand, and the 
larger than forecasted external demand, on the other, helped reinvigorate Singapore’s 
post-recession economy (WTO-TPR, 2012). 
 However, beyond the economic motivations for free trade are crucial geopolitical 
objectives that buttress Singapore’s defence space amid some serious geographic 
predicaments. In doing so, the PAP government pursues bilateral, minilateral and 
multilateral FTAs that are believed to enhance and preserve national security by ensuring 
the benignity and stability of the geopolitical environment in which the city-state is 
embedded. This way, the PAP leaders and policymakers hope to secure Singapore’s geo-
economic and geo-political interests while simultaneously reducing its geo-strategic 
insecurities.  
 
5.4.3 Geo-political rationale 
 
The regional and multilateral fronts  
At the regional level, Singapore has actively participated in the establishment and 
implementation of the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) that accounts for more than 
30.0% of its total exports.212 Together with the other South-east Asian countries, 
Singapore is currently working toward the realisation of the ASEAN Community by 
2015. The end goal of which is:    
  
…the creation a single market and production base, in which there is a free flow of goods, 
services, investments, and skilled labour, and a freer flow of capital, along with equitable 
economic development, and reduced poverty and socio-economic disparities.213  
 
 In 2011, the ASEAN members had agreed on a Framework on Regional 
Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). The said framework was designed to 
formulate a single FTA by consolidating and improving upon the ASEAN FTAs with 
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third countries.214 As of 2014, the ASEAN has concluded five bilateral FTAs involving 
seven countries, namely, Australia, New Zealand, India, Japan, South Korea and China 
(ARIC, 2014). Similarly, it has staunchly supported the trade liberalisation project set 
forth by APEC members that are committed to the development of free trade and 
investment zone across the Asia-Pacific by 2020 (ASEAN Secretariat, 2014).  
 The Singaporean government, however, views Asian regionalism not only as 
being more reactive than proactive, but also more defensive than offensive. Ironically, 
Singapore has greater substantive and positive profile globally than regionally where the 
political sensitivity of small regional powers such as Indonesia and Malaysia prevail 
(Leifer, 2000; Low, 2001, 2005; Ganesan, 2005; Thompson, 2006; Acharya, 2008). Thus, 
Asian regionalism is a very slow and cautious process that is contingent upon several 
critical factors, including: (i) how the European integration vis-à-vis American 
hemisphere works out; (ii) how the leadership between the rising Chinese power and the 
waning Japanese influence is calibrated; (iii) how power-sharing among ASEAN 
members is managed; and (iv) how the left-over stimulus of the old flying-geese model is 
applied (Low, 2001, 2005; Anthony-Caballero, 2005). The fact that Singapore’s bilateral 
FTAs were created before the ASEAN Plus Three (APT) reflects the complexity 
involved in negotiating regional economic agreements. Clearly, both the economic and 
geopolitical landscapes have shifted and trade liberalisation, regardless of the modality, 
has come into vogue (Low, 2001, 2005; Thompson 2006).   
 As free trade has come into vogue, the regional vis-à-vis- global landscape within 
which states operate to pursue their national interests has shifted (Low, 2001, 2005; 
Thompson, 2006). Accordingly, the International Enterprise Singapore (formerly, Trade 
Development Board) has launched trade missions outside the Asia- Pacific region to 
cover the emerging markets of Africa, Latin America, Central Asia, Latin America, 
Central and Eastern Europe and the Middle East. Although these developing export 
markets at present provide insignificant commercial value to Singapore, nevertheless, 
they highlight the city-state’s “distant horizon” approach to foreign economic 
policymaking that is necessary for maintaining its wider global scope (Dent, 2001, 2002; 
Lee, 2013). The main priority remains economic integration as a means of reducing 
Singapore’s multi-pronged insecurities, thereby improving the city-state’s defence and 
survival. 
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 To maintain its broad international latitude, Singaporean authorities strongly 
support the multilateral trade system under the purview of the WTO. In December 1996, 
the country hosted the WTO’s First Ministerial Meeting, which was a clear manifestation 
of the government’s subscription to the idea of multilateralism (Dent, 2001; Khor, 2007). 
Since then, Singapore has taken a lead role along with other like-minded members in 
preparing the launch of the Doha Round and the post-Doha negotiating process to keep 
the momentum of multilateral trade. There is a consensus among foreign economic 
policymakers in Singapore that a WTO-led free trade remains the most effective trade 
policy for the city-state (Dent, 2001, 2002; Liang, 2005; Chong, 2007; Khor, 2007). As 
such, the Singaporean government follows the bicycle analogy of multilateral trade 
negotiation: if you don’t continue to make forward progress then you are in danger of 
falling off. In other words, momentum must be sustained in order prevent the complete 
collapse of the multilateral trade order. In doing so, Singapore has vehemently promoted 
the “New Millennium Round” within the WTO (Dent, 2001, 2002; Liang, 2005; Chong, 
2007; Khor, 2007). 
 However, its aborted launch at the Seattle Ministerial Meeting in December 1999 
highlighted the systemic weakness of the multilateral system and became a source of 
great concern among Singaporean technocrats and policymakers.215 Furthermore, the 
twin problems of complex multilateralism and global social movements (GSM) have 
posed potential threats to Singapore’s sense of economic security given its relatively 
state-centric and elitist approach to policymaking.216 The proposed incorporation of 
highly sensitive trade issues including labour, environment and human rights into the 
WTO agenda, and the civil society pressure on the WTO’s institutional foundation and 
legitimacy have generated destabilising effects to the multilateral trade system (Smith, 
2004; Wolfe, 2004; Steger, 2007; Gallagher, 2008; Jackson, 2008).   
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 Due to its semi-periphery status, Singapore is struggling to reconcile the concerns 
it shares with developing countries regarding these issues with its intensifying relations 
with fellow developed countries, most of which are staunch promoters of these linkages 
(Sally, 2004; Dent, 2005, 2006; Low, 2005; Khor, 2007). Thus, it is a puzzle for some 
leaders of the developed states to witness Singapore’s refusal to endorse a more 
sophisticated multilateral trade agenda that allows for the incorporation of non-
traditional trade policy issues given the city-state’s commonalities with other core powers 
(Dent, 2005, 2006; Lee, 2013). Although it acknowledges the general stance of core 
members with regard to these issues, it also shares the qualms of periphery members that 
view such issue linkages in the WTO as inherently problematic.   
 These value-laden trade policies can exacerbate the existing divisions among 
WTO members and further disrupt the advancement of free trade itself. As argued by 
one official from Singapore’s Ministry of Manpower (in Dent, 2002: 161): 
 
Together with other ASEAN members, we have argued strongly against any trade-labour 
linkage, as we are concerned that such linkage is likely to be used for protectionist purposes 
detrimental to, the causes of both trade liberalisation and global economic growth. 
 
 Hence, instead of advocating a stringent “regulationist” approach to these issue 
linkages – for example, trade-labour, trade-environment and trade-human rights to name 
a few – Singapore has favoured a plurilateral method through voluntary compliance with 
higher standards and stricter regulations set by members that are willing to undertake 
them (Dent, 2005, 20006; Khor, 2007). By doing so, Singapore is not completely 
extricating itself from complex multilateralism but is exploring other feasible alternatives 
for maintaining the cohesion and stability of the multilateral trade system amid a 
transitory stage in WTO governance. 
 However, the current trade impasse experienced in both the WTO and APEC 
has compelled Singapore to exploit the growing trend of bilateral FTAs among Asia-
Pacific countries. The failure of WTO to conclude the current Doha Development 
Agenda highlights the growing cynicism and disenchantment on the part of its 
developing and least developed members rather than the dearth of shrewd economic 
calculations and (Smith, 2004; Wolfe, 2004; Steger, 2007; Gallagher, 2008; Jackson, 2008). 
As of 2014, the Singaporean government has already signed and implemented thirteen 
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bilateral FTAs encompassing twenty countries located in various continents.217 The main 
rationale is to increase the thrust of trade liberalisation processes in APEC and ASEAN, 
and at the same time, establish a vital safety net if the process deteriorates further (Dent, 
2006; Kawai and Wignaraja, 2010; Koo, 2013; Ravenhill, 2013; Hamanaka 2014). 
 The Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP) is arguably the most high profile 
among these alternatives for a number of reasons. First, the TPP is a trans regional 
agreement that attempts to link countries in four different corners of the Asia-Pacific – 
Southeast Asia, Oceania, and North and South America.218 Second, the agreement is also 
viewed as an important tool for ensuring the continued interest and involvement of the 
United States in the Western Pacific rim, and conversely for Washington, “as a means of 
signalling the return of the US to the region under the Obama administration” (Capling 
and Ravenhill, 2011: 558). Third, the TPP also aspires to be a “twenty-first century 
agreement” by addressing domestic regulatory policies that influence trade and 
investment, and thus, goes beyond traditional market access negotiations.219  
 Lastly, the agreement is expected to “multilateralise regionalism” by untangling 
the noodle bowl, being open to future accessions and providing a foundation to the long-
term APEC goal of freeing trade among its members (Capling and Ravenhill, 2011: 559). 
There are substantial differences between the negotiating priorities of the current 
participants. Hoewever, the strong commitment shown by the PAP government in TPP 
negotiations, despite the limited economic gains that it expects from the agreement, 
highlights the role of security interests as drivers of Singaporean FTAs. As Capling and 
Ravenhill (2011) postulate, the anticipated forward momentum in the TPP negotiations 
will create incentives for non-participants to join eventually, thus making it a more crucial 
strategic and economic accord.  
 However, at the time of writing the TPP is a huge work in progress. As some 
observers have noted, governments in many of the participating countries seem to be 
much more interested than local interest groups in the proposed accord (Kawharu, 2012; 
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Capling and Ravenhill, 2011; Naoi and Urata, 2013). The complications arising from 
convoluted rules of origin (ROOs) prevent domestic businesses from fully utilising the 
existing agreements. Consequently, in many countries, protectionist groups are effectively 
stifling some members of the pro-liberalisation business lobby (Naoi and Urata, 2013). 
Hence, while the TPP has become a key component of the United States’ rehabilitated 
resolve to engage with the Asia-Pacific, the relatively small size of participating 
economies significantly curtails its expected economic and politico-strategic utility 
(Caplan and Ravenhill, 2013). 
 
The bilateral front 
For some observers, the failure of the WTO to conclude the current Doha Development 
Agenda (DDA) highlights the growing cynicism and disenchantment on the part of the 
developing members (Smith, 2004; Wolfe, 2004; Steger, 2007; Gallagher, 2008; Jackson, 
2008). One of the most highly contested issues confronting the institution aside from 
classical economic considerations relates to the incorporation of non-traditional security 
issues into the multilateral trade agenda (Khor, 2007; Aggarwal and Govella, 2013). The 
balancing of diverse and often conflicting national interests pursued by all members has 
proved to be one of the biggest obstacles moving forward with the new multilateral 
negotiation rounds.  
 On the one hand, most of the developed members argue for the annexation of 
nontrade issues pertaining to human security such as environment, labour and human 
rights (Aggarwal and Govella, 2013; Ahnlid, 2003; Vogel, 2013; Yamada, 2013). On the 
other, developing members fiercely advocate for improved market access to the highly 
protected labour-intensive industries of the developed world specifically through the 
agricultural and textile sectors where they have comparative advantage (Aggarwal and 
Govella, 2013; Ahnlid, 2003; Vogel, 2013; Yamada, 2013). Such tension significantly 
contributed to what Christopher Dent (2006) refers to as “WTO inertia.” 
 As mentioned, the current trade impasse experienced both in the WTO and 
APEC has compelled Singapore to exploit the growing trend of bilateral FTAs, 
particularly within the Asia-Pacific region. Interestingly, the city-state’s small size has 
become in a sense an economic advantage given the nominal costs and minor challenges 
that it poses for its bilateral partners. Singapore has served as a litmus test for other 
Asian countries that are actively conducting bilateral FTA negotiations with larger and 
more challenging partners. In other words, the country’s bilateral FTAs have been 
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instrumental in “stirring the pot” and exploring new frontiers for the region’s next phase 
of growth in light of the changes precipitated by globalisation (Dent, 2001, 2002, 2006; 
Low, 2001, 2005). As such, Singapore is not the only country that is forced to react to 
the systemic threats and opportunities that are simultaneously generated by globalisation. 
 Some critics have argued that the continuous proliferation of bilateral FTAs – 
regional and/or trans regional – may prove detrimental in the long run due to their 
propensity to side-track the multilateral (WTO) and regional (APEC and ASEAN) 
channels of free trade, thus further aggravating the intrinsic flaws of both modalities 
(Bhagwati, 2003, 2008; Plummer et al., 2010). However, the geo-economic and geo-
political utilities of bilateral FTAs in the twenty-first century cannot be denied, 
particularly when the WTO process is currently malfunctioning and is in disarray 
irrespective of the former’s precise impact on multilateralism. Such observation is 
especially true for a realist-cum-trading state like Singapore.  
 
The United States – Singapore Free Trade Agreement (USSFTA): The USSFTA is the 
product of crisscrossing interests between two states attempting to implant security 
elements within their trade relations.220 In 2005, the Bush Administration began the 
campaign for linking security and trade issues in various platforms including the ASEAN, 
ARF and APEC. Unlike other bilateral FTAs, the USSFTA goes beyond traditional 
economic considerations by annexing the sensitive issue of security relations between the 
two countries in the agreement. This is supported by the observation that the common 
motivations that drive the formation of a bilateral FTA – reducing effective tariff rates, 
abolishing non-trade barriers, and gaining reciprocal access to each other’s goods, 
services and final markets – do not exactly apply (Pang, 2007, 2011; Aggarwal, 2013). In 
fact, both the United States and Singapore have had the lowest tariff rates among all 
trading states with the latter being the most free entrepot in the world.12 Both countries 
continue to back the multilateral trade liberalisation of the WTO, but at the same time 
consider bilateral FTAs as complementary building blocks for the eventual realisation of 
a single global market (Pang, 2007, 2011; Aggarwal, 2013). 
 With respect to growth prospects, Singapore – an economy of US$ 274.7 billion 
GDP and a total population of five million – offers both public and private firms limited 
space for further market expansion. Going global, therefore, is not merely an option but 
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the only way to Singapore’s continued survival. Hence, while the USSFTA makes little 
economic sense for American policymakers given the asymmetric opportunities that are 
expected to go to Singapore, nevertheless, for the Singaporean policymakers, the FTA 
provides the strategic hinterland (Koh and Chang, 2004; Aggarwal, 2013). This is further 
highlighted by the fact that the market access it created for the city-state is larger than the 
aggregate market access provided by all major ASEAN economies (Koh and Chang, 
2004; Pang 2007, 2011). 
 Meanwhile, from the American side, FTAs serve as political rewards for states 
that are supportive of US foreign economic and security policies. Examples of these are 
the United States-Israel Free Trade Agreement (USIFTA) signed in 1985, and the United 
States-Jordan Free Trade Agreement (USJFTA) signed in 2000. While the latter is the 
first FTA that the US has ever ratified and implemented with an Arab country, the 
USSFTA is the first of its kinds with an Asian country. This was largely in recognition of 
the Singaporean government’s decision to grant the United States access to its military 
bases after the latter’s naval and air stations in the Philippines were shutdown in 1991 
(Pang, 2007, 2011; Aggarwal, 2013). Hence, the United States has secured a strategic base 
that enabled the execution of its foreign economic and security policies across Asia- 
Pacific region (Higgott, 2003; Aggarwal, 2013; Lee, 2013). 
 Once the negotiations for the USSFTA concluded in May 2003, former US 
President George W. Bush Jr. made a visit to Singapore to sign a strategic partnership 
framework agreement in October of the same year. This paved the way for the bilateral 
linking of security interests and free trade objectives between the two countries, which 
took effect on 1 January 2004. The agreement was an upshot of the Bush 
administration’s two-pronged foreign policy strategy implemented shortly after the 11-
September events. It gave the United States: (i) the right to unilaterally strike suspected 
states or territories that provide sanctuaries to terrorists within the context of preventive 
or pre-emptive war doctrine; and (ii) the mechanism for binding trade policies to wider 
and broader political, economic, and security aims (Jervis, 2003; Monten, 2005; Kaufman, 
2007). To complement this strategy, the US Congress established the Trade Promotion 
Authority in 2002 that gave the Bush administration the power to formulate, negotiate 
and conclude preferential FTAs on a fast-track basis.221 The goal was to intensify 
American free trade through the bilateral instead of the multilateral route.  
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 In July 2005, it was Lee’s turn to visit Washington to sign The Strategic 
Framework Agreement for a Closer Cooperation Partnership in Defence and Security 
with Bush.222 The fact that the said agreement took two years to be concluded indicates 
that the negotiations may not have been very straightforward. The said agreement has 
two main components: (i) a Defence Cooperation Agreement (DCA) that incorporated 
all standing bilateral defence cooperation and opened new areas of collaboration, 
specifically the development of military expertise and defence capabilities to address a 
broad range of non-traditional security threats; and (ii) a Protocol of Amendment to the 
1990 Memorandum of Understanding (AMOU) to extend the access for American ships 
and aircraft to facilities located in Singapore. Therefore, the event has formally embedded 
their respective security imperatives into the existing trade relations between them. Both 
heads of state agreed that it was the logical follow-up on the FTA.   
 Interestingly, despite Singapore’s secretive nature, the government hurriedly 
announced this “more than economics” accord with the US. It specifically highlighted 
the agreement’s security-related components including greater military technology 
transfers; intensified joint R&D activities; and closer collaborations between the two 
states’ armed forces (Pang, 2007, 2011). Lee was very optimistic about the positive role 
of the United States in maintaining security and stability in the region “as it has done for 
many years” (in Pang, 2007: 21). During the 2005 APEC meeting held in Pusan, South 
Korea, Lee even alluded to the “Asianness” of the United States considering the 
proximity of its westward territory, Guam to Japan and New Guinea (Pang, 2007).  
 In response, Bush reiterated that the FTA would be the basis for the bilateral 
security cooperation necessary in defeating terrorism in Southeast Asia and stopping the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (Pang, 2007). In addition, the United States 
also shares with Singapore some of the biggest security concerns in the Asia-Pacific, such 
as: protection of the channel through the Malacca and Singapore Straits; freedom of 
navigation across the South China Sea; tension brought about my nuclear proliferation in 
the Korean peninsula; and the volatility of cross-strait relations between China and 
Taiwan (Schott, 2004; Aggarwal, 2013). Thus, the Singaporean government views its 
bilateral FTA with the US as a means of bolstering American strategic engagement in the 
region. 
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 Evidently, the military and security collaboration schemes seem to be reinforcing 
the United States’ initiatives for the war on terrorism, and the two partners’ preference 
for interlacing security issues with free trade. 9/11 has provided the impetus for 
consolidating the cohabitation of security and trade into the neo-conservative foreign 
and defence policies of the United States, which the city-state fully embraced, particularly 
during the Bush administration. A classic example is Singapore’s decision to send a 
military contingent to Iraq and provide a strategic staging ground for the American 
military operations within the “axis of evil” that began in 2003 (Higgott, 2003; Schott, 
2004; Aggarwal, 2013). In this sense, the war in Iraq has served as a litmus test for 
screening America’s prospective FTA partners in the Asia-Pacific – one that Singapore 
has successfully passed. 
 Hence, for the most part, Singapore’s top leaders and policymakers adhere to the 
same security concept and strategy that promoted by their American counterparts. In 
fact, since gaining independence, Singapore has reserved its right to pre-emptive strikes 
in the hope of effectively deterring latent and imminent security threats (Leifer, 2000; 
Ganesan, 2005; Acharya, 2008). Both governments believe in the deterrence capability 
generated by strong, mobile and lethal state force. The two countries also conduct annual 
joint air, naval and military exercises in the South China Sea (Koh and Chang, 2004; 
Pang, 2007, 2011). Such activities have enabled collaborations between the two 
governments over Afghanistan and Iraq as well as deployment of a superior naval force 
to fight maritime piracy in Southeast Asia. An action that costs some US$25 billion 
annually (Pang, 2007, 2011; Aggarwal and Govella, 2013; Lee, 2013). Clearly, these 
security linkages have performed a vital role broadening the content and scope of 
Singapore’s bilateral FTA with the United States and has enabled the city-state to 
enhance its bilateral defence collaboration with the world’s reigning superpower. Against 
the backdrop of a rapidly transforming Asian security environment, the two countries 
share a common understanding of the utility of coordinating security policies via FTAs.  
 But while the USSFTA highlights the complementarity of Singapore’s geo-
economic and geo-political interests with the core strategic agendas of the United States, 
the China-Singapore Free Trade Agreement (CSFTA) presents quite a different narrative.  
 
The China-Singapore Free Trade Agreement (CSFTA): Singapore’s pragmatic approach 
to foreign policy naturally compels it to balance against China along with other smaller 
and weaker states in the region even as it attempts to interlock China in all aspects of 
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bilateral relations – economically, politically and culturally. Put differently, the city-state’s 
bilateral strategy with respect to China is determined by its economic dynamism, 
demographic features and geopolitical setting: a tiny, wealthy and predominantly Chinese 
country stuck between the two large Islamic states of Indonesia and Malaysia, whose 
respective relations with China are influenced by a myriad of complexities. Nevertheless, 
the physical distance between Singapore and China provides the former greater 
“balancing latitude” compared to other Asian neighbours that are living in much closer 
proximity to the latter.  
 Thus, while some Southeast Asian countries such as the Philippines and Vietnam 
balance against China because they must, Singapore balances because it can, and that is 
partly due to the relative autonomy afforded by the physical distance between them 
(Leifer, 2000; Goh, 2005; Tan, 2009, 2012). In short, the Singaporean government 
simultaneously pursues economic bandwagoning and security balancing with China. As 
Kuik Cheng-Chwee (2008: 11) puts it, “the peculiarity of Singapore’s China policy is that 
it is by design an ambivalent one: warm in economic and diplomatic ties but distanced in 
political and strategic spheres.”   
 Arguably, it this paradoxical yet pragmatic feature of Singaporean foreign policy 
that informs the city-state’s strategic relations with China. The enormous extent of 
China’s power and influence in Asia cannot be simply disregarded or repudiated by its 
significantly smaller and weaker counterparts in the region, not in the least Singapore. 
Similarly, no amount of remonstration regarding China’s continuing ascent can reassure 
Singapore about the nature of future Chinese motives, especially when China’s 
phenomenal growth begins to inconvenience other countries. Thus, Singapore’s 
balancing or as what some scholars refer to as “hedging” strategy with respect to China is 
designed to be pragmatic in order to prevent its extreme dependence on, and lopsided 
investment in one major power (Goh, 2005; Kuik, 2008; Tna, 2009, 2012).  
 However, some observers argue that the city-state’s decision to sign a bilateral 
FTA with the US, along with the subsequent strategic framework agreement, has to do 
more with proliferation of non-traditional security threats particularly global terrorism 
than with rising Chinese power (Tan and Ramakrishna, 2004; Kuik, 2008; Tan, 2009, 
2012). The absence of territorial dispute between Singapore and China is one indication 
that the latter does not pose direct military threats to the former. Hence, from the 
perspective of Singaporean policymakers, the issue of terrorism takes precedence over 
the issue of rising China, as it is perceived an indirect challenge to the island-state. 
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 Nevertheless, being the typical “anticipatory state,” the Singaporean government 
is worried about what an intensifying Chinese military power could mean to the city-state 
and the whole Asia-Pacific in the longer run (Ganesan, 2005; Acharya, 2008; Kuik, 2008). 
Consequently, the country’s top leaders attempt to involve the United States in various 
Asia-Pacific affairs to establish the countervailing force that can balance China. By doing 
so, Singapore hopes to maintain regional peace and stability. As Goh (in Tan, 2009: 37) 
noted: 
 
China is conscious that it needs to be seen as a responsible power and has taken pains to 
cultivate this image. This is comforting to regional countries. Nevertheless, many in the 
region would feel more assured if East Asia remains in balance as China grows. In fact, 
maintaining balance is the overarching strategic objective in East Asia currently, and only 
with the help of the US can East Asia achieve this. 
 
 Given the ambivalence surrounding China’s politico-strategic motives and future 
conduct, developing contingency measures or “Plan B’s” becomes a crucial aspect of 
Singaporean foreign policy. In doing so, Singaporean officials and policymakers are 
expected to conduct systematic assessments of feasible future scenarios to analyse their 
probable effects on the city-state amid the growing uncertainties in the region. China’s 
future intent and capacity if left unchecked may undermine regional prosperity and 
stability; limit Singapore’s available policy options; and engender internal conflicts and 
divisions among ASEAN members that will weaken the organisation’s overall cohesion 
(Kuik, 2008; Acharya, 2008; Tan, 2009, 2012). For obvious reasons, such concerns are 
anathema to a trading state like Singapore.  
 Nevertheless, on 3 September 2008, the China-Singapore Free Trade Agreement 
was signed after eight rounds of negotiations held for two years in Singapore and 
Beijing.223 The CSFTA became the first comprehensive bilateral FTA that China signed 
with another Asian country and was entered into force on 1 January 2009. There is little 
doubt that commercial considerations have played a crucial part in Singapore’s persistent 
economic engagement of China. For Singapore, economic engagement has been a key 
strategy for transforming itself into a regional trading hub or nodal point that buttresses 
the growth and development of economic activities by advanced, industrialised countries 
(Leifer, 2000; Ganesan, 2005, 2010; Acharya, 2008).  
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 Therefore, the CSFTA can be viewed as the logical outcome of a long-standing 
Sino-Singapore relation that dates back to the 1960s and all through the 1980s, where, in 
the absence of diplomatic connections, the city-state has vigorously promoted bilateral 
economic engagements. China’s economic opening to the world in 1978 happened to 
coincide with the economic recession that hit Singapore in 1985. As a response, the 
Singaporean government established the so-called “second wing” of the national 
economy at the start of the 1990s, that is, economic internationalisation and 
regionalisation. The goal was to exploit the expanding economic opportunities in China 
by complementing its huge market (Chia, 2005; Ganesan, 2005, 2010; Kuik, 2008; Tan, 
2009, 2012). Since then, the trade between Singapore and China has steadily grown. 
China is currently Singapore’s largest trading partner in terms of both exports and 
imports; whereas Singapore is China’s 14th largest exporting and 12th largest importing 
country (WTO-TPR, 2014). 
 Despite complementary markets, Singaporean firms and enterprises still have to 
compete with the enormous pool of cheap Chinese labour. To counter this problem, 
Singapore has recalibrated and retrained its labour force to reduce its dependence on the 
manufacturing sector while expanding its service sector (Tan, 2009). The idea is to 
develop strategic niche markets for itself in China by concentrating on areas where it has 
the comparative advantage and promoting the city-state’s reliable business brand. In 
doing so, Singapore is compelled to explore economic areas that are unfamiliar to the 
Chinese to avoid head-to-head competition with China in which it would predictably 
lose. Another vital issue for Singapore as well as other Southeast Asian states is the tight 
completion for foreign direct investments (FDIs). But as some observers have argued, 
the threat of FDI competition has been largely overstated given that these ASEAN 
members, with the inclusion of Singapore, have benefited from economically engaging 
China (Chia, 2005; Tan, 2009; Ganesan, 2010). Such incompatibilities have underscored 
the limits to bilateral economic cooperation between Singapore and China despite having 
a shared culture and relatively close ethnic bond. 
 Singapore’s ambivalent attitude toward China was demonstrated on several 
occasions. One of which was when Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong, who at that time 
was still a deputy prime minister, visited Taipei in July 2004. Some observers have argued 
that Lee had grossly overestimated the level of pragmatism in China (Ganesan, 2005, 
2010; Acharya, 2008). Despite a previous agreement between Singaporean and Chinese 
officials that “private visits” to Taiwan would not destabilise their bilateral relations, 
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 Lee’s most recent trip to the island was met with unusually strong condemnation 
from the PRC. One of the main reasons was that Chen Shui-bian, the president at the 
time of Lee’s visit to ROC, was the former head of a pro-independence party called the 
Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). To avoid the further escalation of the crisis, 
Singapore quickly expressed its deference to China by repeatedly stressing its recognition 
of, and support for Beijing’s One-China policy with respect to Taiwan (Ganesan, 2005; 
Tan, 2009). 
 Before this incident, in September 2002, Taiwan urged China not to interfere 
with its plan to establish a bilateral FTA with Singapore. The call was made amid 
allegations that China’s trade minister had purportedly warned his Singaporean 
counterpart to abandon all plans for pursuing a free trade deal with the ROC, as it would 
inevitably enrage Beijing. To be sure, the struggle for negotiating and concluding a 
bilateral FTA with Singapore and Taiwan continued for a considerable period. In March 
2008, a few months after his election as president of Taiwan, Ma Ying-jeou of the 
Kuomintang Party (KMT), had proposed for the reopening of bilateral dialogues to 
assess the feasibility of forming an exclusive FTA with Singapore (Dent, 2006; Glaser, 
2013). The city-state’s reply was again one of deference and compliance, stating that it 
would only be willing to do so if Taipei abstained from politicising the agreement (Dent, 
2006; Glaser, 2013). 
 On 7 November 2013 – in what some analysts view as Taiwan’s emergence on 
the global diplomatic stage – the bilateral FTA between Singapore and Taiwan 
concluded. The pact – officially known as the Agreement between Singapore and the 
Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu on Economic 
Partnership (ASTEP) – was signed by the Taiwanese representative to Singapore Fadah 
Hsie and the Singaporean trade representative to Taiwan Calvin Eu during a ceremony 
held in Singapore.224 Singapore's Minister for Trade and Industry, Lim Hng Kiang was 
cautious with his comments about the agreement, noting that: “Companies from both 
sides are already actively pursuing business opportunities in each other's economies. The 
agreement will further enhance and deepen trade and investment flows between both 
sides”(Hsu and Poon, 2013). As for China’s position regarding the issue, its Foreign 
Ministry spokesman Hong Lei had this to say: “Our position on Taiwan's foreign 
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interactions remains consistent and clear. We hope Singapore could abide by the one-
China policy and deal with its economic ties with Taiwan in a prudent and proper 
manner.”225 
 These experiences underline the profound pragmatism of Singapore’s policy and 
approach with respect to China. In fact, Singapore’s decision to vote in favour of China’s 
accession – in lieu of Taiwan – to the United Nations in 1971 was driven by pragmatic 
rather than ideological motivations. This was despite its long-standing battle against the 
Chinese-enthused communist rebellion (Leifer, 2000; Acharya, 2005; Ganesan, 2005). 
Nevertheless, this policy shift has not totally prohibited Singapore from exploring new 
economic opportunities, and establishing healthy albeit unofficial political relations with 
Taiwan. This observation is strongly supported by the successful conclusion of ASTEP, 
considered by some as “a precarious feat of diplomacy by any stretch of imagination” 
(Tan, 2009: 39). To a certain extent, such forms of strategic engagement with the 
Taiwanese government demonstrate Singapore’s strength of resolve to act independently 
in its own interest. This is despite the city-state’s “norm” of deferring to Beijing to 
stabilise Sino-Singapore diplomatic relations. 
 Singapore’s ability to act independently from China should not entirely come as a 
surprise given that the first major bilateral FTA ever formed in East Asia was between 
the island-state and Japan called the Japan-Singapore “New Age” Economic Partnership 
Agreement (JSEPA) that took effect in January 2002.226 The intensifying strategic 
competition between Japan and China has largely driven the security-trade linking 
approach in the Asia-Pacific. Yet, because of some crucial security considerations, China 
and Japan are being prevented from signing a bilateral FTA with each other, thus 
thwarting the creation of an East Asian FTA (Aggarwal and Govella, 2013; Lee, 2013). 
As a result, the two regional powers have competed and continue to compete to attract 
potential FTA partners particularly in the Southeast Asian region in the hope of 
improving their status as the primary regional power.     
 However, China’s highly centralised policymaking arrangement has enabled 
Chinese leaders and policymakers to stay ahead of Japan in this race. Beijing’s serious 
efforts maintaining its FTA with ASEAN may be viewed not only as a strategy to contain 
the escalating discomfort felt by some Southeast Asian leaders toward China but also to 
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undermine Japan’s regional leadership role by placing it on the defensive diplomatically 
(Lee, 2013). The Sino-Japanese rivalry has engendered a strategic externality that can 
potentially enhance the economic and security levels of not only Singapore, but the 
whole Southeast Asian region by allowing them to strike more favourable deals 
(Mochizuki, 2009; Lee, 2013). From here, the ASEAN region may eventually emerge as 
an important hub in the Asia-Pacific FTA network, a prospect that Singapore is all too 
willing to embrace.   
 
5.5 LIMITS TO SINGAPORE’S STATIST SECURITY-TRADE LINKAGES  
Several factors influence Singapore’s capacity for overcoming its self-consuming strategic 
paranoia. These are: (i) limits of PAP-centric security framework; (ii) limits of elitist 
nation-building (iii) limits of deterrence strategy; and (iv) limits of alliance and alignment 
strategy. The first and second factors represent the internal constraints that sustain 
Singapore’s security complex and vulnerability fetish, whereas the third and fourth 
factors deal with the external constraints that reinforce them. It is worth noting, 
however, that these factors are interconnected and therefore overlap with each other. 
Together, they undermine the defence-upgrading utility of Singaporean free trade 
activities by exacerbating further the underlying geographic factor.  
 
5.5.1 Limits of PAP-centric security framework  
The Singapore case illustrates how the existing political system, the government, and the 
ruling political party, are fused together to create a single overarching governing entity. 
Since 1959, the PAP has vigorously promoted the idea that a dominant party system is 
the most effective model for achieving Singapore’s security objectives and economic 
interests (Mauzy and Milne, 2002; Velayutham, 2007; Barr and Skrbis, 2008; Low and 
Vadaketh, 2014). Using its impressive track record in providing economic development 
and preserving social cohesion, the PAP promotes itself as the best candidate for the job. 
The overwhelming power held by the PAP in all the three branches of government 
enables the party to blur the lines separating the government and the state (Ganesan, 
1998, 2005; Low and Vadaketh, 2014).  
 In other words, the whole Singaporean city-state and the PAP-led government 
become one and the same. This implies that the broad-based definition of state interest is 
co-opted by the narrow-based conception of PAP interest. Hence, Singapore’s national 
security policies and strategies now expediently accommodate the ruling party’s ulterior 
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motives. Such “tripartite fusion” is not unique to Singapore as it also occurs in 
neighbouring countries such as Malaysia and Indonesia (Ganesan, 1998; Nathan, 1998). 
In fact, the belief in the importance of establishing a strong central government to 
develop national resilience and maintain regional stability has become the norm in 
Southeast Asia (Alagappa, 1998; Ganesan, 1998; Crump, 2007).  
 However, unlike its former host country Malaysia, the Singaporean government 
has adopted ethnic neutrality as a policy amid its multiracial society, both for internal and 
external reasons. As the only “Chinese” state in Southeast Asia, Singapore has usually 
been treated with suspicion by its predominantly Malay neighbourhood (Ganesan, 1998, 
2005; Leifer, 2000; Acharya 2008). Therefore, constructing the Singaporean identity 
based purely on Chinese ethnicity might be aggressively opposed by a quarter of the 
island’s non-Chinese population.227 Despite its subscription to ethnic neutrality, the 
government has promoted Chinese identity, but only insofar as it reinforces socio-
political structures and assists in various economic affairs, particularly East Asian 
investments. When identity discourse threatens to disrupt the existing ethnic balance by 
instigating nationalist movements with racial undertones, the government acts swiftly to 
suppress it. By disassociating itself from a particular ethnic group and class, the PAP is 
able to successfully portray itself as the quintessence of Singapore’s communal corporate 
interests (Ganesan 1998, 2005; Mauzy and Milne, 2002; Low and Vadaketh, 2014).  
 These communal interests are the foundations of today’s Singaporean national 
identity. An identity is adroitly conceptualised by the PAP’s top officials and superficially 
adopted by the population at large. By constantly reproducing and re-injecting this PAP-
manufactured identity, it has become “common sense” or “realism” in Singapore’s daily 
discourse and practice. Put differently, a national ideology has been transformed into a 
non-ideological and pragmatic apparatus (Ganesan, 1998; Barr and Skrbis, 2008; 
Ortmann, 2009). In this sense, domestic survival pertains to the ability of the ruling party 
to counter the growing electoral and socio-political challenges that the government is 
confronting.  
 In the 1950s and 1960s, the PAP’s clampdown on dissenting parties and 
oppositional groups was largely a reaction to the security threats induced by the island’s 
unification with the Malaysian Federation (Ganesan, 1998; Vasil, 2000; Mauzy and Milne, 
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2002). Nevertheless, this resulted in the depoliticisation of the Singaporean public and 
the corresponding demobilisation of oppositional politics. The citizens’ general 
disinterest toward politics, coupled with the city-state’s remarkable economic 
performance have helped legitimise the PAP government’s monopoly and control of 
Singapore’s domestic political system all throughout the 1970s (Ganesan, 1998; Vasil, 
2000; Mauzy and Milne, 2002). 
 However, since the 1980s the PAP’s political “immune system” has shown some 
signs of vulnerability. In 1981, J.B. Jeyaratnam of the Worker’s Party won the election in 
the Anson constituency and became the first politician from the opposition to win a 
parliamentary seat since Singapore’s independence (Ganesan, 1998). Three years later, the 
number of opposition members in the parliament had increased to two (Ganesan, 1998). 
In 1991, the PAP lost four out of the 81 seats to the political opposition, making it the 
PAP’s weakest electoral performance at that time (Ganesan, 1998).  
 Fast forward to the 2011 general elections, the cracks in PAP’s electoral armour 
had been manifested even more clearly. The regime’s 81-seats-to-six victory was viewed 
as yet another breakthrough, not for the PAP, but for the opposition (Lee and Tan, 2011; 
Tan, 2014). It gave the worst election results for the ruling party since 1965 in terms of 
the PAP’s share of the popular votes vis-à-vis the number of successful candidates from 
the opposition (Lee and Tan, 2011; Tan, 2014). The 60.1% votes won by the PAP in 
2011 compared poorly with the 66.6% votes they collected in 2006, which in itself 
upsetting given their 75.3% haul in 2001 (Lee and Tan, 2011; Tan, 2014).  
 Evidently, the PAP’s electoral appeal is experiencing a relative decline based on 
the downward trend reflected by its percentage of popular votes won during the last 
three general elections. However, because of the tripartite fusion of the party, state and 
government in Singapore, the PAP can frame the threats to its political hegemony as 
threats to the entire city-state. In doing so, the government maintains a PAP-configured 
domestic political order as a means of addressing the gradual contraction of the ruling 
party’s electoral support base. Domestic order in this context is a euphemism for the 
regime’s political survival. Hence, the government has vigorously pushed for the 
preservation of a one-party system and has gone to great lengths to promote the idea that 
Singapore’s geo-political and geo-economic viability is largely contingent on the PAP’s 
continued monopoly over power (Ganesan, 1998, 2005; Milne and Mauzy, 2002; Low 
and Vadaketh, 2014).    
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 Furthermore, Singapore’s opposition parties have usually focused on economic 
issues that enabled them to expand their electoral base rather than on the relatively 
“taboo” subjects of security that are often shrouded by a veil of secrecy (Vasil, 2000; 
Mutalib, 2004). This implies that the PAP government enjoys a virtual free pass with 
respect to the passage and implementation of its security policies and strategies. Its 
effective control of the bureaucracy, and the vitality with which it has pursued economic 
stability and social cohesion, has to certain extent, diminished public interest in 
democratic political participation (Milne and Mauzy, 2002; Low and Vadaketh, 2014). 
Therefore, it may be argued that the depoliticisation of Singaporean citizenry has 
retarded the growth of a liberal-democratic civic culture.  
 In addition, the Singaporean case represents an anomaly to the accepted theory 
about the pivotal role of the middle classes cultivating and spreading liberal democracy 
principles within the developing world. The preoccupation of the Singaporean middle 
class with materialism has side-tracked concerns toward the PAP’s repressive rule as 
evidenced by a circumscribed freedom of expression; restricted freedom of action; highly 
regulated mass media; and tightly monitored opposition parties (Huang, 2010; Hong, 
2012). Given that the middle class seems to have little problem trading off their civil 
liberty for ensuring their economic comfort, the PAP’s security ideology is legitimised 
further.  
 Finally, the PAP government has also portrayed itself as a racially impartial 
technocratic state. The political externalities associated with its “Chineseness” compel 
Singaporean officials and policymakers to put greater efforts in dealing with the issue of 
ethnicity within its densely populated territory. The threat of Communalism has been 
exaggerated by trans-border communal links with Malaysia and Indonesia and what the 
government considers a widespread anti-Chinese attitude within the two states (Leifer, 
2000;  Dent, 2001, 2002; Ganesan, 2005; Acharya, 2008). The anxieties felt toward the 
Chinese minorities in these predominantly Muslim countries have added fuel to the 
hostility directed toward the city-state. For instance, the relative economic security of the 
ethnic Chinese communities in Malaysia and Indonesia has paradoxically heightened the 
insecurities felt by locals, thus making them the targets for various nationalist movements 
and anti-government protests (Abdullah, 2009; Shiraishi, 2009; Thayer, 2009). Indeed, 
Singapore has often been perceived as the “Chinese island in a Malay sea,” prompting 
former Indonesian President B. J. Habibie to call it ‘a little red dot’ (Leifer, 2000; 
Ganesan, 2005, 2008; Acharya, 2008). The Singaporean government viewed such 
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comment not only as a dig at its geographic size but also at its 2.8 million Chinese 
citizens residing within a Muslim neighbourhood. From Singapore’s viewpoint, its very 
existence provokes uninvited scrutiny from nearby countries that seriously undermines 
its sense of security.  
 Overall, the island’s gnawing external vulnerability provided the PAP with a 
strong justification for monopolising state power. Surviving outside threats to the city-
sate required the establishment of a strong government that was free from electoral 
challenges and political oppositions. However, as the three-way merging of the party, the 
government and the state progressed, these linkages have also been transformed.  Rather 
than using external security threats as raison d'être for Singapore’s existing political 
arrangement, the PAP government now argues that domestic political survival via the 
preservation of the dominant-party system is an essential precondition for ensuring 
external security. 
 
5.5.2 Limits of elitist nation building 
The Singaporean case highlights a nation-building project that has been 
unapologetically elitist and has developed in conjunction with elite formation. 
Some experts have argued that the city-state’s particular brand of political elitism is 
largely anchored in Lee’s ingenuity and mentality.228  Lee’s definition of the elites as 
being “at the very top of society and possessing all the qualities needed to lead” 
underlines their central role in the management of the city-state (Barr and Skrbis, 
2008: 9).  
 Such a claim is evidenced by the huge number of government-owned and 
controlled private firms as well as the cross-fertilisation of civil service employees 
and cabinet members on various government-related boards (Barr and Skrbis, 
2008; Barr, 2014). Moreover, the synergetic relations between the PAP and trade 
unions have resulted in a blending of leadership, thereby allowing the elites to 
control both sides of the capital-labour divide (Trocki, 2005; Benson and Zhu, 
2008). In short, virtually all facets of Singaporean society are permeated by the 
government-allied elites. In rare instances where the organisation was afforded a 
                                                 
228
 The former prime minister’s introduction to the English class system; the weaknesses of a 
supposedly egalitarian society; and his wide-ranging extra-curricular readings at Cambridge 
particularly Arnold Toynbee’s A Study of History, have all contributed to his vision of Singaporean 
elitism. Toynbee’s thesis on the role of the ‘creative minority’ in steering an entire civilisation became 
the theoretical basis of Lee’s own interpretations of elitism and progressivism within Singapore. See 
for example, Vasil (2000); Barr and Skrbis (2008); and Barr (2014). 
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certain amount of space to manoeuvre, the government had strategically shunned 
all links that might be interpreted as political (Vasil, 2000; Barr and Skrbis, 2008).229 
All of these issues point to the fact that the elites can penetrate the viscera of 
Singaporean nation building (Worthington, 2003). 
 Furthermore, the idea that a Singaporean nation-sate function solely on the 
grounds of meritocracy is increasingly becoming a myth as existing modes of 
collective understanding lock citizens into synthetic and inflexible racial confines. 
As such, the city-state is not exactly the synthesis of individual Singaporeans, but 
the totality of strongly defined ethnic clusters. As Barr and Skrbis (2008: 10) argue:  
 
Every Singaporean is allocated an official racial designation … This designation is a factor in 
determining the schools they and their children attend what languages they learn at school; 
what special help might be available for education; where they live; and which parliamentary 
constituencies they can contest. Racial classification is the only piece of information on the 
front of a Singaporean identity card apart from one’s name and photograph. In fact, 
Singaporeans outside the dominant Chinese majority are unlikely to think of themselves as 
Singaporean without hyphenating their Singaporean nature with their racial marker. Thus, an 
Indian is more likely to think of himself or herself as an Indian-Singaporean than as simply 
Singaporean.  
 
 While it may be argued that such condition is a side effect of colonial 
construction within a pluralist society, nevertheless, it has continued even in the post-
colonial Singapore despite government attempts at suppressing inter-ethnic tensions.230 
Some observers have underscored the impacts of Lee’s social cognisance that was largely 
influenced by English and Chinese-made ethnic stereotypes and preconceptions 
prevalent in the 1940s and 1950s (Mauzy and Milne, 2002; Barr and Skrbis, 2008; 
Mutalib, 2012). Singapore’s founding prime minister has often viewed the world as a 
racial stratum dominated by the “superior” Chinese race. When asked for his opinion 
about the “x-factor” in development, Lee (in Barr, 2000: 185) answered by citing a 
parable: 
 
                                                 
229
 A classic example was the co-optation of the Association of Muslim Professionals (AMP) that was 
perceived as a direct competitor of the state’s own version of the program called MENDAKI. For more 
information, see MENDAKI’s official website, available online at http://www.mendaki.org.sg/.   
230
 For instance, by allowing racially oriented practices such as the public announcement of university 
results and matriculation based on ethnicity, the government essentially weakened the value of its 
meritocratic system. For more in-depth discussions of Singapore’s meritocracy, see Lai (2004); 
Velayutham (2007); Barr and Skrbis (2008).  
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Three women were brought to the Singapore General Hospital, each in the same condition 
and each needing a blood transfusion. The first, a Southeast Asian [read Malay] was given 
the transfusion, but died a few hours later. The second, a South Asian [read Indian] was also 
given the transfusion but died a few days later. The third, an East Asian [read Chinese] was 
given a transfusion and survived. That is the X factor in development.  
 
 Such a response highlighted the context through which Singapore’s political elites 
view the different facets of government and society. It clearly enunciated the message 
about the prevailing hierarchy among the Chinese, Malay and Indian Singaporeans. 
Consequently, the cultural deficit theory has become pervasive among the non-Chinese 
Singaporeans who are often criticised for their cultural “deficiencies” such as laziness and 
the lack of drive to succeed (Lai, 2004; Barr and Skrbis, 2008; Mutalib, 2012; Vadaketh, 
2012). Thus, despite the official discourse on multiculturalism, the Singaporean society 
remains inundated by ethno-religious hierarchies that aggravate and maintain ethnic 
chauvinism. In this sense, meritocracy and multiculturalism serve as smokescreens for 
concealing the systematic assertion of “Chineseness” in Singapore’s multi-ethnic rhetoric 
(Lai, 2004; Barr and Skrbis, 2008; Mutalib, 2012). The outcome is a racially charged social 
cognition implanted into the Singaporean psyche, so much so that even in the late 1990s, 
Lee (in Barr and Skrbis 2008: 10) would unabashedly proclaim that: 
 
When doing a project [the British] would put the Chinese in the middle and put the Indians 
at the side, and the Indians were expected to keep pace with the Chinese. There was a hell of 
a problem, because one Chinese would carry one pole with two wicker baskets of earth, 
whereas two Indians would carry one pole with one wicker basket between them. Therefore, 
it’s one quarter. Now, that’s culture. Maybe it has to do with genetic characteristics, I’m not 
sure.  
 
 Not surprisingly, these ethnic considerations are strongly manifested in the 
construction and implementation of Singapore’s NSPS. First, the PAP government 
is impenitent in its belief that ethno-religious influences remain crucial elements of 
contemporary societies especially in Singapore (Mutalib, 2002, 2012; Mauzy and 
Milne, 2002). Consequently, the country’s top political leaders are not very 
optimistic about the realisation of a united Singaporean nation in the near future. 




If for instance, you put a Malay officer who's very religious and who has family ties in 
Malaysia in charge of a machine gun unit, that's a very tricky business ... if today the Prime 
Minister doesn't think about this, we could have a tragedy. 
 
  Thus, despite Singapore’s existing policy on meritocracy, the 
disillusionment experienced by Malay and Indian minorities continues to grow.231 
By doing so, the government is effectively undermining its efforts developing and 
instilling national consciousness among all Singaporean citizens regardless of their 
race and religion.  
 Second, Singapore’s NSPS also have to consider the city-state’s geopolitical 
status within a Malay-dominated region. As such, the PAP government is hesitant 
to fully implement an ethnically neutral defence policy and strategy considering its 
delicate bilateral relations with Malaysia and Indonesia which from time to time are 
being battered by aggressive pro-Malay and pro-Muslim policies in these countries 
(Mutalib, 2002; Abdullah, 2009; Gin, 2009; Shiraishi, 2009; Thayer, 2009). 
However, given the existing discriminatory norms within the Singapore Armed 
Forces (SAF), the city-state is bound to confront even greater dilemmas in the 
region. This condition is further aggravated by the affected parties’ retaliatory 
attitude when confuting each other’s opinion on sensitive geo-political and geo-
strategic issues.232 
 Third, government attempts at retaining Singapore’s racial proportionality 
that has been perpetually dominated by the Chinese reflect the weight of ethnic 
factor in the configuration of its NSPS. Such an approach results in the further 
entrenchment of Chinese dominance in virtually all aspects of the republic’s 
defence and security sector, as well as the implementation of governmental 
initiatives designed to check the declining population particularly among the local 
Chinese (Mutalib, 2004). In 2013, the PAP government released a white paper 
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 For instance, Malay soldiers are still barred from sensitive SAF appointments that include the 
armoury and tank units and front-line combat infantry despite their qualifications. Likewise, 
comments regarding their supposed ‘Islamisation tendencies’ offer the government a convenient tool 
for rationalising such customary practices in the security sector. See for example, Barr and Skrbis 
(2008); and Mutalib (2012). 
232
 When Lee made a derisive statement in 1997 that the Malaysian state of Johor linked to Singapore 
by a causeway was ‘notorious for shootings, muggings and carjackings, Malaysia’s then Prime Minister 
Mahathir Mohammad was quick to criticise the former for being insensitive. The Malaysian media had 
also condemned Lee and his entire government, claiming that Singapore has had a history of using 
Malaysia as an excuse for resolving its own internal unity issues. See, Leiffer (2002); Ganesan (2005); 
Barr and Skrbis (2008); Abdullah (2009).  
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discussing the importance of maintaining a healthy and sustainable population size 
for a “dynamic” Singapore.233 The said document cited controlled immigration as a 
key strategy for addressing the country’s low total fertility rate (1.21 as of 2011) 
that has been below the replacement rate of 2.1 for more than three decades. 
Dwindling birth rates coupled with increasing life expectancies inevitably lead to 
ageing and a shrinking citizen population and workforce, thereby fraying the 
fabrics of Singapore’s national security. Against this backdrop, the country’s top 
political elites have argued that:  
 
Taking in younger immigrants will help us top up the smaller cohorts of younger 
Singaporeans, and balance the ageing of our citizen population. To stop our citizen 
population from shrinking, we will take in between 15,000 and 25,000 new citizens each 
year. We will review this immigration rate from time to time, depending on the quality of 
applicants, our birth rates and our changing needs.234 
 
 Consequently, the influx of foreign workers is expected to continue in the 
foreseeable future, especially from countries and territories with ethnic Chinese 
citizens such as China, Hong Kong, Malaysia and Taiwan. In addition, although the 
easy flow of skilled and unskilled labour into the city-state helps sustain the 
viability of its domestic economy, such policy affects various facets of Singaporean 
nation building. Internal issues such as local-migrant cohesion and compatibility; 
latent xenophobic tendencies due to worsening employment insecurities; and racial 
imbalances in its increasingly multi-ethnic population, invariably alter the island’s 
security landscape (Mutalib, 2004; Ganesan, 2005, 2009; Velayutham, 2007; Barr 
and Skrbis, 2008).   
 
5.5.3 Limits of deterrence strategy 
Over the decades, Singapore’s inclination toward forward defence has undergone vital 
canonical revisions. From being a “poisonous shrimp” in the 1970s, Singapore’s security 
doctrine had shifted to a so-called “porcupine” strategy at the start of the 1980s.235 Put 
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Ibid: 26.  
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 The idea behind the ‘poisonous shrimp’ approach is to raise the costs of attacking Singapore to an 
undesirable level in order to prevent enemies from invading it. However, this outlook started to 
change in the 1980s when the government adopted the 'porcupine' strategy which is designed not 
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differently, the city-state had replaced its defensive deterrence policy with a forward 
defence approach (Leifer, 2000; Acharya, 2008). The new doctrine does not merely 
accept the inevitability of losing the battle as it now aims for a swift and decisive victory 
for Singapore, thereby giving the country an image of a contemporary Sparta (Leifer, 
2000; Mauzy and Milne, 2002; Ganesan, 2005; Chew and Tan, 2008).    
 As a modern-day Sparta, the Singaporean government allots 25.0 % of its annual 
budget on defence on average.236 In 2013, military spending increased to a staggering $12 
billion from $600 million in the 1980s.237 Singapore's continued high defence 
expenditures, which in per capita terms far exceed those of its neighbours, has afforded 
the city-state the most sophisticated weapons systems and military arsenals in the entire 
Southeast Asia. Such material capability is expected to deter full-blown wars. Establishing 
credibility, therefore, is necessary for the employment of an effective deterrence. As the 
PAP government argues (in Chew and Tan 2008: 248):  
 
We are not just a poisonous shrimp … We do not go on the basis that if somebody attacks 
us, we will hit them and will hurt them. However, we will go on the basis that we will hit 
them, and we will be around to pick up the pieces in the end. 
 
 The government cites the rapidly transforming global security landscape as the 
main rationale behind Singapore’s highly militarised defence plans. Given the potential 
impacts of China’s rise as a global economic and military power, the city-state recognises 
the difficult balancing act that it has to master to maintain the security and stability of its 
immediate environment. Although Singapore has good diplomatic ties with both the US 
and China, the unstable balance between the East and West puts it in an awkward 
position. Although Singapore gravitates toward the US both politically and militarily, the 
city-state progressively relies on China economically (Mauzy and Milne, 2002; Chew and 
Tan, 2008; Kuik, 2008; Tan, 2009).  
                                                                                                                                            
only to inflict intolerable costs on potential aggressors but also to outlast them in the event of a 
conflict. See for example, Tan (1999); Mauzy and Milne (2002); Matthews and Yan (2007); Lee (2010).  
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 Between 2008 and 2012, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) ranked 
Singapore as the fifth-largest importer of military hardware. This accounted for 4.0% of all global 
weapons imports, and the twentieth biggest arms exporter after a massive jump in trend-indicator 
value (TIV) to 76 million in 2012 from 12 million during the previous year. For more details, see 




 Hence, the Singaporean government is cautious when labelling its relations with 
these two great powers, opting to use the term security partners rather than allies (Leifer, 
2000; Ganesan, 20005; Acharya, 2008; Kuik, 2008). However, the absence of permanent 
allies implies that Singapore must rely on itself for its survival. As such, the country’s 
defence spending is determined by the level of fear and paranoia engendered by the 
likelihood of being coerced and intimidated by larger powers, and any form of conflict 
among great powers.238   
 
5.5. 4 Limits of alliance and alignment strategy 
At the regional level, the PAP government puts a strong emphasis on the importance of 
the ASEAN in reinforcing and maintaining Singapore’s external security. During the 
1970s and 1980s, the country’s involvement in ASEAN was instrumental in averting the 
threat of Communism when the region was divided between Communist Indochina and 
non-Communist Southeast Asia.239 Today, the ASEAN provides the necessary 
institutional platform through which Singapore manages its delicate relations with 
Malaysia and Indonesia by influencing their behaviour toward the “little red dot.” As far 
as state security is concerned, the city-state has obtained enormous benefits from the 
ASEAN arrangement since its creation in 1967.  
 At the same time, Singapore’s membership in the ASEAN has also enabled its 
government to address non-traditional security issues that threaten regional peace and 
development more efficiently such as global and domestic terrorism, piracy, smuggling, 
illegal migration and the multifaceted environmental problem to name a few. Central to 
the facilitation of this regional forum is the development of a normative framework 
necessary for institutionalising convivial relations among its geographically clustered 
members (Ganesan, 1998, 2005; Leifer, 2000; Acharya, 2008). Largely, this institutional 
approach runs complementary to the PAP government’s deterrence policy. Thus, 
Singapore has increasingly assigned weight to cooperative strategy that enhances and 
preserves both internal and external security: 
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 Singapore currently imposes a constitutional cap on its defence expenditure at 6.0% of its GDP. 
Although state officials have insisted that its actual expenditure does not reach its self-imposed 
ceiling, exceeding this limit is not implausible considering the city-state’s pursuit of Total Defence. 
Nevertheless, according to government data, Singapore spent on average 3.3% of its GDP on defence 
between 2000 and 2013. For more details, see World Bank’s website, available online at 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.XPND.GD.ZS. 
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 At that time, the ASEAN’s security policies were specifically aimed at Vietnam and largely reflected 
in Singapore’s highly aggressive foreign policy stance within the organisation, particularly against the 




The uncertainties underscore the need to forge personal and institutional links at all levels 
with the ASEAN countries, building on the foundations that already established. In an 
uncertain world, ASEAN is the rock on which we must anchor our national survival and 
progress (in Wong, 2005: 54): 
 
 Although the strengthening of ASEAN interdependence is high on 
Singapore’s priority list, the government also stresses that such goals must not 
interfere with state sovereignty. Hence, opportunities that present “malignant” 
threats to the political status quo are likely to lead to an impasse, while those that 
are deemed to carry “benign” threats to state sovereignty are more likely to 
progress (Acharya 2008; Ganesan 2005, 1998; Koh and Chang 2004; Leifer 2000). 
Nevertheless, as the city-state marches toward maturity and regional efforts toward 
political and economic cooperation intensify, the PAP’s realist interpretation of 
national security is gradually softened. Singapore has come to realise that a 
competitive, zero-sum security outlook does not complement the requirements of 
a trading state whose survival and progress significantly rely on the general 
openness and health of both the regional and global trading systems (Milne and 
Mauzy, 2002; Low and Vadaketh, 2014). After all, facilitating trade and investment 
agreements with states that are constantly paranoid about their security status 
yields marginal benefits as they are driven by mutual fear rather than mutual trust.  
 Accordingly, Singapore entangles itself in the continuously evolving 
regional security landscape to help facilitate confidence building measures (CBMs) 
and develop collective norms that are essential to achieving shared security 
objectives. To this extent, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) provides a good 
starting point.240 However, given the differences in strategic culture and 
philosophy, the likelihood of transforming into a higher-level regional security 
body similar to those found in Europe is quite slim. Notwithstanding these 
uncertainties, Singapore is optimistic that regional efforts will help propagate 
common multilateral security interests that may not be possible under highly 
disproportionate bilateral arrangements (Suryadinata, 2004; Anthony-Caballero, 
2005; Ganesan, 2005). For instance, China’s on-going operations to unilaterally 
expand its territorial claims in the West Philippine Sea highlight the invasive 
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tendency of a regional superpower. Such concern creates an impetus for Singapore 
and ASEAN members to express their shared interest to balance or at least 
neutralise China’s rising hegemonic propensity.  
 Meanwhile, at the bilateral level, several factors constrain the relations 
between Singapore and the United States despite their close alignment. On the one 
hand, debates concerning Western principles vis-à-vis Asian values are brought to 
the forefront (Velayutham 2007; Suryadinata 2004). On the other, Singapore’s 
reassuring attitude toward Washington’s involvement in the Asia-Pacific region 
does not necessarily imply that the former aspires to be a member of American-led 
efforts to restrain China’s rising influence (Leifer, 2000; Ganesan, 2005; Acharya, 
2008).  
 From Singapore’s standpoint, a clear-cut alignment with the United States 
does not only jeopardise its vital economic linkages with China that are 
continuously expanding but also places the country in a precarious situation when 
conflicts or disagreements between the two superpowers arise (Ganesan, 2005; 
Pang, 2007; Tan, 2009). Moreover, the PAP government deems it wiser for 
Singapore to demonstrate certain level of sensitivity toward its neighbours 
especially when issues concerning the genuineness of American objective; the 
importance of national and regional self-reliance; and Islamism, become the central 
points of contention (Suryadinata, 2004; Velayutham, 2007). Thus, in 2003, it was 
reported that the Singaporean government had rejected the United States’ offer to 
give the city-state a major non-NATO ally (Ganesan, 2005; Acharya, 2008). 
 Therefore, the PAP government has refrained from explicitly supporting 
Washington in its covert efforts to “rebalance” the China-centric geo-political and 
geo-strategic configurations of the Asia-Pacific. Some of the most influential 
political figures in Singapore have had serious concerns about the overall efficacy 
of American foreign policy to deflect latent security threats in the twenty-first 
century. For instance, Lee Kuan Yew had warned about the possible effects of 
what he thought was an excessive American unilateralism in the global war on 
terrorism. Lee claimed that Washington’s actions could incite costly reprisal from 
the island’s Islamic neighbours (Mahizhnan, 2004; Tan, 2009).  
 Similarly, Singapore’s two former ambassadors had conveyed their 
apprehensions toward America’s genuine interest in the Asia-Pacific during the 
visit of former US Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld to the country in June 
216 
 
2005. Rumsfeld was criticised by the two diplomats for what they deemed an anti-
China position (Pang, 2007). One of them questioned Washington’s seemingly 
hypocritical attitude with respect to China’s growing military spending, given that 
its defence expenditure was higher than the next ten biggest military spenders in 
the world combined. The other one probed the real motive behind the United 
States’ active endorsement of democracy in Asia: whether it was intended to help 
or destabilise China in the short run (Pang, 2007). Hence, it would be imprudent to 
openly support the United States, particularly its war on terrorism agenda as it 
aggravates the insecurity confronting the city-state and region as a whole 
(Mahizhnan, 2004; Tan, 2009). 
 Thus, while Singapore accepts the United States as a strategic partner, it 
does not shy away from publicly expressing some of its qualms about the probable 
impacts of American foreign policies. In essence, Singapore is simultaneously 
interpreting Beijing’s position to Washington while guiding the latter towards 
understanding the former’s position. Put differently, while “Singapore assures 
China that it has a friend who cares about the interests of the Middle Kingdom; at 
the same time the city-state makes it absolutely clear to the United States why it 
will not do America's bidding so willingly” (in Pang, 2007: 22).   
 Evidently, the rhetorical approach to a three-way alignment between 
Singapore, the United States and China reflects deeper concerns. The uncertainties 
surrounding the political and economic rise of China prevent Singapore, as well as 
the other small periphery and semi-periphery countries in the region, from 
unequivocally aligning itself with Washington to keep their strategic options open. 
Despite Singapore’s long-standing endorsement of American engagement in 
Southeast Asia and the larger Asia-Pacific region, the two states can be more 
accurately described as partners rather than allies  
 
5.6 CONCLUSIONS 
For a small, pragmatic state like Singapore, the means to survival is through economic 
growth via free trade vis-à-vis its other complementary neoliberal economic policies. As 
argued in this chapter, free trade serves as a vital strategy for securing and enhancing 
Singapore’s defence space underpinning its geo-economic and geo-political viability in 
the twenty-first century. Given its disproportionate dependence on foreign markets, 
maintaining a high-level market access is a major concern for Singapore to ensure a 
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sustainable level of economic prosperity. Blocking the country’s entry into key 
international markets will obliterate its export-oriented, entrepôt-operating economy. 
Thus, the Singaporean government does not only adhere to the principles of free trade, 
but also strongly promotes it to the targets of its economic diplomacy.  
 Consequently, Singapore’s key foreign economic policies – specifically those 
concerning FTAs – are designed to alleviate the country’s multifaceted insecurities that 
are engendered by its security complex. The roots of this security complex can be traced 
back to the earliest phases of Singapore’s nation-building process that has been 
exacerbated and preserved by the PAP regime to legitimise its political perpetuity. To 
justify the restriction of public participation in policymaking, the PAP had to promote 
itself as the most qualified party for securing the city-state’s collective interests by 
moving away from highly divisive, factional conflicts. Singaporean leaders have since 
argued that the delicate nature of the republic’s security environment more than warrants 
their non-observance of democratic processes concerning national security issues.   
 For a geographically challenged island-country, the existence of a social compact 
is extremely important to national security (Leifer, 2000; Ganesan, 2005; Barr and Skrbis, 
2008). The relatively compliant attitude and quiet acceptance of the population toward 
the PAP rule is a vital component of this social compact. Such condition underscores the 
unique status of the PAP within the Singaporean city-state. Unlike its counterparts in 
other neighbouring countries, the PAP is not only the ruling political party but is also 
seen as the steward of Singapore’s national interests and values (Ganesan, 2005; Barr and 
Skrbis, 2008; Acharya, 2008). Consequently, it faces little to no opposition in developing 
and executing domestic and foreign policies particularly those that relate to security and 
economics. Such condition has not only reinforced the city-state’s prevailing political 
system, but more importantly has blurred the separation between state and PAP 
interests.   
 Naturally, the government’s pursuit of economic prosperity has become replete 
with security undertones, given the siege mentality and vulnerability fetish enveloping the 
island-state. As a result, the Singaporean government has constantly emphasised robust 
economic performance as the cornerstone of its national security. As discussed 
throughout the whole chapter, security considerations have been deeply inculcated into 
Singapore’s free trade strategies. Given its near zero tariff rates across the board, the 
economic gains that Singapore can expect from further trade liberalisation are limited. 
Due to its preoccupation with survival, the city-state has attempted to bolster its 
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economic interdependence with various countries, both big and small, to reduce 
insecurity by linking its security interests and free trade objectives. Such strategy has 
moved in both intra-regional and trans-regional directions.  
 On the one hand, Singapore has courted the regional powers – specifically China 
and Japan – to deflect the security threats occasionally posed by its relatively large Islamic 
neighbours. This is despite initial antagonism faced by the island-state from other 
ASEAN members, who argued that bilateral FTAs prevent them from reaching the goal 
of creating an ASEAN Community (Koo, 2013; Lee, 2013). On the other hand, 
Singapore has also been very active in forging bilateral trade relations with great powers 
outside the East and Southeast Asian regions. The main rationale behind this is China’s 
rise as a global power. Notwithstanding Beijing’s assurances about the benign nature of 
anticipated Chinese “hegemony” in the near future, Singaporean leaders and 
policymakers are still uncertain about China’s real intentions in the region.  
 Hence, Singapore has aggressively negotiated bilateral FTAs with trans regional 
powers, specifically the United States. From Singapore’s viewpoint, a strong US military 
presence will strengthen Washington’s security commitments in the Asia-Pacific amid a 
heightened regional tension, which happens to coincide with China’s re-emergence on 
the international political scene. The Singaporean government has effectively interwoven 
a goal of national security with the goal of “reinforcing a nation’s cohesion, regime 


















TRADING IN VAIN: THE PHILIPPINES’ HUMANIST SECURITY-TRADE LINKAGES 
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
The highly uneven development of the Philippine economy has been a long-standing 
threat to its national security. The country had earlier on served as a model economy for 
many of the neighbouring states after posting one of highest per capita incomes among 
the Asian economies during the post-war period. In fact, between the 1950s and 1960s, 
the Philippines’ per capita income was the highest in the whole of Southeast Asia.241 
However, things took an unexpected turn in the 1970s when the country’s economy was 
suddenly overtaken by Thailand and Taiwan (Balisacan and Hill, 2002, 2003; Hill and 
Piza, 2007). Its dramatic fall from the top continued in the 1990s after China and 
Indonesia both eclipsed its economic performance (Manacsa and Tan, 2012). Since then, 
the Philippines economy has never quite recovered, earning it unenviable titles such as 
the “sick man of Southeast Asia” or “East Asia’s stray cat” (Noland, 2000; White III, 
2015).            
 At the crux of Philippine lopsided economic development, is a deeply entrenched 
patronage system ruled and maintained by powerful Filipino oligarchs.242 Such type of 
politico-economic arrangement has engendered institutionalised inequality and structural 
poverty that both present significant threats to the Philippines’ supposedly human-
centric national security policies and strategies. Yet from the point of view of the 
Philippine government by articulating the country’s lopsided economic development as a 
threat to national security, in essence it is forging a development-based security 
paradigm. As the incumbent President Benigno Aquino III stated (in NSC, 2010: 31):  
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 For more details, see the Bank’s World Development Indicators, available online at 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator.    
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 Jeffrey Winters (2011: 6) defines oligarchs as the “actors who command and control massive 
concentrations of material resources that can be deployed to defend or enhance their personal 
wealth and exclusive social position.” Accordingly, an oligarch’s ultimate goal, according to Winters 
(2011: 6) “is to secure, maintain, and retain his or her position of extreme wealth and power against 
all manner of threats.” In Aristotle’s formulation, the poor define democracy as the rule, whereas 
oligarchy is the rule of the wealthy few. Nevertheless, Winters (2011: 11) argue that democracy and 
oligarchy “can coexist indefinitely as long as the unpropertied lower classes do not use their expanded 
political participation to encroach upon the material power and prerogatives of the wealthiest.” In 
other words, the two systems are compatible for as long as the two realms of power do not clash. 
While oligarchy “rests on the concentration of material power,”democracy “rests on the dispersion of 
nonmaterial power” (Winters 2011: 11). 
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If the government is able to make good on the promise of taking the high road, the “Ang 
Daang Matuwid,” then it must be sure that the people are afforded every opportunity to 
pursue their individual dreams of a better quality of life – all under the consideration of 
national security where the welfare and well-being of the people are of primordial 
consideration. 
 
 Unfortunately for the Philippines, oligarchic forces have adeptly harnessed the 
neoliberal economic policies designed to enhance economic development, particularly 
free trade. The elusiveness of trickle-down effects from GDP growths can be explained 
by the lack of “political will” to challenge the elites’ stranglehold over the Philippine 
political economy. Consequently, the country’s experience with trade liberalisation has 
not transformed the Philippine economy into a more equitable one due to the perverse 
culture of patronage politics. The twin problems of poverty and inequality undermine the 
government’s supposedly development-oriented security rhetoric and agenda.  
 This chapter critically analyses the Philippines’ use of free trade in securing and 
enhancing its development space amid the economic insecurities engendered by the 
oligarchic factor.243 The term “development space” in this context specifically refers to 
the capacity of the Philippine government to independently formulate and effectively 
implement development policies against the backdrop of a deeply-embedded oligarchic 
system that breeds and sustains patronage politics. The sections explore the different 
facets of the country’s imbalanced economic development vis-à-vis the preservation of 
the country’s oligarchy-oriented policies in the twenty-first century.  
 By systematically blocking social-equalising policies that curtail oligarchic wealth, 
national wealth is perpetually entrapped within the elite strata of the society. Neo-
patrimonial culture in the Philippines is rife and underpins a bipolar society that allows 
few families to enjoy the unjust excessiveness of wealth while simultaneously forcing the 
majority to resign themselves to existing poverty and inequality. Hence, despite the 
government’s all-inclusive security slogan that emphasises equitable economic 
development, its security blueprint faces critical limitations that frustrate this goal. These 
limits have contributed to the country’s lacklustre experience with free trade, which in 
turn, has highlighted the multiple failures of the Philippine political economy.  
 In light of this, I attempt to answer the following sets of questions. First, why 
does the Philippines link its humanist security interests with free trade activities? Given 
the existing oligarchic factor, how does free trade (at bilateral, minilateral and multilateral 
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 Appendix 4 provides an up-to-date list of Philippine FTAs.  
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levels) affect the Philippines’ remaining development space? Second, why does the 
government continue to maintain the oligarchic system despite the country’s uneven 
economic development? What are its implications for the Philippines’ domestic politics? 
Third, what are the factors that limit the capacity of free trade for securing and 
enhancing the Philippines’ development space? How do they influence the prevailing 
structural poverty vis-à-vis institutionalised inequality in the country? 
 
Plan of the chapter 
The chapter is divided into six sections. In Section 6.1, I provided the context through 
which the Philippines’ humanist security-trade linkages in the twenty-first century will be 
examined. I argued that against the backdrop of an oligarchic factor, one of the primary 
referents of the Philippines’ national security is its diminishing development space. The 
country’s uneven economic development has become an existential threat to the well-
being of individuals and societies. Accordingly, government leaders and policymakers 
have started paying attention to the humanist components of national security, rather 
than focusing solely on its statist elements.  
 However, despite the grand pronouncements about the importance of equitable 
economic development in enhancing national security, the Philippine political economy 
remains highly oligarchic and patrimonial. Thus, it is important to examine whether the 
government is genuinely concerned in addressing the poverty and inequality conditions 
in the country or is only paying lip service to the electorally popular idea of a people-
centred security framework. The Philippines’ experience highlights some of the strongest 
cases againstu progressive and unabated free trade. The system is considered to have 
done little to alleviate structural poverty and institutionalised inequality.    
 In Section 6.2, I briefly examine the conditions underpinning the Philippines’ 
uneven economic development. I provide preliminary insights about the importance of 
economic engagements – mainly via free trade – to achieve a more just and equitable 
level of economic growth necessary for mitigating the problems of structural poverty and 
institutionalised inequality. 
  In Section 6.3, I discuss the results from the key informant interviews (KIIs) 
conducted with Filipino officials as part of the research fieldwork. The objective is to 
provide a general understanding of why the Philippines’ humanist security interests and 
trade activities are being linked together, and how these linkages influence the survival of 
the island nation in the twenty-first century. The interviews have focused on the three 
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main aspects of the Philippines’ security-trade nexus: (i) its national security policies and 
strategies; (ii) its free trade activities and agreements; and (iii) the relationships between 
these two variables. This dialogue is crucial to determining the discrepancies between the 
Philippine government’s rhetoric and action, and state and non-state perceptions. 
 In Section 6.4, I evaluate the impacts of the Philippines’ free trade activities on its 
overall level of development space. I focus on the role of free trade as a double-edged 
strategy that simultaneously expands and contracts the country’s development space by 
expanding its domestic economy, and reinforcing oligarchic vis-à-vis patronage systems. 
To do so, I analyse three crucial aspects of free trade that the government has failed to 
properly consider, namely: (1) failure of “good” trade intentions; (2) failure of “good” 
trade theories; and (3) failure of “good” trade negotiations.    
 In Section 6.5, I investigate some of the key factors affecting the utility of free 
trade for securing and enhancing the Philippines’ existing development space, including: 
(i) limits of “patrimonial” democratisation; (ii) limits of “patrimonial” administrations; 
(iii) limits of one-size-fits-all economic policies; and (iv) limits of bureaucracy. The 
objective is to find out the potential consequences and ramifications of these factors on 
the Philippines’ humanist security-trade linking efforts, and from there, evaluate the 
country’s capacity to overcome its oligarchic system vis-à-vis patronage culture. In doing 
so, I explain why the Philippines government has largely maintained the current structure 
of its political economy despite the twin problems of structural poverty and 
institutionalised inequality.  
 Finally, in Section 6.6, I conclude by arguing that the Philippines’ oligarch-
oriented political economy exacerbates the highly uneven economic development in the 
country. The highly corrupt patronage culture that such an arrangement engenders runs 
in direct contrast to the government’s people-centric national security model that 
emphasises a more equitable and inclusive economic development. Through strategic 
exploitation of the country’s free trade mechanisms, the Filipino oligarchs can maximise 
not only their economic power but also their political influence even at the expense of 
worsening poverty and inequality conditions. The wealth of the nation has remained in 
the hands of the very few elites by preventing the passage of social-equalising policies. 
Finally, where political institutions are frail, differences in leadership styles and methods 
may have considerable effect on the political outcomes. However, the Philippines case 
illustrates the transmutation of state power into a powerful apparatus that is using 




6.2 THE SCOURGE OF UNEVEN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT  
Today, a significant percentage of the Philippine population think of themselves as poor. 
Self-rated poverty (SRP) ranges from 50.0% to 54.0% between 2004 and 2010; while self-
rated hunger (SRH) averages to more than 20.0% for the same period.244 By the end of 
2013, SRP has increased to 55.0%, while SRH has doubled to 41.0%.245 Its median SRP 
threshold, that is, the minimum monthly budget with which Philippine households will 
not consider themselves food-poor, is estimated at US$109.0 for Metro Manila; US$82.0 
for balance Luzon; US$91.0 for the Visayas; and US$73.0 for Mindanao.246 
 Pervasive inequality in the country reinforces the socio-economic insecurities felt 
by poor Filipino families on a daily basis. Such inequality is manifested not only in 
income terms but also in non-income terms such as the unequal access to various public 
goods and services (ADB, 2007, 2009; Son and San Jose, 2009; Tabuga and Reyes, 2011). 
The country’s relatively stable Gini index underscores the difficulty resolving this 
problem as conditions of inequality remain virtually unchanged since the 1960s (ADB, 
2007, 2009; Son and San Jose 2009). Over the last thirty years, the curve has fluctuated 
within a very narrow band of 0.44 and 0.48 (ADB, 2007, 2009; Ofreneo, 2012). 
 Decomposed inequality in 2009 revealed that more than 90.0% resulted from 
inequality between individuals within each region, while less than 10.0% was caused by 
differences in mean per capita income or expenditure across regions (ADB, 2009). 
Moreover, the data from 2009 showed that the income of the top 1.0% of families in the 
Philippines was equivalent to the aggregate income of the bottom 30.0% (ADB, 2009).  
 Clearly, the concern is the widening gap in average welfares and human 
achievements among households within and across regions. The disparity emerges from 
huge differences both in ownerships of physical capital and possessions of human capital 
(ADB, 2009; Son and San, Jose 2009; Tabuga and Reyes, 2011). These figures simply 
imply that wealth distribution in the country has not improved. Although the average per 
capita income may have increased in absolute terms, Filipinos have not equally shared 
the fruits of economic progress. For instance, a huge part of the national income ($US6.6 
billion) between 2003 and 2006 went to private corporations instead of private 
households ($US5.23) (NAPC, 2010). 
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 As of 2014, SRP is estimated at 11.8 million while SRH is estimated at 8.8 million as of 2014. For 
more details, see Social Weather Stations website, available online at http://www.sws.org.ph/.  
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 Despite a string of policy reforms introduced since 1986, the country’s tale of 
structural poverty and institutionalised inequality has remained largely predictable over 
the years.247 A central component of these structural adjustments related to tariff reform 
agendas prescribed by the WTO. The Philippines was heading toward the adoption of 
policies designed for the unilateral liberalisation of its key economic sectors. The 
principal driving force behind the aggressive liberalisation of Philippine trade was the 
failure of import substitution strategy to bring about competitive levels of development 
through industrialisation (Clarete, 1999, 2005; Cororaton, 2000; Habito and Cororaton, 
2000). The restructuring of tariffs was first initiated in 1981 when the government 
rationalised its existing protectionist measures to a narrower band to better manage price 
distortions induced by trade barriers, on the one hand, and improve the overall efficiency 
in resource allocations based on the logic of comparative advantage, on the other 
(Clarete, 1999, 2005; Malaluan, 2011). Then where did it all go wrong? 
 







Table 5: Summary of key informant interviews in the Philippines 248 
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 Based on the Medium-Term Philippine Development Plan (MTPDP), the policies and reforms 
pursued since the restoration of democracy broadly fall into the following areas: “monetary and fiscal 
reforms for restoring and maintaining macroeconomic stability; trade, industrial, and financial 
reforms for improving economic efficiency and competitiveness; governance reform and 
decentralisation for improving the effectiveness of the national and local governments; and social 
policies and programs for fighting poverty, improving income distribution, and achieving the 
Millennium Development Goals(MDGs). These policies and reforms are embodied in a number of 
initiatives or programs implemented since 1986, including: trade liberalisation, tariff reduction and 
accession to the WTO; fiscal consolidation and tax reform; creation of an independent central bank 
with inflation targeting as a key policy tool; privatisation of several government owned and -
controlled corporations; power sector restructuring and reform; comprehensive agrarian reform; 
banking sector reform and capital market development; devolution of public services delivery to local 
government units; and declaration of poverty reduction as the overarching development goal and 
commitment to social programs for poverty alleviation and achieving MDGs.”  For a full copy of the 
document, see the National Economic Development Authority’s website, available online at 
http://www.neda.gov.ph/?p=1128.  
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 Filipino representatives from three different sectors participated in the interviews to provide 
comments and insights on the Philippines’ security-trade nexus in the twenty-first century. The 
selected participants are all practitioners and experts in their respective fields. While their views do 
not necessarily encapsulate the whole gamut of arguments, nevertheless, they are crucial for painting 




6.3.1. On the Philippines’ national security  
The main theme that has emerged from the interviews regarding the national security 
concept in the Philippines is the need to shift from a state-centric security agenda to a 
more people-centered one given the rapid proliferation of non-traditional threats that 
undermine the quality of life among individuals and communities. That is, from state 
security to human security. Although there is no special cabinet or council that defines 
what the national interest should be, the Philippine Constitution articulates the 
importance of protecting not only the country’s national sovereignty and territorial 
integrity but also the citizens against internal and external threats. As such, the National 
Security Council (NSC) defines national security as “a state of condition where the 
country’s most cherished values and beliefs, democratic way of life, institutions of 
                                                                                                                                            
(i) Miss Carmina Acuña, Director at the National Security Council; (ii) Dr. Lorenzo Clavejo, Director of 
Strategic Planning Office at the National Security Council; (iii) Dr. Maria Ella Atienza, Former Chair of 
Third World Studies Center; (iv) Dr. Clarita Carlos, President of Center for Asia Pacific Studies; and Dr. 
Ramon Claret, Dean of the School of Economics, University of the Philippines-Diliman. In the first part 
of each interview, the participants discussed their general views on the concept of national security in 
Singapore [do you mean the Philippines Michael?]. In the second part, they discussed this security 
concept in relation to the country’s participation in various free trade activities. In the last part, the 
informants discussed the linkages between the country’s security considerations and free trade 
objectives. This section does not provide an in-depth analysis of each statement provided by the 
participants. The main arguments presented in this section are thoroughly discussed in Section 4 and 
Section 5. As mentioned, the main objective of this section is to present an overview of Singapore’s 
[do you mean the Philippines Michael?] security interests and predicaments, on the one hand, and 
free trade initiatives and engagement strategies, on the other.    
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governance and unity, welfare and well-being as a nation and people are permanently 
protected and continuously enhanced.”249 As Carmina Acuna points out:  
 
Unlike in other departments, the NSC approach to security policies is more holistic. We 
must recognise the importance of incorporating peoples’ interests in the NSP by framing 
people-centred security issues more prominently in the agenda. In all of the NSC reports, we 
inject the implications of every policy recommended on the people. The fact that the Chief-
of-Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) is not included in the NSC 
membership is meant to stress the supremacy of civilian authorities over the military. The 
NSC serves as the President's principal advisory body on the proper coordination and 
integration of plans and policies affecting national security. At the end of the day, its goal is 
to arrive at the best policy, that is, the “optimum security policy.” Ironically, retired military 
officers are usually appointed to assume the post of the NSC Secretary General acting 
concurrently as the National Security Adviser (NSA). Even the head of the National 
Intelligence Coordinating Agency (NICA) that provides intelligence support to NSC comes 
from the military sector. So the problem is the adoption of an appropriate approach for 
implementing the objectives relating to human security. That is, how do we uphold the 
human security definition? 250  
 
 This growing interest in the human dimension of national security is highlighted 
by reports being published by the Philippines’ Military which state that the country is not 
facing immediate threats of aggression from other states in the short to medium-term 
(DND, 2006; AFP, 2007, 2008). Consequently, efforts are now directed toward the 
containment of internal security threats as they continuously shape the government’s 
security policies, strategies and plans. In other words, the country’s concept of national 
security is not purely statist. After all, the Constitution, according to Acuna clearly states 
that the duty is to protect both the people and the state.251 However, the immediate 
question that comes to mind is which should come first: the protection of the state or 
the protection of the people? Lorenzo Clavejo offers one possible answer: 
 
During the Martial Law years, the protection of the state was the primary duty of the 
military. The main object of security was the protection of the Marcos regime. The 1987 
Constitution attempted to change this by emphasising the security of the people rather than 
the state. Hence, the military must protect the people and not the state. In short, the sum 
total is about people empowerment. Of course, the irony is that it appears the primacy of 
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Interview with Dr. Lorenzo Clavejo on 4 February 2013 in Quezon City, Philippines. 
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human security over state security is not upheld. Take for instance the Philippine Human 
Security Act (HAS) of 2007, which plainly talks about an anti-terrorism agenda. Yet, human 
security is more than just terrorism. The only reason the term human security was used was 
because the crafters of RA No. 9372 wanted it to sound more holistic and comprehensive. 
So rather than using the term ‘anti-terrorism’, they used human security. Needless to say, the 
HSA should be reviewed and reconsidered in the context of changing environment. The 
concept of human security is extremely important. It is an expression of our leaders' 
perspective on how to engage with different existential threats. But the problem is that it is 
being immediately challenged. It is not being given a chance. We are trying to catch up with 
the rest of the world but we also try to pull each other down. 252 
 
 Critics and observers have often argued that the basic problem of human security 
is that it is one of those empty catch phrases. The key to security, particularly human 
security is to situate the individuals within a particular community since each community 
has its sets of security threats.253 In Ella Atienza’s words: 
 
The lack of precise and concise definition of human security prevents the term from being 
used in the country’s official national security policy documents. It is an end goal and at the 
same time, an approach to human development. In the Philippine context, human security is 
anchored on a number of elements, particularly economic security, which also affects food 
security and health security.254 
 
 Clearly, the pivotal actor defining national security in the Philippine context is no 
longer exclusively the state as it is becoming more and more localised. 255 As Clarita 
Carlos argues: 
 
Security and comfort are cousins, which is to say that a person or a community’s level of 
security is correlated to a level of comfort, and vice versa. Moreover, security is age-cohort 
sensitive. It changes over time. By bringing the security language vis-à-vis its agenda from 
high politics to low politics, we can increase both its level and scope. In doing so, the habits 
of cooperation and cordiality must be properly observed. While I am glad that we are 
moving forward to people-centred security, however, I have to emphasise that its meaning 
must be based on the point of view of the one experiencing it. In other words, there is no 
one size fits all policy. What is precious to you may not be precious to others.256 
















 However, in the Philippines’ context one particular source of human insecurity 
stands out – the primacy of oligarchic elite ruling over the political and economic spheres 
of the country. In the words of Ramon Clarete:  
  
The over concentration of wealth due to oligarchy is a major security concern, specifically, 
economic security. These people are rich not because they’re hardworking but because they 
were born with it. Money went to them without any sweat. We are so used to doing what we 
are doing now even when we can gamble. Entrepreneurial risks are not as aggressive as we 
expect them to because of the arrangement. As a result, opportunities do not happen for 
both the people and the economy as a whole. 257 
 
 Based on these statements, a more holistic approach to framing the national 
security rhetoric is now being adopted in the Philippines. A central feature of this so-
called holistic national security is the emphasis on the human-centric elements of 
security. Several local projects focusing on the development of the human security 
discourse have already been carried out by various sectors in the years following the 
UNDP’s introduction of the concept in 1994. For example, the Philippine Human 
Development Report has defined human security as the freedom from fear, want and 
humiliation in the context of an ideology-based armed conflict (UNDP, 2005). The 
report argues that human security is a right in itself. The people’s range of options is 
significantly broadened through this means. Human development is the condition that 
enables citizens to freely and safely make those choices. In other words, human security 
is the external precondition necessary for achieving human development. Individual and 
community insecurities inevitably lead to state insecurities (UNDP, 2005).     
 Meanwhile, a local NGO named Tabang Mindanaw has proposed a justice-based 
human security framework, which underlined the injustice against marginalised sectors 
rather than structural poverty as the main culprit for armed conflict (Atienza et al., 2010). 
Such conceptualisation requires the implementation of a three-stage process: (i) 
acknowledging the existence of inequalities; (ii) investigating why such inequities arise; 
and (iii) developing responsive institutions to fight injustice. According to the group, the 
successful completion of this process enables human security to supplement state 
security, advance human rights and promote human development. 
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Interview with Dr. Clarete on 17 Janaury 2013 in Quezon City, Philippines. 
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 Lastly, the Third World Studies Centre (TWSC), an academic think-tank based in 
the University of the Philippines-Diliman, has formulated a human security framework 
based on four fundamental principles: (i) emphasis on community security over 
individual security; (ii) resource entitlement; (iii) plurality of understanding; and (iv) the 
underlying interconnectedness among a range of human security dimensions (Atienza et 
al., 2010). It explores the various dimensions of human security based on the perceptions 
and experiences of individuals in the community; principal stakeholders; legislators; and 
marginalised sectors in selected conflict areas in the country (Atienza et al., 2010). The 
concept is adopted in the creation of the human security index (HSI) designed to 
measure the scope and magnitude of human security critical to processes of conflict 
prevention and peace building in the Philippines.    
 All this highlights the humanist dimension of national security as defined in the 
Philippines’ context. Such conceptualisations illustrate how the country’s national 
security rhetoric has been progressively redefined as the government embraced a more 
people-centred outlook with respect to its primary referents. Regrettably, the Philippines 
faces persistent problems – in particular, a highly imbalanced economic development – 
that threaten the government’s integrated approach to national security. As will be argued 
in the proceeding sections, many of these problems are rooted in the “patron-client 
relationships” underpinning the Philippine political economy. 
 
6.3.2 On the Philippines’ free trade  
Acuna posits “since the approach to national security policies should be holistic, we must 
also consider non-traditional threats to security that may arise from various situations or 
activities that affect individuals and communities such as the implementation of free 
trade agreements.”258 In support of this assertion, Clavejo remarks that “we need to 
reflect on our wherewithal, that is, to put our defences where our interests lie, be they 
strategic through partnerships and dialogues or economic through trade liberalisation.”259 
Similarly, Atienza argues that “human security deals with the threats that prevent people 
and communities from achieving human development due to wide-ranging threats not 
only violent military conflicts but also unfair and unjust free trade practices.”260 The 
biggest problem, however, according to Carlos is that:  
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 Interview with Director Carmina Acuna on 25 January 2013 in Quezon City, Philippines. 
259 
Interview with Dr. Lorenzo Clavejo on 4 February 2013 in Quezon City, Philippines. 
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Interview with Dr. Maria Ella Atienza on 11 Janaury 2013 in Quezon City, Philippines. 
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… the Philippines does not appreciate the need for a framework document that will serve as 
the basis of its decision-making processes. To use an analogy, the country is a ship that must 
go somewhere but we are not seeing that because that somewhere is not defined whether in 
terms of governance, security, trade or all of the above. The former President Marcos used 
to have that notion of ‘future Philippines’ – like a ship moving forward beyond a president’s 
term. But we all know what happened to him.  
 
 Clarete’s supposition suggests that this lack of long-term vision on the part of the 
government may be due to the country’s reactive attitude.261 This is particularly evident 
when analysing the government’s inept strategy (or the lack thereof) for negotiating 
FTAs with key trading partners: 
 
Without trade liberalisation, there will be inbreeding of production, leading to smuggling. 
FTAs, therefore, are opportunities that the country needs to grab. It will be a mistake if we 
shy away from these. The main concern relates to the ineffectiveness of the government in 
pushing for the complementary programs necessary to the FTAs. We need to make a 
decision on what kind of industries have to be pushed and evaluate the requirements for 
these in terms of infrastructures, as well as regulatory policies. If we don’t, then we are 
bound to repeat the same mistakes that we did in the past, accumulating huge trade deficits 
and not being able to create more jobs. But it is challenging to do that again due to 
oligarchic influences.262 
 
 Consequently, the adoption of policies toward economic liberalisation in the 
Philippines, particularly with respect to free trade, has not given rise to a competitive 
liberal economy. Domestic markets that have been borne out of the country’s trade 
liberalisation policies are installed and controlled by few oligarchic families. Indeed, the 
erosion of state capitalism has paved the way for the emergence of oligarchic capitalism 
comprised of small cartels of political and economic elites (Karadag, 2010). Such an 
arrangement dilutes the state’s infrastructural power as bureaucratic institutions are 
gradually subsumed by the patronage system that has become a defining character of 
Philippine political economy (Hutchcroft and Rocamora, 2003; Quimpo, 2009, 2014; 
Manacsa and Tan, 2012; Hodder, 2014). 
  The institutionalisation of inequality vis-à-vis structural poverty has allowed 
these powerful Filipino families to marshal support from the lower sections of the 
population during election periods while simultaneously employing non-democratic 
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methods for containing grassroots mobilisation that destabilises the elite-driven 
patronage system. The result is a highly imbalanced development of the Philippines’ 
economy. The shrinking of the country’s development space poses greater threats to the 
economic security of individuals and communities excluded from the oligarchs’ zone of 
affluence. Rather than serving as an engine for national development, free trade has 
largely served the interests of the few “national” oligarchs.  
 
6.3.3 On the Philippines’ security-trade nexus 
For Acuna, “balancing the freedom from fear (traditional) and freedom from want (non-
traditional) dimensions of national security is very hard and the idea of free trade may or 
may not accomplish this.”263 This sentiment is shared by some of the local analysts who 
argue that the management of free trade in the Philippines has been far too aggressive 
for its own good (Bello, 2004, 2005; Malaluan, 2011). To some extent, the country has 
been a pioneer in embracing free trade principles. A quick look at the country’s tariff 
profile reveals tariff reforms that are far more aggressive relative to other developing 
countries in the region, particularly in agriculture.264   
 Despite this, trade outcomes in the Philippines are still inferior compared with 
neighbouring economies such as Thailand, Malaysia, Vietnam and China.265 Not 
surprisingly, opponents of free trade have emphasised its failure to generate export 
revenues despite the substantial reductions to import substitutions which only further 
aggravated poverty conditions in the country due to a significant loss of jobs (Bello, 
2004; Clarete, 2005). Hence, Clavejo insists “the key is to convince the rest of the 
bureaucracy to invest in security-enhancing strategies both traditional (through improved 
military capabilities) and non-traditional (through effective trade policy formulations).”266 
Although Atienza believes “the promotion of fair and just trade can contribute to human 
security by benefiting the poor,” however, the reality is that the present conduct of free 
trade in the country has created a significant number of losers.267 In Malaluan’s rather 
poignant reflections (2011: 8-9): 
 
These are the poorest and most vulnerable segments of the population that no one bothers 
to look at. They are the segment of labour unable to find jobs with decent pay in the harsh 
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conditions of competition under trade liberalisation. They are the growing number of 
informal settlers in the cities, trying to escape non-paying agriculture. They are the large 
number of informal workers crowding city streets at any time of the day in search of odd 
jobs.  
 
 For Carlos, the problems that the country is facing with respect to international 
trade are a by-product of the Westphalian system, which was the basis for creating 
nation-states such as the Philippines.268 Carlos suggests that: 
 
The West has this penchant for defining the East. This is very clear from the way security 
agendas and trade policies are framed and implemented. The West should stop defining the 
East. If we do not move away from a western notion of security, vis-à-vis strategies for 
implementing our trade policies, then we are in for the same thing. So we have to be really 
careful with the operationalisation of these terms, as well as in choosing the indicators the 
will be used to gauge them.269 
 
 Nevertheless, amid the surmounting trade backlash, Clarete remains faithful to 
the doctrines of free trade, arguing that “trade liberalisation is still the key to economic 
integration enhancing global security, and therefore, national security.”270 As far as 
Clarete is concerned, “the government’s primary motive for liberalising the country’s 
highly protectionist trade regime has been the attainment of efficiency levels necessary 
for making Filipino consumers – the people – better off.”271 As he fervently argues albeit 
quite cynically:  
 
With regard to the seemingly unfair practices and double standards prevalent in the WTO, 
what we have to understand is that we always use each other. We just have to deal with it. 
That is realpolitik. We do not get everything. We cannot cry because of double standards 
since there are no benefits from crying. We win some and we lose some. Sometimes 
governments bend multilateral rules to address political problems domestically. Is that good? 
If someone complains then we will have to deal with it.  
 
 To summarise, based on the interview accounts, the one of the primary referents 
of national security in the Philippines is its contracting development space. At the root of 
the Philippines’ highly unbalanced economic development lies a deeply-entrenched 
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patronage system controlled and preserved by powerful Filipino oligarchs. Such a 
politico-economic arrangement has led to structural inequality and institutionalised 
poverty that undermines the government’s supposedly people-centric national security 
policies and strategies. The oligarchic forces have even skilfully harnessed free trade 
policies designed to achieve more inclusive economic developments.  
 By methodically shirking social-equalising measures that cut into the oligarchs’ 
assets (for example, expropriating land for free redistribution, providing higher wages 
and benefits, and paying progressive taxes), the wealth of the nation is perpetually 
ensnared within the upper reaches of the society (IBON, 2011). Consequently, very few 
families relish in excessive wealth and comfort, while the rest are trapped in chronic 
poverty and systemic inequality (Hutchcroft and Rocamora, 2003; Quimpo, 2009, 2015; 
White III, 2014).  
 
6.4 TRADING IN VAIN: THE PHILIPPINES’ HUMANIST SECURITY-TRADE LINKAGES  
For the devoted advocates of free trade, the Philippine economy has come a long way 
since its accession to the WTO in 1995. The country’s relatively open trade regime has 
been instrumental in achieving significant economic gains. Between 2005 and 2011, the 
Philippines has registered: an annual real GDP growth rate of 5.0%; a moderate average 
inflation rate of 5.0%; and a surplus in external account partly due to high remittances 
inflows of about 10.0% of GDP. Furthermore, according to the WTO, “growth has been 
broad-based across private consumption, investment, and exports, and was helped by 
fiscal stimulus implemented in 2008 and 2011 in response to the global economic crisis” 
(WTO-TPR, 2012:1). In 2010, the Philippines was the world's 37th largest exporter of 
goods and the 27th largest exporter of services (WTO-TPR, 2012).  
 Furthermore, as one of the founding members of the Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Philippines has committed to the establishment of the 
ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) by 2015.272 A key component of the AEC is the 
facilitation of ASEAN FTAs with various partners aside from the ASEAN Free Trade 
Area (AFTA).273 Thus, through its membership in the ASEAN, the Philippines has been 
able to negotiate and implement FTAs with key countries particularly in the Asia-Pacific, 
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including: the ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand Free Trade Area (AANZFTA, 2010); the 
ASEAN-China Free Trade Area (ACFTA, 2010); the ASEAN-India Free Trade Area 
(AIFTA, 2010); the ASEAN-Japan Free Trade Area (AJFTA, 2008); and the ASEAN-
Korea Free Trade Area (AKFTA, 2010). 274 In addition, the country has also successfully 
concluded its bilateral agreement with Japan in 2008 under the so-called Japan-
Philippines Economic Partnership Agreement (JPEPA).  
 However, for the staunch critics of free trade, the term “multilateral punishment” 
best describes the remorseful experience of the Philippines in the WTO (Bello, 2004: 3) 
According to them, the country’s membership in this multilateral institution has led to 
sheer catastrophes that adversely affected both its politico-economic and socio-cultural 
arrangements (Malaluan, 2011; IBON, 2014). Virtually all the drawbacks and externalities 
predicted by those who opposed the country’s membership to the WTO had materialised 
(Bello, 2004, 2005). Moreover, the amendments made in the Philippines’ Constitution 
designed to accommodate the WTO rules work mainly in favour of the huge 
multinational and transnational corporations (Bello 2004; IBON, 2013).  
 Thus, proponents of the de-globalisation thesis argue that one of the side effects 
of WTO membership has been the corrosion of national sovereignty (Bello, 2005; 
Altman, 2009). The manner in which the country’s legal system is realigned to 
complement WTO preconditions has undermined the function of free trade as an engine 
for industrialisation. By doing so, critics have argued that the government has joined an 
institution that is not only blind to development but is also non-democratic and non-
transparent in its decision-making procedures (FGS, 2003; IBON, 2013). Effective 
control is monopolised by big trading powers through a process called “consensus” 
which in practice has severely marginalised the small and weak trading countries like the 
Philippines (Bello, 2005: 4).        
 Three crucial aspects of free trade have been gravely overlooked by the 
government, which resulted in the country’s lacklustre performance: (i) failure of “good” 
trade intentions; (ii) failure of “good” trade theories; and (iii) failure of “good” trade 
negotiations.  
 
6.4. 1 Failure of “good” trade intentions 
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From the perspectives of most Filipino technocrats the progressive elimination of 
distortive protectionist mechanisms through unilateral reductions of tariff and non-tariff 
barriers will lead to the adoption of world market prices in the domestic economy 
(Clarete, 1995, 2005; Habito and Cororaton, 2000; Wignajara et al., 2011). Domestic 
firms will be subject to a highly competitive market environment dominated by 
industrialised economies, which will compel them to develop efficiency-enhancing 
strategies to withstand external competition and remain relevant in their respective 
industries. From the trade policymakers’ standpoint, the main motive for transforming 
the country’s highly protectionist trade regime into a more liberalised one is to achieve 
high levels of efficiency that make Filipino consumers better off. 
 Hence, the Philippine government had initiated a three-phase trade reform 
schedule designed to stimulate the performance as well as enhance the competitiveness 
of its lethargic economy by maintaining a low and nearly uniform tariff rate. In Phase 1 
(1981 and 1985) the Tariff Reform Programme (TRP) was introduced to narrow the 
tariff band from 100-0% to 50-10% (Clarete, 2005). This was accompanied by the 
espousal of the Import Liberalisation Programme (ILP) intended to abolish all non-tariff 
import mechanisms, but was temporarily suspended in the midst of mounting political 
pressures in the country toward the end of the Marcos regime (Habito and Cororaton, 
2000; Cororaton, 2004; Clarete, 2005). Nevertheless, Phase 2 was launched in 1991 with 
the implementation of the Executive Order 470, which further narrowed the range of 
tariff structure by clustering the commodities within a tariff scale of 10.0% to 30.0% 
(Clarete, 2005). Finally, Phase 3 entered into force in 1994 with the introduction of a 
four-tier tariff rate classification: 3.0% for “non-endemic” raw materials and capital 
equipment; 10.0% for “endemic” raw materials and capital equipment; 20.0% for 
intermediate goods; and 30.0% for finished products (Clarete, 2005).  
 Ex-ante simulations using a fifty-sector computable general equilibrium (CGE) 
were conducted to predict the effects of having a freer trade on the Philippine economy 
after its WTO accession.  Initial assessments of tariff restructurings showed a 2.3% 
cumulative impact on real GDP (Cororaton, 2004; Clarete, 2005). Statistical findings also 
suggested that although there would be a relatively small reduction in the employment 
level, specifically in service and agricultural sector, nonetheless, the number of jobs that 
would be created in the more competitive manufacturing sector would more than offset 
this loss (Cororaton, 2004; Clarete, 2005; Aldaba, 2012). The predicted increase in real 
GDP would lead to more efficient income distributions and therefore, would make the 
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poorest quintile income groups the biggest gainers by receiving the largest share of the 
GDP growth (Habito and Cororaton, 2000; Clarete, 2005). In short, ex-ante results had 
verified the optimistic claims made by the chief proponents of WTO membership and 
the pursuit of trade liberalisation in general. 
  Critics, however, have expressed their scepticism toward these findings by 
emphasising some of the serious threats that it could pose to the economy. They argue 
that domestic producers do not possess the required minimum capacity to compete with 
industries from the advanced economies (Bello, 2004, 2005; Wignaraja et al., 2010, 2011). 
Although free trade creates some winners, their numbers are smaller than those that are 
forced out of their businesses. Displaced workers will then face significant adjustment 
costs as they search for new job opportunities and attempt to develop the required skills 
for these new jobs (Malaluan, 2011; IBON, 2013). For instance, the abolishment of 
protectionist measures in the manufacturing sector will force local firms to shut down 
operations, thereby leading to higher unemployment rates that aggravate poverty 
conditions (Wignaraja et al., 2010, 2011). Similarly, intensified competition in the 
agricultural sector will drive down the prices of local produce in domestic markets and 
result in a higher incidence of poverty in rural areas due to reductions in income 
(Mangabat, 1999; CETIM, 2000; Malaluan, 2011).  
 These concerns have proved to be legitimate given the significant discrepancies 
between forecasted and actual outcomes from implementing low, nearly uniform tariff 
rates upon the country’s accession to the WTO. Contrary to the positive results derived 
from the ex-ante analyses of trade liberalisation, ex-post assessments showed only a 
fractional positive adjustment (Cororaton, 2004, 2008; Clarete, 2005). With respect to 
merchandise trade, results obtained from the ex-post assessments based on secondary 
data differed from those that came out of ex-ante CGE analyses. For most of the period 
covered in the ex-ante CGE analyses, imports have exceeded exports, which indicated a 
trade deficit because of trade liberalisation (Cororaton, 2004, 2008; Clarete, 2005). In 
addition, rather than showing a fairly diverse exports basket from a huge number of 
industries, ex-post assessments revealed a concentration of exports in very few industries 
(Clarete, 2005; Lim, 2009; Usui, 2011; Aldaba, 2012, 2013).  
 
6.4.2 Failure of “good” trade theories 
First, in terms of production, ex-post assessments revealed the manufacturing industry 
would be a part the problem rather than a solution to job reductions in agriculture and 
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services contrary to initial reports obtained from ex-ante simulations (Cororaton et al., 
2005; Clarete, 2005; Aldaba, 2012, 2013). Theoretically, trade liberalisation would shift 
the resources from industries rendered uncompetitive by the lowering of import 
restrictions to those that would survive the increased market competition. However, in 
the case of the Philippines the shares of various manufacturing sectors to total 
manufacturing production hardly changed (Habito and Cororaton, 2000; David et al., 
2007; Aldaba, 2012). In other words, the configuration of the merchandise sector 
remained largely stationary even during the period of aggressive tariff reduction. 
Therefore, the evolution of the country’s production space would suggest that although 
its exports basket may have become more sophisticated, industrial diversification has 
stagnated over the years (Clarete, 2005; Aldaba, 2012, 2013). 
 Second, with respect to employment, ex-post analyses showed the service sector 
generating jobs at an annual rate of about 4.5%, thus making it the biggest source of 
labour in the country (Clarete, 2005; Cororaton and Cockburn, 2006; Serrano, 2008). In 
fact, since 1988, the service sector has created more jobs for Filipinos compared to the 
agriculture and manufacturing sectors. For instance, between 1995 and 2010, an 
estimated 10.3 million new jobs were created (ILO, 2014). Out of this total, 46.9% came 
from services; 37.4% from agriculture; and only 15.7% from industry (ILO, 2014). 
Although both the agriculture and industry sectors continue to generate jobs, however, 
they usually fall short of the required levels particularly in the rural areas (ADB, 2007; 
David et al., 2007). Based on the percentage of Filipinos joining the labour force, an 
estimated one million jobs per year has to be created to allow improvements in 
household incomes; greater efficiency in domestic markets; and ultimately, reduction in 
poverty levels (ILO, 2014).   
 Third, concerning development, the population’s per capita income, in general, 
has remained relatively constant even years after implementing its tariff reform 
programmes (ADB, 2007; UNDP, 2012). Put differently, the average Filipino’s standard 
of living has remained roughly the same since 1995. Even though per capita income 
slightly dropped from $1,173 in 1980 to $1,165 in 2001, the proponents of trade 
liberalisation argued that this could not suggest that a more liberalised trade made the 
country either better or worse off (Clarete, 2005; Cororaton et al., 2005; ADB, 2007). 
Indeed, per capita income could have substantially diminished had tariff reforms not 
been pursued and the Philippines continued to be a non-WTO member. For the staunch 
critics of neoliberal policies, per capita income would have significantly improved had 
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trade protection been maintained or perhaps even intensified (Bello, 2005; Malaluan, 
2011). Nevertheless, for the Filipino policymakers in favour of free trade, the positive 
trends reflected by other development indicators including life expectancy at birth and 
literacy rates are attributable to its relatively open trade policies. For instance, life 
expectancy has increased from 61.3 years in 1980 to 68.5 years in 2010 (UNDP, 2010). 
Similarly, the population’s literacy rate has also improved as the percentage of illiterate 
Filipinos dropped from 12.21% in 1980 to 4.58% in 2010 (UNDP, 2010).  
 Fourth, and lastly, the mediocre performance of Philippine exports according to 
ex-post assessments could be substantively explained by the high transaction costs rather 
than the difficulties related to market access (WTO-TPR, 2005, 2012; ADB, 2007). More 
specifically, the country’s inability to enhance its efficiency mobilising products from the 
production points to the markets has significantly contributed to the underperformance 
of the Philippines’ export industries. In other words, the problem was more logistical in 
nature given the lack of responsiveness on the part of the Filipino exporters to the 
changing demands of importers of the country’s goods and merchandise. The Philippine 
experience has provided a clear illustration of how transaction costs could potentially 
weaken, if not reverse, the expected positive net effects of lowering trade protection rates 
on resource allocations. It showed that reduction in import restrictions did not 
automatically lead to the efficient redistribution of resources to export-oriented 
industries due to substantial levels of transaction costs as opposed to being zero (WTO-
TPR, 2005, 2012; ADB, 2007).  
 The inability of various ex-ante and ex-post analyses to reasonably predict the 
impact of free trade on the Philippines’ economy have led the critics to claim that the 
government’s decision to abandon its import substitution policies has further aggravated 
conditions of poverty and inequality conditions because of a significant loss of jobs 
(Bello, 2004; Malaluan, 2011; IBON, 2013). Thus, as far as the opponents of free trade 
policies are concerned, the Philippines’ experience proves that trade liberalisation is not a 
straightforward solution to asymmetric development, but only perpetuates structural 
poverty and institutionalised inequality in the country.  
 
6.4.3 Failure of “good” trade negotiations  
The Philippines’ lack of central agency responsible for the formulation and 
implementation of its free trade goals and objectives creates inefficiencies that constrain 
benefits, including: (i) turf mentality among government offices; (ii) limited capacity for 
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trade research; (iii) blurring of authority delineations; and (iv) absence of suitable 
mechanisms for consultations and feedbacks (Pasadilla and Liao, 2005; Wignaraja et al., 
2011).  
 First, representatives from various line agencies comprising the Tariff and 
Related Matters (TRM) Committee show symptoms of turf mentality that prevents the 
formulation of complete and cohesive cross-industry trade strategies (Pasadilla and Liao, 
2005). A misplaced competitive spirit often dominates inter-agency dialogues, which 
undermine efforts toward the facilitation of a more cooperative environment. The TRM 
members have developed a rather strange outlook that forces them to protect the 
industry that they are representing at all costs, regardless of its effect on other industries 
and the economy as a whole (2005; Aldaba, 2012, 2013; Abad et al., 2012). Rather than 
advancing the country’s collective trade interests, they insist upon the protection of their 
respective sectors, which leads to sub-standard proposals and inferior outcomes. In other 
words, a better-equalised national position is traded over narrowly defined sectoral 
motives. Accordingly, identifying priority industries has become highly politicised since 
all representatives demand preferential treatment for theirsectors.  
 Second, the absence of a clear-cut mandate and delineated lines of authority 
formulating trade policies has ultimately resulted in misunderstandings and the grave 
misuse of national resources (Pasadilla and Liao, 2005). For one, going beyond the 
committee’s collegial nature in order to make and implement difficult decisions on highly 
contested issues can be very problematic (Abad et al., 2012). In addition, due to resource 
constraints, unqualified members from different line agencies are sometimes tapped to 
represent the country in bilateral trade negotiations (Nye, 2011). Given their lack of 
negotiating qualifications and limited experience with the language and practice of 
international trade, they usually end up conceding to agreements that are unfavourable to 
the country’s economic well-being. This problem was highlighted during the JPEPA 
negotiation rounds where the inexperienced Filipino negotiators agreed to nontrade-
related demands solicited by their Japanese counterparts, but rejected by the veteran 
trade representatives (Pasadilla and Liao, 2005; van de Haar, 2011). Such practice 
inexorably places the Philippines at a disadvantaged position without realising the costs. 
This highly fragmented delineation of authority leads to a loss of institutional memory, 




 Third, aside from the problem of disjointed coordination, the Philippines 
government is also severely restricted by its limited resources for various kinds of trade 
research (Pasadilla and Liao, 2005; Abad et al., 2012). The lack of financial resources for 
enhancing the technical capacities of concerned agencies to conduct extensive studies on 
trade policies undermines efforts toward effective negotiations. Government agencies 
responsible for the formulation of trade policies lack the necessary skills and knowledge 
for understanding the complex dynamics of international trade negotiations. One of the 
more serious effects of this problem is the reliance on line agencies for the research 
funded by private-sector lobbyists that do not necessarily provide accurate findings and 
credible recommendations given their stakes in these particular trade issues (Pasadilla and 
Liao, 2005; Abad et al., 2012). The derisory treatment of numerous trade matters results 
in incomplete understandings about the ramifications of different agreements that the 
government is signing or has previously signed.    
 Fourth, the presence of a strong top-down influence with respect to policy 
formulation enables lobbyists to exploit multiple power centres in various segments of 
the government (Pasadilla and Liao, 2005). The systematic involvement in policy 
planning processes is overwhelmed by the clientelist method adopted by powerful 
industrialists designed to capture the votes of Congress and other key figures in the 
executive branch (de Dios and  Hutchcroft, 2003; Nye, 2011). This type of political 
climate breeds disillusionment on the part of trade policymakers given the patron’s 
wherewithal to reverse or thwart decisions that have been scrupulously formulated by a 
committee at the stroke of a prominent official’s pen. As such, patronage politics breaks 
the shield that is supposed to “immunise” national trade strategies from unwarranted 
external pressures. Moreover, resolutions that have been fervently debated between inter-
agency committees can easily be upended, which causes sluggishness in the TRM 
mechanism (Pasadilla and Liao, 2005). Government officials usually have a hard time 
standing their ground given their self-acknowledged limitations when confronted by 
representatives from private sectors who have a sense of entitlement.  
 Lastly, and perhaps most disappointing, the Philippines’ trade sectors lack 
significant level of awareness about the breadth and depth of the country’s involvement 
in free trade (Pasadilla and Liao, 2005; Wignajara et al., 2011). Ironically, despite the 
stakes, local industry players often do not have well-defined goals about to the 
concessions that they wish to gain from the Philippines’ various trading partners. The 
failure to properly set expectations concerning preferential access to foreign markets 
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represents a missed opportunity on the part of Filipino industrialists to positively 
contribute to the development of effective trade policy strategies (Abad et al., 2012; 
Aldaba, 2012, 2013). While this may be gradually changing, the Philippines’ trade 
orientation remains largely defensive. Put differently, the government vis-à-vis industrial 
players are more concerned about how to best safeguard their domestic interests rather 
than finding ways to more effectively exploit foreign markets.  
 However, improving the overall process of trade policymaking in the country is 
far from being a panacea. For better or worse, the Philippines’ trade positions and 
strategies still rest in the hands of elected officials since they are a function of the 
country’s national priorities. The success of various trade negotiations, along with their 
actual impacts on the domestic economy, is contingent upon the general quality of the 
domestic polity and the choices that the government makes. Thus, while the 
institutionalisation of trade policy mechanisms may indeed help much still depend on the 
head of state’s overarching vision for the nation.    
 
6.5 LIMITS TO THE PHILIPPINES’ HUMANIST SECURITY-TRADE LINKAGES  
Several factors influence the Philippine government’s capacity for overcoming the 
deeply-entrench oligarchic factor permeating the country’s political economy. These are: 
(i) limits of “patrimonial” democratisation; (ii) limits of “patrimonial” administrations; 
(iii) limits of one-size-fits-all economic policies; and (iv) limits of bureaucracy. The first 
and second factors represent the direct influences of the Philippines’ oligarchic system 
vis-à-vis its patronage culture toward the country’s uneven economic development. The 
third and fourth factors represent the indirect influences of an oligarchy-driven and 
patronage-based political economy that further aggravates structural poverty and 
institutionalised inequality in the country. However, it is worth noting that these factors 
are all interconnected, and therefore, overlap. Together, they undermine the 
development-upgrading utility of the Philippines’ free trade activities by further 
reinforcing the underlying oligarchic factor.  
6.5.1 Limits of “patrimonial” democratisation 
The decision of the American colonial regime to transplant its own brand of 
representative democracy into an economic arrangement dominated by the landed 
oligarchs has enabled the latter to seize control of the country’s democratic institutions 
and procedures (Manacsa and Tan, 2012; White III, 2015). In doing so, the United States 
set aside the policies that had the potential to transform the Philippine polity into a more 
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level playing field. Consequently, the domestic political space had been insulated from 
revisionist agendas espoused by various social factions.    
 Therefore, the government’s capacity for independent actions had been curtailed 
by the oligarchic groups attempting to amass public power to protect their vested 
interests (Villacorta, 1994; McCoy, 1994; Hutchcroft, 1998). In addition, the “re-
democratisation” process that took place immediately after the end of Martial Law had 
simply led to the reinstallation of a pre-Marcos political order (Quimpo, 2009, 2015; 
Manacsa and Tan, 2012; Hodder, 2014). The upshot is that the reproduction of elite 
authority has further subjugated the Philippines’ political economy – the sine qua non for 
the country’s highly asymmetrical economic development. Despite the introduction of 
various democratic institutional reforms, the underlying oligarchic force is still able to 
permeate and saturate the Philippine government vis-à-vis bureaucracy.  
 The question therefore is, why and how does oligarchic power overcome state 
power?  Throughout Philippine history, a few very influential families owning huge 
corporations and vast lands have ruled the government. The American strategy for 
consolidating power throughout the archipelago had enabled the elites to further expand 
their economic interests via political appointments (Krinks, 2002; Manacsa and Tan, 
2012). In the process, these families have exploited the country’s public goods and 
resources and this continues to fuel institutionalised corruption. Several infamous terms 
have been used to describe the country’s pitiful politico-economic condition such as 
“anarchy of families”; “booty capitalism”; “non-substantive democracy”; “ersatz 
capitalism”; and “cacique democracy” (McCoy, 1994; Anderson, 1998; Hutchcroft, 1998; 
White III, 2015). The obvious incapacity of the government to ‘immunise’ itself from 
oligarchic manipulation has significantly helped to maintain and exacerbate the country’s 
uneven development.   
 When the United States’ colonial regime decided to erect political agencies to 
facilitate electoral contestations in the Philippines, the elite clans consolidated their 
powers to give birth to a national oligarchy instead of a national government (Anderson, 
1998). Such a system has bred what the Filipinos now call trapos, a pejorative term that is 
being used to describe traditional “dirty” politicians (Magno, 1995; Manacsa, 1999; 
Eaton, 2003). These trapos are deemed responsible for the “reverse accountability” in 
Philippines’ politics by holding the individual voters accountable for electing their 
respective patrons into power in exchange for favours that are either provided in the past 
or promised for delivery once elected (Hutchcroft, 1998; Quimpo, 2009, 2015; Hodder, 
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2014). In this scenario, peasants and the labourers’ interests are being co-opted by the 
landlords’ personal preferences. Thus, it may be inferred that voter support for patrons is 
largely a function of the latter’s “own interests, rewards for loyalty, and the fear of 
vengeance” (Linz, 1975: 260).  
 Even the implementations of disastrous economic policies endorsed by some top 
government officials and policymakers have eventually been manipulated to protect the 
interests of Filipino oligarchs. To this extent, the Philippines’ uneven development is not 
simply a matter of constantly choosing the wrong policies to implement, but rather the 
result of conscious efforts by rent-seekers to maintain them despite their damaging 
effects on the rest of the country. A perfect example was the implementation of import 
substitution industrialisation by the government after its independence from the United 
States in 1946 (Ranis, 1974; Bautista, 1989; Lim, 2001).  
 In contrast to the export-oriented strategy launched by the East Asian countries 
that led to annual per capita GDP growth of 6.0%, the Philippines had chosen to 
implement the ISI and became the worst performing economy in the region (Sarel, 
1994). Although the ISI promotion may have been an honest mistake on the part of the 
Filipino technocrats, the oligarchs’ general disinterest in rectifying such an error 
underlined their tendencies to exploit all profit-maximising policies, both good and bad. 
Thus, several critics have argued that despite its problems, the ISI policy was maintained 
because it could widen the space for oligarchic predation (Quimpo, 2009; Manacsa and 
Tan, 2012; Hodder, 2014).  
 Moreover, the “policy of attraction” introduced by former U.S. governor-general, 
William Howard Taft (originally intended to entice the landlord class to collaborate with 
the American forces rather than joining the revolutionary factions) had transformed the 
economic elites of the Spanish-colonial era into political elites, which now control 
Philippine politics (Hutchcroft, 2008: 142). Since representative institutions have 
emerged prior to the development of a strong republic, political parties have become 
“convenient vehicles of patronage that can be set up, merged with others, split, 
reconstituted, regurgitated, resurrected, renamed, repackaged, recycled, refurbished, 
buffed up or flushed down the toilet anytime” (Quimpo, 2005: 4-5). Paul Hutchcroft 
(1998: 18-21) has used the term “neo-patrimonial” to describe this type of political 
economy where the rent-seekers emerging from a bureaucratic capitalist system can 
control formal state structures from the outside. The unique Filipino customs of “giving 
for gratitude” and “labour for loyalty” have also complemented these prevailing patron-
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client relationships, thereby maintaining the omnipotence of the oligarchic elites 
(Grossholtz, 1964). The Philippines government has continued to operate within this 
context from one administration to another since the country had gained independence 
from the United States.  
 As the Philippine case has illustrated, a patrimonial state that allows oligarchical 
relations and interests to dominate bureaucratic systems creates a hunting ground for the 
unrestricted accumulation of personal wealth (Weber, 1978). Therefore, creating a new 
constitutional framework that replicates a pre-Martial Law system within a relatively 
unchanged economic arrangement is not only futile, but also counterintuitive to any 
prospect of change. It seems that neither regime change nor democratisation in the 
Philippines has significantly helped mitigate the oligarchs’ influence over state affairs, 
particularly concerning decisions involving the domestic economy. Consequently, a 
strongly developed Philippine republic has yet to emerge (Manacsa and Tan, 2012; White 
III, 2015). 
 
6.5.2 Limits of “patrimonial” administrations 
 
The Marcos administration 
Even the infamous episode of authoritarianism in the Philippines through former 
President Ferdinand Marcos’ Martial Law in 1972 did not overcome the elites’ vice-like 
grip of the state. Instead of freeing the state from the shackles of oligarchic control, 
Marcos had merely regrouped the existing personal-clientelist networks and made 
himself its overarching patron. Through the imposition of new political frameworks, 
access to power at all levels became contingent on the patronage of autocracy and, 
therefore, eliminated all of the antagonistic and unserviceable sections (Magno, 1995). 
The Philippine neo-patrimonialism under the Marcos era had taken a new face as it 
transformed into a highly personalistic, sultanatic regime.275 This prevented the 
emergence of a strong state that had the wherewithal to oppose systematic oligarchic 
predation (Quimpo, 2009, 2014; Manacsa and Tan, 2012).    
 A critical part of Marcos’ version of patronage politics was the replacement of 
the old oligarchy with a new one by creating opportunities and public positions for the 
latter group, while simultaneously blocking the former group. Notwithstanding his anti-
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 Juan Linz defines the sultanatic regimes as authoritarian and based on personal ideology and 
personal favour to maintain the autocrat in power. As such, there is little ideological basis for the rule 
except personal power. For a further discussion of sultanatic regimes, see Chehabi and Linz (1998).  
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oligarch rhetoric, Marcos developed his own personalised patronage system, sequestering 
the powers and possessions of his elite enemies and transferring them to his elite friends 
(Manacsa and Tan, 2012; Hodder, 2014). In other words, the authoritarian regime had 
simply reversed the position through which the new oligarchy could pillage the state 
from the inside rather than from the outside.  
 
The Aquino administration 
Regrettably, even with the institution of a new Charter during former President Corazon 
Aquino’s administration, Filipino officials and policymakers still failed to develop a 
strong, visionary state. Ironically, the re-democratisation of the Philippines’ bureaucracy 
had simply led to the renaissance of the pre-Marcos patronage system (Manacsa and Tan, 
2012; Tusalem and Pe-Aguirre, 2013). The post-authoritarian system had several crucial 
features that effectively stifled the genesis of a developmental state in the Philippines. 
First, the first-past-the-post approach to selecting the new president made it difficult to 
achieve a significant level of voters’ support (Franco, 2001; Teehankee, 2002; Manacsa 
and Tan, 2012). Therefore, obtaining a mandate for vital national political and economic 
policies became unnecessarily strenuous and confounding. Second, the 1987 Constitution 
did not stimulate the establishment of ideology-based political parties with clear-cut 
programmes designed to achieve a specific long-term vision for the Philippines 
(Teehankee, 2002; Quimpo, 2005, 2014). Instead, the new Charter simply laid the 
groundwork for the bourgeoning of disposable political parties stripped of any moral 
aspirations to serve the interests of their respective constituencies.    
 Evidently, the Marcos regime had failed to overcome the politico-economic 
wherewithal of the old oligarchy, which had survived momentary disruptions to “private” 
state affairs. Therefore, end of the Marcos dictatorship signalled not the beginning of a 
new Philippines’ political economy, but the refurbishing of the old oligarchy’s political 
apparatuses for bureaucratic exploitation. The reopening of political offices in the 
country’s capital led to the manufacturing of parties that were dedicated to the 
promotion of the “dynastic interests” of a few oligarchic families (Gutierrez, 1994). Not 
surprisingly, these newly developed parties showed the usual symptoms of old patronage 
politics, that is, “reliance on coalitions of local elite, non-ideological character, and 
shifting membership” (Hutchcroft and Rocamora, 2003: 278). This partly explains why 
the elections since Marcos’ demise have never resulted in the creation of a definitive 
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electoral mandate that is necessary for institutionalising and legitimising a coherent and 
viable national politico-economic agenda (Manacsa and Tan, 2012; Hodder, 2014).  
 Furthermore, the existing three-year term for the House Representatives and 
various local government officials further aggravated the problem of developing stable 
political alliances and policy continuity amid a weak political party system in the country. 
Access to patronage has become the primary impetus for forming a party, thereby 
making the political process a mere bargaining tool for negtiating coalitions based on 
individual and/or group identities (Hutchcroft, 1998; Manacsa and Tan, 2012; Hodder, 
2014). Such a system reinforces the balimbing or turncoat attitude that characterises the 
Philippine socio-political culture (Magno, 1995; de Dios and Hutchroft, 2004; Balisacan 
and Hills, 2007).       
 Lastly, the administration’s failure to formulate, ratify and enact two very vital 
laws – the land reform programme and anti-dynasty law – had significantly undermined 
Aquino’s capabilities to overhaul the Philippines’ political economy. The traditional 
landed elites succeeded gaining access to the legislature, which delayed progress even 
more due to the “uneven application, slow adjudication of cases, and the government’s 
inability to finance the compensation to landlords as stipulated in law” (de Dios and 
Hutchcroft, 2003: 52). Influential political clans also successfully prevented the 
enactment of any constitutional banning of political dynasties, which led to the 
exploitation of the highest local and national electoral posts (Manacsa and Tan, 2012; 
Tusalem and Pe-Aguirre, 2013). Thus, to some extent, it can be surmised that Aquino’s 
ultimate aspiration (intentionally or unintentionally) was to simply replicate the 
Philippines’ conditions – political, economic and social – before the declaration of 
Martial Law. That said, the most jarring concern with such a myopic thinking was the 
utter disregard for behaviours and practices that gave birth to subjugating patronage 
politics in the past.  
 
The Ramos administration 
Former President Fidel Ramos, Aquino’s ‘anointed one’ and successor, initiated the 
“Strong Republic” rhetoric when addressing the problems generated by political elitism 
(Rivera, 1994; Villacorta, 1994). Ramos believed that the oligarchic control of political 
power had engendered an economic order that enabled a very few influential families to 
extract wealth from the national economy with little or no limits (de Dios and 
Hutchcroft, 2003). In contrast to a government driven by a neo-patrimonial culture, the 
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strong state is able to independently pursue national interests that are not solely 
contingent on the demands of a specific class or group. Under the former arrangement, 
there was no incentive for political actors to develop structures that promoted domestic 
accountability and fair competition given that their loyalty was devoted to their own 
patronage. From Ramos’ standpoint, a country that is attempting to build a strong state 
does not need to be authoritarian as long as the bureaucracy is professional, accountable, 
transparent and dedicated to securing the long-term national vision rather than short-
term economic interest (Hutchcroft, 2008; Manacsa and Tan, 2012). 
 Therefore, central to the rise of a strong Philippines’ state is the emergence of 
revisionist political leaders that have resolved to keep the markets free from oligarch 
predation. However, politicians often discover that the adaptation to democratic 
practices is much easier than the transition to free market policies. Put differently, it is 
more problematic to organise markets than to organise elections (Huntington, 1992; 
Teehankee, 2002; Quimpo, 2009, 2014). Consequently, politicians are compelled to rely 
on patron-client relationships, which invariably lead to larger public deficits and higher 
levels of corruption, thereby distorting incentives (Kerkvliet, 1995; Hicken, 2011). Given 
that the country’s decision-makers themselves are guided by their idea of public good, 
the state cannot be expected to accommodate and transform polarising social demands 
into public policies (Eisenstadt and Roniger, 1984; Skocpol, 1985). Put bluntly, inclusive 
growth can only occur if the ruling elite want it – that is, if inclusive growth endows them 
with greater power. Otherwise, they will oppose it (Carney, 1989; White, 2009).   
 In the end, Ramos, just like his own patron Aquino, had failed to initiate key 
reforms that could have made the bureaucracy more resilient against political 
patrimonialism. Left without a choice, Ramos embraced traditional political customs and 
practices in order to put forward his own political agenda (Manacsa and Tan, 2012). In 
short, the Ramos administration merely continued an enduring neo-patrimonialism in the 
country (Villacorta, 1994). Consequently, the state remained powerless to harness the 
benefits of intensifying economic liberalisation because of the absence of any critical 
institutional change in the system.   
 
The Estrada administration  
Conditions surrounding the Philippine political economy deteriorated even further under 
the leadership of former President Joseph Estrada after he won the 1998 presidential 
elections. With 40.0% of the voters casting their ballots in his favour, Estrada’s pseudo-
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populist government had convincingly denounced the culture of oligarchic politics with 
the help of his “Erap para sa Mahirap” (Erap for the Poor) campaign slogan (Macapagal 
and Nario-Galace, 2003: Hedman, 2010). Estrada vowed that under his leadership, no 
influential social entity – be it kinfolk or friends – will be given special privileges (PCIJ, 
2003; Manacsa and Tan, 2012). Largely, Estrada had succeeded inspiring the lower 
classes of the Philippines who willingly bought the idea that the “president of the 
masses” had finally arrived – from their favourite local movie theatres to the Malacañang 
Palace.  
 Nonetheless, Estrada’s huge popularity could neither cover up nor compensate 
for the country’s terrible economic shape. Despite the administration’s initial 
proclamations regarding the supposed insulation of decision-making processes from 
peripheral influences, Estrada’s administration had fell prey to the excessiveness and 
recklessness of the oligarchic predators. Some of the peripheral actors that yielded 
considerable power over government affairs during Estrada’s presidency were padrinos or 
the “intercessors” (Manacsa and Tan, 2012: 71). The padrinos were outsiders with close 
personal connections with the president either by blood or by social relations, and whose 
assistance and opinion had been discretely sought. Their primary role (albeit unofficial) 
was to direct the president’s attention to the needs of certain political actors’ to ensure 
that necessary actions were taken. Not surprisingly, Estrada’s padrino system was heavily 
comprised of blood relatives and close friends who supported him during his campaigns. 
Thus, despite the presence of institutionalised “gatekeepers” that regulate information 
such as the Offices of the Executive Secretary (OES) and the Presidential Management 
Staff (PMS), the padrinos were able to successfully circumvent the government’s 
policymaking processes (Magno, 1995; Manacsa, 1999; Macapagal and Nario-Galace, 
2003).  
 The padrino system was complemented by the kumpadre (buddy system) composed 
of Estrada’s closest friends and allies (Magno, 1995; Aquino, 1998; Manacsa, 1999). Aside 
from his official cabinet members, Estrada’s kumpadres had served as his de facto 
advisers. Such practice had opened yet another backdoor entry for peripheral actors that 
enabled them to access government resources. While Department Secretaries comprised 
the official axis of power, the kumpadres constituted the informal bloc of political control 
over some vital aspects of the economy including business, computers and even 
legislative bills (Manacsa and Tan, 2012). The culture had become so pervasive that at 
one point Estrada’s off-the-record advisers and consultants reached two hundred 
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(Laquian and Laquian, 2002). Some kumpadres had no official function or role within the 
government, but acted as primary chiefs of certain policy areas (Magno, 1995; Aquino, 
1998; Manacsa, 1999). 
 This furtive policymaking environment inevitably ignited a clash between 
Estrada’s formal and informal advisers. One-upmanship became the rule of the game 
where the “winners” were decided in terms of who succeeded at persuading or even 
bypassing the president (Manacsa, 1999; Manacsa and Tan, 2012). Such clandestine 
approaches to decision-making perfectly complemented the culture of corruption that 
ultimately defined the Estrada administration. The construction of Estrada’s policy 
regime made it practically impossible to trace the initiators of various policies as well as 
the officials accountable for their flawed execution. This acute disjuncture in Estrada’s 
public policy management had further shrunk the country’s development space.  
 In 2000 Estrada was impeached by the House of Representatives and was tried in 
the Senate for charges relating to state plunder, corruption and involvement in an illegal 
numbers game known as jueteng. Ironically, these allegations came from one of Estrada’s 
former kumpadres who accused him of the malversation of public funds. On 16 January 
2001, Estrada was ousted from office by a civilian-military uprising locally referred to as 
People Power II or EDSA Dos (Hutchcroft, 2008; Quimpo, 2009, 2014; Manacsa and 
Tan, 2012). The following day, the Supreme Court declared that the seat of presidency 
was vacant and stated with finality that Estrada had constructively resigned from his 
post.  
 
The Arroyo administration 
His then vice-president Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, the daughter of the country’s ninth 
president, Diosdado Macapagal, replaced Estrada. Arroyo’s regime was no more than a 
continuation of the traditional clientelism in the Philippines characterised by the 
methodical looting of government resources and the rapid deterioration of public 
institutions. However, this was not merely trip back to the prowling years of the Marcos 
family. Arroyo’s era was “marked by the adjustment of predatory forces to global 
economic and political liberalisation” (Quimpo, 2009: 347). In the era of globalisation, 
underhanded government transactions were pursued within the context of market 
economy logic “[in order] to produce private goods for officials, their families, and their 
cronies” (Diamond, 2008: 42). While Arroyo had promised to transform personality-
based Philippine politics into a politics of party programmes and sincere dialogues with 
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ordinary citizens, she ended up with the distinction of being one of the most corrupt 
presidents that had ruled the government. Based on the survey conducted by Pulse Asia 
in 2007, 42.0% of Filipinos believed that Arroyo was the most corrupt president in the 
history of the Philippines since Marcos.       
 Just a few years into her presidency, a litany of corruption charges had been 
hurled against Arroyo as well as some of her family members, relatives and close 
friends.276 Astonishingly, Arroyo had survived the imbroglio through her skilful 
exploitation of the country’s patronage culture. Arroyo was able to adeptly consolidate 
the existing webs of patron-client relationships using the strong claws of the Executive 
only resorting to full, absolute authoritarianism for a few days (Linantud, 2004; 
Hutchcroft, 2008; Quimpo, 2009). This gave rise to a predatory regime that further 
undermined the country’s democratic institutions resulting in rigged elections; heightened 
repression; enfeebled rule of law; influx of unqualified political appointees; and enlarged 
military influence (Hutchcroft, 2008; Quimpo, 2009). Government institutions were the 
first casualties of Arroyo’s destructive presidency. The justice system was reduced to a 
mechanism that suppressed popular dissent while the military and the police acted like 
the private armies of a mobster regime. The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) 
became the playground for fixers while the bureaucracy, in general, became a schoolyard 
for politically inept state managers cheered on by the House of Representatives and the 
Senate.  
 The elites’ overarching control of the Arroyo administration had enabled them to 
convert democratic into outright predatory institutions (Quimpo, 2009, 2014). The 
pivotal actors for such an arrangement were the ideologically “homogenised” political 
parties that allowed the politicians to switch alliances whenever it suited them 
(Hutchcroft and Rocamora, 2003; Hutchcroft, 2008). At first glance, such volatility may 
be perceived as a weakness, but for many traditional politicians, it was this particular 
character of the Philippine party system that complemented their predatory objectives. 
By hijacking the country’s check-and-balance mechanisms, the “political termites” under 
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the outcomes of 2004 presidential elections put the country on the brink of yet another forced 




Arroyo’s regime were able to escape public accountability, chewing away on their 
improprieties and indiscretions.  
 
The Aquino III administration  
Then came the incumbent President Benigno Simeon Aquino III. Prior to his election to 
office, many Filipinos doubted his capacity for leading the nation, let alone fulfilling his 
campaign promise not only to fight but end corruption. Such cynicism had strong basis 
given his lacklustre performance both as a senator and as a three-term representative. In 
fact, Aquino III became a probable presidential candidate only after the passing of his 
mother, former President Corazon Aquino in August of 2009. Thus, similar to his 
mother, Aquino III was a symbolic leader rather than a consummate politician with the 
innate desire (for better or worse) to run the country. Aquino III had admitted this 
himself when claiming “it was fate… the people found me” (Mellor and Batino, 2013). 
 Five years into his presidency, Aquino III is surprising the naysayers including 
some of his fiercest critics as the country reaches astounding levels of GDP growth. In 
2013 alone, the Philippine economy rose above 7.0% for four straight quarters despite 
the regional and global slowdown (Yap and Yap, 2013). To a considerable degree, 
Aquino III was able to curtail the uncontrolled excesses of oligarchic elites specifically on 
the issues concerning widespread corruption and senseless political violence. His 
administration has chased to court public officials involved in anomalous government 
transactions by filing criminal charges against them.277 However, despite his initial 
triumphs, the scandal over the misuse of public funds by some of the country’s top 
officials and lawmakers has suddenly become the most crucial crisis that is now 
confronting Aquino III’s government. The Priority Development Assistance Fund 
(PDAF) scandal, considered by many as the biggest fraud involving public funds in 
Philippine history, saw billions of pesos worth of government funds stolen by certain 
                                                 
277 
Among his biggest catch was Arroyo herself who was charged with electoral sabotage for the 
manipulation of 2007 senatorial elections along with plunder for the dishonest use of the Philippine 
Charity Sweepstakes Office fund. She was placed under hospital arrest in 2011. Aquino III also 
succeeded in ejecting key Arroyo appointees perceived to be negligent in handling corruption cases 
filed against powerful officials. For instance, Merceditas Gutierrez resigned from her post as 
Ombudsman in April 2011 before her impeachment trial for betrayal of public trust, particularly fo the 
low rate of conviction and apparent vacillation on several major scandals under Arroyo’s regime. In 
another case, Renato Corona was impeached from his position as Supreme Court Chief Justice in 
December 2011 for a similar offence, specifically for failing to properly disclose his statement of 
assets, liabilities, and net worth (SALN). 
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members of both the Senate and Congress.278 The scam involved the funding of ghost 
projects of implicated legislators and officials using the PDAF money.279  
 While Aquino III has been uncompromising with the crackdown of corrupt 
officials, nonetheless, patronage politics has continued to wield an overwhelming 
influence on his administration. The taming of oligarchic powers still seems a bit far-
fetched even under Aquino III’s regime. Although the president has moved to abolish 
the PDAF amidst strong public indignation over the scandal, he did not cut down the 
amount of funds held at his discretion.280 This led critics to label this patronage-prone 
reserves as the “President’s pork barrel.” The opposition is able to divert public outrage 
away from corrupt officials to the administration (David, 2013) by depicting the 
president as the principal distributor of the pork barrel (and therefore, the one who is 
“most guilty” for perpetuating a rotten system). 
 Finally, if the May 2013 elections were to serve as any indication, the rife 
corruption of political dynasties in the country – led by the Binays, Estradas, Marcoses, 
Arroyos, Revillas, and the Cayetanos – is bound to continue in the foreseeable future 
(David, 2013; Quimpo, 2015). While some of these political dynasties have contracted, 
others have expanded as more family members come to the fore of Philippine politics. 
Therefore, Aquino III’s reforms cannot be expected to have any long-term impact since 
they do not genuinely confront the order that is underpinned by oligarchic wealth and 
power. In the end, it may just be another hiccup in the life cycle of Philippine oligarchy.  
 
6.5.3 Limits of “one-size-fits-all” economic policies 
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In September 2013, three senators and five former congressmen, along with the accused 
mastermind Janet Lim Napoles, a multimillionaire businesswoman, and 29 others have thus far been 
charged with the malversation of public money and plunder. Ironically, the three senators implicated 
– Juan Ponce Enrile, Jinggoy Estrada and Ramon Revilla, Jr. – happened to be members of both the 
opposition and the elite political clans that had supported the president’s anti-corruption initiatives 
including Corona’s conviction. 
279 
These bogus projects were in turn ‘implemented’ through Napoles' companies without producing 
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created under the purview of the JLN Group of Companies owned by Napoles, naming some of her 
employees and even a nanny as incorporators or directors. Each of these foundations and/or NGOs 
served as official recipients of PDAF funds coming from particular legislators. Several bank accounts 
where attached to each organisation where PDAF funds would be deposited for the implementation 
of their imaginary projects. 
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favour of the impeachment of Corona received an estimated P50 million each ‘bonus’ for helping the 
Chief Justice’s eviction from office.  
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The 2011-2016 Philippine Development Plan (PDP) is Aquino III’s blueprint for 
implementing the government’s so-called “social contract with the Filipino People.”281 
The Plan underlines the twin problems of inadequate investment and human capital as 
the main culprits of Philippine economic and human inequities. In doing so, it 
acknowledges the social reality that the large majority of the Filipinos are excluded from 
the country’s economic growth. The Plan’s main economic thrust is straightforward: 
stick to the globalisation policies implemented over the last decades; deepen and broaden 
privatisation through Public-Private Partnerships or PPPs; and selectively implement 
social protection programmes such as conditional cash transfers (CCTs).282 However, a 
more in-depth analysis of the Plan indicates serious problems, which are likely to sustain 
the country’s uneven economic development. By insisting on the appropriateness of 
“one-size-fits-all” economic policies, the government is misinterpreting the country’s 
current economic situation. 
 First, the Plan lacks ingenuity in terms of formulating strategies that foster 
inclusive growth (IBON, 2011). The administration’s passive adherence to free market 
philosophy prevents it from taking a more proactive role in stirring its development 
goals. While recent data has shown a relative growth in investments, exports and overall 
GDP, these figures have failed to translate to lower levels of inequality and poverty 
incidence.283 Critics have argued that the government’s phlegmatic devotion to free trade 
underlines its anachronistic outlook concerning development policies (IBON, 2011). 
This is particularly unsettling when analysed against the backdrop of the continuing 
WTO stalemate where member states, particularly those in the developing world, reject 
more advanced liberalisation measures (Ezeani, 2013; Hartman, 2013). The 
selection of target sectors that the government envisions developing reflects the 
administration’s lack of strategy for inclusive and sustainable national development. 
Examples of these are the cheap labour business process outsourcing; foreign-controlled 
shipbuilding; export-oriented agri-business and forestry; extractive mining; and 
international tourism.284 Although investments and exports figures will certainly rise in 
these sectors, none of these can stimulate Filipino industrialisation. Thus, critics have 
                                                 
281
 For a full copy of the said document, see the National Economic Development Authority’s website, 
available online at http://www.neda.gov.ph/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/CHAPTER-1.pdf.  
282
 Ibid.  
283
 For more details on the current data, see National Statistics Office’s official website available 
online at http://www.nscb.gov.ph/poverty/. 
284





claimed that that the principal task of the government’s development plan is to sell the 
country’s national and human resources to foreign investors at a bargain price (Bello, 
2004, 2005; IBON, 2011). The government does not shy away from its explicit 
promotion of cheap labour exports; setting aside the agenda for creating local jobs that 
will cut down the number of Overseas Filipino Workers (OFWs). In fact, it even 
attributed the country’s newfound resilience against global financial crises to the steady 
inflow of remittances. 
 Moreover, the administration’s view of good governance is heavily influenced by 
the requirements of the free market, that is, improving governance and strengthening 
weak institutions to bring down the costs and risks of doing business, instead of securing 
the poor’s rights to development (Bello, 2004; 2005; IBON, 2011). This gives the 
impression that the initiatives undertaken to address bureaucratic maladies including 
institutionalised corruption are directed toward the goal of attracting foreign direct 
investments rather than practicing good governance to better serve the people.
 Second, the Plan also prioritises the creation of an environment conducive to 
foreign investors over the construction of a people-oriented development strategy that 
secures the general well-being of Filipinos (IBON, 2011; Malaluan, 2011). Despite the 
Plan’s well-articulated mission of fighting poverty and bridging inequality, its systematic 
evasion of politically unpopular yet socially beneficial policies (such as a more just and 
equitable distribution of wealth, assets and incomes) undermines the credibility of the 
administration’s inclusive development rhetoric. The government seems to be more 
interested in the development of the business sector than the people themselves. While 
such a strategy may indeed foster a good business climate, nonetheless it is not 
necessarily favourable for the economy as a whole. In short, the government seems to 
favour foreign investments over local capital; private business profits over labourers’ 
welfare; and landowners’ claims over farmers’ rights (Bello, 2004, 2005; IBON, 2011; 
Malaluan, 2011). These biases further strengthen the wherewithal of oligarchic elites for 
exploiting the bureaucratic systems and resources. In other words, the rudimentary 
equation of private business success to socio-economic advancements invalidates the 
government’s capacity for inclusive growth and development. 
 Third, the administration’s problem with the budget deficit also compels it to 
pursue a more intensive privatisation scheme (IBON, 2011; NEDA, 2011). Developing 
the bulk of the proposed infrastructure programmes included in the Plan, the 
administration relies on extensive public-private partnerships (PPP). However, such a 
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strategy has the unintended consequence of transferring government responsibility for 
creating public goods and delivering social services to the private firms. Consequently, 
the government becomes heavily reliant on the ability of private firms to generate even 
more profits from providing public goods and services (Bello, 2004; IBON, 2011). The 
commonly held view is that private funding enables the government to curb its 
expenditures and debts. By doing so, the government can focus its scarce resources on 
more important issues that need immediate attention.  
 Furthermore, the private sector is also said to enhance the efficient handling of 
public projects given their technical expertise, which the government tends to lack. 
However, in reality, estimating a project’s actual cost is not always straightforward since 
contingent liabilities may easily increase despite strict procurement procedures (IBON, 
2011). In addition, the private sector is not always immune from the inefficiencies that 
are commonly associated with different government agencies. Problematic contracts 
sometimes fail to provide the expected level of service and in the process may require 
additional budget, if not a complete bailout, in order to rectify the problem (Bello, 2004, 
2005; Malaluan, 2011).      
 Fourth, through efforts to cushion the effects of non-discriminatory 
privatisation, the Plan promotes CCTs as a smokescreen for the marginalising effects of 
globalisation policies (IBON, 2011). By enabling poor Filipino families to purchase basic 
health and education services from private suppliers, the CCTs become an integral 
component of the privatisation of social services. Critics have argued that the 
administration’s unwarranted expansion of the program is not only unsustainable, but is 
also expensive to target because it is merely debt-propelled aid devoid of any serious 
reform (Bello, 2010; Comia, 2010). Meanwhile, more important but politically difficult 
socioeconomic restructurings are continuously ignored given the government’s 
subscription to a pure free market economy. Examples of these are job creation on an 
economy-wide scale; higher wages and improved incomes; creating opportunities for 
Filipino agricultural and industrial producers; local technological progress and 
innovation; domestic capital accumulation, and greater equity (IBON, 2011; NEDA, 
2011).  
 By maintaining the current domestic conditions, foreign investors can 
systematically exploit the economy to their clear advantage, thereby shutting out local 
firms and producers (Bello, 2004, 2005; Malaluan, 2011). For instance, the huge and 
profitable infrastructure projects carried out under the PPP benefit the well-established 
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foreign corporations and landed elites rather than the people living on a dollar a day but 
(Bello, 2004; IBON, 2011; Malaluan, 2011). Without proper monitoring and evaluation, 
the government’s highly optimistic assessments about its alleged pro-people development 
plan can easily be misdirected. 
 Fifth, and lastly, the Plan is bent to increase tax collections from poor workers 
while thoughtfully shielding the rich from further increases in tax obligations (Quimpo, 
2009; IBON, 2011). Instead of imposing direct taxes on high-income individuals and 
corporate profit, and indirect taxes on non-basic luxury goods and services, the 
administration’s strategy for addressing the country’s deficit problems is to tighten its 
development expenditures related to welfare spending, social investments and public 
infrastructures (IBON, 2011; NEDA, 2011). The administration is effectively 
transferring a huge part of the burden to lower-income groups by insisting on higher 
taxes on essential goods as well higher fees for basic government services. Indeed, recent 
improvements in tax revenue collections did not spring from better tax administration, 
but the reformed value-added tax (RVAT) along with de facto higher tax liability from 
rising energy and oil prices.  
 Thus, for the staunch opponents of the administration, the outcome of the Plan 
is sustainable inequality rather than sustainable economic development. The ultimate 
recipients of the increasing national wealth are the powerful elites who systematically 
evade social-equalising measures that cut into the oligarchs’ fortunes. The elusiveness of 
trickle-down effects from the country’s recent growths in GDP can be explained by the 
lack of development-oriented leadership that challenges elite interests. The Plan’s 
subconscious democratic biases prevent government leaders and policymakers from fully 
appreciating the economic plight of the non-oligarchs and the non-elites in the 
Philippines.  
 
6.5.4 Limits of bureaucracy 
Government efforts to expand the country’s development space in a manner that 
reduces poverty and inequality are also undermined by problems relating to bureaucratic 
inefficiencies. First, the government’s minimal spending on basic services has aggravated 
the conditions of poor Filipino households. For instance, government expenditure on 
the health and education sectors as percentage of GDP between 1996 and 2006 declined 
by more than 50.0% (from 0.7% to 0.3%) and 36.0% (from 3.1% to 2.4%) respectively 
(Manasan, 2009). Meanwhile, public spending on social protection has remained marginal 
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over the years (0.8% in 2008) and was mainly limited to food subsidy, which accounted 
for 73.0% (Manasan, 2009; NAPC, 2010). These figures are substantially lower than the 
averages found in some Southeast Asian (1.5%) and South American (3.0%) countries 
during the same period (NAPC, 2010; Ofreneo et al., 2012).   
 Second, the government also suffers from weak and fragmented social protection 
mechanisms. In general, social protection in the country has a very narrow range of 
beneficiaries primarily due to financial constraints (Ofreneo et al., 2012). As a result, 
most of the existing initiatives are only able to cater to a small percentage of the 
population that requires assistance. The poor and informal sectors have the least access 
to basic services due to a lack of leverage over decision-making processes carried out by 
local leaders and various service providers (NAPC, 2010). The incapacity of the poor 
sector to actively engage with government agencies in policy dialogue has undermined 
the core objectives of these projects. Therefore, since one of the key roles of the 
government is to address the concerns of marginalised groups, improving the 
participatory mechanisms that are available to the poor is a crucial step toward effective 
engagements with public officials (NAPC, 2010; Ofreneo et al., 2012). The presence of 
many disparate and uncoordinated temporary employment programs does very little for 
the improvement of social protection in the country.     
 Third, the government also faces difficulties properly targeting, monitoring and 
assessing its development programs due to inferior policy designs; mediocre management 
systems; and the asymmetry of information. For instance, only 25.0% of the total poor 
population benefited from a rice subsidy program that was launched by the government, 
while subsidies for tertiary education and housing mainly benefited those in the high 
income brackets (NAPC, 2010). In addition, many of these programs were incompetently 
monitored and evaluated by the same implementing agencies (Ofreneo et al., 2012). Not 
surprisingly, agency officials have lost the necessary motivations and the incentives for 
carefully reviewing the effectiveness and efficiency of their programmes.     
 Fourth, and lastly, the government is beset by weak institutional capacity that 
breeds and sustains corruption. In any country with institutionalised corruption such as 
the Philippines, its integrity pillars – the judiciary and executive; the police and the press 
– are constantly being compromised (Hutchcroft and Rocamora, 2003; Yap, 2011; 
Ofreneo et al., 2012). The Philippines government loses more than $US42 million to 
corruption a year, making it one of the most corrupt nations in the Asia-Pacific region 
(Yap and Tubeza, 2010). In the education sector, for example, corruption has badgered 
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the procurement of textbooks and supplies as well as the appointment and promotion of 
teachers and other education personnel. Similarly, corruption in the health sector has 
substantially reduced the national immunisation rates and increased the average waiting 
time for patients.  
 Several independent global research agencies have confirmed this problem. In the 
2014 Corruption Perception Index (CPI), the Philippines scored 35/100 and was ranked 
85th out of 175 countries that were surveyed.285 Furthermore, the 2014 Global 
Competitiveness Report (GCR) revealed that Philippines’ corruption results in insecure 
property rights; diversion of public funds; low public trust of politicians; and burden of 
government regulation.286 It remains the biggest constraint for improving the country’s 
global competitiveness. Nevertheless, the 2013 Worldwide Governance Indicators 
(WGI) showed an increasing trend in terms of the government’s capacity to control 
corruption, from 38.54% 2003 to 43.54% in 2013.287 In short, corruption has been 
ingrained deep within the national culture and as consequence has become a trademark 
of the Philippine bureaucracy.   
  
6.6 CONCLUSIONS 
National security in the Philippines is primarily rooted in the government’s capacity to 
facilitate a proportional level of economic development that minimises structural poverty 
and institutionalised inequality. However, the ability of the very few yet very powerful 
Filipino elites to transform the country into an archipelago of oligarchies or 
“oligarchipelago” highlights the deeply entrenched oligarchic system vis-à-vis patrimonial 
culture that has come to define the Philippine development problematic. The primacy of 
the oligarchy or family dynasties in the national government and economy deeply reflects 
the Philippines’ “soft” state and weak democracy. Such type of domestic politico-
economic arrangement has inevitably resulted in structural poverty and institutionalised 
inequality. Although oligarchy and patrimonialism do not necessarily facilitate conditions 
that lead to political and economic marginalisation, in the case of the Philippines they 
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have further exploited the inefficiencies and weaknesses of an elite-driven political 
economy.  
 For instance, the oligarchs’ strategic utilisation of ineffective trade mechanisms 
has enabled them to maximise their economic wealth and political power despite adverse 
effects on poverty and unequal conditions in the country. Oligarchs can limit the 
distribution of national wealth among them by blocking the passage of social-equalising 
measures. This highly corrupt patronage culture is in direct contrast to the government’s 
people-centric national security model that emphasises a more equitable and inclusive 
economic development. However, in the absence of countervailing powers, the oligarchy 
will certainly adopt policies to ensure its perpetual and uncontested control over the 
Philippine political economy.  
 Where political institutions are frail, differences in leadership styles and methods 
can have enormous effects on political outcomes. The five administrations (including the 
present one) that have emerged after the end of the Marcos regime revealed significant 
variations with respect to the image and quality of their respective governments. Aquino 
was, for better or worse, a “throwback” president whose primary agenda was the 
regeneration of the old oligarchy to restore elite-driven institutions that had been 
sabotaged by her despotic predecessor.288 Ramos was a member of the military royalty 
who bowed down in front of his patrons to negotiate for the implementation of watered-
down economic reforms.289 Estrada was a charismatic actor who misplayed the role of a 
Filipino Robin Hood by pillaging the nation’s wealth, but only to redistribute them 
among his kinfolk and friends instead of his poor and oppressed supporters.290 
 Arroyo was the wilful presidential daughter whose mastery of economic 
philosophy had enabled the efficient plundering of government resources. She was 
consequently overthrown by another People Power Revolution.291 Lastly, Aquino III is 
the acquiescent son whose unforeseen rise to the presidency has inspired dreams for a 
new belle époque in the Philippines’ political economy - if only he would compromise his 
oligarchic roots and upbringing. Thus, the Philippines’ case is a strong illustration of how 
state power can be transmogrified into a powerful device that secures some narrowly 
defined oligarchic interests.  
 
                                                 
288
 Based on Hutchroft’s (2008) characterisation of the past four Philippine presidents after Marcos. 
289
 Ibid.  
290










































TRADING IN BIAS: MALAYSIA’S HUMANIST SECURITY-TRADE LINKAGES 
 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
The long-standing practice of dividing Malaysians into bumiputras (literally interpreted as 
the “sons of the soil”) and non-bumiputras has been at the crux of deeply entrenched 
ethnic divisions in the country.292 The country’s march toward a multi-ethnic nation 
building has been severely undermined by aggressively promoting the bumiputra identity 
as the cornerstone of Malaysian nationalism. Since the creation of the Malaysian state, no 
serious reference has been made toward a pluralistic nationalism in Malaysia (Gomez and 
Jomo, 1997; Gomez, 2004). This observation highlights the rather uneasy transformation 
of Malaysia into a nation that is more accommodating of non-bumiputra interpretations of 
national security. Despite Malaysia’s great ethnic diversity, its security policies and 
strategies are heavily Malay-centric since they are defined entirely by bumiputra leaders and 
policymakers. In fact, Article 153 of the Malaysian Constitution states that: 
 
 It shall be the responsibility of the Yang di-Pertuan Agong (King of Malaysia) to safeguard 
the special position of the Malays and natives of any of the States of Sabah and Sarawak and 
the legitimate interests of other communities in accordance with the provisions of this 
Article.293 
 
 Thus, the Constitution provides a strong legal basis for the provision of exclusive 
rights and privileges to the Malays, which are not extended to other ethnicities 
particularly the Chinese-Malaysians and the Indian-Malaysians. Despite the bumiputras’ 
significantly enhanced economic status and continued political supremacy, Article 153 
remains embedded in the Constitution. The Barisan Nasional – the country’s perpetually 
ruling regime currently dominated by the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO) 
party – constructs and implements various ideational and material security apparatuses 
designed to preserve the Malay-dominated status quo (Humphreys, 2010; Azizuddin, 
2013). In the process, the Barisan regime has become the equivalent of the entire 
Malaysian nation-state. The wider objective of protecting Malay interests has been co-
opted by the narrower objective of securing the Barisan’s political perpetuity using a 
pretext of inter-ethnic equality. To pursue its Malay-centric social vision, the government 
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has launched a number of affirmative action policies (AAPs) that have been implemented 
at the expense of other Malaysian ethnic groups (Faaland et al., 1990; Gomez and Jomo 
1997, Nathan, 1998; Nelson et al., 2008).       
 The government’s bold gamble with neoliberal economic policies, specifically 
those involving free trade, has rewarded Malaysia with robust economic growths 
(Athukorala, 2005; Tham, 2008). This in turn has allowed the Barisan regime to formulate 
and execute a number of ethnic-oriented AAPs, including: the New Economic Policy 
(NEP, 1971); the National Development Policy (NDP, 1990); and the New Economic 
Model (NEM, 2010). Given the political costs and economic inefficiencies generated by 
these racially-configured initiatives, their relevance in twenty-first century Malaysia has 
received enormous criticisms from local and external observers (Mandal, 2004; Meerman, 
2008; Ragayah, 2008). The popular view is that the Barisan are fundamentally biased 
against non-Malays because the latter are seen to curtail their rights as Malaysian citizens 
even further.         
 Interestingly, the economic and political viability of these initiatives are constantly 
debated not only by the non-bumiputras but also by the so-called “othered” bumiputras 
comprising non-Muslim and non-Malay indigenous groups found mainly in the Sabah 
and Sarawak regions. Rather than fostering a sense of equality by creating fair 
opportunities for everyone regardless of their ethnicity, the AAPs have been designed to 
achieve equality based on results that they intend to achieve: that is, the security of the 
bumiputras’ political, economic and social status. However, the UMNO-led regime has 
offered a compelling case for the implementation of AAPs by arguing that economic 
growth is not sufficient for creating an equitable and just multi-ethnic society (Gomez 
and Jomo, 1997; Nathan, 1998; Khoo and Wah, 2002; Nelson, 2008). Furthermore, it has 
emphasised the need to ensure that the trickle-down effects of export-led growth would 
eventually reach Malaysia’s most economically disadvantaged sectors particularly the 
bumiputras. Therefore, the Malay-dominated government maintains that the AAPs are not 
zero-sum strategies used to systematically exploit the non-Malays. A closer inspection of 
these “social-equalising” strategies reveals that the Barisan’s deep-seated political interests 
must be protected at all costs.         
 This chapter critically analyses Malaysia’s use of free trade principles to secure 
and enhance its diversity space amid the presence of one-sided domestic security 
dilemma engendered by the bumiputra factor.294 The term “diversity space” in this context 
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specifically refers to the supposedly equal rights and opportunities of all ethnic groups in 
Malaysia to participate freely in the country’s political, economic and social affairs. The 
sections explore the different facets of the country’s nation-building process vis-à-vis 
preservation of the government’s racially-configured policies in the twenty-first century. 
Such an approach leads to a scenario where the enhancement of Malay security inevitably 
demands the de-enhancement of non-Malay security. Hence, de-ethnicising the political, 
economic and social arrangements of the country remains highly unlikely as long as the 
constitutional framework that legitimises a bumiputra-centric Malaysian nation-state is 
sustained.          
 In light of this, I attempt to answer the following sets of questions. First, why 
does Malaysia link its humanist security interests with free trade activities? Given the 
existing bumiputra factor, how does free trade (at bilateral, minilateral and multilateral 
levels) affect Malaysia’s remaining diversity space? Second, why does the government 
continue to maintain its ethnic-biased affirmative policies amid the country’s shrinking 
diversity space? What are its implications for Malaysia’s domestic politics? Third, what 
are the factors that limit the capacity of free trade to secure and enhance Malaysia’s 
diversity space? How do they influence its one-sided domestic security dilemma? 
 
Plan of the chapter 
The chapter is divided into six sections. In Section 7.1, I provide the context through 
which Malaysia’s humanist security-trade linkages in the twenty-first century will be 
examined. I argue that against the backdrop of the bumiputra factor, one of the primary 
referents of Malaysia’s national security is its diminishing diversity space. The 
government’s predilection for a bumiputra-centric nation-building process inevitably 
engenders a scenario where the Malays’ collective security inexorably hinges upon the 
non-Malays’ collective insecurity. Put differently, enhancing the bumiputras’ relative 
security inevitably leads to the relative insecurity of the non-bumiputras. This problem is 
reinforced by the continuous supremacy of a Malay-dominated Barisan regime in virtually 
all aspects of Malaysian affairs. To maintain its political legitimacy and perpetuity, the 
UMNO-driven regime develops and implements racially configured affirmative policies 
under the pretext of ethnic parity and harmony. Yet, even for the “othered” bumiputras, 
the very concept of “bumiputraism” has become an exploitative instrument that legitimises 
and empowers the Malay bumiputras at their expense, thereby resulting in widening the 
cleavages between them (Ibrahim, 2012; Welsh, 2013). 
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 In Section 7.2, I briefly examine the process of nation building in a pluralistic 
Malaysia by tracing the roots of its one-sided security dilemma, which in turn drives the 
country’s ethnic-based political, economic and social arrangements. I provide preliminary 
insights about the importance of economic engagements – mainly through free trade – as 
a means of developing and sustaining Malaysia’s affirmative policies deemed crucial for 
diversity in the face of a one-sided domestic security dilemma.  
 In Section 7.3, I discuss results from the key informant interviews (KIIs) 
conducted with Malaysian officials as a part of research fieldwork. The objective is to 
provide a general understanding of why Malaysia’s humanist security interests and trade 
activities are linked together, and how these linkages influence the survival of the island 
nation in the twenty-first century. These interviews have focused on the three main 
aspects of Malaysia’s security-trade nexus: (i) its national security policies and strategies; 
(ii) its free trade activities and agreements; and (iii) the relationships between these two 
variables. This dialogue is crucial for determining the discrepancies (if any) between the 
Malaysian government’s rhetoric and action, as well as state and nons-tate perceptions. 
 In Section 7.4, I evaluate the impact of Malaysia’s free trade activities on its 
overall level of diversity space. First, I discuss the pivotal role of free trade as a means of 
significantly expanding Malaysia’s domestic economy, which in turn, has enabled the 
government’s employment of costly ethnic-based affirmative policies. And second, I 
critically evaluate the individual AAPs adopted by different Malaysian prime ministers 
since the 1970s to highlight their impacts on the country’s shrinking diversity space.  
 In Section 7.5, I identify some of the key factors affecting the utility of FTAs for 
securing and enhancing Malaysia’s existing diversity space. I analyse the material and 
ideational apparatuses comprising Malaysia’s national security policies and strategies, and 
assess the economic and political viability of affirmative policies.  The objective is to find 
out the potential ramifications of these factors on Malaysia’s humanist security-trade 
linking efforts, and from there, evaluate the country’s capacity to overcome its one-sided 
domestic security dilemma. In doing so, I explain why racially biased policies are deemed 
more favourable than ethnically neutral initiatives when enhancing Malaysia’s internal 
security. 
 Finally in Section 7.6, I conclude by arguing that the de-ethnicisation of 
Malaysian nation-building remains a great challenge today given that the bumiputra factor 
has always served as the primary impetus for policymaking in the country. Because of the 
pre-eminent status of the bumiputras, the wider goal of achieving pluralistic security for all 
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Malaysians has been gradually reduced to the narrower pursuit of homogenous security 
for the Malays. To this extent, it may be inferred that Malaysia’s national security is 
designed primarily to counter the insecurities confronting the Malays by promoting their 
ethnic interests above all other racial groups. Instead of promoting a greater sense of 
national unity, domestic institutional mechanisms have generated racially configured 
perspectives that are socially divisive. The state efforts to build a “1 Malaysia” identity 
have led to the institutionalisation of a particular social frame based on ethnic identities, 
thereby creating even greater tensions and divisions among people.295 The result is a one-
sided security dilemma where improvements in the political, economic and social security 
of the non-bumiputras regrettably lead to equivalent insecurities on the part of the 
bumiputras.  
 Free trade plays a central role both in the creation and preservation of this 
dilemma. The country’s impudent involvement in various free trade activities has enabled 
the government to ratify and institutionalise several affirmative policies that have further 
strengthened the bumiputras’ relative position in society often at the expense of other 
ethnic groups. These actions are morally acceptable for the Malay-dominated Barisan 
regime as they are means of carving out a space for the often impoverished and 
powerless “sons of the soil.” In the end, the long-standing question of “bumiputraism for 
whom” remains as pertinent today as ever in Malaysia.  
 
7.2 NATION-BULDING IN A MULTI-ETHNIC MALAYSIA  
In the case of Malaysia, the state emerged at approximately the same time as the ruling 
political coalition and developed before the establishment of the nation (Gomez and 
Jomo, 1997; Nathan, 1998; Crump, 2007). Since the country’s formal independence, the 
Barisan regime has dominated and controlled Malaysia’s state and non-state affairs. 
Inevitably, state institutions and machinery have become extensions of the coalition that 
exploits them. The Malaysian state has become identical to the Malay-dominated regime 
– where the government is the Barisan Nasional, and the Barisan Nasional is the 
government (Nathan, 1998). Given the Barisan’s overarching preponderance, the regime 
can manipulate effectively the construction of Malaysia’s national security rhetoric and 
agenda. Not surprisingly, the Barisan’s top leaders and figureheads have traditionally 
defined security threats in terms of the problems that undermine the legitimacy and 
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stability of the coalition. This underlying agenda has been pursued under the pretext of 
fostering ethnic equality among all Malaysians through the preservation of certain Malay 
privileges and rights that cannot be extended to other races. 
  Interestingly, even Malaysia’s former name Malaya was an allusion to the basic 
“Malayness” of the tanah Melayu or the Malay land (Nathan, 1998). These narrow 
conceptions of Malayness had been maintained even after annexation to the Malayan 
territory of Singapore (until 1965) along with the two North Borneo regions of Sabah 
and Sarawak (Nathan, 1998; Crump, 2007). Hence, the racial ascription of territories was 
a vital component of Malaysian nation building particularly during its formative years. 
Constitutional provisions underpinning the security and sovereignty of the Malayan state 
were anchored on the sacrosanct role of the nine Malay sultans who also supervised the 
administration of Islam within their respective states (Hooker, 2003; Roff, 2003; 
Shamsul, 2003). Therefore, the sultans had served as legitimating actors in the 
institutionalisation of the Malays’ supreme authority over Malaysia. This overarching 
thrust of the Malaysian Constitution remained inviolable, even to this day. Logically, the 
Malay rulers have framed the perceived corrosion of traditional Malay values and loyalties 
as a threat to the nation’s security in the face of growing pluralism. 
 To further complement the establishment of the Malay rulers, Bahasa Melayu has 
been elected as Malaysia’s national language, thereby providing another tool for 
legitimising the Malay dominance (Nathan, 1998; Humphreys, 2010). Its selection as the 
official medium of educational instruction and government communication further 
reinforced the bumiputras’ politico-economic and socio-cultural ascendancy within a 
supposedly multi-ethnic and multi-religious country.  Moreover, Islam had also been 
proclaimed as Malaysia’s official religion, which cannot be questioned under any 
circumstance (Humphreys, 2007; Azizuddin, 2010). Nevertheless, the Constitution does 
allow freedom of religion for all non-Muslims comprising 40.0% of Malaysia’s total 
population.  
 The Muslim-dominated government attempted to practice a secular variety of the 
religion to emphasise the country’s moderate and tolerant interpretations of Islam. There 
is a widespread concern that Islam might be an apparatus for exploiting the Malays’ 
relative backwardness by amplifying their sense of insecurity and inferiority (Welsh, 2004; 
2013; Humphreys, 2007). Malay security is more closely linked to a “universalist” and 
modernist conception of Islam, which focuses on nationalism rather than religion per se. 
As Malaysia’s first Prime Minister, Tunku Abdul Rahman (1986: 142-143) succinctly put 
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it: “Islam stands for complete understanding between all peoples and all races.” 
Therefore, the rise of an Islamic state is deemed a serious threat to Malaysia’s security 
interests.  
 Through the Islamisation of public policy under federal authority, the 
government can desegregate the role of Islam as a contrivance of national security. 
However, the federalisation of Islam inexorably intrudes on the customary function and 
influence of sultans as the primary chiefs of Islamic affairs within their respective 
dominions, thereby diminishing the significance of the Malay monarchic space as a 
referent for Malaysian security (Khoo and Wah, 2002; Lim, 2003; Hamayotsu, 2003, 
2004;Milner, 2003). Likewise, the passage and implementation of draconian 
constitutional policies such as the Internal Security Act, Sedition Act, Official Secrets Act 
and the Printing Press Ordinance, have substantially undermined the sultans’ capacities 
for executive power (Gomez and Jomo, 1999). 
 Therefore, it may be surmised that the perceived strength of ethnic Malays rests 
on the relative political weakness of other Malaysian races, particularly the Chinese and 
the Indian-Malaysians. Since the country’s political axioms are essentially Malay in 
derivation and progression, the concept of a Malaysian nation-state is reduced to a mere 
political expression. The reason is that the political groundwork of Malaysian security 
disproportionately feeds on bumiputraism. Thus, the monarchy, religion and language 
merge to buttress the Malay ethnicity, which in turn, becomes the core foundation of 
Malaysia’s national security.  Therefore, securing the bumiputras’ dominion space rather 
than the country’s diversity space is considered de rigueur for the creation of the Malaysian 
nation. Mahathir (in Nathan 1998: 522) justified such act by arguing that: 
 
The Malays are spiritually inclined, tolerant and easy-going. The non-Malays and especially 
the Chinese are materialistic, aggressive and have an appetite for work ... The economic 
dilemma of the Malays still exist [because] for every step forward that the Malays make in 
the economic field other races make ten... [Hence], the whole process must be planned and 
executed with speed and thoroughness to produce a complete radical change in the Malays. 








Table 6: Summary of key informant interviews in Malaysia296 
 
7.3.1 On Malaysia’s national security   
There are three main themes that emerged from the discussion of national security in 
Malaysia during the interviews: (i) the bumiputra-oriented conception of national security 
initiated and maintained by the UMNO-dominated Barisan Nasional regime; (ii) the 
centrality of economics in this Malay-configured national security; and (iii) the resulting 
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 Malaysian representatives from two different sectors participated in interviews to provide 
comments and insights on Malaysia’s security-trade nexus in the twenty-first century. The selected 
participants were both practitioners and experts in their respective fields. While their views do not 
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more general understanding of Malaysia’s security-trade linking efforts. Interviews were conducted 
with: (i) Dr. Mohd Azizuddin Mohd Sani, Dean of University Utara Malaysia’s School of International 
Studies, College of Law, Government and International Studies (COLGIS); and (ii) Dr. Mohammad 
Syafi’i Anwar, Executive Director of the International Centre for Islam and Pluralism (ICIP) who is 
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but declined. Other academic scholars in Malaysia were invited, but declined citing the “sensitive” 
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part of the interviews, the participants discussed their general views on the concept of national 
security in Malaysia. In the second part, they discussed this security concept in relation to the 
country’s participation in various free trade activities. In the final part, the informants discussed 
linkages between the country’s security considerations and free trade objectives. This section does 
not provide an in-depth analysis of each statement provided by participants. The key arguments 
presented in this section are thoroughly discussed in Section 4 and Section 5. As mentioned, the main 
objective of this section is to present an overview of Malaysia’s security interests and predicaments, 
as well as free trade initiatives and engagement strategies.  
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bumiputra-centric affirmative policies designed to enhance Malaysia’s national security 
defined in terms of Malay security. When conceptualising Malaysia’s national security, 
Syafi’i Anwar argues that:  
 
In studying national security, we first need to discuss national identity.  In this regard, we 
look at the spirit of nationalism, its core ideas in the context of a multicultural society. The 
government, therefore, must be committed to developing and promoting the security of 
Malaysian people. The interest of the people is how to create a better Malaysia, hence, the 
need for a more comprehensive security framework.297  
 
 At this point, it is relevant to consider the multi-ethnic composition of the 
Malaysian population. Based on the data released by Malaysia’s Department of Statistics 
in 2013, there are a total of 29.6 million Malaysians comprising 61.4% Malay; 23.7% 
Chinese; 7.1% Indian; and 7.8% from other ethnic groups. The Malays claim entitlement 
to certain rights and privileges that are not readily extended to other ethnic groups, 
particularly the Chinese and Indian-Malaysians who are viewed as immigrant races. The 
institutionalised primacy and dominion of the Malay race over other ethnicities has been 
a pivotal element in Malaysia’s nation building. This has significantly influenced the 
country’s security rhetoric and agenda. Consequently, the concept of Malaysian security is 
defined virtually in terms of Malay security.298 Therefore, any threat that destabilises the 
Malay-dominated status quo is perceived as a national security threat, regardless of how 
this may impact on the rest of the non-Malay population. Hence, balancing Malay 
interests with those who are not Malay is a crucial task on the part of the ruling UMNO 
party that leads the whole Barisan regime. As Azizuddin Sani claims:  
 
It is very tough to replace the Barisan. In Malaysia, the structure of the political party is a 
form of mass movement. In other words, it is a bottom-up process. The Barisan has 
significant support from people. However, due to the enlargement of the middle class, more 
is demanded from the Barisan, which it cannot always provide. Thus, we are witnessing a 
gradual move toward a more genuine two-party political system. Therefore, the ruling 
regime tries to “wag the dog.” The government diverts the public’s attention away from 
political controversies involving the ruling party to cover them up. For example, the 
government is using the media to scare people about Singapore’s plan to invade Malaysia. In 
that sense, it is just a distraction. However, back in the 1990s, Malaysia feared the West. The 
fear was rooted in the idea of cultural imperialism of the western world.  It is probably the 
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nature of the government to change the perception of people to win back and sustain their 
support. To counter that fear, the government focused first on the economic issues that 
gave people a greater sense of security. To this extent, in terms of security we are concerned 
with the economy. 299 
 
 Indeed, the ways the Barisan leadership had attempted to win back and retain the 
bumiputras’ loyalty and support to the regime were by showing their capacity for 
revitalising the Malaysian economy. Mahathir Mohamad’s security ideology had clearly 
underscored the centrality of economics to develop and implement Malay-oriented 
security policies and strategies: 
 
National security is inseparable from political stability, economic success and social 
harmony. Without these, all of the guns in the world cannot prevent a country from being 
overcome by its enemies whose ambition can be fulfilled without even firing a single shot. 
All they need really is to subvert the people and set up a puppet regime. Clearly economic 
difficulties are serious threats to national security. Failure to understand this threat may 
result in a cycle of recession followed by political instability, security threats and even greater 
recession. The skilful management of the economy and clear thinking are therefore an 
integral part of the strategy for national security. 300 
 
 However, Bridget Welsh offers a different view of what national security “truly” 
means in the Malaysian context:  
 
The Prime Minister and his office is the primary referent of national security in Malaysia. 
And the failure to maintain his position is the main threat to “national security”. Malaysia’s 
security remains primarily focuses on domestic issues. This is indicative of allocation in the 
police force, with a focus on maintaining UMNO in political power. Resources are heavily 
skewed to protecting those in power. That said, there are other important concerns. These 
include: a) South China Sea, b) ISIS and terrorism, c) economic performance and d) 
maintaining strong bilateral/multilateral presence. The government strategies are not fully 
cohesive or public. The policy making process remains reactive and centered around the 
premier’s office. The close affinity between the Western countries and Najib has profoundly 
shaped security concerns in recent years.301 
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 Notwithstanding these criticisms, Mahathir’s interpretation of Malaysian national 
security resonated well with the bumiputras who have been suffering from what critics call, 
the “Malay crutch mentality.” This characteristic may be viewed as a type of mindset that 
results from the tendency of Malays to accept flagrant racism in the workplace 
environment or in any other sphere that they are involved in to justify the relative 
stagnation and socio-economic underdevelopment of the bumiputra community (Gomez, 
2007; Mutalib, 2012). As Anwar points out:  
 
In the mindset of the ordinary people, human security is all about economic security. They 
do not really care about the politics of security for as long as they are economically secure. 
This is a very limited understanding of the term “security,” yet is totally comprehensible, 
especially when the people involved belong to the poor class such as the bumiputras. But we 
cannot rely solely on the state. According to the ruling coalition, it is only they that can 
establish a good government. Looking at the most recent election results, however, the 
people begin to think that it is not the case. There is a strong denial on the part of the 
government regarding the people's general sentiments. Thus, the role of the civil society 
organisation is very important in rethinking a Malay-centred concept of security. Now, there 
are still no clear written concepts about basic civil rights that are necessary for all Malaysians 
not only for the Malays but for everyone such as press freedom or the freedom of 
expression in general. Some nationalists would argue that such rights could be exploited as 
they encroach upon the private lives of the public officials. But in Malaysia, press freedom is 
still severely restricted by the government.302 
    
 Using the slogan of “comprehensive security,” the Malaysian government tightly 
controls some basic civil rights, particularly free speech, and rationalises such limitations 
as necessary steps for protecting and maintaining peaceful relations among various ethnic 
groups.303  As Azizuddin laments: 
 
Freedom of speech has always been sacrificed in the name of national security. Although 
democracy is pursued as a political ideal, constraints may be arbitrarily imposed on political 
processes as deemed necessary to save other fundamental values. Somehow, a strong 
government that is able to deal with the competing demands of an ethnically diverse society 
may be viewed as undemocratic as it may deny the people of their basic legitimate rights. 
Here in Malaysia, it is not the limitation of free speech per se that is being contested but 
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rather, the regime’s domination in virtually all platforms of political expression in the hope 
of weakening the opposition as well as supress dissents and criticisms.304  
 
 Overall, based on the comments made by Malaysian experts, the Barisan’s security 
rhetoric and agenda is primarily concerned with the preservation of a bumiputra-imagined 
nation by ensuring their dominance over domestic political, economic and social 
arrangements. Consequently, the broad objective of pursuing Malaysia’s interests has 
been reduced to the narrow objective of preserving the bumiputras’ exclusive rights and 
privileges under the pretext of ethnic equality. By doing so, the Malay-dominated regime 
can effectively squash its major opponents, thereby preserving its political perpetuity. In 
this sense, ethnic issues present a strong ethnic challenge to Malaysia’s national security, 
and, indeed, is a compelling force to drive Malaysian policy both in the domestic and 
international spheres. 
 
7.3.2 On Malaysia’s free trade activities  
Malaysia’s commitment to free trade has played a central role in its remarkable economic 
transformation throughout its history. No other country in Southeast Asia except for 
Singapore has had a long-standing commitment to maintaining relatively low trade and 
investment barriers.305 The country’s open trade policy regime is generally acknowledged 
as the main driver behind Malaysia’s success in harnessing the opportunities and the 
trickle down effects generated by intensifying trade interdependence (UNDP-Malaysia, 
2006; WTO-TPR, 2014). In maintaining the efficacy of Malaysia’s trade strategies, 
Azizuddin argues that:  
 
Malaysia is trying to be friends with all countries. Now, Vietnam and the Philippines might 
consider China as a threat but not Malaysia. In fact, Malaysia is now trying to increase its 
trade with China and the United States in particular. That is why this year [2013] we are 
celebrating the forty years of Malaysia's diplomatic relations with China. Malaysia’s trade 
relations are in the upward trend. By having close relations with both countries, we not only 
increase our trade but also enhance our national security. Not to mention our relations with 
neighbouring countries via the ASEAN is also enhancing our trade prospects, and therefore, 
our national security. Since Malaysia is a small country, it cannot counter big countries like 
China on its own. It utilises the ASEAN to increase its effective political leverage and 










power. However, although mutual suspicion between member states is minimised it does 
not mean that the governments can be very confident that interference by others will not 
take place at one point. 
  
 Indeed, Malaysia’s export-led growth has generated positive outcomes 
particularly with respect to domestic levels of unemployment vis-à-vis poverty. However, 
the government has argued that such results were not sufficient for creating a more 
equitable multi-ethnic society that is crucial for national security and stability (Gomez 
and Jomo, 1997; Nathan, 1998; Hilley, 2001; Crump, 2007). Accordingly, a number of 
racially oriented affirmative policies have been introduced since the 1970s in the hope of 
promoting a fairer redistribution of wealth and resources among the ethnic groups in 
Malaysia. One main rationale behind their implementation, according to the government, 
is to ensure that the trickle-down effects of export-led growth will reach Malaysia’s 
economically marginalised citizens, especially the bumiputras (Embong, 2008; Meerman, 
2008; Ragayah, 2008). For instance, the government’s adoption of the National 
Economic Policy (NEP) in 1970 had two overarching goals: reduction of nationwide 
poverty and social restructuring. The idea was to dismantle deeply entrenched disparities 
in income, wealth and occupation between the bumiputras and non-bumiputras (Gomez and 
Jomo, 1997; Hilley, 2001; Gomez, 2004, 2007; Nelson et al., 2008). The UMNO-led 
government has viewed such a strategy as key to achieving social cohesion and national 
unity within a pluralistic Malaysia. In Harold Crouch’s (2001, p. 243) assessment:  
 
Two decades of the NEP transformed Malaysian society…Because social restructuring had 
been carried out in the context of a rapidly growing economy, the relative and absolute 
increase in Malay participation in the modern economy was accompanied by only a relative, 
not an absolute, Chinese decline…[However] it clearly did not bring justice for all. Chinese 
and Indians felt the brunt of official discrimination while the benefits flowing to the Malay 
community were by no means distributed equally. Nevertheless, although the government’s 
affirmative action policies did not put an end to ethnic rivalry, they did at least blunt the 
sense of deprivation felt by many Malays, while discrimination against non-Malays was not 
permitted to reach a point at which most non-Malays would feel they had nothing to gain 
from the existing social order.  
  
 Despite the seemingly positive outcomes of Malaysian free trade activities, Welsh 
questions their intrinsic utility by identifying its two implicit roles with respect to Barisan 




Trade agreements serve two roles: first, buttressing alliance relationships that shore up the 
external legitimacy of the premier and his party, and second, potentially enhancing economic 
performance which shores up the premier and has portrayed national benefits. Trade 
discussions foster common ground dialogue with multiple countries, despite the differences 
on specific issues.306 
 
 However, from Anwar’s point of view, the more important issue to tackle is the 
willingness of the ruling government to develop and promote the security of the entire 
Malaysian population through its free trade policies: 
 
Neoliberal economic policies, such as trade, must support Malaysia as a whole, not only the 
Malays. To this extent, the state is not the most significant institution of human security but 
the civil society, including the media, the growing middle class and the NGOs. These forces 
act as watchdogs against government excesses and drive the reconceptualisation of highly 
Malay-centric national security.307  
 
 While agreeing to some of Anwar’s assertions, Azizuddin emphasises the current 
state of grassroots civil society in Malaysia that further reinforces the perception about 
state supremacy: 
 
Most Malaysians would argue that the state is still the best entity that could provide security 
for the people. Grassroots civil society is still very weak in Malaysia. The civil society 
organisations (CSOs) in Malaysia are too partisan, that is, they either they side with the 
government or the opposition. Nevertheless, in the post-2000 Malaysian context, there is a 
shift in the political thinking due to expansion of the middle class. The people have become 
more critical to the government’s affirmative action policies that are increasingly viewed as 
“discriminatory” despite the media restrictions. Moreover, the current Prime Minister is 
trying to open up the society to give people more political freedom. Democratisation, I 
believe, is in the process. 308  
 
 Overall, based on the comments from Malaysian experts, the government has 
utilised free trade and its complementary neoliberal economic in pursuing its social vision 
of improving the status of the Malays but often at the expense of other Malaysian ethnic 
communities. Not surprisingly, the government-configured AAPs have attracted 
substantial criticisms from various sectors of the Malaysian population. Critics have 
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pointed to the inefficiencies stemming from a racially -based (rather than a deprivation-
based) system that encourages negligence and indifference on the part of the favoured 
bumiputras (Gomez and Jomo, 1997; Hilley, 2001; Wah and Saravanamuttu, 2003; Nelson 
et al., 2008). The formulation and implementation of affirmative policies is generally 
viewed as an inherently discriminatory approach against the non-bumiputras, which 
further diminishes the limited diversity space in Malaysia. As Malaysia’s former Prime 
Minster Tunku Abdul Rahman himself (1986) has postulated: “An attempt was made to 
fill the target without thought for the ability and the capability of attaining it. Some 
became rich overnight while others became despicable Ali Babas while the country 
suffered from economic setbacks.”  
 
7.3.3 On Malaysia’s security security-trade nexus 
The perceived inter-ethnic economic disparity within Malaysia is continuously being used 
as a rationalisation for not only maintaining, but even enhancing the existing preferential 
treatments afforded to Malays. As Azizuddin claims: 
 
The economic strategies adopted, from heavy industrialisation to trade liberalisation, were 
and still are race-based. Political parties have always played the race card. To some extent, 
this has reinforced the post- immigrant syndrome common among Chinese and Indian-
Malaysians. Because of this the idea of constructive engagement has had limited impacts on 
the development of mutual confidence among ethnic groups in Malaysia. Policies are 
structured top-down instead of a bottom-up approach. The debate between guns and butter 
still tilts toward the latter. Although the government has already done a lot for the people, 
the social contract of ethnic equality must still be fulfilled. Fortunately, after the violent 
racial riots in 1969, racial differences within Malaysia have not led to severe ethnic conflicts 
partly because of the critical middle class. 309 
 
 In a sense, the government’s affirmative policies are not simply driven by the 
vision of building a cohesive and harmonious multi-ethnic Malaysian nation. They are 
strategically designed to maintain the appeal of the UMNO-led Barisan Nasional by 
maintaining the exclusive rights being granted to the Malay community, which forms the 
base of the party’s electoral support. As Welsh asserts:  
 
With respect to the role of free trade agreements on Malaysian national security, they 
enhance the position of the premier and Malaysia’s relations in the region/allies. And there 
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is a host of issues that can undermine their relevance in the Malaysian context such as the 
lack of public support/ownership for these agreements; the lack of transparency in the 
agreements; and the lack of clear benefits for sectors. There are also specific issues, such as 
government procurement, conflict with the underlying rational of the UMNO 
leadership/regime.  
 
 Furthermore, the imposition of affirmative policies has the paradoxical effect of 
further curtailing Malaysia’s diversity by reinforcing the racial disparities experienced by 
the non-bumiputras to favour their bumiputra counterparts. As Anwar warns:  
  
Malaysia is a pluralist world, with a variety of ethnicities, religions, languages and cultures. 
This condition is reinforced by the processes of free trade vis-à-vis globalisation, as well as 
the growth of knowledge and an ever-higher intellectual heritage passing from one 
generation to the next. The problem, however, is that the percentage of critical middle class 
in Malaysia while gradually growing is still very small.310  
 
 Rather than introducing critical reforms that can profoundly transform the 
extremely prejudiced system that is run by the Malays, the UMNO-led regime takes the 
pre-existing methods and practices as priori conditions for what it deems as effective 
governance. As Malaysia’s current Prime Minister Najib Razak has come to acknowledge:  
 
Ethnic-based quotas have been imposed extensively throughout the economy. These 
practices have also given rise to unhealthy and pervasive rent seeking and patronage 
activities, which have over-shadowed and irreparably harmed the meritorious performance 
of key affirmative action programmes. All stakeholders are demanding that these practices 
be revamped and changed to make them more effective, equitable and inclusive. 311 
 
 Overall, the Malaysian government’s pursuit of ethnic parity via the 
implementation of ethnic-based affirmative policies has paradoxically led to the creation 
of a one-sided security dilemma that puts the security of the bumiputras and non-
bumiputras at diametrically opposed positions. Such practice of categorising Malaysians 
between Malays and non-Malays has been the underlying source of strong ethnic division 
in Malaysia. In the case of Malaysia, free trade has been used as a tool for substantially 
improving the country’s economic wealth in order support the creation and 
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implementation of Malay-centric affirmative policies. From the standpoint of the ruling 
political party vis-à-vis regime, securing Malaysia’s diversity space demands a policy of 
deliberate favouritism toward the ethnic bumiputras even at the expense of other ethnic 
groups, particularly the Chinese and the Indians.  
 
7.4 TRADING IN BIAS: MALAYSIA’S HUMANIST SECURITY-TRADE LINKAGES  
 
7.4.1 Free trade: the fuel for affirmative action policies 
 
Mixing the right trade recipe 
The Malaysian government has carefully utilized trade policies as a means of intervening 
in the domestic economy to promote certain sectors that are dominated specifically by 
the Malays.  Notwithstanding the cost of intervention (such as the efficiencies arising 
from the misallocation of resources between protected and non-protected sectors, as well 
as the creation of rents and seeking behaviour), the government insists that it is a vital 
condition for the emergence of the bumiputra business class. The evolution of the 
country’s free trade policies and strategies can be grouped into four phases: (i) Phase 1 
(1957-1970) adopted import substitution to promote the growth of local firms that 
produced simple consumer goods; (ii) Phase 2 (1970-1980) embraced export-oriented 
industrialisation policies which led to the creation of free trade zones that gradually 
reduced tariffs; (iii) Phase 3 (1980 to 1985) initiated a second round of import-
substitution policies for heavy industries – automobile, petrochemical, iron and steel and 
cement industries – which resulted in an increased average protection rate of 70% in the 
early 1980s from 25% in the early 1960s; and finally, (iv) Phase 4 (1985 to present) 
introduced structural adjustment programmes that led to substantial tariff reductions and 
removal of quantitative restrictions.312 
 Foreign direct investments (FDIs) usually follow trade liberalisation and in the 
case of Malaysia, FDIs have always been a critical factor in economic restructuring 
(Athukorala, 2005; Tham, 2008). To attract substantial FDIs, Malaysia has offered 
various incentives including more liberal tax policies, unlimited profit remittances, 
repatriation of capital related to FDI, and the liberalisation of equity rules (WTO-TPR, 
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2006, 2010, 2014). In doing so, the government has actively pursued multinational 
corporations (MNCs) by launching the Malaysian Industrial Development Authority 
(MIDA) to promote its industrial agenda (Athukorala, 2005; Tham, 2008). Some of the 
largest MNCs based in the United States, the EU and Japan have since actively invested 
in Malaysia (WTO-TPR, 2006, 2010, 2014). 
 Various strategies have been employed in order to create a favourable domestic 
environment for the MNCs such as the provision of fiscal incentives in the form of tax 
holidays and the extension of pioneer status to MNCs within the free industrial zones 
(FIZs).313 Malaysia’s Free Zone Act of 1990 has enabled the creation of FIZs for 
manufacturing export goods and the free commercial zones (FCZs) for repackaging, 
trading and transit activities.314 Moreover, the healthy reserves of an educated and 
relatively cheap labour force have been available for the MNCs in Malaysia (Rasiah, 2002; 
Athukorala, 2005; Tham, 2008). 
 Not surprisingly, the Malaysian economy continues to be outward-oriented with 
trade in goods and services that accounts for 162.4% of its GDP in 2014 (WTO-TPR, 
2014). While the economy is relatively diverse, a substantial portion of its foreign trade is 
increasingly becoming intra-regional, that is, within the Asia-Pacific (WTO-TPR, 2006, 
2010, 2014). The tariff remains one of Malaysia’s chief trade instruments that comprised 
1.3% of total tax revenue in 2012 (WTO-TPR, 2014). The relatively small amount of 
tariff revenues reflects the progressive reduction in Malaysia’s MFN tariff rate from 7.4% 
in 2009 to 5.6% in 2013 (WTO-TPR, 2014). Similarly, the gap between Malaysia’s applied 
MFN rate and applied preferential FTA rate has been substantially narrowed (WTO-
TPR, 2014). 
 Malaysia has espoused two key strategies shaping its overall trade and investment 
climate, namely, the Economic Transformation Programme (ETP), and the Government 
and the Transformation Programme (GTP). Both initiatives are being implemented 
through the government’s 10th Malaysia Plan for the period 2011 to 2015.315  Together, 
they highlight the importance of stimulating a private sector led growth and ensuring the 
                                                 
313 
FIZs are export hubs developed to promote export-oriented industries by ensuring that transaction 
costs are minimal and providing infrastructure facilities. In other words, companies within the FIZs are 
able to produce and export goods without paying customs and excise duties, as well as sales and 
service taxes. See, Athukorala (2005); Tham (2008).
 
314
 A full copy of Malaysia’s Free Zone Act of 1991 is available online at 
http://www.agc.gov.my/Akta/Vol.%209/Act%20438.pdf.  
315
 See, Malaysia’s 2010 Economic Transformation Programme available online at 
http://malaysiafactbook.com/Economic_Transformation_Programme; and the 10th Malaysia Plan 
available online at http://www.pmo.gov.my/dokumenattached/RMK/RMK10_Eds.pdf.  
279 
 
full incorporation of Malaysian firms within global value chains. To do so, the 
government focuses its efforts to drawing more investments and fostering greater 
competition to drive national productivity and innovation, which in turn will help 
cultivate local skills.316 In short, the goal is to shift toward a specialisation in higher value-
added and knowledge-intensive production activities.317  
 Malaysia’s policy elites have emphasised the importance of maintaining a limited 
role for the state when running the economy through trade and investment liberalisation; 
elimination of distortive price control mechanisms; regulatory reforms at all government 
levels; and privatisation of government-linked and/or controlled companies (WTO-TPR, 
2014). Furthermore, the government has been urged to promote stronger bases in fast-
emerging Asian economies, particularly in the ASEAN and the Gulf regions by 
intensively promoting various trade-related activities while maintaining close relations 
with its traditional trade partners such as the United States, the EU and Australia 
(UNDP-Malaysia, 2006; WTO-TPR, 2006, 2010, 2014).   At the multilateral level, 
Malaysia plays an active role by granting MFN treatment to all WTO members and 
supporting the negotiations for the Doha Development Agenda (DDA). In addition, the 
country received Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) treatment from the EU and 
Turkey until 31 December 2013, as well as from Belarus, Japan, Norway, the Russian 
Federation and Switzerland.318 In return, Malaysia has signed the Global System of Trade 
Preferences among Developing Countries (GSTP) that grants 10.0% preferential tariff 
for certain goods such as woven fabrics made of man-made fibres (UNCTAD, 2014).
 However, at the regional level Malaysia’s profound inclination with Third World 
philosophy during the Mahathir regime partly explained its rather cynical position toward 
preferential free trade agreements, specifically during the early stages of their 
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development. Under Mahathir’s guidance, Malaysia had held fast to the belief that 
national liberation struggles in the Third World would be a major force in the global 
revolution to recalibrate the existing politico-economic status quo between advanced 
capitalist countries in the West and the impoverished regions of Asia, Africa and Latin 
America (Gomez and Jomo, 1997; Hilley, 2001; Athukorala, 2005). From Mahathir’s 
point of view, Third Worldism could be interpreted as no more than the assertion of 
humanity of the colonised or previously colonised people: 
 
When the rich chopped down their own forests, built their poison-belching factories and 
scoured the world for cheap resources, the poor said nothing. Indeed, they paid for the 
development of the rich. Now the rich claim a right to regulate the development of the poor 
countries ... As colonies we were exploited. Now as independent nations, we are to be 
equally exploited.319  
 
 Thus, Singapore’s announcement of its bilateral FTA plans with Japan in 1999 
was met with strong criticism from the Malaysian side. From the viewpoint of Malaysian 
officials, such a policy stance would not only undermine the cohesiveness of regional 
economic relations and the prospects for establishing an East Asian Economic Grouping 
(EAEG) but also the larger multilateral trade process in the WTO.320 Moreover, by 
signing individual bilateral trade deals, Malaysia warned other ASEAN members about 
the possibility of a “back-door” entry for third parties in the region (Athukorala, 2005; 
Tham, 2008).   
 Nevertheless, a few years after the ratification of the Japan-Singapore Economic 
Agreement for a New-Age Partnership (JSEPA) in 2002, Malaysia has started to join the 
bandwagon. The government began negotiating its own agreements with several 
countries – India, Japan, Korea, Australia, Chile, New Zealand, Pakistan, Syria, Turkey, 
United States and the EU – in efforts to address the diminishing competitiveness of 
Malaysian exports due to preferential treatments extended to other competitors via 
bilateral FTAs (Arnold, 2005; Sen, 2005; Tham, 2008).  
 As of 2015, Malaysia’s trade network constitutes twelve FTAs including the 
AFTA. Five of these are ASEAN RTAs with third countries (Australia and New 
Zealand, India, Japan, South Korea and China), and six are bilateral agreements (with 
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Japan, Australia, Chile, India, New Zealand, and Pakistan).321 In 2012, the Regional 
Comprehensive Partnership (RCEP) negotiations were launched to intensify the linkages 
among the sixteen participating economies involved in ASEAN FTAs.322 Moreover, 
Malaysia also participates in the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) negotiations along with 
eleven other countries. 323 It is also currently negotiating RTAs with Turkey, the 
European Union and the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) comprised of 
Switzerland, Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein.324 Lastly, Malaysia has also actively 
engaged in the APEC’s trade and investment-related initiatives such as the Second Trade 
Facilitation Action Plan (TFAP II) and Bogor Goals Assessment both launched in 2010, 
as well as the Supply Chain Connectivity Framework introduced in 2009 (WTO-TPR, 
2010, 2014).  
 
The reaping of trade benefits 
Through trade liberalisation coupled with FDI creations, Malaysia’s economic structure 
has significantly transformed – from being a raw material producer to a manufacturing-
based economy. In 1975, the share of agriculture of GDP was 24.5%, whereas 
manufacturing’s share was only 15.3% (Athukorala, 2005; Tham, 2008). However, by 
2012 agriculture’s share of GDP dropped to 10.1%, while manufacturing’s share rose to 
24.2% (WTO-TPR, 2014). Meanwhile, the service sector has been the chief contributor 
throughout this period, constituting 50.4% of the 2012 GDP (WTO-TPR, 2014). Given 
the shifting patterns and changing nature of domestic production, the respective shares 
of each sector in total employment have also changed. Agriculture’s share of total 
employment in 2012 diminished to 11.1% from 40.0% in 1975 (WTO-TPR, 2014). In 
contrast, manufacturing’s share of total employment rose to 28.9% from 15.0% during 
the same period (WTO-TPR, 2014). Moreover, by 2012, the service sector’s share in total 
employment was estimated at 53.5% (WTO-TPR 2014).  
 However, before this the manufacturing sector was comprised mainly of small 
enterprises. The lack of job opportunities amid a rapidly increasing population naturally 
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resulted in high levels of unemployment, which subsequently led to racial riots in 1969. 
This compelled the government to adopt structural adjustment policies that would help 
overcome the identification of ethnicity with particular economic function (Gomez and, 
Jomo 1997; Hilley, 2001; Athukorala, 2005; Tham, 2008). To do this, Malaysia focused 
on the development of its manufacturing industries. This led to the establishment of 
industrial estates in selected centres all over the country where local and foreign investors 
could put up their manufacturing facilities (UNDP-Malaysia, 2006; WTO-TPR, 2006). 
The government then created a list of prospective “winners” that would complement 
Malaysia’s macroeconomic targets such as automotive, shipbuilding, iron and steel 
(UNDP-Malaysia, 2006; WTO-TPR, 2006). 
  Unfortunately, Malaysia has had limited success developing globally competitive 
export products considering the lack of clear winners from these industries (Tham, 2004, 
2008; UNDP-Malaysia, 2006). Despite this, Malaysia’s experiment with export-led market 
generated huge economic growth. In the 1970s, Malaysia registered an average growth 
rate of 7.5%, dropped to 5.8% in the 1980s and once again rose to 7.1% in the 1990s 
(UNDP-Malaysia, 2006; WTO-TPR, 2006). In the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis, 
GDP growth plunged to recessionary levels.  However, unlike some affected countries, 
Malaysia did not seek IMF assistance dealing with the crisis (Embong, 2008; Nelson, 
2008; Ragayah, 2008). After initially adopting traditional tight fiscal and monetary 
policies, the government decided to implement some non-orthodox measures that were 
harshly criticised by the international community as they contradicted the IMF’s standard 
remedies (Embong, 2008; Nelson, 2008; Ragayah, 2008).   
 For example, in mid-1998, the National Economic Action Council (NEAC) 
directed the government to expand its fiscal and monetary policies, impose capital 
controls, and peg the Ringgit at RM 3.8 to the US dollar instead of the RM 2.5 pre-crisis 
rate (Hew, 2005; Ragayah, 2008). Although no other country in the region had adopted 
these measures, Malaysia’s 6.4% per capita GDP growth in 2000 underlined its relative 
success.325 To this extent, it can be inferred that Malaysia’s high level of openness does 
not severely undermine its policy space and decision-making autonomy over the 
application of what may be considered as radical measures against powerful external 
shocks (Meerman, 2008; Nelson, 2008; Ragayah, 2008).    
 Since then, Malaysia’s economy has been recovering at a moderate rate of 4.7% 
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in the 2000s.326 Despite the downward trend in Malaysia’s economic growth, the 
country’s industrialisation policies have certainly helped in curbing national 
unemployment, particularly in urban regions, thereby mitigating the incidence of poverty 
(UNDP-Malaysia, 2006; WTO-TPR, 2006). In the 1970s, 21.0% of the urban population 
were living below the poverty line.327 Forty-four years later, urban poverty has declined 
to 1.0%.328 Meanwhile, in the rural areas, poverty incidence was reduced 3.4% in 2012 
from 59.0% in 1970.329 Hence, the transition of the Malaysian labour force from a 
rural-based, low wage sector to urban-based, high income sector has positively 
contributed to the goal of reducing poverty at the national level.    
 
7.4.2 Costly affirmation: ethnic-based affirmative policies in action 
 
The National Economic Policy (1970-1990): economy for whom? 
One of the key strategies employed by the Malay-dominated Barisan regime to overcome 
their insecurity was the adoption and implementation of the NEP from 1970 to 1990.330  
The relative economic insecurity felt by Malays was further aggravated by the results of 
general elections held on 10 May 1969, which appeared to jeopardise even their political 
supremacy (Nathan, 1998; Crump, 2007; Humphreys, 2010). The two parties that had 
campaigned against the legitimacy of special bumiputra rights and privileges outlined in 
Article 153 of the Constitution – the Parti Gerakan Rakyat Malaysia (Gerakan) and 
the Democratic Action Party (DAP) – made significant gains from the said election 
(Nathan, 1998; Crump, 2007; Humphreys, 2010). These perceived vulnerabilities on the 
part of the Malays had often been regarded as sine qua non for the violent racial riots that 
took place on 13 May 1969. Amid such volatile conditions, a “social engineering” 
initiative was passed to eradicate poverty and abolish the identification of ethnicities with 
specific economic functions. That project came to be known as the NEP. Here it worth 
noting that the Malay supremacy and affirmative actions are two different concepts; the 
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latter is time-bound whereas the former is not (Faaland et al., 1990; Means, 1991; Gomez 
and Jomo, 1997; Nathan, 1998; Hilley 2001). 
 The NEP’s overarching goal was the development of a socioeconomic 
environment where Malaysians could find self-fulfilment in a system that provided for 
proportional participation, management and control in the economic life of the nation. 
This vision was to be achieved through rapid expansion of the economy that would 
reduce the non-Malays’ share of the economic pie in relative terms while increasing it in 
absolute terms (Gomez and Jomo, 1997; Crump, 2007; Beeson and Bellamy, 2008; 
Humphreys, 2010).  Such a strategy was deemed appropriate by the Malaysian 
government for the redistribution of national wealth in favour of the bumiputras.  
 By the 1980s and 1990s the interventionist policies rolled out in the previous 
decade had been gradually replaced by economic policies that significantly curtailed the 
state’s economic role (Faaland et al., 1990; Gomez and Jomo, 1997; Nathan, 1998). 
Nevertheless, the underlying objective of entrenching the bumiputras’ tight control of the 
Malaysian political economy had remained intact. Hence, the government launched 
several programs designed to enhance the Malays’ economic security such as the 
Incorporated and Heavy Industries Corporation of Malaysia (HICOM), as well as the 
deregulation and privatisation policies implemented in the mid-1980s.331 
 The most ardent proponents of the NEP point to its apparent success, 
particularly between the 1970s and the 1990s: (i) the increase in the bumiputras’ share of 
national wealth from 4.0% to 20.0% per capita GNP rose from RM 1, 142 to RM 12,102; 
(ii) the reduction of absolute poverty 6.8% from 50.0%; and (iii) the expansion of 
bumiputras’ market share from 2.0% to 20.0% (Jomo, 2004; Lee, 2011). However, in terms 
of wealth redistribution results proved to be inconclusive. Although the Gini index 
decreased from 51.3 in 1970 to 44.6 in 1997, 70.2% of the total households in the 
bottom 40.0% income group were bumiputras whereas 62.7% of the total household in 
the top 20.0% were non-Malays (Jomo, 2004; Lee, 2011). Furthermore, intra-ethnic 
income inequalities had noticeably increased, specifically within the bumiputra 
communities (Lee, 2011; Aziz, 2012).   
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 Despite the affirmative policies’ marginal effects on inequality, there is little 
doubt that the bumiputras are now in a much better position than they were in 1969. 
Although resentment among the non-Malays has remained strong since its introduction, 
the architects of the NEP have pointed to the fact that Malaysia has not experienced 
violent race riots similar to those in 1969 when the bumiputras felt most vulnerable 
economically (Faaland et al., 1990; Jomo and Gomez, 1997; Nathan, 1998; Khoo and 
Wah, 2002). Notwithstanding questions regarding the credibility and consistency of the 
statistic released to the public by the government, the Barisan officials were quick to 
assert that such figures justified the adoption of an ethnic-based economic restructuring. 
Despite the claims that such developments were as much the results of robust economic 
growth as affirmative policies, the Malaysian government had stoutly emphasised the 
“social equalising” effect of its NEP (Gomez, 2004; Mandal, 2004; Meerman, 2008; 
Nelson, 2008).           
 Soon, the broader goal of developing the bumiputras’ assets has shifted to a much 
narrower goal of creating wealth for individual Malays based on their business 
connections and political clout. The system for assigning lucrative government projects 
has come under the control of well-connected Malays in various bureaucratic agencies 
(Gomez and Jomo, 1997; Kooh and Wah, 2002; Gomez, 2004; Salazar, 2004; Merman, 
2008). Moreover, the “Ali Baba arrangements” being negotiated between the Malay 
renters looking for “can-do” Chinese business associates that can run bumiputra-
dominated sectors have become a standard practice (Gomez and Jomo, 1997; Meerman, 
2008; Lee, 2011).  
 This has enabled the commissioned Chinese entrepreneurs to exploit large pools 
of capital exclusively available to their bumiputra counterparts. Hence, underneath the 
NEP’s affirmative policies, a new breed of Chinese impresarios has started to emerge. 
Therefore, national wealth is trapped in the hands of the economic elites whose 
successes are largely the results of government favouritism as distinct from merits and 
skills. Accordingly, Chinese Malays have typically viewed the NEP as the “necessary evil” 
for preventing further aggressions from the bumiputras, and have thus come to terms with 
these given conditions.      
 In short, the NEP did completely succeed in addressing the cause of unequal 
wealth distribution vis-à-vis the economic disparities that it engendered despite the 
launch of affirmative policies that further shrunk Malaysia’s diversity space. Since it did 
not discriminate on economic status (both rich and poor bumiputras were entitled to the 
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same benefits under the NEP), it became a windfall-generating mechanism for the 
powerful bumiputras rather than an instrument for assisting Malaysia’s most marginalised 
sectors. By lumping together the wealthy and deprived bumiputras in one race-based 
category, the NEP generated imbalances, which resulted in the continued economic 
deprivation of some Malays. For instance, its goal of enabling the bumiputras to acquire 
30.0% of national wealth could lead to a scenario where only a few bumiputras are sharing 
29.0% of the wealth, while the rest compete for the remaining 1.0%.  
 Another serious criticism worth noting is the absence of specific plans for 
assisting the Chinese and the Indian-Malays to achieve their 40.0% target during the 
NEP’s actual implementation. Clearly, the NEP has further aggravated Malaysia’s 
patronage system with which the former Prime Minister Mahathir himself had played a 
proactive role by dispensing favours and providing occasional policy concessions 
through a web of bilateral arrangements (Faaland et al., 1991; Means, 1991; Gomez and 
Jomo, 1997; Hilley, 2001; Yusof and Bhattasali, 2008).   
 
National Development Policy (1991-2000): development for whom? 
The NEP was replaced by the National Development Policy (NDP) developed by then 
Prime Minister Mahathir and was implemented in 1991 until 2000. Its main thrust was to 
further minimise racial imbalances in a more explicit manner. The NDP reiterated the 
importance of the NEP by maintaining its main components while introducing several 
modifications, including: (i) a shift in focus of the anti-poverty strategy toward the 
eradication of hard-core poverty rather than poverty in general; (ii) a shift to the 
employment and rapid development of the Bumiputera Commercial and Industrial 
Community (BCIC) to enhance Malay participation in modern economic sectors instead 
of merely emphasising bumiputra ownership and control of corporate equity; (iii) greater 
reliance on the private sector in the restructuring objective by creating greater 
opportunities for its growth; and (iv) greater focus on human resource development as a 
fundamental requirement for achieving the objectives of growth and distribution.332  
 On the one hand, competition among foreign firms within the Malaysian 
economy had been openly supported by the government to limit the role of domestic 
capital and further accumulation of national wealth largely held by the Chinese 
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community (Sundaram, 1993, 2007; Nathan, 1998; Menon, 2008). On the other, a 
number of programs had been implemented to promote entrepreneurship, managerial 
expertise and skills development within the Malay community (Nathan, 1998; Menon, 
2008).  
 In other words, the NDP continued to pursue most the NEP’s affirmative 
actions designed for the ethnic Malays, which further reinforced the bumiputra’s 
supremacy over Malaysia’s political economy. Notwithstanding the change in focus with 
respect to the government’s two-pronged strategy vis-à-vis its application of a balance 
development concept, the NDP was, in essence, version two of the older NEP.333 The 
outcome was an increase in the number of Malay political elites opposed to any type of 
concessions that undercut the bumiputras’ constitutionally guaranteed “privileged space” 
despite its adverse impact on the country’s diversity space.  
 In fact, even the question of whether or not the NEP and NDP’s objectives have 
been met is considered classified information. From the perspectives of some bumiputra 
elites, the 1969 racial riot were the results of the violation of the social contract between 
the Malays and non-Malays that emphasised the inviolability of the former’s supremacy 
(Nathan, 1998; Hilley, 2001). Therefore, Malaysia’s political system reflects a 
consociational arrangement where compromises are negotiated by the elites that 
represent their respective ethnic enclaves (Gomez and Jomo, 1997; Nathan, 1998; Hilley, 
2001; Embong, 2008). The viability of the scheme depends on the the government’s 
ability to sell the idea that these inter-ethnic agreements promote and secure the interests 
of the whole nation and not only those of the most favoured group. However, in reality 
attempts at power sharing within the ruling Barisan coalition were made essentially in 
Malay terms and conditions. Consequently, gerrymandering and “siege legitimacy” have 
become common strategies for addressing latent threats to Malay supremacy while 
preventing the full development of those hidden within specific internal cleavages 
(Hussein, 2002; Wah, 2002, 2003; Lim, 2003; Ostwald, 2013). To this extent, economic 
nationalism has led to the consolidation of narrow bumiputra security interests as opposed 
to Malaysia’s national security objectives.  
 
New Economic Model (2010 – present): a new economy for whom?  
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 In March 2010, Malaysia’s current Prime Minister, Najib Razak has unveiled his 
economic plan called the New Economic Model (NEM).334 One of its main thrusts is the 
conversion of some of the NEP’s ethnic-based affirmative policies into need-based 
strategies. The idea is to shift the government’s role to being a facilitator rather than a 
mere orchestrator of pro-growth policies (Gooch, 2010; Lee, 2011). Such a shift would 
inevitably require the curbing of Malaysia’s contentious affirmative policies that have 
adversely affected the non-Malays. This marked the first time that a Malaysian prime 
minister had explicitly linked the nation’s continuing socioeconomic dilemma with the 
Barisan’s social engineering experiments and proposed some important amendments (Lee, 
2011).   
 Although Najib has not advocated for the complete dismantling of affirmative 
policies, it was a bold political statement that signified a progressive Malaysian leadership 
in the twenty-first century. Therefore, the questions are what has driven the UMNO-led 
Barisan Nasional to take such a political gamble, and is it sincere about deconstructing its 
ethnic-based approach to domestic policymaking.  While some economists have long 
contested the efficiency and fairness of Malaysia’s AAPs, it is only recently that a leader 
of the ruling political party has acknowledged an influence on the country’s enduring 
structural economic problems (Gooch, 2010; Schelleken, 2010; Lee, 2011). The UMNO’s 
growing vulnerability as evidenced by the Barisan coalition’s dismal showing in the 2008 
general elections, has made it less contentious for present leaders to undo (at least 
rhetorically) many of these racially-configured policies.335   
 There are several existing structural problems in the Malaysian political economy 
that the NEM has attempted to address, including: (i) private investments falling from 
32.0% of GDP in 1996 to 10.0% in 2011; (ii) widespread corruption by bureaucrats; 
heavy dependence on low value-added industries generating low-skilled jobs for low 
wages; (iii) lack of innovation, creativity and dynamism in the economy; and (iv) an 
inadequate number of skilled workers (NEAC, 2010). These problems underline 
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Similar to all post-independence general elections, Malaysia’s 2008 parliamentary election was 
won by the ruling Barisan coalition. However, it yielded one of the worst outcomes in the coalition's 
history after securing only 140 parliamentary seats (or 63.1%) of the total 222 seats. Opposition 
parties, represented primarily by Democratic Action Party (DAP), the Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party 
(PAS), and Parti Keadilan Rakyat (PKR), had won a total of 82 seats or 36.9%. It marked the coalition’s 
failure to win a two-thirds supermajority in the Malaysian Parliament required to pass amendments 
to the Constitution since 1969. Five of the twelve contested state legislatures were also won by the 
opposition, compared with only one in the 2004 election.   
289 
 
Malaysia’s inability to escape from a so-called “middle-income trap” due to its refusal to 
undertake necessary reforms (Subramaniam, 2014). As such, Najib’s proposals have 
explicitly linked his idea of successful reform with the transformation of national 
mentality vis-à-vis a comprehensive review of persisting affirmative policies. From 
Najib’s perspective, policies that have worked wonders in the previous era are now 
posing significant obstacles to Malaysia’s success by creating market distortions that put 
the nation in a disadvantaged position (Lee, 2011). Accordingly, Najib has decided that 
the Malaysian politico-economic, as well as educational systems need to be reformed by 
adopting market-friendly and merit-based approaches (Lee, 2011; Subramaniam, 2014). 
These planned reforms reflect the government’s attempt to phase out the provisions that 
have led to rent-seeking and patronage activities pursued in the name of Malay 
affirmation. In the words of Najib:  
 
Affirmative action policies cannot be based on a fixed point in time. They must evolve as 
the needs and economic conditions of a society change … The NEM is a natural evolution 
of the NEP to meet contemporary requirements for greater transparency, accountability and 
the merit-based, rather than race-based, needs of our poorest citizens… Our ultimate goal is 
that no Malaysian will live in poverty and every citizen will receive a fair chance to succeed 
and prosper. This was also the goal of the NEP. Its original objectives are still relevant, but 
it is time to review the way in which inclusiveness is conceptualised and implemented…To 
achieve our vision of a high-income, sustainable and inclusive economy, we must address 
disparities in ways that matter to all Malaysians, whether Malay, Chinese, Indians, 
Kadadusuns, Ibans or the Orang Asli … Economic disparities have long been a source of these 
tensions and the NEM seeks to address this gap by striking a fair balance between the 
special position of the Bumiputeras and the legitimate interests of other communities. An 
inclusive society will narrow the inequalities in our nation, help those in need and will utilise 
the talents of all Malaysians in our effort to build a competitive economic workforce.336 
  
 Thus, Najib is the first Malaysian prime minister to openly question and challenge 
the wisdom of Malay preferentialism. His “1 Malaysia” project was implemented to 
project globally the present government’s internal capability to manage multiculturalism, 
stability and development. By pushing for inclusive and sustainable policy reforms that 
mitigate patronage practises and extend affirmative actions toward all underprivileged 
Malaysians regardless of their ethnicities, Najib is taking a gamble that is unprecedented 
in the regime’s history (Kwek, 2011; Lee, 2011). Malaysia is now under the leadership of 
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a prime minister that sees the country’s structural dilemmas as the unforeseen outcomes 
of his comrades’ affirmative policies. Ironically, it was Najib’s father, former Prime 
Minister Abdul Razak, who instituted these affirmative policies in the aftermath of racial 
riots in 1969.  
 Najib is not alone in espousing these views. Based on the opinion poll conducted 
by Merdeka Centre for Opinion Research, 71.0% of Malaysians (of which 65.0% are 
Malays) agreed that affirmative policies needed to be reformed.337 In addition, more than 
50.0% of the respondents agreed that politicians were to blame for Malaysia’s racial 
problems while 41.0% did not consider themselves as “Malaysians first.”338 However, this 
does not imply that the prime minister is not facing some serious opposition. In fact, 
various sectors have expressed their concerns over Najib’s plans including his very own 
UMNO party, the left-wing and some influential segments of the Malaysian elites (Lee, 
2011). Hence, it will be naïve to view such rhetoric as pure altruism, let alone a 
“metanoia” on the part of UMNO leadership. The underlying motive remains the 
preservation of the Barisan’s central role in virtually all aspects of Malaysian affairs under 
the UMNO’s headship. Nonetheless, the announcement to reform certain NEP 
provisions denotes a shrewd tactical shift on the part of the ruling party vis-à-vis 
coalition.  
 Since the NEM’s roll out, the government has introduced haphazard reforms. 
For instance, non-Malays have been allowed to participate in some previously restricted 
economic subsectors.339 However, critics have pointed to major areas excluded from the 
early reforms including finance, mining and resources, real estate and utilities. Moreover, 
although Najib has rejected calls for a compulsory increase in the 30.0% target for 
bumiputra proprietorship, he has failed to revise, let alone abolish, the said target based on 
his NEM proposals (Lee, 2011; OECD, 2013). In fact, in June 2010, the Prime Minister 
confirmed that the NEP target of 30.0% would remain (Lee, 2011). This decision 
underscores the continuation of preferential treatments given exclusively to the 
bumiputras under the Najib government (Nambiar, 2009, 2010; Lee, 2011). By limiting 
structural adjustments to non-politically sensitive sectors, Najib’s NEM failed to induce 
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deeply penetrating reforms into the Malaysian political economy. Hence, the rollback of 
the “affirmative state” under Najib’s leadership remains highly improbable.      
 Such outcomes, however, are largely predictable given that genuine reforms 
would imperil the overarching supremacy of the Malay elite. Therefore, the Barisan 
Nasional Supreme Council has rejected Najib’s idea of moving away from the NEP target 
as the coalition was not prepared to risk the status quo that legitimises its power 
(Nambiar, 2009; Hong, 2010). The re-assessments of affirmative policies were reported 
to have been watered-down by some senior heads of the UMNO party, thus further 
highlighting the absence of a unanimous support for Najib’s strategic gamble (Hong, 
2010; Lee, 2011). Meanwhile, outside the UMNO party, Malaysia’s civil servants – 
comprised mainly of the bumiputras – are also a crucial referent unit of the NEP’s 
affirmative policies (Embong, 2008; Meerman, 2008; Nelson, 2008). Understandably, 
they are the staunchest critics of Najib’s “de-racialised” NEM proposals. With 
approximately 1.2 million Malaysians in the civil service (of which 90.0% are bumiputras), 
the group constitutes a huge electoral support base that the UMNO cannot afford to 
alienate amid the party’s heightened political challenges to the party.340 
 It will be misleading to assume that the opposition parties have a unified stand in 
favour of the proposals for winding back the bumiputra-centric policies. This is evident in 
the reluctance of the ultra-Islamic PAS for adopting strategies based on a free-market 
approach and discontinuing exclusive government subsidies for the Malays (Porter and 
Permatasari, 2010). It will also be a mistake to presuppose that discontented Malay voters 
will back the attenuation of the AAPs favouring the bumiputras. Rather than expressing 
dissatisfaction toward these policies, the main complaint is against the institutionalised 
corruption and cronyism enabling the few bumiputra families to benefit while excluding 
the rest of the Malay population (Malhi, 2003; Case, 2004; Welsh, 2004; Derichs, 2004; 
Liew, 2007). In short, there is insubstantial evidence for suggesting that anti-UMNO 
Malays would support reforms that will demolish the AAPs from which they derive most 
of their benefits.  
 Even more startling is the huge internal backlash that Najib’s proposals are facing 
within the UMNO itself. The rise of the Perkasa, a non-governmental Malay supremacy 
organisation formed in the aftermath of the 2008 general elections, reflects the growing 
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discontent among the members and officials.341 The group is reported to have some 420, 
000 active members, 60.0% of which are said to be from the UMNO. One of its top 
advisers is no less than former Prime Minister Mahathir. In the midst of the UMNO’s 
growing instability, minimising internal divisions has become a top priority for its leaders 
even if it entails the preservation of an affirmative state. Consequently, Najib is retreating 
away from his bold pronouncements, conceding that the pace of reforms rests on people 
buying-in to the changes (Hookway, 2010; Lee, 2011).  
 
More justifications 
As far as the ruling party vis-à-vis regime is concerned, maintaining positive growth via 
free trade has been a necessary precondition for securing and enhancing one of the 
primary referents of Malaysia’s national security:  a fragile diversity space that provides 
little or no room for the bumiputras. While some developing countries are still trying to 
figure out how to tame the forces of economic liberalisation to work in their favour, 
Malaysia is already instilling and nurturing a “first-class mentality” among its citizens. To 
do so, the Malaysian government has staunchly undertaken racially configured affirmative 
policies that were deemed important for facilitating a more equitable distribution of 
national wealth. At the surface level, results were short of phenomenal. Between 1970 
and 2010, the country’s annual economic growth has regularly exceeded 8.0% (averaging 
to an impressive 6.4% yearly), thus augmenting the national income more than six times. 
Malaysia’s expeditious development coincided with its rapid integration into the world 
economy, which also resulted in a remarkable progress in education as well as physical 
infrastructures (UNDP-Malaysia, 2006; WTO-TPR, 2006, 2010, 2014).  
 These interrelated factors have enabled the government to establish export-
oriented manufacturing industries, which have been fuelled by the steady inflow of FDIs. 
Despite the negative socio-cultural externalities that may have arisen due to the 
affirmative policies, the Barisan’s vision of developing a bumiputra commercial and 
industrial class has materialised to some extent. Furthermore, the Malay-dominated 
government is firm in its belief that its social engineering project has driven the necessary 
structural transformation within Malaysia by contributing immensely to the development 
not only of the Malays’ physical capabilities but also their mental psyche, thereby 
reducing their sense of vulnerability and insecurity. These positive results, along with the 
                                                 
341 




relative stability of the domestic environment, cancel out the high costs of Malay 
affirmation. 
 By doing so, the Barisan government seems to demonstrate (albeit 
unintentionally), the complementarity between neoliberal economic policies such as free 
trade and equitable social growth. To a certain extent, the Malaysian experience has 
shown that a market-oriented economic development can produce relatively equitable 
occupational and class structures with the help of ethnic-based social policies (Embong, 
2008; Meerman, 2008; Ragayah, 2008; Nelson, 2008). Economic growth stimulates the 
fiscal resources necessary for curing some of the country’s social deficiencies and the 
effective employment of social policies enhances the social cohesion and political 
stability indispensable to growth. However, as shown in the detailed discussions of 
Malaysia’s affirmative actions, the noble objective of protecting the bumiputras’ interests is 
reduced to the narrow pursuit of preserving the Barisan’s political supremacy under the 
pretext of securing Malaysia’s diversity space.  
 
7.5 LIMITS TO MALAYSIA’S HUMANIST SECURITY-TRADE LINKAGES  
Several factors influence the Malaysian government’s capacity for overcoming the deeply 
entrenched bumiputra factor permeating the country’s political, economic and social 
arrangements. These are: (i) economic limits of bumiputra affirmation; (ii) political limits 
of bumiputra affirmation; (iii) limits of the Barisan’s ideological security constructs; and (iv) 
limits of the Barisan’s material security constructs. The first and second factors represent 
the constraints to Malay-centric affirmative policies that are sustained despite their 
economic and political limits. The third and fourth factors represent Malaysia’s ‘hearts 
and minds’ security slogan that exacerbate further the one-sided domestic security 
dilemma. However, it is worth noting that these factors are all interconnected and 
therefore overlap with each other. Together, they undermine the diversity-upgrading 
utility of Malaysia’s free trade activities by further reinforcing the underlying bumiputra 
factor. 
 
7.5.1 Economic limits of bumiputra affirmation 
Despite Malaysia’s largely acclaimed development story, several factors have eventually 
weakened the country’s economic performance. These are rooted primarily in the 
inefficiencies of its AAPs which put into question their economic sustainability. When 
restructuring Malaysian society, the government has sought to create a bumiputra 
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entrepreneurial and industrial community (Mandal, 2004, 2008; Gomez, 2005; Salazar, 
2005). This new class was envisioned by Mahathir as the future source of Malaysian 
innovation and investment that would put the country on the map of the developed 
world. In other words, the bumiputra entrepreneurial and business class would become 
the driver of Malaysia’s economic development. Several measures were undertaken to 
pursue this objective: (i) privatisation; (ii) purchase of additional firms; (iii) capital 
participation requirements; (iv) PERNAS subsidiaries; and (v) government contracts.342  
 The general sentiment is that majority of large bumiputra enterprises emerged as 
the result of rents acquired from the government. Only a small fraction of the bumiputra 
business class created over the past decades participated in export-oriented 
manufacturing industries. Most of them directed their entrepreneurial efforts toward 
rent-seeking practices induced by patronage politics within the government (Gomez and 
Jomo, 1997; Nathan, 1998; Hilley, 2001; Meerman, 2008). As such, the bumiputra business 
class is commonly described as crony capitalists whose main function was to act as 
substitutes for the political patrons. They have been accused of exploiting the resources 
provided to them by the government, and are therefore often criticised for being rentiers 
rather than genuine industrialists (Gomez and Jomo, 1997; Hamayotsu, 2004; Mandal, 
2004; Salazar, 2004; Lopez 2007).        
 Mahathir himself was at the forefront of many of the government’s economically 
costly affirmative policies. In fact, prior to his premiership, Mahathir had long argued 
that equality between races could only be achieved when each race was represented at 
every layer of Malaysian society, in every sector of employment, in proportion more or 
less to their percentage in the population (Faaland et al., 1990; Nathan, 1998; Milne and 
Mauzy, 1999; Hilley, 2001). Mahathir had envisaged a bumiputra business class that would 
eventually develop commercial and industrial expertise necessary to build rents “by 
investing surplus and creating new wealth, not just for themselves but also for the 
nation” (in Meerman, 2008: 91).  
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partnerships with private firms, as well as to nurture developing industries that would be held in trust 
until the Bumiputras obtained adequate experience to take them over. Finally, lucrative government 
procurements and contracts were offered virtually to Bumiputras, while non-bumiputras had to settle 
as sub-contractors. See Gomez and Jomo (1997); Khoo (2002); Wah (2002); Mandal (2004); Salazar 
(2004); Lopez (2007); Meerman (2008).   
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 However, such an outcome has often been elusive. Members of the bumiputra 
business class have frequently created joint ventures and subcontracted their operations 
to local and foreign firms that have the right capacity to perform the required tasks.343 By 
2006, 85.0% of the contracts originally awarded to the bumiputras went into the hands the 
non-bumiputras (Meerman, 2008). Consequently, the wealth and income of the non-
bumiputras have substantially increased amid the public sector’s heavy reliance on their 
capacity to carry out critical public investments and deliver other key contracts (Salazar, 
2005; Lopez, 2007; Lee, 2008; Meerman, 2008). Such arrangements have produced a 
corollary effect known as money politics based on patron-client relations, where 
government assets and contracts are rewarded to individuals or groups supporting 
politicians from the ruling UMNO party and the larger Barisan coalition (Jomo and 
Gomez, 1997; Salazar, 2005; Lopez, 2007; Lee, 2008; Meerman, 2008). The outcome is 
the rise of a deeply politicised bumiputra business class competing over the management 
of the Malaysian political economy.344     
 The Malaysian government has incurred significant financial losses pursuing its 
multiple and varying objectives – from creating public enterprises and infant industries to 
developing a bumiputra business class and the patronage politic that it engendered. 
However, it is worth mentioning that the audits and reviews of Malaysian public 
enterprises and corporations are the exceptions rather than the standard.345 Although the 
latest datasets are not always available for up-to-date analysis, the available financial 
information offers several insights about the degree and extent of these losses.346 First, a 
substantial part of the estimated four-fold increase in public debt from US$ 8.4 billion in 
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Most of the privatised enterprises came under the management of bumiputras  while ownership 
functions remained under the control of ministries and government boards. By 1984, the government 
acquired more than a thousand firms from purchasing foreign companies and developing new 
ventures. However, between 1986 and 1994 a large number of these firms had been liquidated and 
divested due to poor performance.  See Gomez and Jomo (1997); Lopez (2007); Meerman (2008). 
344 
Politicians, alongside business entities connected to them were usually favoured by the system and 
charged with distributing subsidies. By the end of the century, most of these newly erected firms had 
gone out of business, either due to bankruptcy or expulsion of their proprietors from the 
government’s most-favoured list, that is, ‘de-patronaged.’ Hence, the key members of the bumiputra 
business class heavily relied on the patronage of powerful politicians. Their capacity to generate profit 
and accumulate wealth largely depended on the relative influence of their patrons. See, Khoo and 
Wah (2002); Salazar (2005); Lee (2008); Meerman (2008).  
345
 Analysts continue to face enormous difficulty accessing the raw data from Household Income 
Surveys conducted by Malaysia’s Economic Planning Unit (EPU) as they are still deemed to be racially 
sensitive. Consequently, the analysts of Malaysian ethnic inequalities vis-à-vis diversity space continue 
to rely heavily on published government statistics that prevent a more objective analysis of the issue.  
346 
In an email correspondence with Dr. Tham Siew Yean, Professor and Director of Institute of 
Malaysia and International Studies at the National University of Malaysia (UKM), the sensitive nature 
of ethnic income makes it difficult to provide exact national figures.  
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1980 to US$ 31.4 billion 1986 was attributable to the losses incurred by public enterprises 
(Lee, 2008; Meerman, 2008). Of the total government expenditures of public enterprises, 
75.0% had been appropriated by only a few firms – twenty-seven out of more than one 
thousand (Gomez, 2004; 2007; Lee, 2008). Most of these extremely costly industries were 
part of the government- established HICOM, which had some of the highest levels of 
tariff protection.347   
 Second, the financial outlays associated with the creation of bumiputra business 
class, along with UMNO’s patronage politics, were also sizable. A primary example was 
the government-controlled bank called Bank Bumiputra. In her study of post-crisis bank 
restructuring in Malaysia, Chin Kok Fay (2004) argued that the bank intended to grant 
loans to well-connected bumiputras. Those loans had rarely been repaid. Its subsidiary, the 
Bumiputra Malaysia Finance had its operations in Hong Kong and lost US$1 billion in bad 
loans between 1979 and 1982. In 1998, Bank Bumiputra suffered its third insolvency, 
which required an estimated capital injection of RM 1.2 billion to revive its operation. 
Meanwhile, Sime Bank (another government-owned bank) was also forced to close down 
after declaring bankruptcy when it lost RM 1.8 billion. Following the 1997-1998 Asian 
financial crisis, the government allotted 17.0% to 22.00% of its GDP (RM 60 billion) for 
the restructuring of its banking system and rehabilitation of depreciated assets.  
 Third, and lastly, the huge outflow of skilled labour and capital induced by the 
so-called Malaysian Chinese diaspora, particularly between the 1970s and the 1990s had 
adverse effects on domestic economic growth (Crouch, 2001; Embong, 2002; Mandal, 
2008). The restrictive regulations underpinning affirmative policies resulted in 
institutionalised corruption that eroded the essential fabric not only of the bumiputra 
society, but the whole Malaysian nation (Mandal, 2004; Gomez, 2004; Salazar, 2004; 
Meerman, 2008). Rather than aiming to become efficient managers, producers and 
manufacturers, many bumiputras as well as non-bumiputras focused their attention on 
becoming influential power brokers, knowing that most tenders, awards, licenses and 
approvals of share allocations were decided on the basis of political connections.   
 The government continues to emphasise the remaining inter-ethnic economic 
gap as justification for preserving AAPs. This is despite the fact that the indicator used to 
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For instance, Malaysia’s national car, Proton, covered its much of its costs through the imposition 
of nominal tariff protection averaging to more than 50.0%. Similarly, cement factories employed high 
tariff rates to induce profits in the 1990s prior to their sell-off. Meanwhile, the country’s leading 
manufacturer of steel products, Perwaja Holdings Bhd, had been bailed out three times between the 
mid-1980s and 1997, and is currently being rehabilitated. See, Gomez (2004); Athukorala (2005); Lee 
(2008); Meerman (2008); Tham (2008). 
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measure this gap (the inter-ethnic income ratio or IIR) does not accurately reflect varying 
patterns of income distribution within specific ethnic groups, particularly in cases of 
highly slanted distributions (Khoo and Wah, 2002; Mandal, 2004; Meerman, 2008; Lee 
2011). Thus, it fails to capture the difference between reducing the gap by raising the 
incomes of many poor bumiputras and narrowing the disparity by allowing only a few rich 
bumiputras to amass more capital (Meerman, 2008; Nelson, 2008). This scenario 
potentially leads to the over concentration of national wealth in the hands of very few 
elites who are likely to exploit the resulting power configuration when pursuing their 
vested interests. The notion of narrowing the inter-ethnic economic gap by encouraging 
income accumulation within the upper bumiputra strata inevitably leads to wider 
inequalities at both the community and national levels.348  
 
7.5.2 Political limits of bumiputra affirmation 
Despite the scepticism toward genuine motives for formulating and implementing 
affirmative policies that disproportionately favour the Malays, the UMNO-led Barisan 
Nasional is adamant that it has done so for altruistic reasons. One way of examining the 
political sustainability of ethnic-based AAPs is by looking at the way in which they affect 
the government’s autonomy ratifying and enacting its preferred policy objectives (Lopez, 
2007; Nelson et al., 2008). The Malaysian experience challenges the traditional view that 
globalisation essentially compels national governments to limit their roles in order to 
successfully open their economies to international trade and foreign investments, 
irrespective of their impacts on domestic welfare and equity. Malaysia did not shy away 
from taking alternative paths when the dominant neoliberal philosophies and prescribed 
remedies were at odds with its vision. On the contrary, it implemented robust social 
policies, which despite their enormous costs have proved compatible with equitable 
growth. Under the Mahathir regime, the government attempted to rationalise its policy 
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In fact, the persisting gap is primarily caused by a significant percentage of bumiputras employed in 
low-income sectors found in rural parts of the country. In addition, a portion of this gap can be 
explained by the large concentration of Bumiputras in government sectors, which traditionally offers 
lower wages than private firms. Further, the gap is also prone to overestimation given that a wide 
range of subsidies exclusively available to bumiputras are not accounted for when calculating 
household incomes. Indeed, one of the corollary outcomes of the AAPs was the emergence of a three-
tiered economy driven by a bumiputra-dominated public sector; a mixed-controlled private national 
sector; and a foreign-led FDI sector. For more details, see Mandal (2004); Gomez (2007); Lopez 
(2007); Embong (2008); Meerman (2008); Nelson (2008); Ragayah (2008).  
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choices in terms of its Look East Policy (LEP).349Although the LEP did not yield highly 
successful outcomes, it demonstrated that the powerful ideological influence of 
economic globalisation had not severely constrained Malaysia’s policy preferences 
(Lopez, 2007; Nelson et al., 2008).     
 From the perspective of top bumiputra officials, the AAPs strongly illustrate the 
government’s freedom to develop its desired socioeconomic strategies and consolidate 
efforts in pursuing them. They are striking manifestations of Malaysian policy 
independence amid the constraints generated by intense competition for global markets 
and investments. The fortuitous racial riots of 1969 convinced Malaysia’s political figures 
that stability and national unity necessitated extensive alleviation of national poverty vis-
à-vis the substantial extenuation of ethnic inequalities in income and wealth (Faaland et 
al., 1990; Gomez and Jomo, 1997; Nathan, 1998; Hilley, 2001). This realisation made 
social restructuring an urgent and crucial “extraordinary” measure that needed to be 
adopted to protect national security. Thus, rather than treating economic growth and 
social agendas as mutually exclusive, the Malaysian government emphasised 
complementarity between the two by pushing for the rapid advancement of bumiputras’ 
welfare status without completely neglecting non-bumiputras’ conditions (Mandal, 2004; 
Lopez, 2007; Nelson et al., 2008).   
 The period between 1970 and 1990 largely reflected this conjecture. Foreign 
investors have generally tolerated the imposition of the AAP quotas along with other 
costs primarily because of their perceived influence sustaining and strengthening 
domestic socio-political stability. While Malaysia has been chiefly concerned with 
pursuing economic growth, the government believed that it was able to maintain the 
balance between its social initiatives and those intended to stimulate trade and 
investment (UNDP-Malaysia, 2006; Meerman, 2008; Nelson, 2008; Tham, 2008). Thus, 
although economic liberalisation processes have compelled the government to modify at 
least some of its affirmative policies, particularly during the economic recession in the 
mid-1980s, they did not thwart the core thrust of Malaysia’s social vision.  
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 The LEP was launched at the beginning of Mahathir’s career as Prime Minister in late 1981. The 
policy did not only focus on Japan, but South Korea and Taiwan as well. From Mahathir’s view, the 
notion of ‘looking East’ meant learning the good values of the East (such as technological skills and 
work ethics) rather following all East Asian practices blindly or trading exclusively with them. A huge 
emphasis was placed on developing cooperative projects to enable the technology transfers that 
would benefit both parties. For more in depth discussion of the LEP, see Mahathir (1999); Hilley 




 In this sense, the bumiputra leaders have argued that the continuity of political 
control by one dominant party may have enriched Malaysia’s policy autonomy 
(Meerman, 2008; Nelson, 2008; Tham, 2008). However, the problems of patronage 
politics and clientelism have become so pervasive that they now threaten to undermine 
all justifications that used to preserve the supremacy of the UMNO-dominated regime. 
Over the decades, the demands and pressures coming from these well-entrenched 
coteries have progressively grown and now have the power to influence policymaking 
procedures. The majority of the largesse coming from AAPs have been channelled to 
members of the Malay business class that boast special affinity with the ruling party, 
thereby aggravating the patronage culture enveloping the system (Gomez and Jomo, 
1997; Case, 2004; Hamayotsu, 2004; Salazar, 2004; Welsh, 2004). 
 Thus, another way to assess the political sustainability of ethnic-based AAPs is by 
looking at their implications for the continued primacy of the UMNO party vis-à-vis the 
Barisan coalition. There are several important shifts within Malaysia that can potentially 
alter the manner with which ethnic-oriented policies are crafted. First, advancements 
made in the education sector have resulted in the rise of socio-civic organisations actively 
engaging in national policy debates. Although the government has typically treated civil 
society pressures and criticisms as mere disturbances to day-to-day governance, they have 
the power to influence decisions especially when oppositional parties decide to adopt and 
pursue the issues (Abbott 2004; Mandal 2004; Lopez, 2007; Nelson, 2008). Despite 
limited government attention, the level of critical voices and views expressed by non-
state actors over specific components of the AAPs has continued to amplify.  
 Second, issues concerning inter-ethnic relations are also quickly transforming and 
require new policy strategies. Despite the perceived importance of the AAPs mitigating 
the income and professional gaps between bumiputras and non-bumiputras, Malaysian 
society has remained deeply divided and polarised. The causes of underlying tensions 
among ethnic groups are deeper and more complex than traditional economic 
considerations. They involve the need to recognise and respect differing cultural values 
and religious sensitivities observed by each ethnic community (Welsh, 2004; Derichs, 
2004; Nelson, 2008; Ragayah, 2008). In terms of ethnicity, the formulation of national 
culture policy has proved problematic given that it cannot be established which ethnic 
faction should take over decision-making processes involving cultural matters (Nathan, 
1998; Mandal 2008, 200; Nelson, 2008). With respect to religion, the worldwide 
resurgence of Islam, sifted through and combined with the Malay Muslims’ vision, is 
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progressively restructuring Malaysian bureaucracy, laws and institutions. The country’s 
policy elites are being constrained by mounting tensions between the necessity of 
facilitating an attractive investment environment, and escalating pressures emerging from 
Islamic globalisation (Hussein, 2002; Khan, 2003; Liew, 2007; Othman, 2008).   
 Third, and lastly, Malaysia’s ability to effectively fulfil its chosen policy goals and 
objectives also depends on its national administrative apparatus. For the most part, the 
four decades of the AAPs have somehow improved government capacity through wealth 
creation, human resource development, technological advancement and cross-sectoral 
capital base expansion (Gomez, 2007; Meerman, 2008; Nelson, 2008; Lee, 2011). 
However, bureaucratic inefficiencies and corruption are gradually eroding Malaysia’s 
capacity to efficiently compete globally, which in turn, tarnishes the image of the ruling 
party and coalition. The launch of the National Integrity Plan in 2004 was intended to 
address corruptions, malpractices and all the inefficiencies plaguing the bureaucracy.350 
But despite the initial announcements that efforts to improve Malaysia’s national image 
and integrity were to start from the grassroots right up to the highest stratum of society, 
it remains unclear whether corrective policies will be implemented at both lower and 
higher tiers of government.351  
 
7.5.3 Limits of the Barisan’s ideological security constructs  
A central task of the Barisan’s security ideology is the regulation and control of alternative 
channels for discussing nonconforming opinions (Humphreys, 2010; Chen, 2012). 
Varieties of ideological constructs were in place to legitimise the suppression of local 
political opponents and critics, thereby protecting the prevailing Malay-dominated status 
quo.  As Anthony Downs (1957: 96) argues, these nonmaterial forces represent “a verbal 
image of the good society and of the chief means of constructing such a society.” In 
other words, the government systematically regulates the employment of ideologies to 
promote and preserve the security of the UMNO-led Barisan Nasional coalition, pursued 
under the pretext of safeguarding the constitutionality of Malay rights and privileges.   
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Bureaucratic efficiency and integrity issues are somewhat influenced by the level of salaries and 
benefits offered in various government sectors. Therefore, improved salary schemes such as annual 
income increments are expected to change the negative practices and attitudes commonly attributed 




 The coalition’s security ideologies serve a two-level function: first, restricting the 
space available for alternative ideas that question the Barisan; and second, legitimising the 
passage and enactment of coercive instruments vis-à-vis the coalition that exercises them 
(Humphreys, 2010; Azizuddin, 2010). In doing so, they help to secure the pre-eminent 
status of the coalition against threats coming from various oppositional groups. 
However, the fluidity of ideas implies that the coalition’s security ideologies are neither 
permanent nor fixed, but are contingent on specific political and social contexts of the 
time (Humphreys, 2010; Chen, 2012). Hence, there is no overarching idea that dominates 
Malaysia’s security rhetoric. Nevertheless, there is an underlying goal that binds these 
security ideologies together: winning the hearts and minds of social actors that threaten 
Malaysia’s national security defined as the Barisan regime’s security. 
 These coalition-enhancing ideational constructs create a “cloak for shabby 
motives and appearances” by legitimising and giving meaning to its conducts (Apter, 
1965: 314). They act as political tools for securing the coalition’s hegemony rather than 
being mere reflections of the country’s national aspirations. The uncertainty of Malaysian 
politics in the twenty-first century transforms these ideological constructs into electoral 
“chips” that are necessary for the regime’s continued survival (Derichs, 2004; Welsh, 
2004, 2013; Gomez, 2007; Mohamad, 2007; Chen, 2012). Accordingly, the ideational 
components underpinning Malaysia’s national security framework are naturally bent to 
quash counter-narratives, thereby shrinking the country’s diversity space.   
 Islam plays a pivotal role in the hearts and minds campaign of the coalition. As 
an Islamic federal constitutional monarchy, Malaysia’s national security becomes a 
function of its state-configured Islamic ideology. The goal is to cement the country’s role 
as a worthy leader of the Muslim world by projecting an image of moderation and 
tolerance (Humphreys, 2010; Azizuddin, 2010; Chen, 2012). Accordingly, Islam must be 
the people’s way of life and the coalition’s brand of leadership. It is the very “visible 
hand” that runs and controls Malaysia’s affairs and dictates what the objects of national 
security will be. The creation of the country’s national security rhetoric and agenda based 
on the underlying goal of securing the coalition becomes the paramount concern of the 
dominant Barisan elites especially the UMNO members. 
 
 
Mahathir’s security ideology 
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A centrepiece of this movement is the development and propagation of Mahathir’s 
version of Islam both locally and internationally. At the global level, Mahathir’s 
government had portrayed Malaysia as the “model Islamic state” of the post-9/11 world 
(Hooker, 2003; Malhi, 2003; Welsh, 2004; Humphreys, 2010). The former prime minister 
claimed that his government was successful fighting terrorism domestically by adding 
ideological “sweeteners” to its coercive policies (Hilley, 2001; Othman, 2008; Azizuddin, 
2010). Such assertions were usually made in the context of an Emergency where the 
defeat of communism was largely viewed as a result of a hearts and minds ideology that 
emphasised a moderate and tolerant Islam (Nathan 1998; Welsh, 2004; Beeson and 
Bellamy, 2008).  
 However, at the domestic level the opposite was observed. Mahathir’s state-
sponsored Islam was propagated with the help of strong coercive legislation such as the 
Internal Security Act (ISA) of 1960 and more recently, the Security Offences Special 
Measures Act (SOSMA) passed in 2012. Consequently, an underlying paradox emanated 
from Mahathir’s ideational panorama: that is, conquering the hearts and minds of the 
fearful population thru forced imposition of a coalition made Islam. The implicit goal of 
eliminating counter-narratives to the Barisan’s vision of Malaysian nation building had 
been pursued under the banner of counter-terrorism (Humphreys, 2010; Azizuddin, 
2010). Islamic education had been centralised to wither interpretations that were deemed 
“divergent” by coalition members (Hamayotsu, 2003; Khan, 2003; Noor, 2003; Shamsul, 
2003). Jawi (an Arabic alphabet) was adopted in primary schools to strengthen the 
development of Malaysian identity based on the Islamic doctrines approved by the 
Barisan (Noor, 2003; Shamsul, 2003). 
  Such initiatives were putting greater constraints on the remaining diversity space 
available for Malaysia’s non-Muslim and non-Malay citizens. The result was a two-faced 
Malaysian security ideology that endorsed non-violent and non-forcible Islamic rhetoric 
at the international scene while encouraging coercive and aggressive measures to 
implement them at the domestic level (Humphreys, 2010; Azizuddin, 2010; Welsh, 2013). 
Nevertheless, it effectively helped to legitimise the government’s security machinery in a 
way that perpetuated the Malay-dominated regime.  
 
Badawi’s security ideology 
In October 2003, after twenty-two years in office, yet another candidate from the Barisan 
coalition representing UMNO, Prime Minister Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, replaced 
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Mahathir. Despite his initial promise to adopt a softer approach, Badawi continued 
Mahathir’s strategy of fusing together coercive and ideological apparatus when crafting 
Malaysia’s national security framework. Badawi’s security doctrine, which he called Islam 
Hadhari (Civilisational Islam), reflected the past administrations’ aim of securing the 
coalition rather than the diversity of its multi-ethnic, multi-religious population (Chong, 
2006; Humphreys, 2010; Welsh, 2013). Islam Hadhari was not significantly different from 
Mahathir’s “Asian values” in substance. However, in terms of form, Badawi’s ideology 
took Mahathir’s idea of a model Islamic state to the next level by developing a 
comprehensive doctrine that was supposed to embrace Muslims and non-Muslims alike 
at home and abroad (Humphreys, 2010; Azizuddin, 2010; Welsh, 2013). In other words, 
Malaysia’s signature Islam was transformed into an exportable commodity that would 
reinforce the legitimacy of the Barisan coalition well beyond the country’s borders.  
 As far its main architects were concerned, Islam Hadhari was neither a new 
religion nor a denomination but an effort to bring the ummah (a collective term 
identifying all adherents of the Muslim faith) back to its fundamental Islamic roots as 
prescribed in the Qur’an. The terms used to develop Islam Hadhari were universal, and 
could be applied to different contexts. Badawi’s ideology represented a shift toward an 
understanding of the contemporary era within the purview of Islam. By utilising 
charismatic Islamic terminology, Badawi had succeeded in reigniting the coalition’s 
unpopular security ideology (Al-Attas and Chuan, 2005; Liow, 2005; Welsh, 2013). In 
other words, the form rather than substance made Islam Hadhari an appealing ideological 
construct. 
 By restoring the sense of moderation toward the practice of Islam, Badawi had 
hoped that the non-Muslim Malaysians would feel embraced by the regime (Hamayotsu, 
2004; Welsh, 2013; Hamid and Ismail, 2014). For instance, the economic undertones of 
Islam Hadhari's principles reflect Badawi’s promotion of Islam as a religion for 
development.352 As such, Islam was portrayed as a progressive religion that valued 
individual and communal development (Noor, 2008; Hamid and Ismail, 2014). From 
Badawi’s standpoint, it was Malaysia’s duty to demonstrate by word and action that a 
Muslim country could be modern, democratic, tolerant and economically competitive 
                                                 
352
 Islam Hadhari posits ten fundamental principles that Muslim countries must demonstrate, namely: 
(i) faith and piety in Allah; (ii) just and trustworthy government; (iii) free and independent people; (iv) 
vigorous pursuit and mastery of knowledge; (v) balanced and comprehensive economic development; 
(vi) good quality of life for the people; (vii) protection of the rights of minority groups and women; 
(viii) cultural and moral integrity; (ix) safeguarding natural resources and the environment; and (ix) 
strong defence capabilities.  See, Azizuddin (2009); Welsh (2013); Hamid and Ismail (2014). 
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(Gatsiounis, 2006; Humphreys, 2010; Welsh, 2013). While Badawi was aware that his 
security ideology was hardly a panacea, he was optimistic that his brainchild provided 
valuable insights into how a progressive and modem Muslim nation could be built. 
 Locally, the operationalisation of Badawi’s doctrines was questionable at best. It 
was not clear whether Islam Hadhari represented genuine efforts toward the progressive 
interpretation of Islamic thinking or was merely a strategy for securing Malaysian votes 
by not openly marginalising its non-Malay and non-Muslim population (Noor, 2003; 
Hamayotsu, 2004). The coalition utilised its ideological machineries to justify the coercive 
measures undertaken during a series of crackdowns against “deviant” sects such as the 
Tarikat Samaniah Ibrahim Bonjol in 2004, and Terengganu or Sky Kingdom in 2005. The 
government has portrayed these religious entities as threats to Malaysia’s national security 
by espousing alternative views of Islam and adopting a lifestyle that was different from 
those endorsed by the Barisan. These events highlight Malaysia’s unsecured diversity 
space, exacerbating the one-sided domestic security dilemma.  
 Furthermore, Islam Hadhari had also provided the government with an effective 
ideological apparatus for stifling its political rival, the Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party (PAS). 
Badawi likened the PAS’ brand of Islam to a trap that must be exposed to prevent Malay 
Muslims from becoming ensnared (Chong, 2006). Under Islam Hadhari, the PAS faced a 
“lose-lose” situation: either to comply with a Barisan–sponsored Islam and operate within 
this limited context, or reject this model altogether and become an enemy of the state 
(Hilley, 2001; Noor, 2003; Humphreys, 2010; Azizuddin, 2010). Either way, the 
ideological terrain within which the PAS could manoeuvre was significantly diminished. 
Thus, Islam Hadhari enhanced the government’s monopolistic control over the 
organisation and facilitation of Islam. Divergent sects operating beyond the provisions 
and boundaries set by the coalition were more easily detected and trounced.  
 Clearly, Badawi’s security ideology had become an extension of the implicit 
campaign against the expansion of diversity space that is critical for Malaysia’s pluralistic 
society. Islam Hadhari had inevitably led to the Islamisation of the general populace by 
placing a Barisan - configured Islam at the foreground of Malaysian politics (Azizuddin, 
2010; Welsh, 2013). Furthermore, the patronage system has made Malaysians heavily 
reliant on the goodwill of the government not only politically and economically, but also 
ideologically (Hamayotsu, 2004; Salazar, 2010; Humphreys, 2010). In contrast to the 
supposedly “universal” outlook of Islam Hadhari, this ideological construct generated a 
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self-justifying, intolerant and backward-looking Malay mind set (Noor, 2003; Azizuddin, 
2010; Welsh, 2013).  
 Overall, the government’s claim of instituting a moderate state-sponsored Islam 
remains highly debatable. To begin with, its definition of the term “moderate” is vague. 
The de facto prohibition of a PAS-conceptualised Islam contradicts the moderation 
slogan endorsed by the ruling party vis-à-vis coalition. The Barisan’s brand of Islam had 
become indistinct from the one espoused by the PAS (Khoo, 2004; Chong, 2006; 
Humphreys, 2010). These observations underline the role of ideological constructs in 
securing the perpetuity of the UMNO-dominated Barisan Nasional. The underlying 
motive behind the coalition’s projection of Malaysian Islam as the “reasonable” or 
“enlightened” variant of the religion is the promotion of a state ideology that strengthens 
the stranglehold of the regime and its interests. Although the government projects its 
state-manufactured Islam as a necessary ingredient for establishing Malaysia’s leadership 
role in the Muslim world, its tendency to quell deviant voices underscores the regressive 
nature of the model. Rather than propagating a moderate Islam, the coalition is 
moderating its state-configured religion to suppress all threats to its supremacy. 
Therefore, the ultimate goal is to secure the primacy and legitimacy of the UMNO party 
vis-à-vis the Barisan coalition against opposition emanating from Malaysia’s multi-ethnic 
and multi-religious society.  
 
7.5.4 Limits of the Barisan’s material security constructs 
Material security apparatuses are complementing the government’s ideational security 
constructs. These are coercive laws designed to secure the status quo by removing all 
material and/or ideational challenges to its legitimacy (Case, 2004; Crump, 2007; Derichs, 
2004; Humphreys, 2010; Azizuddin, 2010; Lee, 2011). A primary example is the recently 
repealed Internal Security Act (ISA) initially passed by then Prime Minister Abdul 
Rahman in 1960. As stated in Section 73 of the said Act: “any police officer may arrest 
and detain without warrant any person who has acted or is about to act or is likely to act 
in any manner prejudicial to the security of Malaysia or any part thereof.”353 The ISA is 
complemented by the Sedition Act revised in 1971 by Malaysia’s second Prime Minister 
Tun Abdul Razak, which essentially made the questioning of Malay supremacy an act of 
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The ISA served as a preventive detention law that enabled the arrests of individuals without trial 
and criminal charges under limited, legally defined circumstances for sixty days. Moreover, the Act 
also enabled an extension of the detention period for up to two years at the discretion of the Home 





treason. The latter prohibits virtually all activities with “seditious tendency” that result in 
disaffection and hostility toward the government or communal ill-will.354 Despite initial 
controversies, the coalition skilfully justified the passage of the ISA and the Sedition Act 
by arguing that they are crucial for ensuring Malaysia’s internal security and stability 
(Nathan, 1998; Crump, 2007; Beeson and Bellamy, 2008). Such laws are deemed to be 
particularly relevant in the context of a post-9/11 world order, where they serve as 
effective counterterrorism measures akin to the Patriot Act of the United States and the 
Anti-Terrorism Act of Britain.  
 However, in recent years opposition to the ISA has considerably grown.  Critics 
have argued that the Act was passed to stifle what should have been legitimate political 
opposition under a well-functioning democratic society. Its preventative nature was 
compared to an internal pre-emptive strike (Khoo and Wah, 2002; Gomez, 2007). For 
example, during the Operasi Lalang (Weeding Operation) in 1987, 106 people were 
arrested without proper charges under the ISA. Most of the detainees were members of 
the opposition party and various social activist groups. The coalition issued a White 
Paper explaining the arrests, stating that various groups who had created racial tension in 
the country by playing up sensitive issues had exploited the government's liberal and 
tolerant attitude (Khoo and Wah, 2002; Gomez, 2007).  
 One of the most significant outcomes of the struggle was the introduction of 
section 8B of the ISA, which blocked the judicial review of ISA detentions including 
those brought as habeas corpus petitions (Flaherty and Fritz, 2002; HRW, 2004). In 2001, 
this section of the ISA was used to detain members of the People’s Justice Party (PJP) 
dubbed as the Reformasi or KeADILan 10.355 The detainees led by Anwar Ibrahim’s wife 
Wan Azizah Ismail had pressed vocally for the former’s release. Ibrahim was earlier 
convicted of the misuse of power and acts of sodomy in trials that were marred by the 
coerced confessions of key witnesses according to Human Rights Watch.356 Prior to his 
imprisonment, Anwar was leading rallies across Malaysia in support of his newly-
formed reformasi movement, preaching to vast crowds about the necessity for far-reaching 
social, political, and economic reforms (HRW, 2004, Welsh, 2004; Crump, 2007). In 
response, Mahathir’s side claimed that the arrested activists were planning violent 
protests to overthrow the government and were attempting to procure dangerous 
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weapons and explosives (HRW, 2004; Welsh, 2004; Crump, 2007). Despite the serious 
nature of these charges, the government failed to produce any credible evidence to 
support its accusations.   
 Such abuses drove the oppositionist groups, human rights activists and other civil 
society advocates to mobilise large-scale protests against the ISA. For the protesters, the 
Act was an unnecessary draconian law that did not bode well for Malaysia's vision of 
progressing toward a “developed nation” status (Khoo, 2003; HRW, 2004; Welsh, 2004). 
The popularity of these movements, along with the resurgence of a stronger opposition 
after the 2008 General Elections, played a crucial role in Prime Minister Najib’s decision 
to repeal the Act. In 2012, the Security Offences (Special Measures) Act or 
SOSMA officially replaced the ISA.357 The new Act is envisioned “to provide for special 
measures relating to security offences for the purpose of maintaining public order and 
security and for connected matters.” 
 In contrast to the ISA, the new law requires the filing of charges based on 
credible evidence against detainees after twenty-eight days.358 Thus, the burden to 
produce reliable proofs within a specified period is shifted to the government’s law 
enforcement and intelligence agencies responsible for combating terrorist activities. 
However, the SOSMA is also criticised from both sides. On the one hand, anti-terrorist 
groups argue that the requirement to bring charges within twenty-eight days weakens 
Malaysia’s capacity to pre-emptively contain terrorist threats (HRW, 2012; Spiegel, 2012; 
Jeffrey, 2013). On the other, human rights groups criticise SOSMA for allowing police to 
authorise communication intercepts and permitting prosecutors to present evidence 
without disclosing sources. Moreover, acquitted suspects in the midst of an appeal may 
still be detained in prison or tethered to a monitoring device until the appeal had been 
formally settled (HRW, 2012; Spiegel, 2012).  
 Overall, the effectiveness of these laws in curbing threats of terrorism remains 
inconclusive. Yet, it is clear how such coercive mechanisms have been utilised to secure 
the interests of the coalition by suppressing “rogue” ideas while rationalising the 
continued supremacy of the UMNO party vis-à-vis the Barisan coalition at the expense of 
Malaysia’s already limited diversity space.   
 
7.6 CONCLUSIONS 
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In the case of Malaysia, the noble aspiration of protecting Malay interests has been 
reduced to the narrow objective of preserving the political legitimacy and supremacy of 
the UMNO-led Barisan Nasional.  The government has driven forward its bumiputra-
oriented social vision via the construction and implementation of racially configured 
affirmative policies even when they were detrimental to other ethnic groups in the 
country. This is despite the fact that Malaysia’s national security is essentially anchored in 
the conditions surrounding its remaining diversity space amid a pluralist society. Rather 
than promoting a greater sense of national unity, domestic institutional mechanisms have 
engendered racially informed perspectives that are socially divisive.  
 Government efforts to propagate a Malaysia identity have only resulted in the 
institutionalisation of a reductive social frame based on ethnic identities, hence creating 
even deeper tensions and divisions within the nation. The ideational and material security 
apparatuses used by the ruling party and coalition have further reinforced the Malay-
dominated status quo, so much so that they have been amalgamated with the Malaysian 
nation-state. Ideological security constructs have enabled the Barisan to moderate a state-
configured religion designed to eradicate its political nemesis. Although the government 
insists that a state-manufactured Islam be a necessary component of Malaysian leadership 
role in the Muslim world, its tendency to suppress deviant voices underlines its regressive 
nature. Material security apparatuses have also allowed the Barisan to secure its political 
interests by muffling “rogue” ideas and rationalising its continued supremacy as an 
indispensable part of Malaysia’s national security. The result is the creation of a Malay-
dominated status quo that exploits Malaysia’s political, economic and social arrangements 
at the expense of all non-Malay and non-Muslim Malaysians.  
 Therefore, it may be inferred that Malaysia’s national security is primarily 
intended to mitigate the insecurities felt by the bumiputras promoting their ethnic interests 
above all other racial groups. Such an approach inevitably leads to a one-sided domestic 
security dilemma where improvements in the relative security of non-Malays 
unnecessarily lead to the relative insecurity of the Malays. Along with its complementary 
neoliberal economic policies, free trade has played a pivotal role in the emergence and 
continuation of this dilemma. The huge risks taken by the government to participate in 
free trade have yielded substantial economic growth for the country. The wealth 
generated from this growth fuelled the operation of lopsided affirmative policies such as 
the NEP, NDP and NEM, which have all been pursued under the pretext of ethnic 
equality. Not surprisingly, the AAPs received huge criticisms from various members of 
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the Malaysian population, particularly from the non-Malays as well as the “othered” 
bumiputras.  The inefficiencies created by these racial-based initiatives have been staunchly 
debated and questioned from all sides – political, economic and social. Still, the 
government has continued to insist the AAPs are morally guided as they are designed to 
improve the quality and quantity of space available for the marginalised and powerless 
bumiputras.  
 This tradition of dividing Malaysians into bumiputras and non-bumiputras has been 
at the crux of the country’s deeply entrenched ethnic divisions. In essence, the concept 
of bumiputraism has retarded the development of a genuinely Malaysian nationalism based 
on plurality by unevenly promoting Malay ethnicity even after fifty-seven years of 
sovereignty. Behind these actions lay the UMNO vis-à-vis the Barisan’s deep-seated 
political interests that must be protected at all costs.  Hence, it is difficult to de-ethnicise 
Malaysia’s policymaking processes since ethnicity has always been the main thrust of the 
government’s national security rhetoric and agenda. Given the bumiputras’ pre-eminence 
in virtually all aspects of domestic affairs, the notion of Malaysian security has been 
equated with Malay security. For better or worse, Malaysia’s national security is conceived 
and developed around the bumiputra ethnicity. Even for the non-Muslim and non-Malay 
bumiputras, the idea of “bumiputraism” has become an exploitative tool for legitimising the 
special privileges given to their Malay and Muslim counterparts. The result is widening 
gaps among the bumiputras themselves who now insist on receiving exclusive rights rather 
than equal opportunities. Indeed, the age-old question of “bumiputraism for whom” is not 
















SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
8.1 INTRODUCTION 
In the contemporary East Asian security context, free trade is a double-edged sword that 
simultaneously secures and threatens the primary security referents vis-à-vis interests of 
periphery and semi-periphery countries. Notwithstanding the notion that states are 
mainly fixated on issues concerning tariff and non-tariff barriers, the pursuit of free trade 
in the twenty-first century is a highly political and strategic affair. Both traditional and 
non-traditional security imperatives have fuelled the efforts toward statist and humanist 
forms of security-trade linkages. Free trade has been used as an instrument for 
promoting, enhancing, and securing various types of security referents and interests. In 
turn, the multidimensional and multidirectional security threats and issues have 
influenced the utility and implementation of different forms of free trade activities vis-à-
vis agreements. However, to this point very little has been done to explore and explain 
these linkages based on the overarching assumption of cohabitative security – the view 
that security in the twenty-first century encompasses both statist and humanist 
dimensions. Furthermore, there is a dearth of comprehensive theoretical and empirical 
analyses concerning the linking efforts and strategies of periphery and semi-periphery 
states in East Asia. This thesis has attepted to address those gaps.  
 In this Chapter, I present and analyse the main lessons extracted from the 
empirical study of statist and humanist security-trade linkages across a wide-range of 
security contexts, referents, and threats. Here, I shed further light on how the study’s 
main frameworks for understanding the East Asian security-trade nexus fare in view of 
this analysis. To do so, the chapter is divided into six sections. In Section 8.2, I 
summarise the key theoretical, conceptual, and methodological arguments presented in 
Chapter 1. I stress the importance of a thoughtful reconceptualisation of security, and 
the proper contextualisation of East Asian security-trade linking processes. In Section 
8.3, I present an analytical summary of the empirical results and findings generated from 
case studies to answer the thesis’ main research questions. In Section 8.4, I outline the 
general outcomes vis-à-vis the specific inferences from the case investigations along the 
lines of the study’s main themes. In Section 8.5, I reflect on the key points and outlooks 
regarding the present problems and future prospects of East Asian linkages in the 
twenty-first century, particularly with respect to the periphery and semi-periphery 
countries. I then provide important recommendations based on limitations encountered 
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in the thesis that further an understanding of the security-trade nexus by both small and 
great powers in Asia and rest of the world. Finally, in Section 8.6, I conclude by offering 
some final words about the significance of the study, stressing how it can contribute to 
the existing body of knowledge in the research areas explored.    
 
8.2 THEORIES, CONCEPTS, AND METHODS: A SYNOPSIS  
 
8.2.1 Establishing the operative definition of security 
To analytically investigate and assess why and how small East Asian states link their 
security interests and free trade agendas, and the types and characteristics of these 
linkages, I performed two main tasks. First, I theoretically reconfigured the security 
concept by amalgamating the statist and humanist dimensions of security to establish the 
cohabitative security framework that serves as the operative definition of security in this 
study. Second, I empirically applied the modified security framework to analyse linkages 
between cohabitative security referents (statist and humanist), and various types of free 
trade arrangement (multilateral, minilateral, and bilateral).  
 As argued in Chapters 1 and 2, the rationale behind the construction of the 
cohabitative security framework is to integrate the statist and humanist dimensions of 
security in order to accommodate both the traditional and non-traditional security issues 
and threats emanating within and beyond the states’ boundaries. Thus, cohabitative 
security neither trivialises nor undermines the role and power of the state in the 
construction and ratification of security policies and strategies. Rather than constraining 
the statist security concept to underscore the humanist dimension of security, the 
cohabitative security framework amalgamates the “high politics” of the state and the 
“low politics” of individuals, groups, and communities. The intrinsic relations between 
the primary referents of and specific threats to state security vis-à-vis human security 
underscore the mutually constitutive and reinforcing characters of these two dimensions 
of cohabitative security. 
 The idea of cohabitative security highlights several important points about the 
nature of the security concept in the twenty-first century. First, the distinctions between 
traditional and non-traditional security issues are not insurmountable.359 Second, defining 
security strictly in terms of organised violence leads to a false conclusion that issues that 
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do not entail or constitute force cannot be considered security problems.360 Third, 
limiting the discussion of security to the nation-state creates a misleading notion that 
security cannot be analysed at various levels with respect to non-state referents.361 
Fourth, preventing the rethinking and restructuring of the security concept despite the 
evolving domestic and international conditions can also undermine its practical and 
analytical utility.362 Fifth, the criticism that points to the fundamentally different expertise 
required for tackling nonconventional issues underlines the need for interdisciplinary and 
multidisciplinary approaches to security studies, rather than the need to delineate the 
boundaries of security on the basis of the analyst’s expertise.363 
 While the cohabitative security framework does not provide a panacea for long-
standing conceptual problems of security, it does present an alternative approach for re-
evaluating the governments’ relative successes and failures in integrating individuals and 
societies within their respective national security policies and strategies in the twenty-first 
century. By amalgamating statist and humanist security issues, the state’s role in relation 
to human security is “unvilified”. Cohabitative security reveals how traditional, state-
centric security complements and/or supplements the non-traditional, people-centric 
security, and vice versa. Hence, the notion that state and human security are diametrically 
opposed is overcome, allowing state actors to appreciate the multidimensional and 
multidirectional features of security. To a certain extent, a shared understanding of 
security between the state and non-state actors is reached.  
 
8.2.2 Making sense of the security-trade linking process 
With the development of cohabitative security framework, the thesis has proceeded to 
systematically explore and analyse the linkages between security and free trade at regional 
and domestic levels. At the regional level (using APEC and ASEAN as case studies), the 
thesis has shown how the security concept is “homogenised” by prevailing external 
factors that are commonly shared by all member states. Here, the assumption is that both 
statist and humanist security referents confront similar sets of traditional and non-
traditional threats. The countries have formulated and implemented closely linked 
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policies and strategies through these two regional institutions to counter these threats 
more effectively.  
 As argued in Chapters 1 and 2, the presence of shared perceptions and collective 
understandings about regional security issues has enabled the ratification and enactment 
of binding agreements within APEC and ASEAN. The idea of sovereignty has evolved 
to allow shared accountability and responsibility to exist among members by consenting 
to provide legitimate power to these regional institutions. Against the backdrop of 
intensifying politico-economic interdependence, governments are compelled to facilitate 
cooperative measures combating the security threats that weaken their interests and 
aspirations. Despite their differences, perceptions toward regional security vis-à-vis 
insecurity are rooted on existing collective awareness and shared goals between APEC 
and ASEAN members. As such, the pursuit of security at the regional level is not always 
zero-sum but can also be a positive-sum approach.  
 At the domestic level, (using Taiwan, Singapore, the Philippines, and Malaysia as 
case studies), the thesis has illustrated how the security concept could vary from one state 
to another depending on a broad range of pre-existing domestic conditions such as 
regime type and form of party system; level of economic development; social values and 
practices; as well as cultural biases and expressions among others. The assumption here is 
that the relative nature of the security concept is crucial to the identification of issues 
framed as “existential threats,” and therefore, would be provided urgent attention by 
implementing “extraordinary measures”. As argued in Chapters 1 and 2, different threats 
manifested in different spaces and at different scales demand different cures 
administered at different dosages. Hence, it is reasonable to expect some trade-offs 
between state and human security. Therefore, the thesis has performed an in-depth 
analysis of the domestic contexts and factors that have direct and/or indirect influences 
over the configurations of national security policies and strategies across the samples 
examined.  
 With these in mind, the thesis has attempted to extract alternative views for 
understanding the three key themes of the present research: (i) the motives and rationales 
of periphery and semi-periphery East Asian countries for continuously engaging in 
multilevel free trade despite the problems engendered by increasing economic 
interdependence in the twenty-first century; (ii) the prospects for alleviating state-centric 
and human-centric  insecurities through the linking of broad-ranging security referents 
vis-à-vis, and different forms and types of free trade arrangements vis-à-vis agreements; 
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and (iii) the effects of internal and external security environment on the utility of free 
trade for enhancing, improving, and securing the primary security referents of small East 
Asian countries.  
 
8.2.3 Designing a research template 
Answering its main research questions, the thesis has outlined a comparative qualitative 
research design that allowed for: (i) contextual descriptions; (ii) classifications; (iii) 
hypothesis-testing; and (iv) predictions. First, through contextual description, I have 
identified the regional and domestic contexts underpinning the research phenomenon in 
question: the linking of security interests and free trade activities by periphery and semi-
periphery East Asian countries in the twenty-first century. Second, through classification, 
I have established the conceptual differences between statist and humanist linkages by 
constructing distinct categories based on a set of identifiable characteristics. Third, after 
determining the regional and domestic contexts underpinning the security- trade linking 
activities in East Asia and classifying these linkages between statist and humanist forms, I 
have analysed the different facets of what have been described and classified. Fourth, and 
to a lesser extent, I have attempted to predict the general flows and outcomes of statist 
and humanist forms of linkages in the four countries that have been examined based on 
the findings and observations derived from the case analyses.  
 In support of the thesis’ comparative cross-national study of small East Asian 
powers’ security-trade linking efforts, I have performed multiple case studies 
supplemented by elite interviews and documentary analysis. I offered in-depth analyses 
of the four cases to arrive at more complete and holistic account of the outcome 
explained vis-à-vis the key explanatory factors examined. By applying a similar 
conceptual framework to all four cases, I analysed the motives and rationales behind the 
linking efforts of small East Asian states, as well as their dynamics and effects with 
respect to specific security referents. This enabled a deeper a more comprehensive 
understanding of the intricate patterns of connections between the parts of a 
multifaceted unit.  
 To supplement this approach, I also analytically presented the results from the 
one-on-one interviews with my key informants in each of the four countries. This 
dialogue enabled me to gather vital information about the decision-makers and those 
who influence them, as well as the decision-making process itself. I was able to highlight 
both the congruence and discrepancy between government rhetoric and action, and state 
315 
 
and non-state perceptions by shedding light on the critical issues surrounding East Asian 
security and trade. Lastly, I systematically reviewed and analysed the available primary, 
secondary, and tertiary sources to verify and substantiate the information gathered from 
the elite interviews.  
 Overall, the thesis has provided an explanatory type of research by explaining 
why and how security-trade linking efforts are progressing; interpreting the cause-and-
effect relationship between these two main variables; and examining both the similarities 
and differences among the samples’ responses and outcomes, but without numerical or 
statistical analysis. In contrast to analytic induction, I sought an explanatory strategy 
elucidating the processes at work in a small number of cases using in-depth intensive 
analysis and a narrative presentation of the argument as opposed to finding regularities in 
the relationship between proposed explanatory factors and results across cases.  
 
8.3 FINDINGS FROM THE CASE STUDIES  
The thesis begins with a two-pronged argument about the security-trade nexus in the 
twenty-first century, particularly with respect to the periphery and semi-periphery states 
in the Asia-Pacific. On the one hand, free trade is utilised by small East Asian countries 
to promote, enhance, and secure the primary referents and interests of their respective 
national security policies and strategies. On the other, security threats and issues (statist 
and humanist) influence the utility and facilitation of various types of free trade 
(multilateral, minilateral, and bilateral).  
 Therefore, the decision of states to either rush toward a freer trade or retreat to 
increased protectionism is based on their calculations of the capacity of free trade to 
improve their levels of state and human security. Indeed, for the majority of small East 
Asian countries, free trade has become an essential platform for pursuing various 
elements of their national security interests and aspirations. Thus, retreating to a state of 
autarky has become out of the question. The insecurities cropping up internally 
aggravated by a broad-range of external factors compel East Asian countries (especially 
the small ones) to engage more in free trade activities.   
 Chapters 3 to 7 have carefully scrutinised the distinctive dynamics and outcomes 
of East Asian security-trade linkages in the twenty-first century at regional and domestic 
levels. First, regional linking efforts under the purview of APEC and the ASEAN have 
been systematically analysed in Chapter 3. Second, national linking efforts based on the 
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experiences of Taiwan, Singapore, the Philippines, and Malaysia have been meticulously 
analysed in Chapters 4, 5, 6, and 7 respectively.  
 
8.3.1 Linkage efforts in APEC and ASEAN 
In Chapter 3, an overview of East Asian security-trade linkages has been presented by 
closely examining the evolving agendas of the two most important regional institutions in 
the Asia-Pacific: APEC and ASEAN. Five key factors have been analysed to trace the 
emergence of security-trade linking processes in each region and to clarify how each of 
them has contributed to the “cohabitation” of statist and humanist security issues with 
the organisations’ free trade policy agendas. These are: (i) changing views toward free 
trade; (ii) lethargic multilateral trade forum; (iii) from rush to free trade to rush to 
preferential FTAs; (iv) the Asian crisis’ contagion effect; and (v) the need for strategic 
diplomacy.  
The analysis of regional security-trade linkages within APEC and ASEAN 
contexts has generated some important insights regarding the types of security issues that 
are assimilated into these organisations’ respective trade policy agendas. While APEC’s 
humanist linking strategy has prioritised its members’ economic motives (non-
traditional), the ASEAN’s statist linking approach has emphasised its members’ politico-
strategic motives (traditional). Nevertheless, the changing geo-political, geo-economic, 
and geo-strategic settings are compelling both APEC and ASEAN members to develop 
further their respective agendas to maintain their relevance in the region. Such an 
expansion is difficult for institutions that exhibit “institutional sclerosis” as it prevents 
the implementation of necessary reforms in existing structures and practices. Often, the 
relatively more powerful members are threatened by the increasing influence of the rival 
countries. In response, they rely on the structural power that comes from their privileged 
status in these institutions, thereby reinforcing their role and position.  
 Consequently, the balancing of old and new agendas has been a challenging 
process for both APEC and ASEAN members because of their fixation toward certain 
norm-based procedures such as informality; inclusivity and consensus; and non-
interference. They have often been criticised for their seeming lack of genuine efforts at 
incorporating substantive security issues into their respective agendas. Nevertheless, as 
discussed in Chapter 3, significant shifts in regional and global settings have significantly 
altered the institutions’ views and attitudes toward highly diverse security concerns 
particularly with respect to the non-traditional human security. Despite their 
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shortcomings, the fact that both state-centric and people-centric security issues are now 
appended into their respective agendas highlights the progression of East Asian security-
trade linkages in the twenty-first century. 
 The thesis turns next to the comprehensive analysis of statist security-trade 
linkages at the national level using Taiwan and Singapore as primary case studies. As 
argued in Chapter 1, Taiwan and Singapore both illustrate “statist” security-trade linkages 
given the nature of their primary security referents, contexts, origins, and directions of 
threat, whereas the Philippines and Malaysia both demonstrate “humanist” security-trade 
linkages. 
 
8.3.2 Linkage efforts in Taiwan 
In Chapter 4, Taiwan’s use of free trade securing and enhancing its de facto sovereign 
space amid the presence of a cross-strait dilemma engendered by the One-China factor 
has been critically analysed. It argued that Taiwan’s unique geopolitical status compels its 
leaders to resign themselves to the vicissitudes surrounding the cross-strait environment 
in order to preserve the remaining sovereign space that underpins its de facto autonomy. 
In other words, the only way for Taiwan to be de facto free is by remaining de jure 
unfree. However, this type of engagement approach engenders a prisoner’s dilemma that 
forces Taiwan to choose between its geo-economic interests and geo-political aspirations. 
Recalibrating the current arrangement by promoting either political unification or de jure 
independence invariably diminishes Taiwan’s sovereign space amid China’s aggressive 
sinicisation project.  
 Pursuing either “warm” or “cold” economic engagement with China also 
inexorably results in shrinking sovereign space with the likelihood of overdependence. In 
both cases, the Chinese-centric cross-strait status quo is being further perpetuated and 
legitimised. Thus, although the reopening of Taiwan’s cross-strait links with China (along 
with the successful implementation of its new bilateral FTAs with non-diplomatic 
partners) may have given Taipei officials a new hope, however, the fact that such 
agreements are rooted in the One-China principle implies the continued illegitimacy of 
Taiwan’s sovereignty.  
 Despite the expansionary effects of a détente cross-strait approach with respect 
to the island’s de facto sovereign space, it is hardly adequate for legitimising Taiwan’s 
independent existence in the twenty-first century. In fact, as argued in Chapter 4, the 
deep entanglements between Taipei and Beijing’s security interests, and free trade 
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activities, are coercing Taiwanese officials and policymakers to preserve the prevailing 
cross-strait status quo. In their desire to secure greater electoral votes during general 
elections, the major political parties in Taiwan are forced to “cooperate” with each other 
by agreeing to pro-status quo policies.  
 Consequently, both the pro-China and anti-China factions have restrained 
themselves from espousing policies that could potentially undermine the China-oriented 
conduct of cross-strait relations.  This form of consensus has inevitably led to calls for 
the “normalisation” of cross-strait relations. In doing so, both the KMT and the DPP 
have consistently applied the norm of moderation with regard to their cross-strait 
agendas. Through the progressive homogenisation of the parties’ respective policy 
postures toward the issue of sovereignty, Taiwan remains imprisoned within the One-
China trajectory.  
 As Chapter 4 has clearly demonstrated, there is a huge compromise between 
Taiwan’s competing goals of preserving politico-diplomatic viability, and pursuing 
economic interests. However, despite such trade-off, Taipei officials have decided that it 
would be better to rekindle their relations with Beijing rather than to let the cross-strait 
dilemma lead to an impasse. Unfortunately, for Taiwan, its efforts to secure sovereign 
space through heightened economic engagements (specifically via free trade) are being 
frustrated by the lack of political freedom, if not will, to cancel payoffs to China even 
when that latter’s behaviours violate already established conditions.  
 By presenting cross-strait issues as domestic rather than international affairs, 
China is effectively reducing Taiwanese statehood into a special administrative region 
similar to Hong Kong and Macau. This further marginalises Taiwan’s diplomatic status in 
the international scene, which ultimately leads to the erosion of remaining sovereign 
space. The practice observed when signing Taiwanese FTAs (between government 
institutions rather than between the heads of states) reinforces the notion that Taiwan is 
merely a local government unit of China. In the midst of Beijing’s continuous denial of 
Taiwanese independence, the intensifying free trade is a medium for subjugating the 
island’s remaining de facto sovereign space under the Chinese rule. Hence, Taiwan is 
trapped in what appears to be a perpetual prisoner’s dilemma that is induced and 
preserved by the omnipresent China factor. 
 
8.3.3 Linkage efforts in Singapore 
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In Chapter 5, Singapore’s use of free trade securing and enhancing its defence space 
amid the presence of a security complex engendered by geographic factors has been 
comprehensively examined. It argued that for a small, pragmatic state like Singapore, free 
trade acts as an instrument for preserving its geo-economic and geo-political viability 
underpinning its survival in the twenty-first century. The city-state’s foreign economic 
policies (particularly those concerning free trade) are intended to alleviate its multifaceted 
insecurities, which are being prompted by a pervasive vulnerability fetish. This security 
complex vis-à-vis vulnerability fetish is a by-product of Singapore’s rude awakening to 
independence after its abrupt separation from the former Malaysian Federation. Not 
surprisingly, the government’s pursuit of economic prosperity has been replete with 
security undertones. The Singaporean government has consistently underscored the 
importance of strong economic performance as the fundamental basis of national 
security. In doing so, security considerations have been embedded in Singapore’s free 
trade activities and strategies.  
 Considering the city-states near zero tariff rates across the board, the economic 
benefits that Singapore can gain from the further liberalisation of trade are very limited. 
However, amid its anxiety over survival, the Singaporean government is continuously 
beefing up its economic interdependence with different counties, both big and small, to 
reduce its level of insecurity by linking security interests and free trade activities. Such an 
approach has undergone two directions: intra-regional and trans-regional. On the one 
hand, Singapore has courted the regional powers – China and Japan – in attempts to 
deflect the security threats occasionally emanating from its large Islamic neighbours, 
Malaysia and Indonesia. This is despite initial antagonism coming from some ASEAN 
members who were concerned about the adverse effects of bilateral FTAs on the 
fulfilment of the ASEAN Community.  
 On the other, Singapore has also been proactive facilitating bilateral trade 
relations with the great powers from outside its region. The primary motivation behind 
this has to do with China’s continuous ascent to global power. Despite Beijing’s 
assurances about the benign nature of the much-anticipated Chinese “hegemony,” the 
Singaporean government remains sceptical about China’s real intentions for the region. 
Thus, Singapore has belligerently negotiated for bilateral FTAs with trans regional 
powers, specifically with the United States. From Singapore’s standpoint, a strong US 
military presence strengthens Washington’s security commitments in the Asia-Pacific in 
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the midst of heightened regional tension that happens to coincide with China’s global re-
emergence.  
 As Chapter 5 has clearly demonstrated, the Singaporean government has 
effectively interlaced its national security interests with an overarching goal of bolstering 
the island nation’s cohesion, world prestige and most importantly, regime legitimacy via 
economic success. To justify the restriction of public participation in policymaking 
processes, the PAP regime has endorsed itself as the most qualified political entity for 
securing Singapore’s collective interests through the abolition of highly divisive factional 
conflicts. The PAP officials have long argued that the republic’s volatile security 
environment more than warrants the non-observance of some democratic decision-
making processes concerning national security. The Singaporeans’ silent approval of and 
acquiescent attitude toward the PAP rule has been a crucial component the existing 
social compact between the government and the citizens.  
 Such condition highlights the unique status of the PAP regime within the 
Singaporean society. In contrast to its counterparts in some neighbouring countries, the 
PAP is not only the ruling political party but is also deemed as the lone steward of 
Singapore’s national values and interests. Accordingly, PAP leaders face almost no 
opposition in the construction and implementation of its domestic and foreign policies, 
especially those that concern national security. The arrangement has not only hardened 
Singapore’s prevailing political system, but has also blurred the line separating state 
interest and PAP interest.   
 
8.3.4 Linkage efforts in the Philippines 
In Chapter 7, the Philippines’ use of free trade to secure and enhance its development 
space amid uneven economic development engendered by the oligarchic factor has been 
carefully examined.  It argued that national security in the Philippines is largely anchored 
on the capability of the government to facilitate a more equitable form of economic 
development. However, over the decades the Philippine political economy has been 
characterised by deeply-entrenched oligarchical practices and patronage culture. Such a 
condition has resulted in institutionalised inequality and structural poverty that 
undermine the country’s supposedly human-centric national security policies and 
strategies. The ability of the very few yet very powerful Filipino elites to transform the 
country into an oligarchipelago underscores the deeply embedded oligarchic system 
underpinning the Philippine development problematic.  
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 While oligarchy and patrimonialism do not automatically create conditions that 
result in economic and political marginalisation of the majority, nonetheless, the 
Philippines’ case has unambiguously illustrated the manner in which the elites exploit 
their inefficiencies to maintain a patronage-based political economy. The primacy of the 
oligarchy or family dynasties in the national government and the economy deeply reflects 
the Philippines’ “soft” state and weak democracy. Under such conditions, political 
offices, elected politicians and economic policies have all been consolidated to serve the 
interests of a political system that is permanently regulated by and for the oligarchy.  
 The oligarchs’ deliberate exploitation of ineffectual free trade policies and 
mechanisms has enabled them to maximise their economic wealth and political power 
despite their undesirable impact on poverty and inequality conditions in the country. The 
oligarchic elites can limit the distribution of national wealth by preventing the passage of 
social-equalising measures,. This highly corrupt patronage culture thwarts the 
government’s people-centric national security model that emphasises a more equitable 
and inclusive economic development. Without any countervailing force to rectify the 
system, the oligarchy will certainly adopt policies that will ensure it perpetual and 
uncontested control over the Philippines’ political economy. And although the 
differences in leadership styles and management methods may have substantial effects on 
political outcomes, particularly in countries where political institutions are weak, in the 
Philippines, state power has been transmogrified into a mere apparatus for securing 
oligarchic rather than national interests.      
 As Chapter 7 has clearly established, the five post-Marcos administrations that 
have come to govern the country have failed to deflect the overarching power of the 
oligarchs and the underlying patronage culture that they perpetuate. Aquino had mainly 
resurrected the old oligarchy and in the process restored the elite-driven institutions that 
had been previously squashed by her authoritarian predecessor. Ramos had to bow down 
to his patrons before he could negotiate and implement his watered-down economic 
reforms. Estrada had pillaged the country’s wealth for redistribution among his kinfolk 
and friends. Arroyo had mastered the art of efficiently plundering government resources 
until she was ousted from office by yet another revolution. Finally, Aquino III has yet to 
prove his willingness to compromise his oligarchic roots and upbringing to bring about 
effective and lasting reforms. Hence, the Philippines’ case offers a very good example of 
how state power can be transformed by the oligarchic elites into a powerful device that 
enables them to systematically secure their interests. 
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8.3.5 Linkage efforts in Malaysia 
In Chapter 6, Malaysia’s use of free trade to secure and enhance its diversity space amid 
the presence of one-sided domestic security dilemmas engendered by the bumiputra factor 
has been meticulously investigated. It argued that the moral objective of securing the 
Malays’ economic wellbeing had been reduced to the narrow pursuit of political 
legitimacy and perpetual supremacy of the UMNO-led Barisan Nasional.  Malaysia’s 
national security policies and strategies are designed mainly to mitigate the bumiputras 
insecurities by promoting their ethnic interests above all other racial groups. Such an 
approach has ultimately resulted in a one-sided domestic security dilemma where 
improvements in the relative security of the non-bumiputras gratuitously lead to the 
relative insecurity of the bumiputras. This is despite the fact that Malaysia’s national 
security is essentially rooted in the prevailing conditions surrounding its remaining 
diversity space amid a pluralist society. Accordingly, the UMNO-ruled Barisan has been 
completely amalgamated with the Malaysian nation-state.  
 Free trade, along with its complementary neoliberal economic policies, has played 
a very crucial role in the manifestation and perpetuation of this dilemma. The huge risks 
taken by the government when it started participating in various free trade activities have 
significantly transformed the country’s domestic economy. The wealth created by its 
economic growth has stimulated the formulation of imbalanced affirmative policies 
particularly the NEP, NDP and the NEM, which have all been implemented under the 
pretext of ensuring ethnic equality among all Malaysians.  Not surprisingly, these racially 
configured policies have received considerable amount of criticisms from various sectors 
of the Malaysian population particularly from the sides of the non-Malays and the 
“othered” bumiputras. Despite the economic, political and social inefficiencies that have 
been associated with these initiatives, the government has remained resolute in its belief 
that they are vital instruments for improving the quality and quantity of space available 
for the marginalised and powerless bumiputras. Thus, the Malay-dominated ruling party 
/regime has driven forward a bumiputra-oriented social vision via the construction and 
implementation of ethnic-based affirmative policies despite their detrimental effects on 
the other ethnic groups in the country.  
 As Chapter 6 has clearly demonstrated, the long-standing practice of dividing 
Malaysians into the bumiputras and the non-bumiputras has been at the crux of the 
country’s deeply entrenched ethnic divisions. By disproportionately favouring and 
promoting the Malay ethnicity, bumiputraism has retarded the development of a genuinely 
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Malaysian nationalism. Behind these actions lay the UMNO vis-à-vis the Barisan’s deep-
seated political interests that must be protected at all costs.  In doing so, a number of 
ideational and material security apparatuses have been utilised to further reinforce the 
bumiputra-centric status quo. On the one hand, ideological security constructs have 
assisted the Barisan to moderate a state-configured religion designed to eradicate its 
political opponents. While the government maintains that a state-manufactured Islam is a 
critical element of Malaysia’s leadership role in the Muslim world, its suppression of 
divergent voices reflects a rather regressive nature. Material security apparatuses have 
also enabled the Barisan to secure its political interests by muting those ideas which are 
deemed reckless and by justifying its continued supremacy as imperative to the 
preservation of national security. The outcome is a Malay-dominated status quo that 
exploits Malaysia’s political, economic and social arrangements at the expense of all non-
Malay and non-Muslim Malaysians. Considering the bumiputras’ pre-eminence in virtually 
all aspects of country’s domestic affair, Malaysian security is considered equivalent to 
Malay security.  
 
8.4 THEMES OF EAST ASIAN SECURITY-TRADE LINKAGES  
 
8.4.1 High levels of internal and external insecurities  
Looking at the cases that that have been analysed, it is evident that both traditional statist 
and non-traditional humanist security issues also play a pivotal role in the linkage efforts 
of small East Asian states in the twenty-first century. At the domestic level, the 
examination of Taiwan, Singapore, the Philippines, and Malaysia cases has underscored 
the critical role of internal and external insecurities in their respective linkage efforts.  
 In the case of Taiwan, the primary security referent investigated is the island’s 
shrinking de facto sovereign space against the backdrop of a cross-strait security dilemma 
engendered by the One China factor. As mentioned in Chapter 4, sovereign space refers 
to Taiwan’s de facto domestic and interdependence sovereignty, as opposed to de jure 
international legal sovereignty. This particular security referent represents the statist 
dimension of the cohabitative security model developed in Chapter 1. Thus, the origin of 
Taiwan’s insecurity is external – that is, China.  
 In the case of Singapore, the primary security referent given focus is the city-
state’s shrinking defence space against the backdrop of a multidimensional security 
complex induced by geography. As mentioned in Chapter 5, defence space refers to 
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Singapore’s capacity, both military (hard power) and non-military (soft power) to defend 
its geo-political and geo-economic viability. This particular security referent also 
represents the statist dimension of cohabitative security. Hence, similar to Taiwan, the 
origin of Singapore’s insecurity is external – that is, the Asia-Pacific region. Considering 
Taiwan and Singapore’s security referents, contexts, origins and directions of threat, their 
security-trade linking efforts are considered statist.  
 Meanwhile, in the case of the Philippines, the primary security referent probed is 
the archipelago’s diminishing development space against the backdrop of uneven 
economic development generated and perpetuated by oligarchic factors. As mentioned in 
Chapter 6, development space refers to the capacity of the Philippines government to 
independently and effectively pursue its economic development goals and objectives 
amid a deeply-entrenched oligarchic system vis-à-vis patronage culture. This particular 
security referent also represents the humanist dimension of cohabitative security. Hence, 
the origin of the Philippines’ insecurity is internal – that is, the Filipino oligarchy.  
 Finally, in the case of Malaysia, the primary security referent that has been 
scrutinised is the country’s diminishing diversity space against the backdrop of a one-
sided domestic security dilemma that is generated by the bumiputra factor. As mentioned 
in Chapter 7, diversity space refers to the capacity of all ethnic groups in Malaysia to 
participate freely in the country’s political and economic affairs. This particular security 
referent represents the humanist dimension of cohabitative security. Thus, similar to the 
Philippines, the origin of Malaysia’s insecurity is in internal – that is, the perpetually 
ruling Barisan regime vis-à-vis UMNO party. Considering the Philippines and Malaysia’s 
security referents, contexts, origins and directions of threat, their security-trade linking 
efforts are considered humanist. 
 Nevertheless, as mentioned in Chapter 1, these contexts are neither permanent 
nor exclusive. On the contrary, they change and evolve over time. Accordingly, such 
classifications do not necessarily imply that Taiwan and Singapore are exclusively 
concerned with the statist dimension; whereas the Philippines and Malaysia are solely 
focused on the humanist component of cohabitative security. As emphasised in Chapter 
2A, these two dimensions are mutually constitutive and reinforcing, and therefore critical 
to the overall security of the four countries. Given the prevailing security contexts within 
which they are operating, Singapore and Taiwan tend to focus more on the traditional 
elements of security, whereas the Philippines and Malaysia tend to place more emphasis 
on the non-traditional elements of human security. Thus, on the one hand, the linkage 
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efforts in Taiwan and Singapore are analysed with respect to state security, on the other, 
the linkage efforts in the Philippines and Malaysia are analysed with respect to human 
security.  
 At the regional level, a broad range of internal security issues poses critical threats 
to the governments of different states. For instance, security problems generated by the 
so-called “rogue” states and/or “failed” states (mass genocides; racial violence and ethnic 
cleansing; internal displacements and refugees; and vicious competitions for scarce 
resources) do not only affect their citizens but broader regional communities as well. 
When violent domestic conflicts create externalities that ramify across national borders, 
the division between internal and external politics becomes blurry. The presumptions 
concerning the nature of the domestic realm (as being guided by law, order and 
authority) vis-à-vis the state’s supposedly unitary character erroneously ignore the 
domestic issues that have crucial implication on regional as well as global security 
environment. Using APEC and ASEAN as regional cases, the thesis has also explored 
the linkages efforts of Asian states as a collective entity.   
 Within the purview of the APEC, although both the statist and humanist security 
issues have brought a new dimension to its mission and vision statements, nonetheless, 
the organisation has remained largely committed to its original mandate of ensuring the 
smooth operations of economic activities in the Asia-Pacific. Thus, regardless of whether 
APEC would completely be amenable to these issue linkages (either to placate its 
nervous members or preserve its relevance in the region) the main thrust of the “APEC 
Way” remains to be economic integration within a secured regional trading environment.  
 Meanwhile, under the directives of ASEAN members have displayed limited 
interest linking security issues particularly the non-traditional ones into their free trade 
activities. Economic cooperation has always been secondary to the overarching goal of 
preserving political stability. However, in the post-Cold War era the organisation’s view 
toward the incorporation of the human security concept into its agenda has gradually 
shifted. The fact that some of the prevailing non-traditional security issues are now being 
tackled highlights the progress that the “ASEAN Way” is currently making with respect 
to these linkages despite the relative weakness of compliance mechanisms.   
 Observing both the APEC and ASEAN cases, the pursuit of regional integration 
in the Asia-Pacific seems to confront a crucial paradox: upholding of the principles of 
non-interference and non-intervention while facilitating economic and political 
convergence. The tension created by such a contradiction limits the breadth and depth of 
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East Asian linkage efforts in the twenty-first century, particularly with respect to the non-
traditional humanist dimension of cohabitative security. 
 
8.4.2 Multidimensional and multidirectional security concepts, contexts, and 
threats  
Examining the regional and domestic security rhetoric and agenda of East Asian states, it 
is clear how the multidimensional and multidirectional security concepts, contexts, and 
threats influence their linkage efforts. In the twenty-first century, the referents of security 
are multidimensional and multidirectional. As the study has clearly illustrated, primary 
security referents vary depending on the prevailing politico-economic and socio-cultural 
contexts, as well the level of analysis. Nevertheless, the state continues to play a pivotal 
role in the construction and implementation of the countries’ national security policies 
and strategies. As the thesis has argued, the state simultaneously cohabits and competes 
with other referents particularly those that relate to the non-traditional, human-centric 
elements of security. As discussed in Chapter 2A, where the legitimacy and identity of the 
state are both problematic, humanist security referents may take priority over the statist 
security referents. Accordingly, the considerations for sovereignty, territorial integrity and 
other military-oriented issues are moderated while regional and trans regional interactions 
are modified. However, positing that the state will be superseded by non-state referents 
in the near future might be a bit of a stretch.       
 For all security referents – both statist and humanist – survival is the ultimate 
goal. As the thesis has demonstrated, the pursuit of survival does not always have to be 
ruthless and problematic. It is contingent upon several factors including the relative 
distribution of material capabilities; shared intersubjective understandings; and dominant 
social practices. As far as state actors are concerned, political survival (traditionally 
defined in militaristic terms) is a minimum requirement. However, in the twenty-first 
century political survival is defined in a variety of ways and comprises broader non-
military objectives that are also critical to the wider realm where inter-state interactions 
take place. In other words, state survival is challenged both internally and externally by 
threats that are not only military in nature but also determined by non-traditional 
economic, political, social, cultural and environmental conditions.  
 These non-military issues are just as precarious as the traditional ones and in 
some cases are even worse than the latter. Hence, the thesis has presented an alternative 
definition of security in the form of cohabitative security. It incorporates “below the 
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state” actors and issues and amalgamates the supranational and subnational security 
problematic. Thus, the scope of security is broadened to encompass the non-traditional, 
humanist dimension of cohabitative security without eroding the theoretical value and 
empirical utility of the security concept.  
 As the case analyses have shown, the pursuit of security requires competition, 
cooperation, and community building all at the same time. Cooperative approaches to 
security are crucial for alleviating restrictive conditions generated by the security 
dilemma, thereby allowing the facilitation of diverse and multipronged security 
communities. Cooperative security is particularly relevant in the contexts of non-
traditional and non-military issues that undermine the overall level of security at national, 
regional, and global levels. Nevertheless, the self-help approach is not made entirely 
obsolete by cooperative security given the continued relevance of state-centric interests 
and objectives in the twenty-first century. Combining one strategy with another is, 
therefore, necessary for enhancing, improving, and securing both the general referents of 
regional security, and the specific referents of national security. The broad range of 
potential security contexts vis-à-vis referents and threats in the twenty-first century 
implies that a cohabitative strategy will be nothing short of imperative.  
 
8.4.3 Marginal geo-economic size and geopolitical position  
Considering the cases that have been explored, it is evident how the relatively marginal 
geo-economic size and geopolitical position of small East Asian countries drive their 
surity-trade linking efforts. As illustrated by the case analyses (particularly Taiwan and 
Singapore), regardless of how the core powers frame the rhetoric of free trade – whether 
substantively (economic) or tactically (politico-strategic) – the periphery and semi-
periphery powers are left with only one choice. That “choice” is to accommodate as 
much as they can the terms and conditions that apply to these free trade activities vis-a-
vis proposals or risk being left behind. The reason for this behaviour is rather simple: 
they need the core powers more than the core powers need them. Hence, regardless of 
the real impetus for these linkages, small East Asian states that consider themselves as 
part of the “coalition of the willing” are compelled to embrace and adapt to these 
security-trade dynamics in order to improve, if not preserve, their marginal geo-economic 
size and geo-political position in both regional and international arrangements. For 
obvious reasons, this situation is even more challenging and problematic for small East 
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Asian countries with relatively under-developed and highly imbalanced economies such 
as the Philippines and Malaysia.  
 Given the lack of real choice, the periphery and semi-periphery countries in East 
Asia have learned to re-utilise free trade in the hope of protecting their national security 
interests and aspirations. For small East Asian states whose primary security referents are 
state-centric such as Taiwan and Singapore, the main rationale behind their linking 
efforts are defined by traditional security considerations and threats. Hence, their 
security-trade linkages are externally oriented, that is, with respect to statist security 
dimensions such as de facto sovereignty and defence space. Meanwhile, for small East 
Asian countries whose primary security referents are human-centric such as the 
Philippines and Malaysia, the principal rationale behind their linking efforts are defined 
by non-traditional security considerations and threats. Thus, their security-trade linkages 
are internally oriented, that is, with respect to humanist security dimensions such as 
development space and diversity space. 
 Under both scenarios, the requirement for survival compels the governments of 
small East Asian countries to emulate the policies, structures, and systems of the core 
powers. Similarly, the non-conforming states are expected to be socialised within these 
systems and will eventually behave in a similar fashion as the other conforming ones. In 
essence, the system prohibits functionally differentiated units. The differences with 
respect to functions are minimised, thereby causing states to exhibit common 
characteristics. As the thesis has clearly illustrated, an example of a characteristic that has 
become common among small East Asian countries is their tendency to link security 
interests and free trade objectives – either to secure the legitimate referents of national 
security or promote the favoured referents of the ruling government – despite their 
instrinsic differences. 
 
8.5 FURTHER REFLECTIONS ON EAST ASIAN LINAKGES: VIEWS FROM THE MARGINS 
Through the systematic analysis of the key factors that drive the security-trade linkages of 
small East Asian powers in the twenty-first century (prevailing security contexts; primary 
security referents; and main origin and direction of threats), the thesis has provided a 
deeper understanding of how free trade is being used by states to secure their primary 
security referents, on the one hand; and how competing security issues and threats 
influence the creation and utility of the states’ free trade arrangements, on the other. This 
has enabled a deep evaluation of the motives and rationales behind the linkage efforts of 
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periphery and semi-periphery states, as well as a comprehensive assessment of the 
outcomes that they have achieved vis-à-vis their relative efficiency and effectiveness 
concerning these endeavours. In doing so, the study has systematically emphasized the 
respective roles of traditional elements of state security and the non-traditional 
components of human security, in exploring and explaining East Asian linkages in the 
twenty-first.  
 
8.5.1 Reflections on the general outcomes 
Based on the discussions and outcomes presented in the preceding chapters, several 
important points can be made about the small powers’ attempts at linking security and 
trade in the twenty-first century. First, countries engage free trade activities vis-à-vis 
agreements to enhance, promote, and secure their statist and/or humanist security 
referents vis-à-vis interests. The rationales and motives behind this activity, however, 
vary significantly from one country to another. While the constructed rationales for these 
linkage efforts usually sound altruistic (to advance national security), nonetheless, the real 
motives behind them are often less than benevolent (to advance a regime, a party or a 
privileged group’s vested interests).  
 Second, the steady proliferation of bilateral and minilateral FTAs amid all the 
difficulties impeding the Doha rounds at the WTO has provided the East Asian 
governments (not only the core regional powers but also the periphery and semi-
periphery powers) strategic platforms and indispensable opportunities for pursuing a 
whole host of various national security interests and objectives – altruistically or 
otherwise.  
 Third, and lastly, East Asian countries (via their memberships in the two most 
important regional organisations in the Asia-Pacific) have made some noteworthy 
progress in broadening and widening APEC and ASEAN’s respective agendas in order 
to accommodate non-traditional security issues that continue to gain momentum in the 
twenty-first century. Notwithstanding their glaring institutional limits as well as the 
obvious reluctance of some of their members because of certain normative principles, 
the human-centric dimensions of security are now slowly co-habited into their free trade 
agendas. 
 
8.5.2 Reflections on the specific outcomes 
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In Taiwan, linkage efforts generate a double-edged effect against the backdrop of China’s 
sinicisation vision. The limits of institutional mechanisms and procedures; nationalist 
objectives; export-led growth; and engagement strategies all contribute to undermining 
the sovereignty-upgrading utility of Taiwan’s free trade activities by further reinforcing 
the underlying One-China factor. Diminishing political tensions across the Taiwan Strait 
create a paradoxical effect that further reduces the political-diplomatic options available 
for Taipei including its quest for de jure independence. In other words, greater cross-
strait rapprochement ironically results in lesser Taiwanese autonomy. To use an analogy, 
China is frazzling the frog (Taiwan) with warm water. The island is gradually absorbed 
within China’s sinicisation trajectory: from short-term economic to long-term political. 
This is achieved by institutionalising cross-strait relations without recognising the 
legitimacy of Taiwanese sovereignty. 
 In Singapore, linkage efforts also engender a double-edged effect, this time 
against the backdrop of a security complex vis-à-vis vulnerability fetish because of the 
island’s geographic constraints. The limits of a PAP-centric security framework; elitist 
nation-building; deterrence strategy; and alliance and alignment strategy have all 
contributed to the undermining of the defence-upgrading utility of Singaporean free 
trade activities by aggravating the underlying security complex factor. The government’s 
strong emphasis on robust economic performance reflects its paranoia over the possible 
obliteration of an export-oriented, entrepôt-operating economy that underpins its geo-
political and geo-economic viability. Countering the threats to its geo-political and geo-
economic viability, the Singaporean government has embedded its security requirements 
into free trade agendas. The idea was to improve and maintain regional peace and 
stability by significantly reducing the likelihood of conflicts via free trade. Behind the 
city-state’s every move and every decision are the very visible hands of the PAP regime 
persuasively arguing that only a dominant-party system can guarantee Singapore’s 
survival in the twenty-first century.  
 In the Philippines, amid the disproportionate economic development engendered 
by the oligarchic factor, the outcome of its linkage efforts has also been two-edged. The 
limits of patrimonial democratisation and administrations; one-size-fits-all economic 
policies; and bureaucracy have all contributed to the undermining of the development-
upgrading utility of Philippine free trade activities by reinforcing further the underlying 
oligarchic factor. Despite the twin problems of structural poverty and institutionalised 
inequality, the Philippines’ government has largely maintained its elite-driven political 
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economy amid the pervasiveness of the underlying oligarchic vis-à-vis patronage system. 
Consequently, the majority of the Filipinos have suffered from political and economic 
marginalisation, as national wealth remains concentrated in the hands of the oligarchy 
while the overall economy is left undeveloped. Indeed, the country’s entrenched history 
of oligarchy and patrimonialism has become a burden to the growth of a well-
functioning democracy. Elite-centric structures have resulted in a shallow democracy 
where the humanist security interests of neither the masses nor the nation as a whole are 
contemplated.  
 Finally, in Malaysia, amid the one-sided domestic security dilemma engendered 
by the bumiputra factor, the result of its linkage effort has been two-edged. The limits of 
Barisan’s ideological security constructs; material security constructs; as well the economic 
and political constrains of bumiputra affirmation, have all contributed to the undermining 
of the diversity-upgrading utility of Malaysian free trade activities by reinforcing further 
the underlying bumiputra factor. For better or worse, Malaysia’s national security is 
conceived and developed around bumiputra ethnicity. Because of the privileged status of 
bumiputras, the wider goal of achieving pluralistic security for all Malaysians has been 
gradually reduced to the narrower pursuit of homogenous security for the Malays. Even 
for the non-Muslim and non-Malay bumiputras, the whole idea of bumiputraism has become 
an exploitative tool for legitimising the special privileges granted to their Malay and 
Muslim counterparts. Here, free trade has been pivotal to the creation and preservation 
of Malaysia’s one-sided domestic security dilemma by fuelling the government’s 
affirmative policies that have further strengthened the bumiputras’ relative position, often 
at the expense of everyone else. The result is the widening not only of inter-ethnic but 
also intra-ethnic cleavages as all Malaysians now insist on receiving exclusive rights rather 
than equal opportunities. Consequently, the de-ethnicisation of Malaysian nation-building 
remains to be a problem today given that the bumiputra factor has always served as the 
primary impetus for policymaking processes in the country. Hence, the question of 
“bumiputraism for whom” continues to be as relevant today as ever.   
 
8.5.3 RECOMMENDATIONS  
 
On the research design and methodology 
The present study has employed a qualitative research design exploring and explaining 
the linkage efforts of small East Asian powers in the twenty-first century. In particular, 
332 
 
the thesis has systematically analysed these linkages using a comparative cross-national 
methodology based on the most different systems design (MDSD). Given the limits 
associated with this particular research design/method, the study can benefit further 
from adopting an alternative approach to an investigation of the East Asian security-
trade nexus.  
 In contrast to the case-oriented qualitative approach, a variable-oriented 
quantitative approach might also be applied when analytically assessing the relations 
between various security referents and free trade arrangements. Such an approach 
requires that the homogeneity of units of analysis are made known at the onset given that 
theoretical and conceptual frameworks have already been predetermined and 
operationalised according to their specialised functions. Arend Lijphart (1971: 685) posits 
that statistical analysis becomes necessary whenever there are sufficient cases available 
for investigation as “it is logically possible and may be advantageous to shift from 
comparative to statistical method.” While the number of cases varies depending on the 
number of variables being tested, nonetheless, the general understanding in variable-
oriented research, is that the greater the number, the greater the possibility that 
regression coefficients are statistically significant.  
 Rather than arranging the cases based on the most different or most similar 
systems designs, a different approach to case selection is followed. However, the 
countries identified as units of analysis must meet the following criteria: (i) apposition to 
the type of theoretical problem posed by the research; (ii) germane to the phenomenon 
under investigation; (iii) empirically invariant based on their respective classificatory 
standards; (iv) representative of the scale of data available; and (v) classified based on 
systematised and repeatable procedures (Smelser, 1976; della Porta, 2008).  
 The application of statistical techniques in the comparative quantitative approach 
is anchored in the investigation of “concomitant variations” via estimation of effects of 
exogenous variables on the endogenous variables or how dependent factors co-varies 
with each independent factors (Durkheim, 1982: 153). As Charles Ragin (1987:54) posits, 
in a variable-oriented approach “generality is given precedence over complexity and so 
the wider the population, the better.” There two underlying assumptions here: first, the 
existence of a considerable degree of homogeneity with respect to units of analysis; and 
second, the concept of time operating for the purpose of augmenting the number of 
cases by creating subunits either through periodisation or setting them as points of 
observation within longitudinal studies (della Porta, 2008).  
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 Unlike the study’s comparative qualitative approach, a quantitative method may 
enable the construction of law-like propositions about security-trade linkages in the Asia-
Pacific by determining the causal relationships between specific phenomena and their 
probable causes and related effects. In other words, the formulation of generalisations 
may be possible even if the explanations arrived at do not always hold true for each case. 
Here, explanation is mainly focused on assessing the influence of different variables on a 
certain observable fact. The study could then provide a better understanding of the 
extensiveness of the conditions under which causal effects are observed; the robustness 
of the nature of causal effects; and the degree of significance of relationships between the 
effects (Lijphart, 1971: della Porta, 2008).  
 Accordingly, the establishment of causations based on interplays between 
identified variables using a set of aggregated cases is a pivotal task in the quantitative 
analysis of East Asian security-trade linkages. However, one central issue that has to be 
carefully considered when undertaking a quantitative analysis of ast Asian security-trade 
linkages is the choice and/or construction of indices that will be used for measuring both 
the dependent and independent variables.  
 
On the primary case studies 
Given the limitations of the present study, only four of the many small periphery and 
semi-periphery countries in East Asia have been used as primary case studies. Future 
research, therefore, can look into these other countries in order to broaden and deepen 
the exploration of East Asian security-trade linkages by examining a new set of security 
contexts and referents, and different sources and directions of threat. For instance, a 
comprehensive analysis of the security-trade nexus in other neighbouring states 
Indonesia, Thailand, Vietnam, Myanmar, Cambodia, Lao PDR, and Brunei, might 
provide insights that can substantiate the key findings generated by this study.  
 Alternatively, future studies may also consider other primary referents in the 
respective security rhetoric and agendas of Taiwan, Singapore, the Philippines, and 
Malaysia aside from the ones that have been investigated in the present research. For 
instance, rather than examining the impact of Taiwan’s state-centric linkages with respect 
to its de facto sovereign space, other researchers can instead look into their effects on the 
island’s socio-cultural space to encompass a humanist dimension. Meanwhile, in the case 
of the Philippines, rather than assessing its human-centric linkages with respect to the 
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development space, other scholars might also be interested to study the islands’ influence 
on the archipelago’s geopolitical space to incorporate a statist dimension.  
 Similarly, the specific contexts in which the security-trade linkages of small East 
Asian states are probed can also be shifted to gain different understanding of their 
linkage efforts and outcomes. For example, Singapore’s statist linkages might be 
examined within the context of rising Chinese power in the light of declining American 
and/or Japanese power. While Malaysia’s humanist linkages can also be scrutinised in the 
context of waning Barisan Nasional influence vis-à-vis the growing “global backlash” on 
Islam.  
 Lastly, to further supplement or validate the results from the elite interviews 
presented in the study, future research can also survey the members of grassroots civil 
societies. By focusing on this specific segment, the extent of discrepancies between the 
perceptions of the elites and non-elites on security and trade issues can be explored and 
taken into account. 
 
8.6 Trading Security: final words 
Ten years after the death of a world-renowned astronomer named Carl Sagan, a book 
called The Varieties of Scientific Experience: A Personal View of the Search for God was published 
based on his series of lectures. In this book, Sagan was quoted: “Extinction is the rule. 
Survival is the exception.” The small East Asian powers have searched for ways of 
circumventing the rule of extinction in the twenty-first century security environment to 
ensure their continued survival. At the heart of this quest for survival lies the relative 
level of security underpinning the states’ national interests and objectives. Moreover, in 
their pursuit of a higher level of security, the states have learned to re-imagine and re-
invent the use of free trade. Accordingly, although free trade has traditionally been 
viewed as a subject of “low politics,” nonetheless, the changing views toward security 
transformed it into a “high politics” affair.   
 Based on findings generated from the study’s case analyses, depending on the 
nature and origin of security threats vis-à-vis contexts observed, free trade may perform a 
multifaceted function. In Taiwan, free trade is a sovereignty-upgrading mechanism; in 
Singapore, a defence-upgrading tool; in the Philippines, a development-upgrading 
instrument; and finally, in Malaysia, a diversity-upgrading apparatus. Thus, free trade has 
become an integral component of East Asian security. Put differently, free trade has 
become the “holy grail” of national security, particularly with respect to periphery and 
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semi-periphery countries in East Asia attempting to enhance, promote, and secure their 
primary security referents vis-à-vis interests. 
 However, given that free trade works like a double-edged sword, states 
attempting to co-habit their security interests and free trade agendas are essentially 
“trading security.” For every additional security that a linkage provides a specific referent, 
a corresponding insecurity is reflected in other referents. This is clearly illustrated in the 
four cases examined in the study. With respect to statist linkages, Taiwan’s linkage efforts 
might lead to the island’s complete assimilation with China; while Singapore’s linkage 
attempts can result in the city-state’s failure to strategically balance American and 
Chinese interests in the region. With respect to humanist linkages, the Philippines’ 
linkage attempts have preserved the uneven economic development and further 
reinforced the oligarchic system and patronage culture, while Malaysia’s linkage efforts 
have perpetuated the racial inequalities and further legitimised the UMNO-led Barisan.  
  Overall, the thesis has been able to provide a clear and a more nuanced picture of 
twenty-first century East Asian security-trade linkages based on the perspectives of 
periphery and semi-periphery states. Through systematic analyses and in-depth 
investigations, the thesis has covered a number of important issues: (i) how small powers 
utilize free trade as a means of advancing their statist and humanist security interests and 
objectives; (ii) how security issues and threats (traditional and non-traditional) determine 
the utiltity, implmentaiton, and outcome of their free trade activities; and (iii) how the 
linkages between  security and free trade affect their chances for survival or extinction in 
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ASEAN+6   1 
Asia-Pacific Trade Agreement   1 
Association of  Southeast Asian Nations  10 
Bay of  Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic 
Cooperation  
1 
Central America 1 
Common Economic Space 1 
Commonwealth of  Independent States Free Trade Area  1 
Customs Union of  Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan  4 
D-8  1 
East Asia Free Trade Area   1 
Economic Cooperation Organization Trade Agreement  1 
Eurasian Economic Community Custom Union  1 
Eurasian Economic Union   1 
European Free Trade Association  10 
European Union 14 
Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Moldova Free Trade Agreement   1 
Gulf  Cooperation Council   9 
Melanesian Spearhead Group  1 
Mercado Comun del Sur  4 
OIC   1 
Pacific ACP countries  1 
Pacific Agreement on Closer Economic Relations (PACER) Plus   1 
Pacific Island Countries Trade Agreement  1 
Shanghai Cooperation Organization 1 
South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation   1 
South Pacific Regional Trade and Economic Cooperation Agreement   1 
Southern African Customs Union   3 
Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership ("Expanded P4 FTA")  1 
Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership Agreement   1 
  
 Source: Asian Regional Integration Center 















Appendix 2. Taiwan’s FTAs 
FTA Status Year 
Philippines-Taipei, China Economic 




Taipei, China-India FTA   Proposed/Under consultation 
and study 
2014 
Taipei, China-Indonesia FTA   Proposed/Under consultation 
and study 
2011 
United States-Taipei, China Free Trade 




Taipei, China and Paraguay Free Trade 
Agreement   
(FA) signed 2004 
Taipei, China and Dominican Republic Free 
Trade Agreement   
Negotiations launched 2006 
New Zealand-Taipei, China Economic 
Cooperation Agreement    
Signed and In Effect 2013 
People's Republic of  China-Taipei, China 
Economic Cooperation Framework 
Agreement    
Signed and In Effect 2011 
Singapore-Taipei, China FTA    Signed and In Effect 2014 
Taipei, China and Guatemala Free Trade 
Agreement    
Signed and In Effect 2006 
Taipei, China and Nicaragua Free Trade 
Agreement    
Signed and In Effect 2008 
Taipei, China and Panama Free Trade 
Agreement   
Signed and In Effect 2004 
Taipei, China-El Salvador-Honduras Free 
Trade Agreement    
  
Signed and In Effect 2008 
Source: Asian Regional Integration Center 























Appendix 3. Singapore’s FTAs 
FTA Status Year 
ASEAN-Hong Kong, China Free Trade 




ASEAN-Pakistan Free Trade Agreement   Proposed/Under consultation 
and study 
2009 
Comprehensive Economic Partnership 
Agreement between Singapore and Sri 




Comprehensive Economic Partnership for 




East Asia Free Trade Area (ASEAN+3)    Proposed/Under consultation 
and study 
2004 
Singapore-Turkey FTA   Proposed/Under consultation 
and study 
2014 
Singapore-United Arab Emirates Free 
Trade Agreement (now GCC-Singapore 




Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP)   (FA) signed 2010 
ASEAN-EU Free Trade Agreement   Negotiations launched 2007 
Canada-Singapore Free Trade Agreement   Negotiations launched 2001 
Pakistan-Singapore Free Trade Agreement   Negotiations launched 2005 
Regional Comprehensive Economic 
Partnership   
Negotiations launched 2013 
Singapore-Egypt Comprehensive 
Economic Cooperation Agreement    
Negotiations launched 2006 
Singapore-Kuwait Free Trade Agreement 
(now GCC-Singapore Free Trade 
Agreement)    
Negotiations launched 2005 
Singapore-Mexico Free Trade Agreement   Negotiations launched 2000 
Singapore-Qatar Free Trade Agreement 
(now GCC-Singapore Free Trade 
Agreement)   
Negotiations launched 2004 
Singapore-Ukraine Free Trade Agreement    Negotiations launched 2007 
Singapore-Bahrain Free Trade Agreement 
(now GCC-Singapore Free Trade 
Agreement)    
Signed but not yet In Effect 2008 
Singapore-EU Free Trade Agreement   Signed but not yet In Effect 2013 
ASEAN Free Trade Area   Signed and In Effect 1993 
ASEAN-Australia and New Zealand Free 
Trade Agreement   
Signed and In Effect 2010 
ASEAN-India Comprehensive Economic 
Cooperation Agreement   
Signed and In Effect 2010 
ASEAN-Japan Comprehensive Economic 
Partnership   
Signed and In Effect 2008 
ASEAN-People's Republic of  China 
Comprehensive Economic Cooperation 
Agreement   
Signed and In Effect 2005 
ASEAN-[Republic of] Korea 
Comprehensive Economic Cooperation 
Agreement   
Signed and In Effect 2007 
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European Free Trade Association-
Singapore Free Trade Agreement   
Signed and In Effect 2003 
Gulf  Cooperation Council-Singapore Free 
Trade Agreement    
Signed and In Effect 2013 
India-Singapore Comprehensive Economic 
Cooperation Agreement   
Signed and In Effect 2005 
Japan-Singapore Economic Agreement for 
a New-Age Partnership   
Signed and In Effect 2002 
New Zealand-Singapore Closer Economic 
Partnership   
Signed and In Effect 2001 
People's Republic of  China-Singapore Free 
Trade Agreement   
Signed and In Effect 2009 
Singapore-Australia Free Trade Agreement   Signed and In Effect 2003 
Singapore-Costa Rica Free Trade 
Agreement   
Signed and In Effect 2013 
Singapore-Jordan Free Trade Agreement   Signed and In Effect 2005 
Singapore-Panama Free Trade Agreement   Signed and In Effect 2006 
Singapore-Peru Free Trade Agreement   Signed and In Effect 2009 
Singapore-Taipei,China FTA   Signed and In Effect 2014 
Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic 
Partnership Agreement   
Signed and In Effect 2006 
United States-Singapore Free Trade 
Agreement   
Signed and In Effect 2004 
[Republic of] Korea-Singapore Free Trade 
Agreement   
Signed and In Effect 2006 
Source: Asian Regional Integration Center 



























Appendix 4. The Philippines’ FTAs 
FTAs Status Year 
ASEAN-Hong Kong, China Free Trade 




ASEAN-Pakistan Free Trade Agreement   Proposed/Under consultation 
and study 
2009 
Comprehensive Economic Partnership for 




East Asia Free Trade Area (ASEAN+3)    Proposed/Under consultation 
and study 
2004 
Pakistan-Philippines Free Trade 




Philippines-Australia FTA   Proposed/Under consultation 
and study 
2014 
Philippines-EU Free Trade Agreement   Proposed/Under consultation 
and study 
2014 
Philippines-European Free Trade 




Philippines-Taipei, China Economic 




United States-Philippines Free Trade 




ASEAN-EU Free Trade Agreement   Negotiations launched 2007 
Regional Comprehensive Economic 
Partnership   
Negotiations launched 2013 
ASEAN Free Trade Area   Signed and In Effect 1993 
ASEAN-Australia and New Zealand Free 
Trade Agreement   
Signed and In Effect 2010 
ASEAN-India Comprehensive Economic 
Cooperation Agreement   
Signed and In Effect 2010 
ASEAN-Japan Comprehensive Economic 
Partnership   
Signed and In Effect 2008 
ASEAN-People's Republic of  China 
Comprehensive Economic Cooperation 
Agreement   
Signed and In Effect 2005 
ASEAN-[Republic of] Korea 
Comprehensive Economic Cooperation 
Agreement   
Signed and In Effect 2007 
Japan-Philippines Economic Partnership 
Agreement   
Signed and In Effect 2008 
Source: Asian Regional Integration Center 












Appendix 5. Malaysia’s FTAs 
FTA Status Year 
ASEAN-Hong Kong, China Free Trade 
Agreement   
Proposed/Under consultation and 
study 
1993 
ASEAN-Pakistan Free Trade Agreement   
Proposed/Under consultation and 
study 
2009 
Comprehensive Economic Partnership for 
East Asia (CEPEA/ASEAN+6)   
Proposed/Under consultation and 
study 
2005 
East Asia Free Trade Area (ASEAN+3)    
Proposed/Under consultation and 
study 
2004 
Malaysia-Gulf Cooperation Council Free 
Trade Agreement   
Proposed/Under consultation and 
study 
2011 
Malaysia-Syria Free Trade Agreement   
Proposed/Under consultation and 
study 
20 
Malaysia-[Republic of] Korea Free Trade 
Agreement   
Proposed/Under consultation and 
study 
2011 
Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP)   (FA) signed 2010 
ASEAN-EU Free Trade Agreement   Negotiations launched 2007 
Malaysia-EU Free Trade Agreement   Negotiations launched 2010 
Malaysia-European Free Trade 
Association Free Trade Agreement   
Negotiations launched 2012 
Regional Comprehensive Economic 
Partnership   
Negotiations launched 2013 
United States-Malaysia Free Trade 
Agreement   
Negotiations launched 2006 
Malaysia-Turkey Free Trade Agreement   Signed but not yet In Effect 2014 
Preferential Tariff Arrangement-Group of 
Eight Developing Countries   
Signed but not yet In Effect 2006 
ASEAN Free Trade Area   Signed and In Effect 1993 
ASEAN-Australia and New Zealand Free 
Trade Agreement   
Signed and In Effect 2010 
ASEAN-India Comprehensive Economic 
Cooperation Agreement   
Signed and In Effect 2010 
ASEAN-Japan Comprehensive Economic 
Partnership   
Signed and In Effect 2008 
ASEAN-People's Republic of China 
Comprehensive Economic Cooperation 
Agreement   
Signed and In Effect 2005 
ASEAN-[Republic of] Korea 
Comprehensive Economic Cooperation 
Agreement   
Signed and In Effect 2007 
Japan-Malaysia Economic Partnership 
Agreement   
Signed and In Effect 2006 
Malaysia-Australia Free Trade Agreement   Signed and In Effect 2013 
Malaysia-Chile Free Trade Agreement   Signed and In Effect 2012 
Malaysia-India Comprehensive Economic 
Cooperation Agreement   
Signed and In Effect 2011 
Malaysia-New Zealand Free Trade 
Agreement   
Signed and In Effect 2010 
Malaysia-Pakistan Closer Economic 
Partnership Agreement   
Signed and In Effect 2008 
Source: Asian Regional Integration Center 
Asian Development Bank 
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Appendix 9. Invitation Letter 
College of Arts 
School of Social and Political Sciences 
Tel: +64 3 364 2899, Fax: + 64 364 2414 
Web site: http://www.saps.canterbury.ac.nz/ 
18 September 2012  
Dear ______________: 
As part of my doctoral research in Political Science at the University of Canterbury in New 
Zealand, I am undertaking a study which explores the possibility of reconceptualising the 
exceedingly narrow national security and excessively encompassing human security to 
construct a ‘cohabitative national-human security’ framework. The study emerges in the context of 
‘new eclecticism’ in Comparative Politics that acknowledges and highlights the plurality of 
subjects, methodologies, and theoretical paradigms currently dominating the field. It is, 
therefore, an attempt to incorporate Security Studies within the Comparative Politics realm. 
The said research is being funded by the New Zealand ASEAN Scholars Awards (NZASA) 
as part of my scholarships.  
 This comparative cross-national study offers an in depth analysis of the experiences 
of three neighbouring trading states in Southeast Asia, namely, the Philippines, Malaysia and 
Singapore, in their quest for good governance and human development against the backdrop 
of trade liberalization. It argues for the need to develop a coherently eclectic security 
paradigm that integrates both state-centred and people-centred security frameworks in 
effectively engaging with traditional and non-traditional security threats originating outside 
and within territorial jurisdictions of sovereign states. The study employs a combination 
research design using qualitative and quantitative methods to provide a more comprehensive 
and holistic understanding of the topic presently being explored. It embarks on explanatory 
and statistical analyses to establish and develop the theoretical rationale behind the 
construction of the proposed framework and test its empirical applicability.  
 Given your expertise in this field, I am humbly inviting you to participate in my 
research. As a respondent you will be interviewed for not more than an hour. If there are 
matters that arise from my other data gathering activities where your views will be significant, 
I may contact you to organize a follow-up interview which will not exceed half an hour in 
length. The interview will revolve around your professional and personal opinions regarding 
national and human security, on the one hand, and ASEAN trade liberalization, on the other.  
 The interview will be recorded using a digital voice recorder. If you are not 
comfortable with this method, please advise the researcher and notes will be taken instead. 
The results of this research may be used by scholars and policymakers in revising and 
improving the theoretical underpinnings and empirical configuration of human security. This 
research will be available as an unpublished thesis at the University of Canterbury and there 
is also a possibility that the research will be published in scientific or academic journals. All 
participants will receive a report on the study.  
 If you are willing to be interviewed, may I ask that you sign and return the attached 




the researcher, or by either using the enclosed self-addressed stamped envelope or e-mailing 
a copy to the researcher not later than a week after you received this letter. As a public 
official and expert in the research area being studied, your answers to the interview questions 
may be cited to support some of the arguments being raised by the author. Thus, with your 
approval and consent to be cited as first-hand reference your name may appear in the final 
output. A soft copy of the final draft of the research will be made available to you at least 
two month prior to its submission to the Department and Review Committee to give you 
enough time to review the parts in which you have been quoted. You also retain the right to 
direct the author to revise or amend certain parts of the quoted lines and/or paragraphs 
based on your own suggestions and recommendations. You will be given one month upon 
your receipt of the final draft to send in your comments to the electronic mail address 
provided by the researcher. Withdrawal of any information which you may provide will not 
result in any negative consequences.  
 During the research, data will be kept in the researcher’s safe filing cabinet and 
personal computer with an anti-hacking device. All data obtained from this study will be 
stored in a secure facility at the University of Canterbury, College of Arts, Department of 
Political Science, for a maximum period of ten years after the research has been completed. 
The data will then be destroyed using the University’s secure destruction service. Your 
participation in this study is voluntary. You may also withdraw your participation and the 
information you have provided for the study by contacting me prior to 15th November 2012 
by phone, mail, or electronic mail. I will do my best to remove any information relating to 
you, provided this is practically achievable. 
 
 
Contact details:  Address:  Department of Political Science 
       College of Arts 
       University of Canterbury 
       Private Bag 4800 
       Christchurch 8140 
       New Zealand 
    E-mail:  michael.magcamit@pg.canterbury.ac.nz 
    Mobile:   (64) 21 039 5207 
 
This proposal has been reviewed and approved by the University of Canterbury Human 
Ethics Committee low risk process. If you have any questions or concerns regarding this 
study please contact the Researcher or the Supervisor.  
 
I hope that you will be able to participate. It will be an honour for me to work with you in 
this research. 
 





MICHAEL INTAL MAGCAMIT  
Candidate, PhD in Political Science  
E-mail: michael.magcamit@pg.canterbury.ac.nz  
Mobile Number: (64) 21 039 5207  
 





Appendix 10. Interview Guide 
 
Michael Intal Magcamit 
PhD Candidate 
Department of Political Science 
University of Canterbury 
Christchurch 8140  
New Zealand 
E-mail:  michael.magcamit@pg.canterbury.ac.nz 
Mobile: (64) 21 039 5207 




Part 1: Guide Questions for ASEAN and APEC Experts 
 
 
A.  On issues concerning regional security in East Asia 
 
1. Being aware of the definitional elasticity of human security, is there a need 
construct an operationalized definition of the concept so that it can serve as a 
practical guide for academic research or governmental policymaking? If so, what 
are the main components that should constitute human security? How do we 
justify these choices? Does the idea of operationalising human security reinforce 
or undermine the objective of reconceptualising security to “avoid the pitfalls of 
ethnocentrism and reflect the context within which the subjects of security are 
located” (Cabellero-Anthony, 2004: 187)?  
 
2. Realist scholars argue that the international system is characterized by conflict, 
suspicion and competition between nation-states, a pragmatic stance that thwarts 
the logic of alternative world orders. As such these supposedly absolute and 
universal principles – peace, harmony of interests, collective and human security 
– are not principles at all but the unconscious reflexions of national policy based 
on a particular interpretation of national interest at a particular time. How does 
human security challenge this view?  
 
3. Can human security concept/agenda be considered a form of problem solving 
theory by taking the prevailing institutions and socio-political relations in to 
which they are organized, as the given framework for action? In this view, can it 
be inferred that the general aim of human security concept/agenda is to make 
these relationships and institutions work smoothly by dealing effectively with 
particular sources of trouble? As such, is the human security concept and agenda 
not guilty of legitimating the very political order it aspires to transform – one 
which favours the powerful and is hostile to change?  
 
4. Knowing how the international system is structured and power is distributed can 
human security concept/agenda provide any meaningful solution to empowering 
the subaltern or does it only reinforce existing policy frameworks as it is too 
easily co-opted by political elites? As such, is the concept of human security at 
risk of being used to justify the expansion of the roles of traditional security 
actors including the state? Does human security truly represent a paradigm shift 




5. Human security has proven to be an effective campaign slogan for gathering 
more and better foreign aid, as well as for protecting communities against 
organized state violence and the vital ecosystems. Beyond its role as a compelling 
battle cry, can human security practices support counter-hegemonic narratives 
which could provide the basis for meaningful systemic change?  
 
6. Will it be more acceptable and practical if human security is viewed as an ethos 
rather than an agenda that needs to be slotted into prevailing security 
frameworks? Why or why not? Should a human security ethos and/or agenda be 
incorporated in the ASEAN/APEC Charter? Why or why not? Why is the 
ASEAN reluctant in adopting a more definitive stance regarding human security? 
Which dimension of security is ASEAN/APEC more concerned with – ‘freedom 
from fear’ or ‘freedom from want’?  
 
7. Ryerson Christie (2010: 186) argues that within critical security studies, the 
human security concept was seen by some as a useful heterodoxy, as a space of 
dissent against the preceding state-centric model that served to silence people 
within the state. However, the arrival of the human security narrative has 
awakened traditional security actors to the needs of peoples in the South, 
highlighting the ways in which issues such as poverty, hunger and environmental 
degradation can make their lives insecure. Yet, this has not translated into an 
increased voice for peoples in the South, and has instead reinforced their 
subjugation to the North’s security measures. How do human security scholars 
and specialists react to this challenge?  
 
B.  On issues concerning regional free trade in East Asia 
 
1. What is the region’s stand regarding the continuous proliferation of bilateral 
agreements in the region? What roles do bilateral trade agreements play in human 
development and government stability? How do bilateral trade agreements affect 
individual East Asian socio-cultural communities, particularly in Taiwan, 
Singapore, the Philippines, and Malaysia? What is the economic significance and 
political value of a single bilateral trade agreement? What are its opportunity 
costs? Are East Asian states better off with the implementation of bilateral trade 
agreements?  
 
2. How should ASEAN/APEC react to the increasing popularity of plurilateral 
trade agreements in the region with some of the world’s most powerful and 
affluent nations? What roles do plurilateral trade agreements play in human 
development and government stability? How do plurilateral trade agreements 
affect socio-cultural communities in East Asia, particularly in Taiwan, Singapore, 
the Philippines, and Malaysia? What is the economic significance and political 
value of a single plurilateral trade agreement? What are its opportunity costs? Are 
East Asian states better off with the implementation of plurilateral trade 
agreements?  
 
3. What is ASEAN/APEC’s view regarding the ongoing multilateral trade impasse? 
Is this a direct consequence of proliferation of bilateral trade agreements, on the 
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one hand, and increasing popularity of plurilateral trade agreements, on the other, 
in the region?  
 
4. What roles do multilateral trade agreements play in human development and 
government stability? How do multilateral trade agreements affect East Asian 
socio-cultural communities, particularly Taiwan, Singapore, the Philippines, and 
Malaysia?  
 
5. How should ASEAN/APEC react to the alleged unfair practices and double 
standards prevalent in the WTO? How does it intend to help its members in 
asserting their positions and increasing their leverage within the multilateral 
institution? Is the WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism effective in litigating the 
cases being filed by the complainants? Does it provide a fair level-playing field 
for all the participants particularly the smaller, weaker nations?  
 
 




A. On issues concerning national security 
 
1. How will you describe Taiwan/Singapore/the Philippines/Malaysia’s national 
security policies and strategies in the twenty-first century?  
 
2. What/who is the primary security referent(s) of Taiwan/Singapore/the 
Philippines/Malaysia’s national security? 
 
 
3. What are the main threats to Taiwan/Singapore/the Philippines/Malaysia’s 
primary security referent(s)? 
 
B. On issues concerning free trade   
 
1. How do Taiwan/Singapore/the Philippines/Malaysia’s free trade 
activities/agreements influence the primary referent(s) of country's national 
security policies and strategies? 
 
2. Do they enhance or undermine the primary referent(s) of Taiwan/Singapore/the 
Philippines/Malaysia’s national security? Why and how? 
 
3. What are some of the factors that influence the utility of Taiwan/Singapore/the 
Philippines/Malaysia’s free trade activities/agreements for enhancing primary 









Appendix 11. Consent Form 
 
Michael Intal Magcamit 
PhD Candidate 
Department of Political Science 
University of Canterbury 
Christchurch 8140  
New Zealand 
E-mail:  michael.magcamit@pg.canterbury.ac.nz 
Mobile: (64) 21 039 5207 








Research Title: Explaining the Unexplained Wealth of Nations:  
A Comparative Cross-National Study of ‘Cohabitative National-Human Security’ 
 
 
I confirm that I am of legal age (above 18 years old) at present and I have read and 
understood the descriptions of the above-named project. On this basis I agree to 
participate in an interview as part of the research. I give my consent for the discussion to 
be recorded by digital voice recorder and to the publication of results. However, I 
reserve the right to direct the researcher to take notes only at any time during the 
interview. I also give my consent to be quoted by the researcher in specific parts of the 
study provided that I get to review the final draft of the research at least one month prior 
to its submission to the Department and Review Committee. I also maintain the right to 
direct the researcher to revise the parts in which I have been quoted based on my own 
recommendation(s). I understand also that I may, at any stage, withdraw my participation 
from the research, including the withdrawal of any information I have provided prior to 
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Abstract
This paper seeks to explore and explain the process through which
Taiwan utilizes free trade – both at multilateral and bilateral levels – in
enhancing its shrinking de facto sovereignty against the backdrop of ubi-
quitous ‘China factor’ in the twenty-first century. It argues that China’s
sinicization project creates a scenario wherein increasing cross-strait sta-
bility ironically leads to decreasing de facto sovereignty for Taiwan. Due
to this existing cross-strait security dilemma, Taiwanese leaders are being
forced to preserve the island’s quasi-independent statehood due to fears
of losing its remaining de facto autonomy over domestic and foreign
affairs. In essence, Taiwan chooses to be de facto free by remaining de
jure unfree. Taiwan’s sovereign space, therefore, becomes a pivotal
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referent object of its national security policy and strategy. Balancing
between the two paradoxical interests of enhancing sovereignty while
maintaining the Chinese-dominated cross-strait status-quo underlines
the relentless games, changes, and fears that Taiwan confronts today.
1 Introduction
Given the ubiquitous ‘China factor’ shrouding the international system,
the paper argues that the primary referent object of Taiwan’s national
security policy and strategy (NSPS) is its diminishing sovereign space.
The term sovereign space in this context particularly refers to Taiwan’s
de facto domestic and interdependence sovereignty, as opposed to de jure
international legal sovereignty.1 As Stephen Krasner (2009) has succinct-
ly put it, sovereignty is ‘the golden ring that political leaders hope to
grasp.’ However, the complexities surrounding the politico-diplomatic
relations between the ROC and the PRC prevent the former from claim-
ing de jure sovereignty.2 This results in the continued non-diplomatic
recognition of Taiwan as a legitimate state in the international arena
(Rich, 2009). Consequently, Taiwan is being forced to resign itself to the
vulnerabilities and vicissitudes stemming from its insecure and incom-
plete sovereignty that continuously contracts as China’s sinicization3
project progresses.
In attempts to prevent the complete co-optation of Taiwan within
Beijing’s One-China trajectory (and therefore, the complete obsolescence
of its de facto sovereignty), the paper argues that Taiwanese officials and
policymakers are increasingly turning into various forms of free trade
agreements (FTAs). Taiwan’s experience with free trade underlines the mu-
tually reinforcing and constitutive multilateral trade agreements and bilat-
eral trade agreements in preserving and enhancing its sovereign space. For
1 Stephen Krasner (2001) defines domestic sovereignty as the actual control over a state exer-
cised by an authority organized within this state; interdependence sovereignty as the actual
control of movement across state’s borders, assuming that the borders exist; and international
legal sovereignty as formal recognition by other sovereign states. See also, Rich (2009),
Thompson (2006), Kingsbury (1998), Clapham (1998), and Jackson (1990) for a more
detailed analysis of different types and degrees of sovereignty.
2 The names ‘Taiwan’ and ‘Republic of China (ROC)’ are used interchangeably in this chapter,
as with ‘China’ and ‘People’s Republic of China (PRC).
3 Sinicization or Chinalization in this context refers to the policies of acculturation, assimila-
tion, or cultural imperialism of neighboring cultures, specifically Taiwan, to China.
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instance, when Taiwan was barred from the GATT,4 its bilateral trade with
the United States ensured that the country’s trade regime was complemen-
tary to the existing multilateral framework. Conversely, when tensions
across the Taiwan Strait escalated, the WTO served as an avenue for
reconnecting Taiwan and China (Hsieh, 2005, 2011; Huang, 2009).
However, these two forms of FTAs engender unique power dynamics. At
the bilateral level between Taiwan and the United States or Taiwan and
China, Taipei is unable to adopt a more assertive strategy with respect both to
the Washington and Beijing (Bhagwati, 1991, 1990; Collie, 1997; Huang,
2009). Meanwhile, at the multilateral level, specifically within the WTO,
smaller and weaker countries like Taiwan are able to forge strategic coalitions
that enhance their collective bargaining power that is crucial during negoti-
ation processes (Cho, 2005; Hsieh 2005; Charnovitz, 2006; Huang, 2009).
Hence, Taiwan’s active participation in both bilateral and multilateral trade is
necessary for the enhancement of its de facto sovereignty. To this extent, free
trade may be viewed as a sovereignty-upgrading mechanism. However, the
ongoing sinicization project being carried out by Beijing via the aggressive
promotion of its One-China policy significantly undermines Taiwan’s capacity
for engaging in these sovereignty-enhancing FTAs.
Against this backdrop, the paper examines Taiwan’s participation in
both bilateral and multilateral FTAs to analyze their impacts on its de facto
sovereignty. In doing so, the sections explore the different facets of existing
cross-strait security dilemma that will explain the decision of the Taiwanese
government to retain its quasi-independent status and that is to preserve its
remaining sovereign space. Put differently, the only way for Taiwan to be de
facto free is by remaining de jure unfree. However, such engagement ap-
proach creates a dilemma that further reinforces the Chinese-dominated
cross-strait status-quo. On the one hand, recalibrating the present cross-strait
environment either by pursuing de jure independence or complete unification
with China invariably threatens Taiwan’s sovereign pace given the primacy of
Beijing’s One-China policy. On the other hand, pursuing either conditional
or unconditional engagement with China unvaryingly imperils Taiwan’s de
facto sovereignty as well due to the likelihood of overdependence.
4 Formed in 1947 and signed into international law on 1 January 1948, GATTremained one of
the focal features of international trade agreements until it was replaced by the creation of the
World Trade Organization on 1 January 1995. For more details, see, WTO website, available
online at http://www.wto.org/.
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In light of this, the paper attempts to answer the following sets of ques-
tion. First, how do bilateral and multilateral FTAs affect Taiwan’s de facto
sovereignty amid China’s ongoing sinicization project? Do they enhance or
undermine Taiwan’s remaining sovereign space? Second, why does
Taiwan’s de facto sovereignty seem to be more conducive for pursuing
FTAs as opposed to de jure sovereignty? How does this affect the existing
cross-strait status-quo? And third, what are the factors that limit the cap-
acity of FTAs for enhancing Taiwan’s de facto sovereignty?
The paper is divided into five sections. Section 1 provided the context
through which Taiwan’s security–trade linkages in the twenty-first century
will be examined. It argued that against the backdrop of omnipresent China
factor, the primary referent object of Taiwan’s NSPS is its diminishing de
facto sovereign space. And in preserving Taiwan’s remaining sovereign
space, the Taiwanese government actively participates in various free trade
activities both at multilateral and bilateral levels. Section 2 briefly examines
Taiwan’s politico-diplomatic history in order to trace the root of its
quasi-autonomous status that results in Taipei’s relentless battles for inter-
national recognition. It provides preliminary understanding of the import-
ance of economic engagements, mainly via free trade, in eking out a wider
space for Taiwan in international politics despite limited formal recognition.
Section 3 evaluates Taiwan’s experience with bilateral and multilateral trade.
It explores the impacts of Taiwan’s free trade activities on its sovereign
space, which to certain extent, highlights the contrast between Taiwan’s pol-
itical clout and economic clout. Section 4 identifies some of the factors
affecting the capacity of FTAs for improving Taiwan’s de facto sovereignty.
It explains why de facto sovereignty tends to be more favorable than de jure
sovereignty when pursuing Taiwanese FTAs and assesses how internal
(domestic politics) and external (engagements strategies) factors limit the
sovereignty-upgrading potential of FTAs. Section 5 concludes that the
warming of cross-strait relations is similar to fraying the frog with warm
water. That is, the normalization of cross-strait political and economic rela-
tions without the legal recognition of Taipei’s sovereignty inevitably absorbs
Taiwan within Beijing’s One-China trajectory.
2 The genesis of Taiwanese sovereignty dilemma
Analyzing Taiwan’s cross-strait engagement policies and strategies requires
an understanding of significant events that took place after the Second
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World War.5 The important decisions taken by Washington and Beijing
with respect to Taipei’s international status significantly influenced the
nature of its statehood as a ‘floating’ de facto sovereign territory. Japan’s
defeat in World War II (WWII) left Taiwan under the temporary leadership
of the Republic of China – Kuomintang (KMT) party (Hsieh, 2005, 2011;
Huang, 2009; Rich, 2009). The strong support initially provided by the
United States in the aftermath of WWII enabled Taiwan’s accession to the
United Nations (UN), becoming one of its founding members (Huang,
2009). In 1945, Taiwan was granted a permanent seat in the United Nations
Security Council, and two years later, it became a GATT contracting party
while still in control of mainland China (Hsieh, 2005, 2011; Huang, 2009).
The ensuing political crises and social unrests, however, drastically trans-
formed the status-quo when KMTwas defeated by the Chinese Communist
Party in the 1949 (Hsieh 2005, 2011; Huang, 2009; Rich, 2009). This forced
the KMT to relocate its government to Taiwan and revoke its GATT
membership the following year (Hsieh, 2005, 2011; Huang, 2009). On 8
September 1951, Japan officially renounced its rights over Taiwan in the
San Francisco Peace Treaty without formally endorsing a party successor
(Huang, 2009). While KMTand CPC both agreed that Taiwan was part of
the mainland, however, both parties also claimed legitimate authority over
the whole China (Hsieh, 2005, 2011; Huang, 2009).
Fearing that a CPC-led China might further reinvigorate communist
sentiments in region, the United States intervened by pressuring Japan to
enact another treaty with the KMT (Huang, 2009). In April 1952, Japan
and Taiwan signed a new agreement known as the Treaty of Peace between
ROC and Japan, which effectively undermined CPC claims (Taiwan’s
Document Project, 1952). Upon the treaty’s ratification, Taiwan was
immediately absorbed within the United States’ anti-communist regional
alliance in Asia-Pacific (Huang, 2009). As a member of this elite circle,
Taiwan enjoyed a number of valuable concessions including economic aid
and politico-diplomatic support from 1950 until mid-1960s. In 1967,
Taiwan rejoined GATT after being granted an observer status (Huang,
2009).
In the late 1960s, however, American foreign policy took a dramatic
turn as it began to consider the inclusion of communist PRC into its
5 The names ‘Taiwan’ and Republic of China (ROC) are used interchangeably in this paper, as
with ‘China’ and ‘People’s Republic of China (PRC).
Understanding Taiwan’s sovereignty-trade linkages in the 21st century 85
 at U
niversity of C






anti-Soviet coalition (Huang, 2009). This bargaining with China produced
three joint communiqués, which sealed the fate of Taiwan as a ‘non-existing’
state, namely: (i) Shanghai Communiqué in 1972, (ii) Normalization
Communiqué in 1979, and (iii) Arms Sales Communiqué in 1982
(US Department of State 1972; Taiwan’s Document Project, 1979; Taiwan’s
Document Project, 1982). These three separate communiqués had one
underlying theme, that is, a ‘One-China’ policy which the United States had
to recognize if it were to win China’s support (Huang, 2009; Lee, 2010;
Wang et al., 2010). Consequently, the PRC took over ROC’s seat in the UN
in 1971, forcing the latter to withdraw and again from GATT during the
same year (Huang, 2009).
With the United States’ recognition of PRC as the seat of Chinese
government, ROC’s most important partner terminated its diplomatic
relations with Taipei and passed the Taiwan’s Relations Act (American
Institute in Taiwan, 1979). The said Act had formally denounced Taiwan’s
bid for independence by officially endorsing a position that there was but
one China and that Taiwan was part of China. Nonetheless, the said docu-
ment also stated America’s intention of maintaining strong, unofficial
relations with the island as a means of promoting peace and stability
in Asia-Pacific. This new mandate required the establishment of the
American Institute in Taiwan, a nonprofit corporation responsible for
handling official policy-related dialogs and exchanges between ROC and
the United States and replacing Taiwanese official ministries (Huang,
2009). In response, Taipei instituted the CCNA or Coordination Council
for North American Affairs in 1979 under the purview of the MFA or
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Huang, 2009). The said body was responsible
for the administration and coordination of bilateral matters between ROC
and the United States. Although these ‘unofficial’ economic and
politico-strategic exchanges redefined US-Taiwan diplomatic relations,
other states, however, had decided to formally end their diplomatic ties
with Taipei, bringing down the number of its political allies from 59 in
1971 to 22 in 2013 (Executive Yuan, 2012).
Given the ROC’s significantly reduced political clout, economic engage-
ments, mainly via free trade, become crucial strategies for carving out a
wider space in international politics amid the insecurities and uncertainties
induced by its sudden diplomatic demotion.
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3 Free trade as sovereignty-upgrading mechanism
3.1 Taiwan’s multilateral trade
The Road to the WTO. Taiwan’s accession to the WTO in 2002 under the
official name of ‘Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen
and Matsu’ (TPKM) was largely deemed by Taipei as a diplomatic
triumph in light of its previous isolation from the international arena pro-
cesses (Hsieh, 2005, 2011; Huang, 2009; Lee, 2010; Zhao and Liu, 2010).
The Taiwanese government has proudly emphasized the diplomatic signifi-
cance of its accession to the WTO, and its benefits to local industries and
firms, as well as ordinary citizens. Given Taiwan’s limited natural
resources, it is imperative for the government to actively engage in free
trade activities. As such, trade has been an important component of
Taiwan’s economic statecraft particularly after reorienting its trade strat-
egy in the late 1950s when it shifted from import substitution to export
promotion processes (Hsieh, 2005, 2011; Huang, 2009; Lee, 2010; Zhao
and Liu, 2010).
While the country’s economy has managed to grow rapidly over the past
decades even without the benefits from being a GATT member, neverthe-
less, Taiwanese officials agreed that membership to international organiza-
tions could enhance these gains, especially for small powers like Taiwan
(Hsieh, 2005, 2011; Huang, 2009). Accession to the WTO, for instance,
was expected to improve overall economic efficiency necessary for increas-
ing trade and income levels (Chou et al., 1997). Such initiative has inevit-
ably led to a number of structural reforms such as the abolishment of
quantitative restrictions to trade, depreciation of the Taiwanese dollar, and
fixing of convoluted multiple exchange rates system (Chou et al., 1997).
The range of forbidden and controlled imports was also substantially cut
down, and licensing procedures were adopted to ensure health and safety
standards (Chou et al., 1997). It is worth noting that even before Taiwan’s
accession, it has already implemented WTO-consistent reforms and pol-
icies (Charnovitz, 2006; Chang and Goldstein, 2007; Yang, 2007; Huang,
2009). The positive results that Taiwan has reaped from the WTO so far
can be attributed to its exceptional preparedness in adopting high levels of
economic liberalization (Yang, 2007). For instance, Taiwan’s average
nominal tariff a year prior to its official accession was already at 6.0%, a
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level that is comparable to those in advanced WTO countries (Huang,
2009; Chang and Goldstein, 2007; Yang, 2007).
Taiwan’s application to the WTO was filed in January 1990, but it took
another twelve years before it was finally approved (Hsieh, 2005; Charnovitz,
2006; Yang, 2007; Huang, 2009). There are three common factors that
prevent applicants from immediate accession to the WTO, these are: (i) more
complicated WTO rules, (ii) non-market economies, and (iii) demands for
greater concessions and more aggressive commitments from existing WTO
members (Langhammer and Lucke, 1999; Huang, 2009). Taiwan, however,
has completed all WTO requirements as early as 1998 (Liang, 2002; Yang,
2007; Huang, 2009). In fact, at the time of its application, Taiwan’s trade
regime was far more liberalized than most of developing members in the
WTO (Liang, 2002; Yang, 2007; Huang, 2009). In short, the amount of time
it took to approve Taiwan’s application should have been significantly
shorter.
The biggest delaying factors in Taiwan’s case were politically charged.
On the one hand, were issues relating to its contested sovereignty, and on
the other hand, were concerns relating to its volatile relations with China
(Hsieh, 2005; Huang, 2009). When China renegotiated its WTO member-
ship with the United States after its temporary withdrawal following the
Tiananmen Square incidence in 1989, the two parties agreed that Beijing
would not block Taipei’s accession (Liang, 2002; Huang, 2009). In ex-
change, it was also agreed that China would be granted membership prior
to Taiwan (Liang, 2002; Huang, 2009). This was explicitly tackled during
the GATT Council Meeting on 29 September 1992, which acknowledged
the One-China principle as stated in the UN General Assembly
Resolution 2758: ‘Many contracting parties, therefore, had agreed with the
view of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) that Chinese Taipei, as a
separate customs territory, should not accede to the GATT before the PRC
itself.’ (GATT Council, 1992) This proved to be a painful process for
Taiwanese officials because despite their preparedness, incumbent WTO
members declined to conclude any form of agreements with Taipei since
Beijing’s application was still in pending (Liang, 2002; Yang, 2007;
Huang, 2009). Consequently, all negotiations with Taipei had to remain
open and were sometimes repeated even when there was nothing more to
add or to discuss (Liang, 2002; Yang, 2007; Huang, 2009). China’s ineffi-
ciency in implementing the required structural reforms into its non-market
economy, as well as its ineffectiveness in bargaining with other members,
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mired Taiwan’s negotiation activities (Huang, 2009). Finally, a day after
China’s accession to the WTO on 10 November 2001, Taiwan was granted
a membership status as a separate custom territory (Liang, 2002; Cho,
2005; Hsieh, 2005; Yang, 2007; Huang, 2009).
The ubiquitous China factor. The WTO, unlike any other existing inter-
national institutions, does not require potential members to be sovereign
states to gain accession. This unique constitutional feature of the WTO
has enabled a form of ‘cross-strait co-existence’ between the ROC and
PRC within the same multilateral space as ‘co-equal’ or parallel members
(Cho, 2005; Hsieh, 2005; Charnovitz, 2006; Huang, 2009; Bush, 2011).
Hence, while Taipei’s WTO accession cannot be regarded as a bilateral
accord with Beijing; nonetheless, it helped in facilitating some semblance
of rule of law between the two parties. In addition, it allowed the Taiwanese
government to stand in an international tribunal through the organization’s
Dispute Settlement Understanding when disagreements over WTO rule and
procedures other members arise (Hsieh, 2005; Charnovitz, 2006). As pom-
pously stated in the 2001 Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) report (cited in
Cho, 2005, p. 743):
Taiwan and mainland Chinawill be two independent, parallel, and equal
members. The WTO mechanism offers the two sides a new channel for
communication, dialogue, and consultation. The two do not have to set
any preconditions or prerequisites. They can conduct dialogue and con-
sultation on mutually concerned issues based on the WTO rules and
framework.
However, questions remain as to whether or not China intends to acknow-
ledge Taiwan’s co-equal status within the WTO given its continual claim of
legitimate sovereignty over the island, along with its long-term goal of reinte-
grating it with Mainland. From the Chinese perspective, Taiwan remains to
be a province of China with or without ‘peaceful unification’ (Lee, 2010;
Zhao and Liu, 2010; Clark and Tan, 2012). As such, Beijing promotes a
WTO framework with ‘One-China gestures’ by rejecting anything that con-
notes the presence of two Chinas (Cho, 2005, p. 751). Such gestures are
intended to castoff any political implications that might arise from China’s
compliance with WTO rules in relation to Taiwan at the global level. In add-
ition, it aims to emphasize that adherence to these multilateral agreements
does not, in any way, nullify Beijing’s One-China principle. In short, these
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One-China gestures aim ‘to tell the world that interactions with Taiwan are
not international affairs but internal matters’ (Cho, 2005, p. 752).
A concrete example is the ‘nomenclature war’ launched by China
against Taiwan as a subtle form of protest over their parallel status in the
WTO. For instance, China uses the name ‘Chinese Taipei’ instead TPKM
to refer to Taiwan in the WTO and insisted that all members must follow
the same (Cho, 2005; Charnovitz, 2006). It did not hesitate from calling
the attention of representatives from other countries that made the mistake
of calling TPKM, ‘Taiwan’during formal or informal sessions (Cho, 2005;
Charnovitz, 2006). Moreover, China prefers to use Chinese language when
preparing official WTO documents that pertain to Taiwan and rejects
TPKM documents that bear the name of ‘Republic of China’ (Cho, 2005).
Such gestures are meant to send the message that the island is part of
China’s separate customs territories just like Hong Kong and Macao
(Cho, 2005; Charnovitz, 2006). Hence, from the Chinese standpoint,
WTO dialogs between Beijing and Taipei are domestic concerns of a single
country with several subsidiaries (Cho, 2005).
Yet, in July 2005, CNATaiwan reported China’s formal recognition of
Taiwan’s TPKM title but demanded the cancelation of diplomatic titles
given to some members of the Taiwanese Mission (cited in Charnovitz,
2006, p. 417). The WTO Secretariat granted the appeal and removed these
titles from the updated version of its Members Directory, provoking Taipei
officials to accuse the organization of ‘throwing away its neutrality under
pressure from China.’ (Bishop, 2005) At present, only the top two officials
at the nation’s Permanent Mission to the WTO are identified by their re-
spective titles, while all lower-ranking representatives only have their
names and areas of expertize listed (Cho, 2005; Charnovitz, 2006).
These nomenclature discriminations and One-China gestures toward
Taiwan are intended to challenge the legitimacy of government’s equal
standing in the WTO (Cho, 2005; Charnovitz, 2006). As far as Beijing is
concerned, Taiwan’s WTO accession is solely based on its status as one of
China’s separate customs and territories (Cho, 2005; Charnovitz, 2006).
Hence, it cannot and should not have a legal standing of its own within the
said institution. Through these projections, Beijing is able to effectively
portray its relations with Taipei as a local affair between Mailand and one
of its customs territories. China’s rejection of Taiwan’s independent legal
status at the WTO explains its continuous refusal to conduct bilateral
dialogs concerning cross-strait issues at a multilateral level.
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3.2 Taiwan’s bilateral trade
The US–Taiwan bilateral relations. Taiwan’s bilateral trade experience with
the United States must be examined against the backdrop of its inability to
access both the UN and GATT. The power asymmetry between the two
parties enabled the United States to manipulate and exploit Taiwan’s
policy mechanisms (Hsieh, 2005; Huang, 2009; Lee, 2010; Zhao and Liu,
2010; Hsieh, 2011). In essence, bilateral trade relations between the two
were more unilateral than bilateral given the United States’ dual role as ne-
gotiator and arbitrator. This has enabled the former to act ‘manipulatively’
and ‘exploitatively’ toward the latter (Bhagwati, 1990; Krugman, 1991;
Zartman and Rubin, 2000, p. 275). Taiwan’s proposals for creating dispute
settlement mechanism to resolve trade issues were rejected by the United
States since bilateral agreements do not allow for it (Charnovitz, 2006;
Huang, 2009). Accordingly, throughout the negotiation processes, Taipei
followed a defensive strategy, acknowledging its lack of any tangible
control over trade matters raised by the United States (Huang, 2009).
Although Taiwan’s contested statehood was a critical factor for explain-
ing its weak bargaining leverage, nonetheless, the island’s excessive de-
pendence on Washington and its lack of access to multilateral trading
system further aggravated its position relative to the United States (Huang,
2009; Lee, 2010; Bush, 2011). Given the Taiwanese government’s passive
and defensive posture, it failed to capitalize on US bilateralism in pro-
moting its political and economic diplomacy objectives (Huang, 2009;
Tucker, 2009; Lee, 2010). Despite Taiwan’s mediocre performance in US–
Taiwan trade talks, several important lessons were learned that helped
the government in its successful bid for a WTO pass. For one, Taiwan’s
experience with US bilateralism made it easier for the country to adjust to
the GATT framework (Cho, 2005; Hsieh, 2005; Charnovitz, 2006; Huang,
2009). The country’s trade regime was in line with the regulations and
procedures being followed in the WTO, which made the transition from
bilateralism to multilateralism relatively smooth (Chou et al., 1997; Huang,
2009). Taiwan’s prior bilateral engagements with the United States, there-
fore, helped the former in preparing for its accession to the WTO. As Siew
affirmed (cited in Huang, 2009, p. 49):
Taiwan’s connection to the international regime and the rules of the
game were established in the period of US–Taiwan trade negotiations.
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Without such experience, the Americans would not like to help Taiwan
join the GATT/WTO while under the pressure from the PRC.
Notwithstanding Taiwan’s limited capacity for effectively balancing the
asymmetric US power, bilateralism between the two has been instrumental
for successful integration of the former within the WTO. This milestone has
significantly contributed to the development of Taipei’s diplomatic scope.
Upon its entry to the WTO, Taiwan was able to conduct positive diplomatic
activities through various multilateral mechanisms that have helped in the
expansion of its sovereign space. These include: (i) application to other
multilateral institutions such as the World Health Organization and the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, (ii) participa-
tion in negotiating groups within the WTO such as the group of ‘Very Good
Friends’ on Service, the group of ‘Anti-dumping Friends’, the group of
‘Friends of Environmental Goods’, and the G10, and (iii) establishment of
diplomatic dialogs with other countries applying for accession after 2002
(Huang, 2009).
The China–Taiwan bilateral relations. A critical glitch in Taiwan’s foreign
economic policymaking stems from its statehood dilemma induced by
China’s continual rejection of its sovereign status. This creates serious
politico-diplomatic constraints that limit the trade policy options available
for Taiwanese leaders, unable to develop either substantive or tactical FTAs
with their prospective partners.6 As one of the biggest export-oriented econ-
omies in the region, forging bilateral and/or regional FTAs with other coun-
tries is instrumental for securing Taiwan’s preferential access as the WTO
Doha Round staggers to a stalemate (Dent, 2002, 2005, 2006; Hong, 2012).
Moreover, FTAs can serve as platforms through which the country’s sover-
eignty can be positively expressed, thereby expanding its China-centric
diplomacy track (Dent, 2002, 2005, 2006; Hsieh, 2005; Bush, 2011; Hong,
2012) The ‘bandwagoning effect’ of FTA proliferation compels Taiwan to
negotiate and conclude trade agreements to avert the risks of further
marginalization.7
6 For a detailed discussion on ‘tactical’ and ‘substantive’ forms of FTAs, see Aggarwal and
Govella (2013), p. 1–22.
7 For in-depth discussion on FTA’s ‘bandwagoning effect,’ see, Bhagwati and Krueger (1995).
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Given the debilitating effects of China factor, Taiwan begins to link its
security motives with FTA agendas, amalgamating economic and
politico-strategic objectives. Taiwan’s FTA plans, therefore, are not only
substantively informed but are also tactically linked to its national security.
Preferential FTAs provide Taiwan a sense of heightened security by min-
imizing its degree of dependence on China (Dent, 2002, 2005, 2006;
Hong, 2012). Hence, FTAs become an attractive medium of escape for
Taiwan. The fear of being marginalized further from intensifying regional
integration compels Taiwanese policy elites to craft economically lucrative
FTAs that will entice potential partners to look beyond the country’s con-
tested statehood (Hong, 2012; Dent, 2002, 2005, 2006).
Inadvertently, the proliferation of FTAs has presented China a new in-
strument for undermining Taiwan’s national security by hijacking its dip-
lomatic space. The result is systematic marginalization of the island from
significant global interactions. Beijing’s forceful arguments in favor of a
strictly state-to-state FTA negotiation further diminish Taiwan’s inter-
national status (Hong, 2012; Dent, 2002, 2005, 2006). As an alternative,
China is persuading Taiwanese policymakers to adopt the Hong Kong
and Macau model for developing CEPA or Closer Economic Partnership
Arrangement (Dent, 2006; Hong, 2012). Such proposition is deemed un-
acceptable by the ROC government as it not only contracts the country’s
diplomatic space but can also potentially lead to a dead-end One-China
situation.
Nevertheless, since KMT’s return to power in 2008 under the leadership
of Ma, Taipei, has begun to downplay the importance of its sovereignty
dispute with Beijing (Rigger, 2010; Wang et al., 2010; Chow, 2012; Hong,
2012; Hwang, 2012). As a strategy, Ma launched the Economic
Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) in November 2008 and was
warmly welcomed by China’s Hu Jintao and became a law in January
2011 (Ministry of Economic Affairs, 2010). As a preferential trade agree-
ment, the ECFA aims to reduce tariffs and commercial barriers between
Taiwan and China and is considered as the most important agreement
since the two sides split after the Chinese Civil War in 1949. From the
point of view of Taiwanese government, the ECFA fulfills three main
objectives: (i) promoting normalization of cross-strait economic and trade
relations, (ii) preventing Taiwan’s marginalization from regional economic
integration, and (iii) enhancing Taiwan’s status as a regional investment
hub (Mainland Affairs Council).
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The ratification of ECFA impacts several facets of Taiwan’s cross-strait
relations with China. The deepening asymmetric interdependence between
ROC and PRC due to ECFA can be interpreted both in economic (‘sensi-
tivity interdependence’) and politico-strategic (‘vulnerability interdepend-
ence’) contexts.8 From an economic context, sensitivity interdependence
occurs when economic events in China create externalities that ramify
across Taiwan, and vice versa, such as large shifts in prices and disruptions
of supply chains (Kahler and Kastner, 2006; Kastner, 2006, 2013; Hong,
2012). The economic fates of both states, therefore, become inextricably
linked together. Meanwhile, from a politico-strategic context, vulnerability
interdependence arises when imbalanced cross-strait relations allow the
stronger party to utilize its power to transform the weaker party’s trade
policies to its uncontested advantage, such as in the case of ECFA (Kahler
and Kastner, 2006; Kastner, 2006, 2013; Hong, 2012). Once dependency
has been established, the dominant partner begins to introduce extra con-
ditionalities which cannot be refuted by the weaker party since the risks of
termination have gone too high (Chow, 2012; Hong, 2012; Hwang, 2012).
On the one hand, the preferentiality and exclusivity being derived
from ECFA integrates Taiwan and China more deeply, and as such,
increases the costs of defection (Kahler and Kastner, 2006; Kastner, 2013).
Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement may also be seen as an
added layer of protection against Taiwan’s further relegation from the
international trading system (Chow, 2012; Hong, 2012; Wu, 2012). It is
envisioned to enhance the country’s industrial competitiveness by attract-
ing more FDIs, hence strengthening its position in the rapidly expanding
Chinese market (Chow, 2012; Hong, 2012; Wu, 2012). In short, it is the
prototype for Taiwan’s future FTAs with prospective partners other than
China. Beijing had promised to support Taipei’s efforts in negotiating
FTAs with other small powers like Singapore and New Zealand to begin
carving its international space under the purview of One-China principle
upon ECFA’s implementation (Dent, 2006; Hong, 2012). Due to China’s
politico-strategic motives, however, the possibility of Taiwan forming
FTAs with other powerful nations such as the United States, Japan, EU
members, and ASEAN as a whole remains unlikely (Hsieh, 2011; Chow,
2012; Hong, 2012; Wu, 2012).
8 For a more in-depth analysis of sensitivity interdependence, see Keohane and Nye (1977); for
vulnerability interdependence, see Hirschman (1945).
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Politically, ECFA is both a cause and effect of cross-strait pacification
and, as such, can either reinforce or threaten stability across the Taiwan
Strait. The main argument against ECFA, however, is that it can potentially
result in the cession of Taiwan’s de facto autonomy in exchange for limited
economic benefits (Chen, 2012; Chow, 2012; Hong, 2012; Hwang, 2012;
Wu, 2012). Critics point to the ambiguous, secretive, and undemocratic
process through which ECFA has been negotiated and ratified by the two
governments, rousing suspicions that the selling of Taiwan’s national inter-
ests (Chow, 2012; Hong, 2012). Although the adoption of ECFA does not
necessarily lead to unification as discussed earlier, the preferentiality
afforded by ECFA to China may contribute to that end goal (Chow, 2012;
Dittmer, 2012; Hong, 2012; Hwang, 2012; Wu, 2012). Similarly, the notion
of normalization of cross-strait relations through ECFA is deemed by
Beijing as a step closer toward unification (Hsieh, 2011; Chen, 2012; Chow,
2012; Hong, 2012; Dittmer, 2012). Arguments for protectionism, therefore,
typically underscore the threats to ROC’s national security induced by
heightened economic engagements (Chen, 2012; Chow, 2012; Hong, 2012).
Critics warn the government about China’s attempts at unification via eco-
nomics strategy for managing relations across Taiwan Strait (Chen, 2012;
Dittmer, 2012; Hong, 2012; Muyard, 2012; Wu, 2012). Despite Taipei’s dis-
criminatory treatment against Chinese products, Beijing remains patient
and compromising since it views ECFA negotiations as a positive function
of One-Chinavision (Chen, 2012; Chow, 2012; Hong, 2012).
Beijing’s insistence on a ‘one country, two systems’ approach for facili-
tating ECFA does not bode well for Taiwanese policymakers who favor
normalization of the status-quo over political unification (Dittmer, 2012;
Hong, 2012; Muyard, 2012; Wu, 2012). The manner with which the PRC
is managing ECFA sends a strong message that it is viewed more as a do-
mestic rather than an international agreement by Beijing. The fact that
ECFA’s legal documents do not include definite plans and schedules
implies that both parties may not be able to fully comply with WTO rules
regarding the proper implementation of FTA’s. Hence, Taipei still consid-
ers multilateral trade under the WTO as the more preferred channel for
asserting its sovereign claims and enhancing its national security given its
constitutionally guaranteed equal rights that mitigates discrimination and
precludes favoritism among members.
Understanding Taiwan’s sovereignty-trade linkages in the 21st century 95
 at U
niversity of C






Taiwan beyond the United States and China bilateral relations. Immediately
after ECFA’s signing, Taiwanese officials have vigorously explored possi-
bilities for developing FTAs with other nations. In fact, even prior to
Taiwan’s WTO accession, the government had already established the
FTA Task Force in 2001, conducting feasibility studies on bilateral trade
with partners such as Japan, New Zealand, Singapore, and the United
States (EDN, 2010).
Although preliminary assessments seemed encouraging, it did not take
long before China issued warnings to countries that were considering
FTAs with Taiwan (Dent, 2006). This led to Singapore’s reassessment of
its FTA plans with Taiwan, arguing that any agreement between the two
countries must be pursuant to the One China principle (Dent, 2006). And
while both parties deemed such decision regrettable, nevertheless, FTA
negotiations eventually led to indefinite suspension (Dent, 2006; Hong,
2012). Even the announcement made by Taiwanese government con-
cerning the official title that will be used in signing FTA documents to
downplay its contested statehood dilemma – Chinese Taipei instead of
Taiwan – did not illicit positive response from prospective partners (Dent,
2006; Hong, 2012). Beijing, therefore, has discovered another effective
mechanism for constraining Taiwan’s diplomatic space by deliberately
blocking its efforts at joining regional and/or transregional FTA activities.
Taiwan did manage, however, to conclude bilateral FTAs with four of its
twenty-two official diplomatic allies, namely: Costa Rica, from October
2002; Guatemala, fromMarch 2003; Panama, August 2003; and Nicaragua,
from, April 2004 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2014). The net economic bene-
fits of Taiwan’s bilateral trade deals with these Central American countries –
estimated at around USD 324 million in 2004 – are relatively small, taking
into account the associated costs for negotiating these FTAs (Dent, 2006).
To this extent, it can be argued that Taipei’s economic motives for concluding
these bilateral agreements were only secondary to its politico-strategic
motives. By signing these agreements, Taiwanese officials have gained vital
first-hand experience with FTA formulations and negotiations. In addition,
these accords have also set the stage for Taiwan’s goal of expanding its diplo-
matic space amid strong pressure from Beijing to uphold the One-China
principle.
Amid PRC’s constant threats against ROC’s FTA plans with non-
diplomatic partners, Taipei has implicitly retaliated by adopting a stealthy
approach to conducting preferential trade negotiations (Dent, 2006). The
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lack of huge media attention on Taiwan’s bilateral involvement is a key
component of the government’s strategy for capturing substantive and/or
tactical FTAs (Dent, 2006). The first concrete results from these efforts
were the signing of bilateral FTAs with New Zealand and Singapore in
2013, three years after ECFA’s enactment. These events had somewhat
ended looming speculations on Beijing’s plan to abandon its promise of
allowing Taiwan to conclude FTAs with other countries even after the
passage of ECFA. Needless to say, Taiwan achieved major diplomatic
milestones with the successful conclusions of its first two bilateral FTAs
with non-diplomatic partners.
On 10 July 2013, Taiwan and New Zealand signed the Agreement
between New Zealand and the Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan,
Penghu, Kinmen, and Matsu (TPKM) on Economic Cooperation or
ANZTEC (New Zealand Commerce and Industry Office, 2013). The said
agreement is Taiwan’s first FTA with a non-diplomatic partner that also
has an existing trade arrangement with China. Taipei officials maintain
that ANZTEC provides Taiwan the much-needed thrust for pursing
greater regional economic integration and opens new doors for similar
agreements against the backdrop of warming cross-strait relations (White
et al., 2013). To avoid unnecessary diplomatic row with its second largest
trading partner, the New Zealand government took a low-profile approach
during negotiations (Craymer and Liu, 2013). Neither government sent
senior ministers to witness the signing of ANZTEC, so as not to imply a
‘state-to-state’ affair. Instead, the pact’s signing was concluded via
webcast, enabling Taiwanese officials to witness the agreement without
having to set foot in New Zealand territory.
Technically, ANZTEC is not a ‘state-to-state’ agreement since it was
signed by the New Zealand Commerce and Industry Office in Taipei, and
the Taipei Economic and Cultural Office in Wellington. This was later on
confirmed by China’s Foreign Ministry spokesperson Hua Chunying at a
press conference held in Beijing on 10 July 2013:
Our position on the issue of Taiwan’s foreign exchanges is consistent and
clear. We have no objection to non-governmental business and cultural
exchanges between foreign countries and the region of Taiwan but oppose
the development of any official ties between them. Fair and reasonable
arrangement could be made for Taiwan’s participation in international ac-
tivities through practical consultation across the Straits on the premise of
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not creating ‘two Chinas’ or ‘one China, one Taiwan.’(Consulate-General
of the People’s Republic of China, 2013)
Following its game-changing FTA with New Zealand, on 7 November
2013, Taiwan signed another bilateral agreement with Singapore, called
Agreement between Singapore and the Separate Customs Territory of
TPKM on Economic Partnership or ASTEP (Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
2013). It is Taiwan’s first bilateral FTAwith a non-diplomatic partner in
Asia and represents the country’s hope to trigger a domino effect by en-
couraging other states to negotiate with it on similar trade accords without
antagonizing Beijing. As with ANZTEC, both parties in ASTEP main-
tained a low-profile approach throughout the negotiation process to avoid
offending Chinese sentiments (Wang, 2013). The deal was signed between
the Singapore Trade Office in Taipei and the Taipei Representative Office in
Singapore, implying a non-‘government-to-government’ agreement similar
to ANZTEC. Taiwan’s Minister of Foreign Affairs David Lin is optimistic
that both ASTEP and ANZTEC will enable the country to accede to pluri-
lateral trade agreements such as the TPP or Trans-Pacific Partnership, and
the RCEP or Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (Shih, 2013).
Meanwhile, China threw caution to Singapore over its FTA activities with
Taiwan, urging its government to recognize the existing One-China policy:
‘our position on Taiwan’s foreign interactions remains consistent and clear.
We hope Singapore could abide by the One-China policy and deal with its
economic ties with Taiwan in a prudent and proper manner.’ (Hsu and
Poon, 2013).
The coming into fruition of ANZTEC and ASTEP can be indications
that cross-strait relations are improving. The PRC is now more comfort-
able in giving ROC some room to navigate in the international arena,
thereby enlarging its diplomatic space. However, the extent to which obser-
vance of One-China principle will influence Taiwan’s capacity at enhan-
cing the level and quality of interactions in international platforms
remains ambiguous. Notwithstanding these uncertainties, both ANZTEC
and ASTEP represent a significant development as far as Taiwan’s ‘inexis-
tence’ at the global arena is concerned and mark the beginning of thawing
political barriers to Taiwanese sovereign statehood.
Overall, bilateral FTAs are vital tools for upgrading Taiwan’s de facto
sovereignty as they enhance the country’s relations with non-diplomatic
partners. While bandwagoning and domino effects of FTAs have
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manifested in various Asia-Pacific countries, Taiwan, in contrast, has
remained relatively idle due to its existing politico-diplomatic issues with
China (Asian Regional Integration Center, 2014). Although recent events
may have revealed a more positive Chinese attitude toward Taiwan’s
FTA goals, nonetheless, there are no guarantees that such behavior will
last in the short, let alone long run. The Taiwanese government, there-
fore, tries to efficiently utilize the benefits from WTO membership.
Unfortunately, the current WTO impasse poses yet another problem for
the country that requires it to play a more pro-active role in helping
other members reach a consensus on problematic trade issues. Hence, in
the context of an omnipresent China factor, Taiwan is essentially facing
a two-way free-trade stalemate, which invariably threatens its remaining
sovereign space.
4 Limits to Taiwan’s sovereignty-trade linkages
4.1 Limits of domestic politics
Different political actors have different views regarding the impacts of
cross-strait trade relations on Taiwan’s de facto sovereignty. On the one
hand, the pan-green forces depict cross-strait trade engagements as threats
to national security, and on the other hand, pan-blue forces highlight the
security-enhancing features of such engagements.9 Despite DPP’s warn-
ings about the imminent threats being posed by deeper economic engage-
ment with the Mainland, the KMT still actively campaigns for enhanced
Sino partnership to take advantage of the economic boom in China (Lee,
2010; Wang et al., 2010; Zhao and Liu, 2010; Chow, 2011).
Thus, it is interesting to see how ordinary Taiwanese citizens view the
intensifying cross-strait relations. Based on the survey conducted by the
National Chengchi University in April 2007 during the time of then-
President Chen of the DPP, cross-strait relations were seen more as a threat
rather than reinforcement to Taiwanese sovereignty. 61.0% of the respon-
dents demanded tighter regulations on cross-strait relations; 35.0%
requested for fewer restrictions; and 4.0% favored the present status-quo
9 The pan-green force is consisted of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), Taiwan
Solidarity Union (TSU), and the minor Taiwan Independence Party (TAIP). The pan-blue
force is consisted of the Kuomintang (KMT), the People First Party (PFP), and the New
Party (CNP).
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(Wang, 2009). Upon the KMT’s return to power in 2008 under Ma’s lead-
ership, the percentage of Taiwanese population that called for stricter regu-
lations increased to 71.0%, whereas those that favored softer policies
decreased to 26.0% (Wang, 2009). These results highlight the largely pes-
simistic views being held by Taiwanese citizens with respect to Taipei’s
engagement strategies with Beijing, specifically after the reopening of
direct links to cross-strait relations. To some extent, these findings reflect
the persistence of Taiwanese nationalism over fears of complete absorption
within China’s sinicization project.
Nevertheless, ECF’s passage and implementation had seemed to alter
Taiwanese perception toward China but not without deep polarization of
local opinion. On the one hand, influential business groups along with
some of the country’s political elites are largely supportive of ECFA, citing
huge economic gains as primary impetus for passing the agreement
(Clark, 2009; Wang et al., 2010; Hsieh, 2011; Clark and Tan, 2012). On
the other hand, parties opposed to reunification plans with China, along
with the local firms adversely affected by the agreement, argue that ECFA
symbolizes Ma’s long-term interest in selling Taiwan’s sovereignty by
ceding all its political and economic authorities to the Mainland (Tien
and Tung, 2011; Hong, 2012). Despite this, results from the surveys con-
ducted by the MAC in 2010 indicated a generally favorable Taiwanese atti-
tude toward ECFA. 60.0% of the total number of respondents agreed that
ECFA creates long-term positive impacts to the economy and 23.0%
expressed less optimism about its promised effects, while the remaining
11.0% showed neutral support for the agreement (Mainland Affairs
Council, 2010).
Furthermore, ECFA supporters argue that the citizens’ favorable view
toward the agreement is largely driven by the satisfying conditions it gener-
ates. 67.0% of survey participants expressed satisfaction with the ECFA,
while only 33.0% claimed dissatisfaction (Mainland Affairs Council,
2010). With regard to ECFA’s latent security threats against Taiwan’s sov-
ereignty, although 34.0% believed that the agreement undermines the
country’s de facto sovereignty, nonetheless, a much larger 66.0% down-
played the veracity of these threats (Mainland Affairs Council, 2010).
With respect to ECFA’s role in Taiwan’s FTA promotion, 71.0% of the
respondents viewed the agreement as a necessary precursor for capturing
more FTAs in the future, thus, underlining its capacity for enhancing
the island’s sovereign space (Mainland Affairs Council, 2010). These
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results suggest that Taiwan’s management style with respect to cross-strait
relations is more fluid than what might have been initially thought of.
Taipei’s pragmatic engagement approach with respect to China has sub-
stantial influence over the politico-diplomatic climate surrounding the two
governments. The island’s speedy recovery from the global recession in
2009, and the inability of the DPP from predicting the accurate impact of
the ECFA on Taiwan’s sovereignty, has significantly improved the Chinese
image (Clark, 2009; Clark and Tan, 2010, 2012).
But, for the members and leaders of the DPP, pro-Taiwan policies par-
ticularly the quest for de jure sovereignty must deeply be interwoven into
the country’s democratization agenda (Clark and Tan, 2012; Rigger,
2010). Replacing authoritarianism with democracy requires the propaga-
tion of Taiwanese nationalism that would overthrow a China-centric
regime in order to declare non-negotiable autonomy from China (Gold,
1986; Wachman, 1994). The DPP officials expected that by leading the
nation in its pursuit for complete independence, the citizens would give
them the required votes to gain power over the government (Clark and
Tan, 2010, 2012). Conversely, the KMT leaders heavily relied on the spill-
over effects of Taiwan’s economic miracle to justify their position that
favored the normalization of cross-strait relations (Clark and Tan, 2010,
2012). So, while the DPP was adamant in endorsing a state-to-state ap-
proach when dealing with China, the KMTwas cautious with implement-
ing its own version of the One-China principle despite its reinstatement of
Taiwan as the legitimate government of all China (Clark and Tan, 2010,
2012; Rigger, 2010).
The results of 1991 and 2008 elections, however, have forced the DPP to
take a more restrained rhetoric on Taiwanese sovereignty after suffering a
landslide defeat against the KMT (Clark and Tan, 2012). Since the explicit
denouncement of One-China policy proved to be electorally costly and pol-
itically infeasible at least in the short run, the DPP started to relax its policy
on sovereignty and crafted a new discourse emphasizing the country’s de
facto rather than de jure independence from China (Rigger, 2010; Clark and
Tan, 2012). This resulted to internal conflicts among various DPP factions
that eventually led to defection of pro-independence members and soon
established the Taiwan Independence Party (Wang, 2000; Rigger, 2001;
Clark and Tan, 2012).
The failure of nationalist goals and objectives to bring about electoral
success their limits for improving Taiwan’s remaining sovereign space.
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Revisionist propositions with regard to Taiwan’s contested sovereignty
yield low numbers of vote for the respective parties espousing them. This
reflects the public’s fear that proposals for either complete unification or
absolute independence invariably undercut the existing cross-strait stabil-
ity. Interestingly, a huge segment of the voting population preferred the
preservation of the status-quo, or the so-called normalization of cross-
strait relations (Hsieh, 2002; Huang, 2009). Consequently, Taiwan’s major
political parties are being compelled to soften their nationalist stance by
taking the middle ground in order to placate the skeptic voters (Wang,
2000; Lin, 2001; Clark and Tan, 2012). It appears, therefore, that a consen-
sus for adopting a moderate approach to achieving nationalist agendas
between these two competing parties has been reached. While general sen-
timents toward each other may be as capricious as the Taiwan–China rela-
tion itself, nonetheless, both have been consistent in applying the norm of
moderation in the conduct of cross-strait affairs.
Once again, this became evident in the 2012 presidential election when
the DPP’s presidential candidate, Tsai Eng-wen, failed to convince
Taiwanese voters that cross-strait relations would remain stable under her
leadership. This forced the DPP to reformulate its engagement policies and
strategies with theMainland (Kastner, 2013). As such, it may be argued that
in the long run, there will be no incentive for Taiwanese political parties and
politicians to launch strong pro-independence campaigns given their huge
electoral risks. Therefore, the freezing of Taiwan’s de jure sovereignty
becomes an attractive choice.
4.2 Limits of engagement strategies
That the ever-increasing economic interdependence between Taiwan and
China engenders security threats due to the latter’s claims of sovereign
authority over the former is reminiscent of Hirschman’s (1980) analysis of
Eastern Europe’s economic dependence on Nazi Germany in the 1930s.
There were three interrelated factors that led to intensified cross-strait
economic relations in the early and mid-1990s, namely: economic
complementarity, cultural and language ties, and political compatibility
(Clark and Tan, 2010, 2012).
The ephemeral harmony of interest induced by volatile political compati-
bility was soon replaced by hostility and tension stemming from provocative
exchanges between the two governments beginning on second half of the
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1990s. President Lee’s visit to his alma mater at Cornell University in June
1995 was interpreted as a subtle assertion of Taiwanese independence, elicit-
ing strong military contestations from Beijing through missile diplomacy
(Clark and Tan, 2010, 2012; Lee, 2010; Zhao and Liu, 2010). Lee’s state-
ments regarding Taiwan’s ‘state-to-state relations’ with China in 1999 led
further to a series of confrontations (Clark and Tan, 2010, 2012; Lee, 2010).
Although Beijing issued grave warnings against a pro-independence presi-
dential candidate, nevertheless, this did not prevent a DPP contender in the
person of Chen Shui-bian, from occupying the presidential seat in 2000 (Lee
2010; Wang et al., 2010; Zhao and Liu, 2010).
After two years of failed attempts at courting China, a ‘one country,
one side’ rhetoric was adopted, provoking yet another cross-strait crisis.
China responded with the passage of its Anti-Secession Law directed
toward Taipei in March 2005, reigniting tensions across the Taiwan Strait
(Wang et al., 2010; Zhao and Liu, 2010). Chen then utilized the China
factor for consolidating domestic support to his nationalist agendas while
freezing the National Unification Council and Guidelines in 2006 (Lee,
2010; Rigger, 2010). As a result, cross-strait relations continued to be
erratic and unstable until the KMT’s return to power in 2008 with Ma
taking over the presidency and promising a more China-friendly approach
(Chu, 2007; Gold, 2009; Tucker, 2009; Lee, 2010; Rigger, 2010; Wang
et al., 2010; Zhao and Liu, 2010).
Despite constant diplomatic bickering, economic interactions between
the two governments remained relatively stable and in fact grew even higher.
Cross-strait trade relations have been successfully insulated during these tu-
multuous periods. However, the imbalanced trade between Taiwan and
China has some serious implications, both positive and negative depending
on whether one generates a surplus or a deficit. The argument regarding the
adverse effects of Taiwan’s trade dependence on China, particularly in terms
of its contested statehood, highlights the limits of ROC’s engagement strat-
egies. Given the overwhelming China factor, Taiwan’s pursuit of economic
interests threatens to undermine its already diminishing sovereign space.
Yet, for the current Ma administration, forging mutual trust and under-
standing through deeper economic partnership with China is the key to en-
suring peace and stability in cross-strait relations (Clark and Tan, 2010,
2012; Lee, 2010; Wang et al., 2010; Zhao and Liu, 2010). In the words of
Ma (in Kastner 2013, p. 6) it’s only by ‘more contact, more understanding,
more exchange [can] we reduce the historical hostilities across the Taiwan
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Strait.’ Such statement implies Ma’s adherence to a softer version of
One-China policy by insisting on closer economic integration with the
Mainland in order to preserve Taiwan’s de facto autonomy.
But, for the staunchest critics of cross-strait economic engagement,
Taiwan’s increasing dependence on China inevitably leads to political uni-
fication (Lee, 2010; Zhao and Liu, 2010; Hong, 2012). First, Beijing may
either use economic sticks or carrots to convince or coerce Taipei into uni-
fication. Second, Taiwanese beneficiaries of economic interdependence in
general may develop a positive outlook toward unification, knowing how
important stable cross-strait relations is for securing their private interests
(Kastner 2013).
Supporters of Ma’s policy, however, claim that there are a few good
reasons to question the assumption that economic integration will eventu-
ally lead to political unification. Although Taiwan’s closer economic rela-
tions with China may enhance the latter’s coercive power, its application,
however, can be both economically and politically costly not only for the
island but also for the Mainland (Cheng, 2005; Kastner, 2013). The impos-
ition of economic sanctions on Taiwan, for example, hurts local business
groups that favor political unification and, as such, are counterproductive
to China’s strategic motives (Hsieh, 2005; Kastner, 2013). In addition,
there are no compelling statistical evidences that would suggest great en-
thusiasm on the part of Taiwanese citizens toward unification projects
(Clark and Tan, 2012; Kastner, 2013). In fact, the percentage of Taiwanese
population demanding to expedite the unification process has dropped to
3.0% over the past decade, while those advocating for a ‘one country, two
systems’ framework were reduced to 8.1% (MAC, 2012). In short, at
present, there are no strong evidences to support the argument that intensi-
fying economic interdependence is increasing domestic support for
Chinese unification.
Finally, the salience of ‘Taiwanese dilemma’ from the Chinese standpoint
somewhat depends on Taiwan’s ruling party (Clark and Tan, 2010, 2012;
Rigger, 2010; Kastner, 2013). A more daring ROC government that pushes
the envelope on sovereignty issues is expected to illicit aggressive reactions
from the PRC, which may ignore the economic costs of war if only to
prevent the emergence of two Chinas (Clark and Tan, 2010, 2012; Kastner
2013). Given the rate at which Chinese economic wealth and military power
are expanding, financial considerations for waging war are becoming less of
an issue, especially when launched against smaller enemies like Taiwan
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(Kahler and Kastner, 2006; Kastner, 2013). So, while strengthening cross-
strait economic ties might bring about new economic miracle for Taiwan, its
overdependence on China, however, blocks fundamental politico-diplomatic
objectives necessary for its sovereign statehood.
This argument is clearly illustrated by the dramatic turn of events that
took place after the KMT’s ‘blitzkrieg’ passage of Cross Strait Services
Trade Agreement (CSSTA) with China on 17 March 2014.10 Ma’s decision
to cut-short a vital deliberation process in the Legislative Yuan concerning
the controversial agreement has provoked the protestors and various mili-
tant groups to occupy the parliament on 19 March 2014 (Arrouas, 2014).
The demonstrators have demanded several conditions from the Taiwanese
president: hold an inclusive citizens constitutional conference; reject the
CSSTA in lieu of a monitoring mechanism for cross-strait agreements;
pass a monitoring mechanism for Cross-Strait Agreements in the current
legislative session; and for legislators from both parties to address the
people’s demands (CALD, 2014). Thus, while on the one hand, big local
business groups support unconditional economic engagement, the grass-
roots civil society, on the other hand, insists on maintaining regulatory
conditions for the facilitation of cross-strait relations. The conflicts between
these two important segments of the population further side-steps the
respective policy strategies of Taiwanese political parties with respect to
issues surrounding Taiwan’s quasi-sovereign statehood.
5 Conclusions
Taiwan’s reopening of cross-strait links with China, along with successful
enactments of its new bilateral FTAs with non-diplomatic partners, has
sparked renewed optimism among Taiwanese officials. However, the fact
that these agreements are anchored on the One-China principle implies the
continued illegitimacy of Taiwan’s independence. Hence, although a
détente approach toward cross-strait relations may have helped in expand-
ing the country’s sovereign space, however, it is largely inadequate for legit-
imizing Taiwan’s sovereign existence in the twenty-first century.
To some extent, Ma’s rapprochement policy with respect to China has
resulted to the easing of tension across the Taiwan Strait. But, the
10 For more information about the protest against the CSSTA, see Democratic Progressive
Party (2014).
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widespread belief that his government is recklessly annexing Taiwan’s na-
tional interests within China’s ‘Greater China Economic Zone’ framework
has ruffled some feathers, particularly who are most concerned about pos-
sibility of unification with the Mainland. Amid China’s continual rejection
of Taiwanese statehood, intensified economic engagements, particularly
via free trade, act as vehicles for conquering Taiwan’s remaining sovereign
space. Clearly, there is a huge tradeoff between Taiwan’s competing goals
of pursuing economic interests, on the one hand, and preserving its
politico-diplomatic viability, on the other, thereby resulting to a dilemma.
To prevent such dilemma from resulting to an internal impasse, Taiwanese
officials have decided that it would be best to rekindle the flame with their
Chinese counterparts. This underlines the risks involved in Taiwan’s
attempts at facilitating FTAs in saving its sovereign space against the back-
drop of omnipresent China factor. Diminishing political frictions across
the Taiwan Strait has the paradoxical effect of further reducing the avail-
able political-diplomatic options for Taiwan, including its quest for de jure
independence. Put differently, greater cross-strait rapprochement paradox-
ically leads to lesser Taiwanese autonomy.
Clearly, the spread of One-China rhetoric, is damaging for Taiwan’s de
facto sovereignty as it helps facilitate the complete sinicization of the
island. By treating cross-strait affairs as domestic rather than international
matters, China is effectively reducing Taiwan’s statehood into a special
administrative region similar to Hong Kong and Macau. This further
curtails Taiwan’s diplomatic recognition, resulting to greater erosion of its
remaining sovereign space. The abstruse customary practice being
observed when signing Taiwanese FTAs – between government institutions
as opposed to state-to-state approach – reinforces the idea that Taiwan is
merely a local government unit of China. Moving toward the institutional-
ization of cross-strait politico-economic relations without acknowledging
the legitimacy of Taiwanese sovereignty inexorably absorbs the island
within China’s sinicization trajectory – from short-term economics to
long-term political. That is, frazzling the frog with warm water.
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Trading in Paranoia: Exploring
Singapore’s Security-Trade Linkages
in the Twenty-first Century
Michael Intal Magcamit
Singapore’s rude awakening to independence has led to the creation of one of the most
important and strategic entrepôts in the Asia-Pacific. The country’s limited territorial
lands and natural resources, combined with huge per capita income, high population
density and sensitive racial mix, make Singapore the quintessential pragmatic trading
state of the twenty-first century. This paper examines how Singapore has embedded
itself at the centre of regional and global trade systems by exploiting various forms of
free trade activities including multilateral, regional and bilateral FTAs that underpin
its security and survival. It argues that in order to maintain the city-state’s geo-
economic and geo-political viability, the Singaporean government has progressively
linked its security interests with its multilevel free trade activities. Given the
‘vulnerability fetish’ and siege mentality that confront Singaporean leaders and
policymakers, the pursuit of economic development via free trade has become the
heart of its national security policy and strategy. The paper concludes by arguing that
the enhancement and preservation of Singapore’s survival as a sovereign nation-state
demands a strategic utilization of FTAs with different trade partners, especially with
regional and trans-regional powers such as the United States and China.
Keywords: Singapore; Free Trade Agreements; Security; United States; China
1 Introduction
A recurring theme in Singapore’s national security narratives is the concern for
survival within a Hobbesian-like environment particularly in the immediate years
following its abrupt separation from Malaysia in 1965. This highlights the
‘vulnerability fetish’1 that haunts Singaporean leaders and policymakers and has
resulted in a realist conception of the island-state’s security policies and strategies. By
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embracing a competitive outlook that sees global politics as a zero-sum game and
sovereignty as a sacred principle that must be gallantly guarded, the Singaporean
security concept reinforces the principles of power balancing (through regional
alliance- and/or partnership-building) and self-help (through the development of
national resources) (Ganesan, 1998, 2005, 2010; Leifer, 2000; Dent 2001, 2002;
Acharya, 2008; Chew and Tan, 2008; Tan, 2009, 2012).
Over the years, however, Singapore’s realist disposition has been gradually
tempered by the intensifying economic interdependence particularly among Asia-
Pacific countries. The island’s scarce territorial lands and natural resources coupled
with high population density, huge per capita income and sensitive racial mix make
Singapore the quintessential pragmatic trading state (Dent, 2001, 2002; Chong, 2007;
Pang, 2007; Tan, 2009). Ironically, despite the constraints created by its sub-optimal
geographic features, Singapore’s physical location has transformed it into a vital
economic hub that links the developed and developing economies across the globe.
Such a strategic position is said to be responsible for Singapore’s remarkable success
with free trade that usually accounts for more than three times its annual GDP
(WTO, 2012; World Bank, 2014).
Furthermore, the creation of regional norms and institutions has significantly helped
in fostering a more benign and stable environment necessary for the continued
economic development of Singapore. However, it must be noted that such conditions
have not completely undermined the value of national self-help as it continues to play a
significant part in the security psyche of Singaporean leaders and policymakers. To this
extent, it may be argued that the Singaporean approach to economic progress vis-à-vis
development is also being viewed and defined in defensive, realist terms. For instance,
the government’s adherence to comprehensive security as exemplified by its Total
Defence doctrine underlines the prevailing notion that economic liberalism in practice
is not exclusively liberal.2 In the words of See Seng Tan (2009: 29), ‘more likely,
[Singapore’s] commitment to economic liberalism does not preclude reliance, at times
robust, on economic realism and/or mercantilism’.
Consequently, Singapore’s geo-political and geo-economic viability becomes deeply
embedded within the existing international and regional trading systems. The potential
escalation of domestic crises – political, economic, social and cultural – into full-blown
regional military conflicts without a strong defence sector capable of deflecting them
has been a source of constant paranoia for the Singaporean government. Even the city-
state’s image as a ‘glittering skyscraper built in a bad neighbourhood’ creates anxiety
among state leaders and ordinary citizens alike (Dhume, 2001). Such problems are
being aggravated by the inadequate manpower necessary for maintaining credible and
resilient armed forces mainly due to the continued decline in the birth rate3 and the lack
of qualified military and defence personnel, which is partly caused by some deeply
entrenched ethnic biases. In short, it will be in the best interest of Singaporean policy
elites to ensure the general stability and predictability of the trading environment that
underwrites some of its security interests.





























Several scholars have attempted to explore the nexus between Singapore’s security
considerations and free trade activities, albeit implicitly. Christopher Dent (2001), for
instance, argues that Singapore’s robust foreign economic policies – specifically
pertaining to free trade – are primarily driven by a deep security complex that has
forced government leaders and decision-makers to aggressively pursue economic
advancement. The goal is not only to improve the socioeconomic welfare of the
average Singaporean family, but, more importantly, to ensure the survival of the state
that is being challenged by old and new forms of security threat. This security
complex, according to Dent (2001: 7–8), is characterized by the state’s ceaseless and
obsessive ‘securitization’ of various dimensions of economic security (supply, market
access, finance credit and techno-industrial) on the one hand, and socioeconomic
security (trans-border community, systemic and alliance), on the other. Dent’s
arguments further reinforce Narayanan Ganesan’s (1998) earlier observation that
Singapore’s realist worldview and conception of national security are gradually
liberalizing as a result of global politico-economic trends. Ganesan (1998) predicts
that the growth of Southeast Asian regional economic cooperation via free trade will
result in a shift in Singapore’s security paradigm toward a less competitive ideology
that underlines the relative importance of mutual gain as opposed to mutual fear in
laying down the groundwork necessary for establishing partnerships and alliances.
Such a deep-seated sense of vulnerability, according to Michael Leifer (2000), has
continued to shape the island-state’s foreign policy despite its assured place within
the international community. Consequently, Leifer (2001) argues that Singaporean
leaders and policymakers have never allowed themselves to take the sovereign status
and political future of their city-state for granted. Understandably, security has been
the overarching philosophy of Singapore’s domestic and foreign policies since the day
that it became a sovereign country. As then Deputy Prime Minister Tony Tan (2004)
has noted:
Without security, there can be no economic development. Conversely, stability and
security are in serious jeopardy without economic development. This is the basis for the
priority that Singapore has placed on ensuring our defence.
In contrast to these earlier works, the paper focuses on one of the key components
of global economic activity that is continuously gaining momentum in the twenty-
first century: free trade agreements (FTAs). In particular, it attempts to explore and
explain the process through which Singapore links its security interests with various
types of FTAs – multilateral, regional and bilateral – in its attempt at enhancing and
preserving its geo-political and geo-economic viability. The paper argues that
Singaporean leaders and policymakers have deliberately grafted the country’s security
requirements into its FTA agendas in the hope of effectively containing potential
threats to its survival as a sovereign nation-state. In doing so, the government adopts
a fairly comprehensive security framework that highlights the role of FTAs as
instruments for regulating domestic and regional conditions that affect state survival.
The paper’s assessment of Singapore’s security policies and strategies generates useful
insights about the military (‘hard power’) and non-military (‘soft power’) capabilities





























of the country for defending the developmental project that is crucial to its geo-
political and geo-economic viability.
In light of this, the paper attempts to answer the following sets of questions. First,
why does Singapore progressively link its security interests with its free trade
agreements? How do multilateral, regional and bilateral FTAs affect Singapore’s
chances of survival as a sovereign state in the twenty-first century? Second, what are
the factors that influence the capacity of FTAs for enhancing Singapore’s geo-political
and geo-economic viability? Do they reinforce or weaken the city-state’s security
complex vis-à-vis its ‘vulnerability fetish’?
To answer these questions, the paper is divided into four sections. This
introduction has provided the context through which Singapore’s security-trade
linkages will be examined. It has argued that against the backdrop of the deep-seated
security complex caused by the ‘vulnerability fetish’, Singapore’s geo-political and
geo-economic viability becomes the primary referent of its security policies and
strategies. Section 2 briefly examines Singapore’s history in order to trace the root of
its security complex that compels its leaders and policymakers to aggressively pursue
FTAs on the one hand, and relentlessly build up military defence capabilities on the
other. Section 3 examines how various types of FTA affect Singapore’s chances of
survival amidst the new and old forms of security threat in the twenty-first century.
The first part of section 3 examines Singapore’s experience with regional and
multilateral trade while the second part evaluates its bilateral trade relations
specifically with respect to the United States and China.4 Finally, section 4
summarizes the paper’s key arguments and concludes that Singapore is actively
engaging in multilevel free trade to enhance and preserve its viability as an
independent nation-state by progressively linking its security interests with its
multilateral, regional and bilateral FTAs.
2 The historical root of Singapore’s paranoia
Singapore’s unexpected bestowal of independence after its bitter separation from the
Malaysian Federation in 1965 highlights the root of the city-state’s profound security
complex (Ganesan, 1998, 2005; Dhume, 2000; Dent, 2001). The former British colony
had been granted home rule in 1959 but it was not until 1963 that it first achieved
formal independence as part of the then Malaysian Federation. However, in a span of
two years Singapore was ejected from the federation amid widespread tensions
emanating from its political and ethno-religious differences with the rest of the
country. In the aftermath of its new-found sovereignty, the People’s Action Party
(PAP) government found itself confronting a strong sense of vulnerability which
resulted in what observers often refer to as siege mentality (Ganesan, 1998, 2005;
Dent, 2001; Kamaludeen and Turner, 2014). Consequently, ‘survival’ has become a
fear-mongering catchphrase that is routinely used for mobilizing public support. The
Singaporean government is well aware of its limitations in carving out an
independent future for the city-state given the absence of a contiguous hinterland.





























Thus ‘defence for survival’ has become the underlying theme of PAP’s security policy
and strategy and has been persuasively implanted into the Singaporean psyche
(Ganesan, 1998, 2005; Dent, 2001).
This underlying sense of defencelessness is further intensified by historical
precedents for the long-term feasibility of city-states. Although the observed patterns
indicate possible unification with an adjacent locality in order to establish a larger
territory, Singapore’s complicated history with Malaysia rules out any chance of
reunification (Ganesan, 1998, 2005; Leifer, 2000; Acharya, 2008). In short, despite its
lack of preparation due to its abrupt expulsion from Malaysia, Singapore has been
forced to fend for itself. The result is a city-state that gravitates around the
paramountcy of sovereignty, emphasizing the centrality of survival in the construc-
tion and implementation of its domestic and foreign policies. Ironically, this has also
engendered a deep-rooted Singaporean security complex that has come to determine
the city-state’s national interests and objectives (Leifer, 2000; Dent, 2001, 2002;
Ganesan, 2005). Singapore’s former Foreign Minister Wong Kan Seng (cited in
Acharya 2008: 16) provided a compelling explanation for the country’s security
complex:
The vulnerability of a small state is a fact of life. Singapore’s independent existence is
today widely recognized. But to answer our basic security, we can never allow tests to
our sovereignty and internal affairs, even when well intentioned, to go unchallenged.
Even today we have had to occasionally remind other countries to leave us alone to be
ourselves.
Clearly, the realist principles of sovereignty and territoriality have come to dominate
Singapore’s national security policy and strategy. In response, the city-state has
progressively resorted to free trade agreements in order to secure its geo-economic
and geo-political viability and, by doing so, has conveniently embedded itself at the
heart of the global trade system. Therefore, preserving the general stability of the free
trade environment – that is, the lifeblood of the republic – has become crucial to
ensuring Singapore’s survival in the twenty-first century.
3 Linking Singapore’s Security Interests and Free Trade Objectives
The PAP government’s concern for the geo-economic and geo-political viability of
Singapore is based on an important factor that is virtually non-existent in the island-
state: natural resources. Singapore is totally lacking in natural endowments except for
its strategic location that happens to be at the centre of international shipping lanes
and air traffic. Due to its inability to cover even some of its basic needs such as food
and water, Singapore relies heavily on the efficient operation of the global economy,
and its rather awkward relations with neighbouring Islamic Malay states. Taking all
these factors into consideration – scarce natural resources, small market and
aggressive neighbours – Singapore’s survival is largely dependent on its capacity to
conduct and participate in various economic dialogues and arrangements both
internationally and regionally. Inevitably, the city-state is highly dependent on





























external markets, foreign investment and international labour. Economic diplomacy,
therefore, is a vital instrument for securing Singapore’s geo-economic and geo-
political interests by smoothing out some of the tensions that are encountered in a
globalizing economy.
To do so, the PAP government exploits its limited but superior technocratic
resources to help shape the global economic system underpinning Singapore’s
security interests. The country’s top officials and policymakers vigorously promote
a multilevel approach to economic diplomacy by simultaneously pursuing bilateral,
regional and multilateral trade, which helps enhance its geo-economic and geo-
political relations with other states. This implies the need for balancing the regional
and international dimensions of Singapore’s foreign economic policy by exploiting
the existing Southeast Asian economic cooperation, while also positioning itself at the
intersection of the international economy (Ganesan, 1998, 2005, 2010; Leifer, 2000;
Acharya, 2008).
Crucial to this task is the adoption of a ‘distant horizon’ approach to policymaking
that emphasizes the significance of long-term transformative economic ventures such
as the pursuit of a knowledge-based economy (Leifer, 200; Dent, 2002; Ganesan,
2005, 2010; Acharya, 2008) However, in adopting this approach, Singapore has
become extremely dependent upon multinational and transnational corporations
both for capital and technology. Such dependence has, in turn, led to the country’s
‘semi-peripheral’ status in the international community (Ho and So, 1997; O’Brien
et al., 2000; Dent, 2002; Loy, 2013). As a newly industrialized economy, Singapore
belongs neither to the ‘core’ of developed countries nor to the ‘periphery’ of
developing and least developed states. The uncertainties associated with being a semi-
peripheral state contribute to Singapore’s deep security complex (O’Brien et al., 2000;
Dent, 2001, 2002). Hence, while both dimensions of Singapore’s foreign economic
policy are meant to be mutually reinforcing, nevertheless in some instances they
generate conflicting effects.
Accordingly, the Singaporean government not only adheres to the principles of
free trade but also vigorously promotes it to the objects of its economic diplomacy. As
mentioned, the PAP government pursues multilevel free trade in an effort to enhance
and preserve Singapore’s relative security by ensuring the benignity and stability of
the environment in which the city-state is embedded. In this way, PAP leaders and
policymakers hope to secure Singapore’s geo-economic interests while simultaneously
reducing its geo-political insecurities. As stated in Singapore’s Trade Policy Review
for 2012:
Singapore’s trade policy goals are to: expand the international economic space for
Singapore-based companies; seek a fair and predictable international trading environ-
ment; and minimize impediments to the flow of imports. It seeks to achieve these goals
by engaging with its trading partners multilaterally, regionally, and bilaterally. The
authorities affirmed that the multilateral framework of the WTO remains the bedrock of
Singapore’s trade policy. (p. 11)





























3.1. Security–Trade Linkages at Regional and Multilateral Levels
At the regional level, Singapore has actively participated in the establishment and
implementation of the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) that accounts for more than
30% of its total exports. Along with other Southeast Asian countries, Singapore is
currently working toward the realization of the ASEAN Community by 2015. The
end goal being the creation of a ‘single market and production base, in which there is
a free flow of goods, services, investments, and skilled labour, and a freer flow of
capital, along with equitable economic development, and reduced poverty and socio-
economic disparities’.5 In 2011, Singapore alongside other ASEAN members has
agreed on a Framework on Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP).
The framework is designed to formulate a single FTA by consolidating and
improving upon ASEAN FTAs with third countries.6 As of 2014, ASEAN has
concluded five bilateral FTAs involving six countries, namely, Australia, New
Zealand, India, Japan, South Korea and China (Asian Development Bank, 2014).
Similarly, it has staunchly supported the trade liberalization agenda set forth by
members of Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) that are committed to the
development of free trade and investment zone across the Asia-Pacific by 2020.
The Singaporean government, however, views Asian regionalism as being more
reactive than proactive as well as more defensive than offensive. Not surprisingly,
Singapore has gained a more positive profile at the global than at the regional level
where the political sensitivity of small regional powers – Indonesia and Malaysia –
prevails (Leifer, 2000; Low, 2005; Ganesan, 2005). Asian regionalism thus becomes a
very cautious and slow process that relies on several crucial factors including: (i) how
European integration vis-à-vis western hemispherism works out; (ii) how the
leadership between rising Chinese power and waning Japanese influence is balanced;
(iii) how power-sharing among ASEAN members is managed; and (iv) how the left-
over stimulus of the old flying-geese model is applied (Low, 2005). The fact that
Singapore’s bilateral FTAs were created prior to the ASEAN Plus Three (APT)
reflects the complexity involved in negotiating regional economic agreements.
As free trade has come into vogue, the regional vis-à-vis global landscape within
which states operate to pursue their national interests has shifted (Low, 2005;
Thompson, 2006). Accordingly, the International Enterprise Singapore (formerly
Trade Development Board) has launched trade missions outside the Asia-Pacific
region to cover the emerging markets of Africa, Latin America, Central Asia, Latin
America, Central and Eastern Europe and the Middle East. Although these
developing export markets at present provide insignificant commercial value to
Singapore, nevertheless they highlight the city-state’s ‘distant horizon’ approach to
foreign economic policymaking that is necessary for maintaining its wider global
scope (Dent, 2001, 2002; Low, 2005; Lee, 2013). The main priority remains economic
integration as a means to reduce Singapore’s multi-pronged insecurities, thereby
improving the city-state’s defence and survival.





























To maintain its broad international latitude, Singaporean authorities strongly
support the multilateral trade system under the purview of the World Trade
Organization (WTO). In December 1996 the country hosted the WTO’s First
Ministerial Meeting which was a clear manifestation of the government’s subscription
to the idea of multilateralism (Dent, 2001; Low, 2005; Khor, 2007). Since then,
Singapore has taken a lead role along with other like-minded members in preparing the
launch of the Doha Round and the post-Doha negotiating process to keep the
momentum of multilateral trade. There is a consensus among foreign economic
policymakers in Singapore that a WTO-led free trade arrangement remains the most
effective trade policy for the city-state (Dent, 2001, 2002; Liang, 2005; Chong, 2007;
Khor, 2007). As such, the Singaporean government follows the bicycle analogy of
multilateral trade negotiation: if you don’t continue to make forward progress then you
are in danger of falling off. In other words, momentum must be sustained in order
prevent the complete collapse of the multilateral trade order. Therefore, Singapore has
vehemently promoted the ‘New Millennium Round’ within the WTO (Dent, 2001,
2002; Liang, 2005; Chong, 2007; Khor, 2007).
However, its aborted launch at the Seattle Ministerial Meeting in December 1999
highlighted the systemic weakness of the multilateral system and became a source of
great concern among Singaporean technocrats and policymakers.7 Furthermore, the
twin problems of complex multilateralism and global social movements (GSM) have
posed potential threats to Singapore’s sense of economic security given its relatively
state-centric and elitist approach to policymaking (O’Brien et al., 2000). The proposed
incorporation of highly sensitive trade issues including labour, environment and human
rights into the WTO agenda, and civil society pressure on the WTO’s institutional
foundation and legitimacy have generated destabilizing effects for the multilateral trade
system (Smith, 2004; Steger, 2007; Gallagher, 2008; Jackson, 2008; Wolfe, 2004).
But due to its semi-peripheral status, Singapore is struggling to reconcile the
concerns it shares with developing countries regarding these issues with its
intensifying relations with fellow developed countries, most of which are staunch
promoters of these linkages (Low, 2005; Sally, 2004; Dent, 2001, 2002, 2006; Khor,
2007). Thus, it is a puzzle for some leaders of the developed states to witness
Singapore’s refusal to endorse a more sophisticated multilateral trade agenda that
allows for the incorporation of non-traditional trade policy issues given the city-
state’s commonalities with other core powers (Dent, 2001, 2002, 2006; Lee, 2013).
Although it acknowledges the general stance of core members with regard to these
issues, nonetheless it also shares the qualms of peripheral members that view such
issue linkages in the WTO as inherently problematic.
These value-laden trade policies can exacerbate the existing divisions among WTO
members and further disrupt the advancement of free trade itself. As argued by one
official from Singapore’s Ministry of Manpower (cited in Dent 2002: 161):
Together with other ASEAN members, we have argued strongly against any trade–
labour linkage as we are concerned that such linkage is likely to be used for protectionist





























purposes detrimental to the causes of both trade liberalization and global economic
growth.
Hence, instead of advocating a stringent ‘regulationist’ approach to these issue
linkages – for example, trade–labour, trade–environment and trade–human rights to
name a few – Singapore has favoured a plurilateral method through voluntary
compliance with higher standards and stricter regulations set by members that are
willing to undertake them (Dent, 2001, 2002, 2006; Low, 2005; Khor, 2007). By doing
so, Singapore is not completely extricating itself from complex multilateralism but is
exploring other possible alternatives for maintaining the cohesion and stability of the
multilateral trade system amid a transitory stage in WTO governance.
The Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP) is arguably the most high profile
among these alternatives not only for Singapore but the rest of the Asia-Pacific
region. Ann Capling and John Ravenhill (2011) cite four main reasons for this. First,
the TPP is a trans-regional agreement that attempts to link countries in four different
corners of the Asia-Pacific – Southeast Asia, Oceania, and North and South
America.8 Second, the agreement is also viewed as an important tool for ensuring
the continued interest and involvement of the United States in the Western Pacific
rim, and conversely for Washington, ‘as a means of signalling the return of the US to
the region under the Obama administration’ (Capling and Ravenhill, 2011: 558).
Third, the TPP, according to Capling and Ravenhill (2011: 559) also aspires to be a
‘21st century agreement’ by addressing domestic regulatory policies that influence
trade and investment, and thus goes beyond traditional market access negotiations
(see also Kawharu, 2012; Naoi and Urata, 2013). Lastly, the agreement is expected to
‘multilateralize regionalism’ by untangling the noodle bowl, being open to future
accessions and providing a foundation to the long-term APEC goal of freeing trade
among its members (Capling and Ravenhill 2011: 559). While there are substantial
differences between the negotiating priorities of the current participants, the strong
commitment being shown by the PAP government in the TPP negotiations despite
the limited economic gains that it expects from the agreement highlights the role of
security interests as drivers of Singaporean FTAs. As Capling and Ravenhill (2011)
postulate, the anticipated forward momentum in the TPP negotiations will create
incentives for non-participants to eventually join, thus making it a more crucial
strategic as well as economic accord.
At the time of writing, however, the TPP is a huge work in progress. As some
observers have noted, governments in many of the participating countries seem to be
much more interested about the proposed accord than are local interest groups
(Kawharu, 2012; Capling and Ravenhill, 2011; Naoi and Urata, 2013). The
complications arising from convoluted rules of origin (ROOs) prevent domestic
businesses from fully utilizing the existing agreements. Consequently, in many
countries, protectionist groups are effectively stifling some members of the pro-
liberalization business lobby (Naoi and Urata, 2013). Hence, while the TPP has
become a key component of the United States’ rehabilitated resolve to engage with
the Asia-Pacific, nonetheless the relatively small size of the participating economies





























significantly curtails its expected economic as well as politico-strategic utility (Caplan
and Ravenhill, 2011).
3.2. Security–Trade Linkages at the Bilateral Level
For some observers, the failure of the WTO to conclude the current Doha
Development Agenda highlights the growing cynicism and disenchantment on the
part of the developing members (Smith, 2004; Steger, 2007; Gallagher, 2008; Jackson,
2008; Wolfe, 2008). One of the most highly contested issues confronting the
institution aside from classical economic considerations relates to the incorporation
of non-traditional security issues into the multilateral trade agenda (Khor, 2007;
Aggarwal and Govella, 2013). The balancing of diverse and often conflicting national
interests being pursued by all members has proved to be one of the biggest stumbling
blocks in moving forward with the new multilateral negotiation rounds. On the one
hand, most of the developed members argue for the annexation of non-trade issues
pertaining to human security such as environment, labour and human rights
(Aggarwal and Govella, 2013; Ahnlid, 2013; Vogel, 2013; Yamada, 2013). On the
other hand, developing members fiercely advocate improved market access to the
highly protected labour-intensive industries of the developed world, specifically in the
agricultural and textile sectors in which they have the comparative advantage
(Aggarwal and Govella, 2013; Ahnlid, 2013; Vogel, 2013; Yamada, 2013). Such
tension significantly contributed to what Christopher Dent (2006) refers to as
‘WTO inertia’.
The current trade impasse being experienced both in the WTO and APEC has
compelled Singapore to exploit the growing trend of bilateral FTAs particularly
within the Asia-Pacific region. As of 2014, the Singaporean government has already
signed and implemented 13 bilateral FTAs encompassing 20 countries located on
various continents.9 The main rationale is to increase the thrust for trade liberal-
ization processes in APEC and ASEAN, and at the same time establish a vital safety
net in case the process deteriorates further (Dent, 2006; Kawai and Wignaraja, 2010;
Koo, 2013; Ravenhill, 2013; Hamanaka, 2014).
Interestingly, the city-state’s small size has, in a sense, become an economic
advantage given the nominal costs and minor challenges that it poses for its bilateral
partners. Singapore has served as a litmus test for other Asian countries that are
actively conducting bilateral FTA negotiations with larger and more challenging
partners. In other words, the country’s bilateral FTAs have been instrumental in
‘stirring the pot’ and exploring new frontiers for the region’s next phase of growth in
light of the changes precipitated by globalization (Dent, 2001, 2002, 2006; Low, 2005).
As such, Singapore is not the only country that is being forced to react to the systemic
threats and opportunities that are simultaneously being generated by globalization.
Some critics have argued that the continuous proliferation of bilateral FTAs –
regional and/or trans-regional – may prove detrimental in the long run due to their
propensity to side track the multilateral (WTO) and regional (APEC and ASEAN)





























channels of free trade, thus further aggravating the intrinsic flaws of both approaches
(Bhagwati, 2003, 2008; Plummer et al., 2010). However, the geo-economic and geo-
political utilities of bilateral FTAs in the twenty-first century cannot be denied,
particularly when the WTO process is currently malfunctioning and is in disarray
irrespective of the former’s precise impact on multilateralism. Such observation is
especially true for a realist-cum-trading state like Singapore. The following subsec-
tions explore Singapore’s attempts at linking its security interests with bilateral FTA
specifically with respect to the United States and China. Short discussions on the
Korea-United States FTA (KORUS); the Singapore and the Separate Customs
Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu on Economic Partnership (ASTEP);
and Japan-Singapore ‘New Age’ Economic Partnership Agreement (JSEPA) have also
been provided to further emphasize some of the most crucial points in the paper.
The United States –Singapore Free Trade Agreement (USSFTA)
The United States–Singapore Free Trade Agreement (USSFTA) is the product of
crisscrossing interests between two states attempting to implant security elements
within their trade relations.10 In 2005 the Bush administration began a campaign to
link security and trade issues in various platforms including the ASEAN, ASEAN
Regional Forum (ARF) and APEC. Unlike other bilateral FTAs, the USSFTA goes
beyond traditional economic considerations by annexing the sensitive issue of
security relations between the two countries in the agreement. This is supported by
the observation that the common motivations that drive the formation of a bilateral
FTA – reducing effective tariff rates, abolishing non-trade barriers, and gaining
reciprocal access to each other’s goods, services and final markets – do not exactly
apply (Pang, 2007, 2011; Aggarwal, 2013). In fact, both the United States and
Singapore have had the lowest tariff rates among all trading states with the latter
being the freest entrepôt in the world.11 Both countries continue to back the
multilateral trade liberalization of the WTO, but at the same time consider bilateral
FTAs as complementary building blocks for the eventual realization of a single global
market (Pang, 2007, 2011; Aggarwal, 2013).
With respect to growth prospects, Singapore – an economy of US$274.7 billion
GDP and a total population of 5 million – offers both public and private firms limited
space for further market expansion. Going global, therefore, is not merely an option
but the only way to ensure Singapore’s continued survival. Hence, while the USSFTA
makes little economic sense for American policymakers given the asymmetric
opportunities that are expected to go to Singapore, nevertheless, for Singaporean
policymakers, the FTA provides the best strategic hinterland (Koh and Chang, 2004;
Aggarwal, 2013). This is further highlighted by the fact that the market access it
created for the city-state is greater than the aggregate market access provided by all
major ASEAN economies (Koh and Chang, 2004; Pang, 2007, 2011).
Meanwhile, from the American side, FTAs serve as political rewards for states that
are supportive of US foreign economic and security policies. Examples of these are
the United States–Israel Free Trade Agreement (USIFTA) signed in 1985, and the





























United States–Jordan Free Trade Agreement (USJFTA) signed in 2000. While the
latter is the first FTA that the US has ever ratified and implemented with an Arab
country, the USSFTA is the first of its kind with an Asian country. This was largely in
recognition of the Singaporean government’s decision to grant the United States
access to its military bases after the latter’s naval and air stations in the Philippines
were shut down in 1991 (Pang, 2007, 2011; Aggarwal, 2013). Hence, the United States
has secured a strategic base that enabled the execution of its foreign economic and
security policies across the Asia- Pacific region (Higgott, 2003; Aggarwal, 2013;
Lee, 2013).
Once the negotiations for the USSFTA were concluded in May 2003, former US
President George W. Bush Jr. made a visit to Singapore to sign a strategic partnership
framework agreement in October of the same year. This paved the way for the
bilateral linking of security interests and free trade objectives between the two
countries which took effect on 1 January 2004. The agreement was an upshot of the
Bush administration’s two-pronged foreign policy strategy that was implemented
shortly after the 11 September 2001 events. It gave the United States: (i) the right to
unilaterally strike suspected states or territories that provide sanctuary to terrorists
within the context of preventive or pre-emptive war doctrine; and (ii) the mechanism
for binding trade policies to broader political, economic and security aims (Jervis,
2003; Monten, 2005; Kaufman, 2007). To complement this strategy the US Congress
established the Trade Promotion Authority in 2002 that gave the Bush administration
the power to formulate, negotiate and conclude preferential FTAs on a fast-track
basis.12 The goal was to intensify American free trade through the bilateral instead of
the multilateral route.
In July 2005, it was Lee’s turn to visit Washington to sign the Strategic Framework
Agreement for a Closer Cooperation Partnership in Defence and Security (SFA) with
Bush.13 The fact that the said agreement took two years to be concluded indicates that
the negotiations may not have been very straightforward. The agreement has two
main components: (i) a Defence Cooperation Agreement (DCA) incorporating all
standing bilateral defence cooperation and opening new areas of collaboration,
specifically the development of military expertise and defence capabilities to address a
broad range of non-traditional security threats; and (ii) a Protocol of Amendment to
the 1990 Memorandum of Understanding (AMOU) to extend access for American
ships and aircraft to facilities located in Singapore. The event has, therefore, formally
embedded their respective security imperatives into the existing trade relations
between them. Both heads of state agreed that it was the logical follow-up to the FTA.
Interestingly, despite Singapore’s rather secretive nature, the government hurriedly
announced this ‘more than economics’ accord with the US. It specifically highlighted
the agreement’s security-related components including greater military technology
transfers; intensified joint R& D activities; and closer collaboration between the two
states’ armed forces (Pang, 2007, 2011). Lee was very optimistic about the positive
role of the United States in maintaining security and stability in the region ‘as it has
done for many years’ (cited in Pang, 2007: 21). During the 2005 APEC meeting held





























in Pusan, South Korea, Lee even alluded to the ‘Asianness’ of the United States
considering the proximity of its westward territory, Guam, to Japan and New Guinea
(Pang, 2007). In response, Bush reiterated that the FTA would be the basis for the
bilateral security cooperation necessary for defeating terrorism in Southeast Asia and
stopping the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (Pang, 2007).
In addition, the United States also shares with Singapore some of the biggest
security concerns in Asia-Pacific, such as: protection of the channel through the
Malacca and Singapore Straits; freedom of navigation across the South China Sea;
tension brought about by nuclear proliferation in the Korean peninsula; and the
volatility of cross-strait relations between China and Taiwan (Schott, 2004; Aggarwal,
2013). Thus, the Singaporean government views its bilateral FTA with the US as a
means to bolster American strategic engagement in the region.
Evidently, the military and security collaboration schemes seem to be reinforcing
the United States’ initiatives in the war on terrorism, and at the same time the two
partners’ preference for interlacing security issues with free trade. The events of 9/11
provided the impetus for consolidating the cohabitation of security and trade into the
neo-conservative foreign and defence policies of the United States which the city-state
has fully embraced, particularly during the Bush administration. A classic example is
Singapore’s decision to send a military contingent to Iraq and provide a strategic
staging ground for the American military operations against the ‘axis of evil ’ that
began in 2003 (Higgott, 2003; Schott, 2004; Aggarwal, 2013). In this sense, the war in
Iraq has served as a litmus test for screening America’s prospective FTA partners in
the Asia-Pacific – one that Singapore has successfully passed.
Hence, for the most part, Singapore’s top leaders and policymakers adhere to the
same security concept and strategy as promoted by their American counterparts. In
fact, since gaining independence, Singapore has reserved its right to pre-emptive
strikes in the hope of effectively deterring latent and imminent security threats
(Leifer, 2000; Ganesan, 2005; Acharya, 2008). Both governments believe in the
deterrence capability generated by strong, mobile and lethal state force. The two
countries also conduct annual joint air, naval and military exercises in the South
China Sea (Koh and Chang, 2004; Pang, 2007, 2011). Such activities have enabled
collaboration between the two governments in Afghanistan and Iraq as well as
deployment of superior naval force to fight maritime piracy in Southeast Asia that
costs some US$25 billion annually (Pang, 2007, 2011; Aggarwal and Govella, 2013;
Lee, 2013). Clearly, these security linkages have performed a vital role in broadening
the content and scope of Singapore’s bilateral FTA with the United States and has
enabled the city-state to enhance its bilateral defence collaboration with the world’s
reigning superpower. Against the backdrop of the rapidly transforming Asian security
environment, the two countries share a common understanding about the utility of
coordinating security policies via FTAs.
To this extent, the USSFTA offers a template for all other US–Asian bilateral FTAs
that might be negotiated and implemented in the future. One other good example is
the Korea–United States (KORUS) FTA which took effect in 2012. President Roh





























Moo-Hyun’s government argues that the KORUS FTA has huge potential for
enhancing not only economic ties but also security and diplomatic relations between
Seoul and Washington (Lee, 2013). Given the current East Asian geo-economic and
geo-political conditions – North Korea’s precarious nuclear adventurism, China’s
double-edged growth and Japan’s military normalization – South Korea does not
really have much option than to further solidify its ties with the United States (Lee,
2013). And as far as the Roh government is concerned FTAs are effective tools for
securing South Korea’s primary strategic goal – the survival of the nation. Hence,
similar to the USSFTA, the KORUS FTA vividly demonstrates the linking of security
interests with free trade objectives. Aside from the USSFTA and USKFTA, the United
States is also currently negotiating bilateral FTAs with other ASEAN countries such
as Malaysia and Thailand, while engaging in preliminary talks with Vietnam, the
Philippines and Taiwan (Asian Development Bank, 2014; WTO, 2014).
But while the USSFTA highlights the complementarity of Singapore’s geo-
economic and geo-political interests with the core goals of the United States, the
China–Singapore Free Trade Agreement (CSFTA) presents quite a different narrative.
China–Singapore Free Trade Agreement (CSFTA)
Singapore’s pragmatic approach to foreign policy naturally compels it to balance
against China along with other smaller and weaker states in the region even as it
attempts to interlock China in all aspects of bilateral relations – economically,
politically and culturally. Put differently, the city-state’s bilateral strategy with respect
to China is determined by its economic dynamism, demographic features and geo-
political setting: a tiny, wealthy and predominantly Chinese country stuck between
the two large Islamic states of Indonesia and Malaysia, both of whose relations with
China are influenced by a myriad of complexities. Nevertheless, the physical distance
between Singapore and China provides the former greater ‘balancing latitude’
compared to its other Asian neighbours that are living in much closer proximity to
the latter. Thus, while some Southeast Asian countries such as the Philippines and
Vietnam balance against China because they must, Singapore balances because it can,
and that is partly due to the relative autonomy afforded by the physical distance
between them (Leifer, 2000; Goh, 2005; Tan, 2009, 2012). In short, the Singaporean
government simultaneously pursues economic bandwagoning and security balancing
with China. As Kuik Cheng-Chwee (2008: 11) puts it, ‘the peculiarity of Singapore’s
China policy is that it is by design an ambivalent one: warm in economic and
diplomatic ties but distanced in political and strategic spheres’.
It is arguably this paradoxical yet pragmatic feature of Singaporean foreign policy
that informs the city-state’s strategic relations with China. The great extent of China’s
power and influence in Asia cannot be simply disregarded or repudiated by its
significantly smaller and weaker counterparts in the region, not least Singapore.
Similarly, no amount of remonstration regarding China’s continuing ascent can
reassure Singapore about the nature of future Chinese motives, especially when
China’s phenomenal growth begins to inconvenience other countries. Thus,





























Singapore’s balancing or as what some scholars refer to as ‘hedging’ strategy with
respect to China is designed to be pragmatic and to prevent its extreme dependence
on, and lopsided investment in one major power (Goh, 2005; Kuik, 2008; Tan,
2009, 2012).
However, some observers argue that the city-state’s decision to sign a bilateral FTA
with the US, along with the subsequent strategic framework agreement, has to do
more with proliferation of non-traditional security threats, particularly global
terrorism, than with rising Chinese power (Tan and Ramakrishna, 2004; Kuik,
2008; Tan, 2009, 2012). The absence of territorial dispute between Singapore and
China is one indication that the latter does not pose direct military threats to the
former. Hence, from the perspective of Singaporean policymakers, the issue of
terrorism takes precedence over the issue of rising China as it is perceived as an
indirect challenge to the island-state. Nevertheless, being the typical ‘anticipatory
state’, the Singaporean government is worried about what an intensifying Chinese
military power could mean to the city-state and the whole Asia-Pacific in the longer
run (Ganesan, 2005; Acharya, 2008; Kuik, 2008). Consequently, the country’s top
leaders attempt to involve the United States in various Asia-Pacific affairs to establish
the countervailing force that can balance China. By doing so, Singapore hopes that
regional peace and stability can be maintained. As Goh (cited in Tan, 2009: 37) noted:
China is conscious that it needs to be seen as a responsible power and has taken pains to
cultivate this image. This is comforting to regional countries. Nevertheless, many in the
region would feel more assured if East Asia remains in balance as China grows. In fact,
maintaining balance is the overarching strategic objective in East Asia currently, and
only with the help of the US can East Asia achieve this.
Given the ambivalence surrounding China’s politico-strategic motives and future
conduct, developing contingency measures or ‘Plan Bs’ has become a crucial aspect of
Singaporean foreign policy. China’s future intent and capacity if left unchecked may
undermine regional prosperity and stability, limit Singapore’s available policy options
and engender internal conflicts and divisions among ASEAN members that will
weaken the organization’s overall cohesion (Kuik, 2008; Acharya, 2008; Tan, 2009,
2012). For obvious reasons, such concerns are anathema to a trading state like
Singapore. Nevertheless, on 3 September 2008 the China–Singapore Free Trade
Agreement was signed after eight rounds of negotiations held for two years in both
Singapore and Beijing.14 The CSFTA became the first comprehensive bilateral FTA
that China has signed with another Asian country and it entered into force on 1
January 2009. There is little doubt that commercial considerations have played a
crucial part in Singapore’s persistent economic engagement of China. For Singapore,
economic engagement has been a key strategy for transforming itself into a regional
trading hub or nodal point that buttresses the growth and development of economic
activities by advanced, industrialized countries (Leifer, 2000; Ganesan, 2005, 2010;
Acharya, 2008).
The CSFTA, therefore, can be viewed as the logical outcome of a long-standing
Sino-Singapore relationship that dates back to the 1960s, and all through the 1980s,





























where, in the absence of diplomatic connections, the city-state has vigorously
promoted bilateral economic engagement. Since then, trade between Singapore and
China has steadily grown. China is currently Singapore’s largest trading partner in
terms of both exports and imports; whereas Singapore is China’s 14th largest
exporting and 12th largest importing country (WTO, 2012). Yet despite having
complementary markets, Singaporean firms and enterprises still have to compete with
the enormous pool of cheap Chinese labour. To counter this problem, Singapore has
recalibrated and retrained its labour force in order to reduce its dependence on the
manufacturing sector while expanding its service sector (Tan, 2009). The idea is to
develop strategic niche markets for itself in China by concentrating on areas where it
has a competitive advantage and promoting the city-state’s reliable business brand. In
doing so, Singapore is being compelled to explore economic areas that are unfamiliar
to the Chinese to avoid head-to-head competition with China in which it would
inevitably lose. Another vital issue for Singapore as well as other Southeast Asian
states is the tight competition for foreign direct investments (FDIs). But, as some
observers have argued, the threat of FDI competition has been largely overstated
given that these ASEAN members, with the inclusion of Singapore, have benefited
from economically engaging China (Chia, 2005; Tan, 2009; Ganesan, 2010). Such
incompatibilities have underscored the limits to bilateral economic cooperation
between Singapore and China despite having a shared culture and relatively close
ethnic bond.
Singapore’s ambivalent attitude toward China has been demonstrated on several
occasions. One of these was when Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong, who at that time
was still a deputy prime minister, visited Taipei in July 2004. Some observers have
argued that Lee had grossly overestimated the level of pragmatism in China
(Ganesan, 2005, 2010; Acharya, 2008). Despite a previous agreement between
Singaporean and Chinese officials that ‘private visits’ to Taiwan would not destabilize
their bilateral relations, Lee’s most recent trip to the island was met with unusually
strong condemnation from the PRC. One of the main reasons was that Chen Shui-
bian, the president at the time of Lee’s visit to ROC, was the former head of a pro-
independence party called the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). To avoid further
escalation of the crisis, Singapore quickly expressed its deference to China by
repeatedly stressing its recognition of, and support for Beijing’s One-China policy
with respect to Taiwan (Ganesan, 2005; Tan, 2009).
Prior to this incident, in September 2002, Taiwan urged China not to interfere with
its plan to establish a bilateral FTA with Singapore. The call was made amid
allegations that China’s trade minister had warned his Singaporean counterpart to
abandon all plans for pursuing a free trade deal with ROC as it would inevitably
enrage Beijing. To be sure, the struggle to negotiate and conclude a bilateral FTA
between Singapore and Taiwan continued for a considerable period of time. In March
2008, a few months after his election as president of Taiwan, Ma Ying-jeou of the
Kuomintang Party (KMT), had suggested the reopening of bilateral dialogue to assess
the feasibility of forming an exclusive FTA with Singapore (Dent, 2006; Magcamit





























and Tan, 2014). The city-state’s reply was again one of deference and compliance,
stating that it would only be willing to do so if Taipei abstained from politicizing the
agreement (Dent, 2006; Magcamit and Tan, 2014).
On 7 November 2013 – in what some analysts view as Taiwan’s emergence onto
the global diplomatic stage – the bilateral FTA between Singapore and Taiwan was
finally concluded. The pact – officially known as the Agreement between Singapore
and the Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu on
Economic Partnership (ASTEP) – was signed by the Taiwanese representative to
Singapore Fadah Hsieh and the Singaporean trade representative to Taiwan Calvin Eu
at a ceremony held in Singapore. Singapore’s Minister for Trade and Industry, Lim
Hng Kiang, was cautious with his comments about the agreement, noting that:
‘Companies from both sides are already actively pursuing business opportunities in
each other’s economies. The agreement will further enhance and deepen trade and
investment flows between both sides’ (Hsu and Poon 2013). As for China’s position
regarding the issue, its Foreign Ministry spokesman Hong Lei had this to say: ‘Our
position on Taiwan’s foreign interactions remains consistent and clear … We hope
Singapore could abide by the one-China policy and deal with its economic ties with
Taiwan in a prudent and proper manner’ (Hsu and Poon 2013).
These experiences underline the profound pragmatism of Singapore’s policy with
respect to China. In fact, Singapore’s decision to vote in favour of China’s accession –
in lieu of Taiwan – to the United Nations in 1971 despite its long-standing battle
against Chinese-enthused communist rebellion was driven by pragmatic rather than
ideological motivations (Leifer, 2000; Acharya, 2008; Ganesan, 2005). Nevertheless,
the policy shift has not totally prevented Singapore from exploring new economic
opportunities, and establishing healthy albeit unofficial political relations with
Taiwan. This observation is strongly supported by the successful conclusion of the
ASTEP, considered by some as ‘a precarious feat of diplomacy by any stretch of
imagination’ (Tan, 2009: 39). To a certain extent, such strategic engagement with the
Taiwanese government demonstrates Singapore’s strength of resolve to act indepen-
dently in its own interest (Magcamit and Tan, 2014). This is despite the city-state’s
‘norm’ of deferring to Beijing in an effort to stabilize Sino-Singapore diplomatic
relations.
Singapore’s ability to act independently from China should not come as a complete
surprise given that the first major bilateral FTA ever formed in East Asia was between
the island-state and Japan; it was called the Japan–Singapore ‘New Age’ Economic
Partnership Agreement (JSEPA) and took effect in January 2002.15 The intensifying
strategic competition between Japan and China has, to a large extent, driven the
security–trade linking approach in the Asia-Pacific. Yet due to some crucial security
considerations, China and Japan are being prevented from signing a bilateral FTA
with each other, thus thwarting the creation of an East Asian FTA (Aggarwal and
Govella, 2013; Lee, 2013). As a result, the two regional powers compete to attract
potential FTA partners particularly in the Southeast Asian region in the hope of
improving their status as the primary regional power. However, China’s highly





























centralized policymaking has enabled Chinese leaders and policymakers to stay ahead
of Japan in this race. Beijing’s serious efforts in maintaining its FTA with ASEAN
may be viewed not only as a strategy to contain the escalating unease being felt by
some Southeast Asian leaders toward China but also to undermine Japan’s regional
leadership role by placing it on the defensive diplomatically (Lee, 2013). The Sino-
Japanese rivalry has engendered a strategic externality that can potentially enhance
the economic and security levels not only of Singapore but the whole Southeast Asian
region by allowing them to strike more favourable deals (Mochizuki, 2009; Lee, 2013).
From here, the ASEAN region may eventually emerge as an important hub in the
Asia-Pacific FTA network, a prospect that Singapore is all too willing to embrace.
4 Summary and Conclusions
For a small, pragmatic state like Singapore, the means to survival is through
economic growth via free trade vis-à-vis its other complementary neoliberal
economic policies. As argued in the paper, free trade serves as a vital strategy for
enhancing Singapore’s geo-economic and geo-political viability in the twenty-first
century. Maintaining a high-level market access is a major concern for Singapore
given its disproportionate dependence on foreign markets to maintain a sustainable
level of economic prosperity. Blocking the country’s entry to key international
markets will obliterate its export-oriented, entrepôt-operating economy. Thus, the
Singaporean government not only adheres to the principles of free trade but also
strongly promotes it to the targets of its economic diplomacy.
Consequently, Singapore’s key foreign economic policies – specifically those
concerning FTAs– are designed to alleviate the country’s multifaceted insecurities
that are engendered by its security complex. The roots of this security complex can be
traced back to the earliest phases of Singapore’s nation-building process, which to a
large extent has been exacerbated and maintained by the PAP regime as an
instrument for legitimizing its political perpetuity (Leifer, 2000; Ganesan, 1998,
2005; Acharya, 2008). Naturally, the government’s pursuit of economic prosperity has
become replete with security undertones given the siege mentality and ‘vulnerability
fetish’ enveloping the island-state. As a result, the Singaporean government has
constantly emphasized robust economic performance as the cornerstone of national
security. To this extent, economic security concerns may be viewed as the upshot of
Singaporean leaders’ high-level security cognizance.
As discussed throughout the paper, security considerations have been deeply
inculcated into Singapore’s free trade strategies. Given its near zero tariff rates across
the board, the economic gains that can be expected from further trade liberalization
of Singapore are limited. Yet due to its preoccupation with survival, the city-state has
attempted to bolster its economic interdependence with various countries, both big
and small, to reduce its insecurity by linking its security interests and free trade
objectives. Such strategy has gone into two directions: intra-regional and trans-
regional.





























On the one hand, Singapore has courted the regional powers – specifically China
and Japan – to deflect the security threats being posed occasionally by its relatively
large Islamic neighbours. This is despite initial antagonism faced by the island-state
from other ASEAN members which argued that bilateral FTAs prevent them from
reaching the goal of creating an ASEAN Community (Koo, 2013; Lee, 2013). On the
other hand, Singapore has also been very active in forging bilateral trade relations
with great powers outside the East and Southeast Asian regions. The main rationale
behind this has to do with China’s rise as a global power. Notwithstanding Beijing’s
assurances about the benignity of anticipated Chinese ‘hegemony’ in the near future,
Singaporean leaders and policymakers are still uncertain about China’s real intentions
in the region. Hence, Singapore has aggressively negotiated bilateral FTAs with trans-
regional powers, specifically the United States. From Singapore’s viewpoint, a strong
US military presence will strengthen Washington’s security commitments in the Asia-
Pacific amid heightened regional tension which happens to coincide with China’s re-
emergence in the international political scene. And by doing so, the Singaporean
government has effectively interwoven the goal of national security with the goal of
‘reinforcing a nation’s cohesion, regime legitimacy and world prestige through
economic prosperity’ (Lee, cited in Dent 2001: 6).
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Notes
[1] Vadaketh (2014) defines the term ‘vulnerability fetish’ as the belief that ‘Singapore is a small,
vulnerable nation that must do all it can to defend and protect itself against potentially
hostile Muslim neighbours’.
[2] See, Singapore’s Total Defence website, available online at: http://www.mindef.gov.sg/
imindef/mindef_websites/topics/totaldefence/home.html
[3] See, Singapore’s Department of Statistics, available online at: http://www.singstat.gov.sg/
statistics/browse_by_theme/population.html
[4] As of November 2014, Singapore has signed and implemented bilateral FTAs with
12 different countries. These are: Australia, China, Costa Rica, India, Japan, Jordan,
New Zealand, Panama, Peru, South Korea, Taiwan and the United States. While added
evidence for the argument being made may be gleaned from the discussion of similar security
provisions in Singapore’s FTAs with the other 10 countries mentioned, due to the paper’s
limitations, the primary focus is on Singapore’s bilateral FTA with the United States and





























China. One of the main reasons for this relates to their key roles in the conduct of free trade
and security dialogues at both global and regional levels in the twenty-first century. In
addition, the author believes that through an in-depth analysis of the US–Singapore FTA
(USSFTA) and the China–Singapore FTA (CSFTA), the paper is able to articulate the
dynamics and rationales behind Singapore’s security–trade linkages more clearly and
precisely. Nevertheless, brief discussions on the possible security implications of other
bilateral FTAs with countries aside from the United States and China have also been
provided to further highlight some of the central arguments of the paper. These are: the
Korea–United States (KORUS) FTA; the Singapore and the Separate Customs Territory of
Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu on Economic Partnership (ASTEP); and the Japan–
Singapore ‘New Age’ Economic Partnership Agreement (JSEPA).
[5] See, ASEAN Economic Community website, available online at: http://www.asean.org/
communities/aseaneconomic-community.
[6] See, full ASEAN RCEP document, available online at: http://www.asean.org/news/item/
asean-framework-forregional-comprehensive-economic-partnership.
[7] The ‘millennium round’ finally culminated in the successful launch of the Doha Round in
November 2001. However, since 2008 negotiations have stalled over differences with respect
to some major issues, including agriculture, industrial tariffs and non-tariff barriers, services
and trade remedies. In July 2008, negotiations collapsed after failing to reach a compromise
on agricultural import rules. This prompted then director-general Pascal Lamy to ask the
members to reflect on the possible ‘consequences of abandoning ten years of multilateral
work. On 7 December 2013, the Bali Ministerial Declaration was adopted by WTO members
that signalled the successful resolution of issues concerning bureaucratic barriers to
commerce. As of January 2014, the future of the Doha Round remains uncertain.
[8] The following are the list of initial participants in the TPP negotiations: Brunei, Malaysia,
Singapore and Vietnam (Southeast Asia); Australia and New Zealand (Oceania); Chile and
Peru (South America); and the United States (North America). Note that these nine
countries are also current members of APEC.
[9] See ADB’s Asia Regional Integration Centre website: http://aric.adb.org/fta-country.
[10] For the full USSFTA document, see Office of the United States Trade Representative website:
http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/singapore-fta.
[11] For comparative analysis of individual countries’ tariff profiles, see WTO Tariff Database
website: http://stat.wto.org/TariffProfile/WSDBTariffPFHome.aspx?Language=E/.
[12] For the full TPA document, see Office of the United States Trade Representative website:
http://www.ustr.gov/trade-topics/trade-promotion-authority.
[13] For the full SFA document, see Singapore’s Ministry of Defence website: http://www.mindef.
gov.sg/imindef/press_room/official_releases/nr/2005/jul/12jul05_nr/12jul05_fs.html#.
UGMTvmSw40
[14] For the full CSFTA document see Singapore’s FTA website: http://www.fta.gov.sg/fta_csfta.
asp?hl=27
[15] For the full document of the JSEPA, see Singapore’s FTA website: http://www.fta.gov.sg/
fta_jsepa.asp?hl=7.
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Abstract: The Barisan Nasional’s construction and implementation of ideational
and material security apparatuses has created a one-sided internal security dilemma
in Malaysia. This paper argues that the noble objective of promoting Malay in-
terests has been transformed to the venal objective of securing Barisan’s political
perpetuity that is being pursued under the pretext of achieving inter-ethnic parity
within a pluralistic Malaysia. The government’s quest for a bumiputra-imagined
nation gave birth to affirmative action policies that have often worked at the
expense of all other Malaysian ethnic groups, particularly the Chinese and Indian-
Malaysians. For better or worse, Malaysia’s national security is conceived and
developed on the basis of bumiputra ethnicity. In other words, Malaysia’s national
security is designed to counter mainly the insecurities confronting the Malays,
thereby generating a one-sided internal security dilemma.
Keywords: affirmative action, bumiputras, Malaysia, national security, policies,
security apparatuses
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Introduction
The long-standing practice of dividing Malaysians into bumiputras (literally,
sons of the soil) and non-bumiputras has been at the crux of the country’s deeply
entrenched ethnic divisions. The concept of bumiputraism has effectively stunted
the development of what could be a holistic Malaysian nationalism based on mul-
tiethnicity by aggressively promoting bumiputra-centric nationalism even after
57 years of independence.1 Since the creation of the Malaysian state, no serious
reference has been made toward a pluralistic nationalism in Malaysia. Such obser-
vation underlines the rather uneasy transformation of Malaysia into a nation that
is more accommodating of non-bumiputric interpretations of national security.
This paper investigates one of the primary referents of Malaysian national
security in the twenty-first century against the backdrop of multiethnic and mul-
tireligious societies that are perpetually being ruled by a Malay-dominated polit-
ical coalition called the Barisan Nasional (BN). It argues that communal politics
along volatile and limiting ethnic borders generates a one-sided security dilemma
wherein Malay security essentially requires non-Malay insecurity. The reason
is that Malaysia’s national security is conceived around Malays’ ethnic identity.
Hence, for as long as the constitutional framework that legitimizes a bumiputra-
centric Malaysian nation-state is sustained, de-ethnicizing the politico-economic
and socio-cultural arrangements of the country remains unlikely.
To do this, the BN constructs and implements various ideational and material
security apparatuses designed to preserve the Malay-dominated status quo.2 In the
process, the BN has become the equivalent of the entire Malaysian nation-state.
The wider objective of safeguarding Malay interests has been co-opted by the
narrower objective of securing the BN’s political perpetuity using the pretext of
achieving inter-ethnic equality. In pursuing its bumiputra-centric social vision, the
government has launched a number of affirmative action policies (AAPs) and have
been implemented often expense other Malaysian ethnic groups.3 These “social-
equalizing” strategies have been zealously pursued to strengthen and protect a
bumiputra-imagined nation.
Malaysia’s gamble with neoliberal economic policies, particularly free trade,
has rewarded the country with robust economic growth.4 This in turn has al-
lowed the Malaysian government to configure and perform several ethnic-oriented
AAPs including the New Economic Policy (NEP) in 1971, the National Devel-
opment Policy (NDP) in 1990, and the New Economic Model (NEM) in 2010.
Not surprisingly, these initiatives have received enormous criticisms from var-
ious sectors of the Malaysian society. The economic and political inefficien-
cies being engendered by these racially-configured initiatives have been greatly
challenged.5
The popular view is that they are fundamentally biased against the non-Malays
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Rather than pursuing equality by creating equal opportunities for everyone regard-
less of ethnicity, the AAPs have been designed to achieve equality based purely
on the results being generated. Thus, the AAPs’ economic and political viability
are often debated. While the government maintains that the AAPs should not be
viewed as zero-sum strategies, nonetheless, a closer inspection of the Malaysian
case reveals that they engender an unintended consequence: a one-sided domestic
security dilemma.
In advancing these arguments, the paper attempts to answer the following sets
of question. First, what are the main components of Malaysia’s national security
policy and strategy? How do they generate a one-sided domestic security dilemma?
Second, how do Malaysia’s AAPs affect the BN’s notion of national security? Why
does the government continue to implement them despite the concerns about their
economic and political sustainability in the longer run?
The paper is divided into four sections. Section one provided the backdrop
in which Malaysia’s one-sided domestic security dilemma will be examined. It
argued that the government’s predilection toward a bumiputra-centric national
security policy and strategy inevitably engenders a scenario wherein Malays’ rel-
ative security inevitably requires non-Malays’ relative insecurity. The continuous
supremacy of Malay-dominated BN coalition in Malaysia’s politico-economic and
socio-cultural affairs further reinforces this dilemma. In maintaining its political
perpetuity, the BN constructs and implements ideational and material security ap-
paratuses. These are being complemented by affirmative action policies (AAPs),
which in turn, are being pursued under the pretext of securing ethnic parity and
harmony. Section two discusses the context in which Malaysia’s one-sided secu-
rity dilemma is explored. To do this, it examines the process of nation-building
in a pluralistic Malaysia to offer preliminary understanding of the conduct of
Malaysian politics by examining its critical foundations. Section three analyses
Malaysia’s national security policy and strategy to identify its main components
and highlight some of the crucial security threats that it seeks to address. The goal
is to examine how Malaysia conceptualizes national security, on the one hand, and
how such conception shapes its domestic politico-economic and socio-cultural ar-
rangements, on the other. It examines the limits to Malaysia’s bumiputra-oriented
national security, namely: limits to ideational security constructs and limits to
material security apparatuses. Section four explores the economic and political
sustainability of Malaysia’s AAPs that are at the heart of a BN-configured national
security framework. It examines how the wider objective of protecting bumiputra
interest is being equated to the narrow objective of preserving the BN’s political
supremacy and why they are still being maintained despite their socio-economic
inefficiencies.
The paper concludes by arguing that the de-ethnicization of Malaysia’s policy-
making procedures remains a challenge given that ethnicity has always been the
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customary practice of equating Malaysian security to Malay security underlines
the bumiputras’ pre-eminence in virtually all aspects of Malaysian domestic af-
fairs. And this is because Malaysia’s national security is conceived and developed
around the bumiputra ethnicity. As such, Malaysia’s national security is designed
mainly to address the insecurities confronting Malays by promoting their politico-
economic and sociocultural interests even at the expense of other ethnic groups.
The regrettable result is a one-sided security dilemma in which the enhancement
of non-Bumiputric security leads to heightened bumiputric insecurity.
The Backdrop
Several observers have argued that the Malaysian state has developed prior to
the nation.6 Moreover, the state has emerged at approximately the same time as the
ruling BN coalition that has ruled Malaysia since its first day of independence.7 As
a result, the state’s institutions and machineries have become synonymous with the
coalition that exploits them. Through mutual reinforcement, the Malaysian state
has become identical with the BN: the government being the BN and the BN being
the government.8 Given the BN’s overarching preponderance, the coalition is able
to effectively manipulate the construction of Malaysia’s national security policy
and strategy. By doing so, the BN’s top officials and figureheads have traditionally
defined security issues in relation to the problems that threaten the stability and
legitimacy of the coalition. This underlying agenda has been pursued under the
pretext of ensuring inter-ethnic equality through the preservation of certain Malay
privileges and rights Malaysia’s multiethnic demography.9
Such narrow conception of ‘Malayness’ has been maintained even when Sin-
gapore (until 1965), along with other two North Bornean regions of Sabah and
Sarawak, were annexed to the Malayan territory.10 The constitutional provisions
underpinning the sovereign aspirations of the Malayan state are anchored on the
sacrosanct role of the nine Malay sultans who also supervise the administration
of Islam within their respective states.11 The sultans, therefore, act as legitimating
actors in the institutionalization of the Malays supreme rights and authority. This
overarching thrust of the Malaysian constitution remains inviolable even up to
this day. In light of the growing pluralism, Malay rulers have framed the per-
ceived corrosion of traditional Malay values and loyalties as threat to the nation’s
security.12
Logically, Islam has been proclaimed as Malaysia’s official religion which
cannot be questioned under any circumstance,13 although the constitution does
allow freedom of religion for all non-Muslims which comprise forty per cent of
the total population. Nevertheless, the Muslim-led government tries to adopt and
practice a secular type of Islam to emphasize Malaysia’s moderate and tolerant
interpretations of the religion. There is a widespread concern about Islam being
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of insecurity and inferiority. The rise of an Islamic state in Malaysia is deemed as
a threat to this Malay-centred national security. In contrast, the Malay conception
of national security is designed to be more tightly linked to the “universalist” and
modernist interpretation of Islam which focuses on nationalism rather than the
religion per se. Through the Islamisation of public policy under federal authority,
the government is able to desegregate the role of Islam as a contrivance of national
security.14
Clearly, the perceived strength of ethnic Malays rests on the relative politi-
cal weakness of other Malaysian races, particularly the Chinese and the Indian-
Malaysians.15 Since the country’s political axioms are essentially Malay, the notion
of creating a “Malaysian” nation-state is being reduced as a mere political expres-
sion. In other words, the political groundwork of Malaysian security narrowly
dwells in Malay security. Thus, the monarchy, religion and language are merged
together to buttress the Malay ethnicity, which becomes the core foundation of
Malaysia’s national security. Securing the Malays’ “dominion space” rather than
the whole country’s diversity space, therefore, is a de rigueur toward the develop-
ment of a Malaysian nation.16
However, even among those who qualify as bumiputras—the Malays along with
the natives of Sarawak and Sabah – the issue of inequality has been a source of
great intra-ethnic tensions. The initial promise of extending the special rights and
privileges of the Malays as bumiputras to the natives of Sabah and Sarawak through
the formation of Malaysia was in fact embedded in Article 153 of the Constitution.
But given Malaysia’s political landscape which may be characterized as a single
nation comprised of contesting nationalism,17 a “competing nations-of-intent”18
arises. As mentioned earlier, ethnicity and religion function as identity markers for
the brand of nationalism and the constitution of national interests. In the case of
Malaysia, although the Peninsular is dominated by Muslim bumiputras, however,
majority of the bumiputras in the East Malaysian states of Sarawak and Sabah are
non-Muslims.19
Such a condition naturally engenders a centre–periphery bumiputra nexus.20 In-
stead of developing a BN-configured Malay nationalism, a new political conscious-
ness among the non-Muslim bumiputras has emerged: the Dayaks in Sarawak and
the Kadazandusuns in Sabah.21 Such sociocultural configuration has further ex-
acerbates Malaysia’s one-sided security dilemma. In both Sabah and Sarawak,
indigenous leaders have referred to themselves as “bumiputra minorities” which
highlights their current ‘othered’ bumiputra status.22 This ongoing opposition be-
tween the federal discourse being espoused by dominant Malay bumiputras, on the
one hand, and the regional discourse being held by the non-dominant non-Malay
indigenous, on the other, highlights the divisive contestation between various vi-
sions of the Malaysian nation-state.23 Not surprisingly, ethnic minorities tend to
be more critical of the regime particularly with respect to issues concerning fair
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support for the ruling BN coalition.24 Some scholars have even argued that regime
hard-liners in Malaysia, ‘fan nationalistic fervour and ethnic tensions in order to
hold on to power.’25 Meanwhile, the violation of fundamental rights – suppression
of free expression, free assembly and religious freedom – remain a serious threat
to Malaysia’s pluralistic society.26 Despite this, the competitiveness of Malaysia’s
authoritarian regime has enabled the ruling party vis-à-vis the coalition to maintain
its stranglehold on the domestic politics, and to a large extent have weathered the
calls for fundamental reform.27
Constructing Malaysia’s Bumiputra-Centric National Security
Malaysia’s national security policy and strategy are a reflection of the govern-
ment’s struggle to transform a former British colonial territory into one cohesive
and united nation. Accordingly, Malaysia adopts a fairly comprehensive approach
in defining national security by weaving together its military, political, economic,
social, cultural and psychological components.28 Several material and ideational
factors influence Malaysia’s conception of national security, including: geography
and history; multiethnic identity and religious plurality; aspiration for national
unity and integration; and the dream of becoming a developed country as well as
a model Islamic nation.29
Malaysia’s national security encompasses both internal and external dimen-
sions. On the one hand, the domestic security being derived from internal peace,
law and order is crucial to the fulfilment of the basic needs and demands of
its pluralistic society.30 The presence of internal stability and harmony underpin
Malaysia’s pursuit of national economic development and progress. Hence, the
passage and enactment of some legislation considered to be draconian by some
liberal democratic states are deemed necessary by the Malaysian government to
control its ethnically-diverse population.31 On the other, external security focuses
on wide-ranging transnational threats being engendered by regional and global
events including terrorism, maritime piracy, drug cartels, illegal migrant workers
and human trafficking to name a few.32 Malaysia’s pursuit of national security,
therefore, implies the notion of strategic survival, both inside and outside its
sovereign boundaries.
The conception of Malaysian national security has been largely inspired by the
Emergency period between 1948 and 1960.33 This period saw the Malayan forces,
backed by their British colonizers, fight against the communist insurgents called
the Malayan National Liberation Army (MNLA) who claimed to be promoting a
new democratic socialist Malaya.34 In response, the coalition launched its ‘hearts
and minds’ campaign to weaken the social appeal of a Communist propaganda
and earn the loyalty of those sympathetic to them.35 This proved to be an effective
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of a new constitution that was signed between the United Malays National Orga-
nization (UMNO) and the Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA) in 1957—both
are member parties of the ruling BN coalition.36
The new constitution recognizes the legality of special preferences and priv-
ileged positions being provided to the Malays.37 Aside from electing Islam as
the state religion and Malay as the official language, the new constitution has
also granted a fixed quota of posts in the civil service for Malays on top of their
guaranteed traditional land rights. In exchange for accepting these terms under the
constitution, the Chinese have been offered extended rights of citizenship.38 Thus,
the Emergency period had served as a sine qua non for legitimizing a national
security framework that is both operationally despotic and ideologically-centered
on addressing the root causes of threats, particularly with respect to the Malays.
Malaysia’s national security is essentially based on material and ideational con-
structs designed to secure its ruling dynastic coalition—the Barisan Nasional
(BN)—rather than the diversity space necessary for accommodating the politico-
economic freedoms and socio-cultural needs of its multiethnic population. In fact,
the BN defines itself as a confederation of political parties that subscribe to the
objects of the coalition rather than the objects of Malaysia’s national interest.39
Combining ideological constructs with coercive apparatuses has been the tra-
ditional approach to developing Malaysia’s national security and policy since the
Emergency period.40 Such approach is designed to secure the BN by suppressing
the growth of unorthodox ideas and concepts, while justifying the supremacy of the
values being cultivated by the ruling coalition. Together, coercive and ideological
instruments have played crucial roles in Malaysia’s national security, which made
paramount the implicit protection of the Malay-dominated coalition at the expense
of its diversity space. In doing so, the coalition has vigilantly upheld a paradoxical
security framework that is propelled by its ‘hearts and minds’ slogan but is exer-
cised through coercive and repressive legislations.41 Such paradox presents two
critical limits to Malaysia’s diversity space that is pivotal to the country’s national
security, namely: (1) limits to ideological security constructs; and (2) limits to
material security apparatuses.
Limits to Ideological Security Constructs
A central task of the BN’s security ideology is the regulation and control
of alternative channels for discussing nonconforming opinions.42 A variety of
ideological constructs have been put in place to legitimize the suppression of local
political opponents and critics, thereby adding another layer of protection for
the Malay-dominated status quo. As Anthony Downs argues, these nonmaterial
forces represent “a verbal image of the good society and of the chief means
of constructing such a society.”43 The government systematically regulates the
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coalition. As argued earlier, this objective is being pursued under the pretext of
safeguarding the constitutionality of specific Malay rights and privileges that do
not extend to other ethnic groups.
The coalition’s security ideologies serve main functions: (1) to restrict the
space available for alternative ideas that question and challenge the BN, and
(2) to legitimize the passage and enactment of coercive instruments vis-à-vis
the political coalition that implements them.44 To this extent, ideologies help in
maintaining the pre-eminent status of the BN amid threats coming from various
oppositional groups. The fluidity of ideas implies that the coalition’s security
ideologies are neither permanent nor fixed but are contingent on specific politico-
economic and socio-cultural contexts of the time.45 Hence, there is no overarching
idea that dominates Malaysia’s security policy and strategy. Nonetheless, there
is an underlying goal that binds these security ideologies together, and that is
winning the hearts and minds of societal actors that threaten Malaysian national
security narrowly defined in terms of the BN security.
These coalition-enhancing ideational forces create a “cloak for shabby motives
and appearances” by legitimizing and giving meaning to its conducts.46 Rather than
being mere reflections of the country’s national aspirations, they act as political
tools for preserving the coalition’s hegemony. The uncertainty and complexity of
Malaysian politics transform these ideological constructs into electoral “chips”
that are necessary for the coalition’s continued survival in the 21st century.47
Accordingly, the ideational components underpinning Malaysia’s national security
framework are naturally bent to quash counter-narratives, thereby shrinking the
country’s diversity space even further. Crafting Malaysia’s national security policy
and strategy based on the underlying goal of securing the coalition becomes
the paramount concern of the ruling BN political elites, particularly for those
comprising the UMNO party.48
As a Muslim-dominated federal constitutional monarchy, Malaysia’s national
security becomes a function of its state-configured Islamic ideology.49 Its goal is
to cement the country’s role as a worthy leader of the Muslim world by projecting
an image of moderation and tolerance.50 Islam must be the people’s way of life
and the coalition’s brand of leadership. It is the very visible hand that runs and
controls Malaysia’s internal and external affairs and dictates the primary referents
of the country’s national security. In short, Islam plays a pivotal role in the hearts
and minds campaign of the coalition.
A centrepiece of this movement is the development and propagation of Ma-
hathir’s own version of Islam both domestically and internationally. At the regional
international levels, the Mahathir regime has portrayed Malaysia as the “model
Islamic state” of the post-9/11 world.51 The former PM argued that its govern-
ment had been successful in fighting terrorism domestically by adding ideological
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of the Emergency, where the defeat of communism is largely viewed as a result of
its hearts and minds ideology emphasizing a moderate and tolerant Islam.53
This image of Malaysia being a model Islamic state is particularly relevant in
the context of the government’s aspirations for taking the driver-seat role in the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Regional cooperation has al-
ways been a major preoccupation for the Malaysian government and the ASEAN
remains the cornerstone of its foreign policy. Malaysian leaders have been very
vocal about the important role of ASEAN in fostering trust and confidence among
its member states which are necessary for maintaining regional peace and sta-
bility.54 For these reasons, Malaysia has been very cautious in presenting and
propagating its state-configured Islam to the rest of the Southeast Asian region
to ensure that it helps encourage behavioral patterns that mitigate internal and
external security risks. Mahathir’s ideological security apparatus in particular is
designed to further enhance Malaysia’s bilateral relations both with Muslim and
non-Muslim countries by encouraging habits of open dialogue on various political
and security issues.55
The most important among these non-Islamic, trans-regional partners is ar-
guably the United States. Given America’s role as the primary security guarantor
it is imperative for the Malaysian government to ensure that its ideological security
apparatus does not contradict but rather complement the former’s security policy
and strategy. To a large extent, Malaysia’s moderate and tolerant interpretation of
Islam is in synced with the West’s military rhetoric and operations against Islamic
extremism in several parts of the world. Gaining the United States’ approval is
crucial for Malaysia as it enables the government to pursue other vectors of efforts
including political and diplomatic coordination on maritime issues; expanding
counterterrorism cooperation; and strengthening of security relations between the
two governments.56 Nurturing international support for Malaysia’s competitive
authoritarianism is crucial for the preservation of the current politico-economic
and socio-cultural status quo, which in turn, further legitimizes the perpetuity of
an UMNO-led government.57
At the domestic level, however, the opposite is observed. Mahathir’s state-
sponsored Islam has been propagated with the help of strong coercive legislations,
particularly the Internal Security Act (ISA) of 1960 and its replacement called Se-
curity Offences Special Measures Act (SOSMA).58 This highlights an underlying
contradiction within Mahathir’s ideational panorama: conquering the hearts and
minds of the fearful population through forced imposition of a coalition-made Is-
lam. The result is a two-faced Malaysian security ideology endorsing a non-violent
Islamic rhetoric at the international scene, while encouraging coercive policies for
implementing these teachings at the domestic sphere.59 Nevertheless, it effec-
tively aids in the legitimization of the coalition’s domestic security machinery
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In October 2003, Mahathir was replaced by PM Abdullah Ahmad Badawi af-
ter spending twenty-two years in office. Similar to Mahathir, Badawi also came
from the UMNO party of the BN coalition. Despite his initial promise to adopt a
softer approach, Badawi has continued Mahathir’s strategy of fusing together co-
ercive and ideological apparatuses in crafting Malaysia’s national security frame-
work. Badawi’s security doctrine called Islam Hadhari or Civilizational Islam
still reflects the past administrations’ aim at securing the coalition rather than the
diversity space necessary to support its multiethnic and multireligious popula-
tion. Substance-wise, Islam Hadhari has no significant difference from Mahathir’s
“Asian values..”60 Form-wise, however, Abdullah’s ideology takes Mahathir’s no-
tion of “model Islamic state” to a higher level by developing a comprehensive
doctrine embracing Muslim and non-Muslim audiences alike, both home and
abroad.61 In other words, Malaysia’s signature Islam has been transformed into an
exportable commodity that reinforces the legitimacy of the BN coalition beyond
the country’s borders.62
According to Badawi, Islam Hadhari is neither a new religion nor denomination
but an effort to bring the ummah, a collective term identifying all adherents of the
Muslim faith, back to its fundamental Islamic roots as prescribed in the Quran and
the hadith.63 The terms that have been used to develop Islam Hadhari were fairly
‘universal’, and therefore, are applicable to different contexts. Badawi’s ideology
represents a shift toward understanding the contemporary era within the purview
of Islam.64 It is the form rather than the substance that made Islam Hadhari an
appealing ideological construct.65 By utilizing charismatic Islamic terminology,
Badawi has succeeded in reigniting the coalition’s unpopular security ideology.66
Badawi’s main thrust is to recalibrate Islam as a progressive religion that values
individual and communal development.67 By restoring a sense of moderation
toward the practice of Islam, Badawi had hoped that non-Muslim Malaysians
would feel welcomed by the regime.68
At the international level, Badawi attempted to export Islam Hadhari to other
Muslim and non-Muslim countries. The idea is to cement Malaysia’s role as a
model nation and leader of the Muslim world by manufacturing it as a development
model based on a state-authorized version of Islam.69 From Badawi’s viewpoint, it
is Malaysia’s duty to demonstrate by words and actions that a Muslim country can
be modern, democratic, tolerant and economically competitive.70 While Badawi
admits that his security ideology is hardly a panacea, nonetheless, he stresses that
it offers valuable insights into how a progressive and modem Muslim nation can
be built.71
Yet at the domestic level, the operationalization of Badawi’s doctrines is ques-
tionable at best. It is not clear whether Islam Hadhari represents genuine ef-
forts toward the progressive interpretation of Islamic thinking or a mere strategy
for securing Malaysian votes by not openly marginalizing its non-Malay and
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machineries for justifying the coercive measures undertaken during a series of
crackdowns against ‘deviant’ sects such as the Tarikat Samaniah Ibrahim Bon-
jol in 2004, and Terengganu or Sky Kingdom in 2005.73 The government has
portrayed these religious entities as threats to Malaysia’s national security by es-
pousing alternative views of Islam and adopting a lifestyle that was different from
the ones being endorsed by the BN coalition.
Furthermore, Islam Hadhari has provided the government an effective ideo-
logical apparatus for stifling its political rival called the Pan-Malaysian Islamic
Party (PAS).74 Badawi has likened the PAS’ brand of Islam to a trap that must be
exposed to prevent Malay Muslims from being ensnared.75 Under Islam Hadhari,
the PAS is faced with lose-lose situation: either to comply with a BN-sponsored
Islam and operate within this limited context, or reject this model and be tagged
as an enemy of the state.76 Either way, the ideological terrain within which PAS
can manoeuvre is significantly diminished. Clearly, Islam Hadhari has further
enhanced the government’s monopolistic control over the organization and facil-
itation of Islam. Divergent sects operating beyond the provisions and boundaries
set by the coalition are more easily detected and trounced. Hence, Islam Hadhari
becomes an extension of the implicit campaign against the expansion of diversity
space that is crucial for securing Malaysia’s pluralistic society.
Badawi’s security ideology inevitably leads to the Islamisation of the popu-
lace by placing Islam at the foreground of Malaysian politics, thus entrenching a
coalition-made Islam even deeper.77 The absence of a genuinely moderate Islam at
the governmental level has permeated grassroots societies. In contrast to the sup-
posedly ‘universal’ outlook of Islam Hadhari, this ideological construct has gener-
ated a self-justifying, intolerant and backward-looking Malay mindset. Therefore,
the government’s claims about the institutionalization of a state-sponsored Islam
that is moderate and tolerant are highly debatable. The prohibition of a PAS-
conceptualized Islam in itself contradicts all sorts of moderate slogan. Ironically,
the BN-sponsored Islam has become indistinct from the PAS-configured Islam.78
Overall, these observations underline the role of ideological constructs in se-
curing the perpetuity of the BN coalition. The underlying motive behind the
coalition’s projection of Malaysian Islam as the”‘reasonable” or “enlightened”
variant of the Muslim religion is the promotion of state ideology that reinforces
the BN’s interests. Although the government projects its state-manufactured Is-
lam as a necessary ingredient for establishing Malaysia’s leadership role in
the Muslim world, nonetheless, its tendency to quell deviant voices under-
scores the regressive nature of the model. Rather than propagating a moderate
Islam, the coalition is moderating its own version of the religion in order to abol-
ish the threats to BN’s security. While to some extent such ideological constructs
may reflect the Malaysian government’s sincere attempts for uniting the Muslim
world against terrorism and extremism, however, they are ultimately designed to
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Limits to Material Security Apparatuses
The government’s ideational security constructs are being complemented by
its material security apparatuses. These are coercive laws designed to secure the
status-quo by removing all material and/or ideational challenges to its legitimacy.79
A primary example is the recently repealed Internal Security Act (ISA) signed by
PM Abdul Rahman in 1960. The ISA served as a preventive detention law which
enabled the arrests of individuals without trial and criminal charges under limited,
legally defined circumstances for sixty days.80 As stated in Section 73 of the said
Act: ‘any police officer may arrest and detain without warrant any person who has
acted or is about to act or is likely to act in any manner prejudicial to the security
of Malaysia or any part thereof.81
The ISA is further complemented by the Sedition Act revised of 1971 by
Malaysia’s second PM Tun Abdul Razak which made the questioning of Malayan
paramountcy an act of treason. The latter prohibits virtually all activities with
“seditious tendency,” resulting to disaffection and hostility toward the government
or communal ill will.82 Despite initial controversies, the coalition has skilfully
justified the presence of ISA and the Sedition Act as necessary legislations for
ensuring Malaysia’s national security.83 Such laws are deemed to be particularly
relevant in the context of post-9/11 world order by serving as effective countert-
errorism measures which are akin to the Patriot Act of the United States and the
Anti-Terrorism Act of the United Kingdom.
In recent years, however, opposition to the ISA has grown considerably. Crit-
ics have argued that the Act was passed to stifle what should have been legiti-
mate political oppositions under a well-functioning democratic system and had
been compared to internal pre-emptive strike given its preventive nature.84 For
example, during the 1987 Weeding Operation (Operasi Lalang), a total of one-
hundred six people had been arrested without proper charges under the ISA.
Most of the detainees were members of the opposition party and various so-
cial activist groups. The coalition issued a White Paper explaining the arrests,
stating that various groups who had played up sensitive issues and thus created
racial tension in the country had exploited the government’s liberal and tolerant
attitude.85
One of the most significant outcomes of this struggle was the introduction of
section 8B of the ISA that blocked the judicial review of ISA detentions including
those brought as habeas corpus petitions.86 In 2001, this section was used to detain
some of the members of the People’s Justice Party (PJP) who were dubbed as the
“Reformasi or KeADILan 10.”87 These abuses drove oppositionist groups, human
rights activists and other members of the civil society to mobilize large-scale
protests against the ISA which was portrayed as an unnecessary draconian law
that does not bode well for Malaysia’s vision of a “developed nation” status.88 The
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in the aftermath of the 2008 General Elections, played a crucial role in Prime
Minister Najib Razak’s decision to repeal the Act.
In 2012, the Security Offences (Special Measures) Act or SOSMA officially
replaced the ISA.89 The new Act is envisioned “to provide for special measures
relating to security offences for the purpose of maintaining public order and se-
curity and for connected matters.” However, the SOSMA is also being criticized
from two sides. On the one hand, anti-terrorist groups argue that the requirement to
bring charges within twenty-eight days under SOSMA weakens Malaysia’s capac-
ity to pre-emptively contain terrorist threats.90 On the other, human rights groups
criticize SOSMA for allowing police to authorise communication intercepts and
permitting prosecutors to present evidences without disclosing sources. Acquitted
suspects in the midst of an appeal may also be detained in prison or tethered to a
monitoring device until the appeal is formally settled.91
Overall, the effectiveness of these laws in curbing the threats of terrorism
remains inconclusive. Nevertheless, it is clear how such coercive mechanisms
have been utilized to secure the interests of the coalition by suppressing “rogue”
ideas and rationalizing the continued supremacy of the BN at the expense of
Malaysia’s pluralistic society.
The Scourge of Bumiputra Affirmation
Malaysia’s bumiputra-centric political economy—being developed and rein-
forced by the UMNO-driven BN coalition—undermines the country’s diversity
space. This in turn destabilizes the country’s national security as it is anchored on
the cohesiveness and harmony among Malaysia’s multiethnic and multireligious
societies. Rather than ensuring that all Malaysian ethnic groups are provided
equal amount of space to develop—political, economically, socially and cultur-
ally —the country’s permanently ruling party and coalition have utilized neoliberal
economic policies, particularly free trade, in securing their supremacy by promot-
ing and maintaining racially-configured affirmative policies. However, there are
two main factors affect the effectiveness of the BN’s current attempts at preserving
the Malay-dominated status quo using affirmative policies—their economic and
political sustainability.
The Economic Sustainability of Ethnic-Based AAPs
Despite Malaysia’s largely acclaimed development story, several factors have
eventually weakened the country’s economic performance. These are rooted pri-
marily on the inefficiencies of its AAPs that put into question their economic
sustainability. In restructuring the Malaysian society, the government has sought
to create a bumiputra entrepreneurial and industrial community.92 This new class
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investment that would put the country in the league of the developed world.93 In
short, they would become the engine of Malaysia’s development. Several measures
were undertaken in pursuing this objective, including: privatization; purchase of
additional firms; capital participation requirements; PERNAS subsidiaries; and
government contracts.94
The general sentiment was that the majority of huge bumiputra enterprises
emerged as the results of rents acquired from the government. Only a small fraction
of the bumiputra business class created over the past decades participated in export-
oriented manufacturing industries.95 Most of them directed their entrepreneurial
efforts toward rent-seeking practices induced by patronage politics within the
government. Consequently, the bumiputra business class is commonly described as
crony capitalists that came into existence to act as substitutes for political patrons.96
They have been accused of exploiting the resources provided to them by the
government and are criticized for being rentiers rather than genuine industrialists.97
Mahathir himself was at the forefront in many of the government’s econom-
ically costly initiatives. In fact, even prior to his premiership, Mahathir had ar-
gued that equality between races could only be achieved when each race was
being represented in every layer of the Malaysian society, in every sector of
employment, in proportion more or less to their percentage in the population.98
Mahathir had envisaged a bumiputra business class that would eventually de-
velop commercial and industrial expertise necessary for building rents ‘by in-
vesting surplus and creating new wealth, not just for themselves but also for the
nation’.99
However, this has not usually been the outcome. The members of bumiputra
business class have frequently created joint ventures and subcontracted their oper-
ations to local and foreign firms which have the capability to perform the required
tasks.100 By 2006, 85% of the contracts originally awarded to the bumiputras
went under in the hands non-bumiputras.101 Accordingly, non-bumiputra wealth
and income have substantially increased considering the public sector’s heavy
reliance on their capacity to carry out critical public investment and other key
contracts.102 Such arrangement has produced a corollary effect known as money
politics based on patron-client relations where government assets and contracts
are being rewarded to individuals or groups supporting politicians from the rul-
ing UMNO party and the larger BN coalition.103 The outcome is the rise of a
deeply politicized bumiputra business class influencing conduct and mechanism
of Malaysia’s political economy.104
Still, the government continues to emphasize the remaining inter-ethnic eco-
nomic gap as justification for preserving the AAPs. This is despite the fact
that the indicator being used to measure this gap—the inter-ethnic income ra-
tio or IIR—does not accurately reflect the varying patterns of income distribution
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slanted.105 In short, it fails to capture the difference between reducing the gap
by raising the incomes of many poor bumiputras and narrowing the disparity by
allowing few rich bumiputras to amass more capital.106 Such scenario has led to
the overconcentration of national wealth in the hands of the very few elite who
are likely to exploit the resulting power configuration in pursuing their own vested
interests.107 The notion of narrowing inter-ethnic economic gap by encouraging
income accumulation within the upper bumiputra strata, inevitably leads to widen-
ing inequality not only within the bumiputra society but the Malaysian nation as
a whole.108
The Political Sustainability of Ethnic-Based AAPs
One way to examine the political sustainability of ethnic-based AAPs is by
looking at their implications on the government’s autonomy for ratifying and en-
acting its preferred policy objectives.109 On the one hand, the required polices for
drawing investment and encouraging competition have been attuned to the pre-
dispositions of Malaysia’s ruling elites. On the other, the government’s economic
policies have signified path dependence in the sense that specific policy initiatives
have emerged upon its adoption of export-oriented, FDI-centered development
strategies.
The Malaysian experience challenges the traditional view that globalization
compels national governments to limit their roles in order to successfully open
their economies to international trade and foreign investments regardless of their
impacts on domestic welfare and equity. Malaysia did not shy away from tak-
ing alternative paths when the dominant neoliberal philosophy and remedy were
at odds with its vision. It implemented robust social policies that have proved
compatible with and critical to equitable growth despite their enormous economic
costs. The government, particularly under the Mahathir regime, attempted to ratio-
nalize its policy choices using its Look East Policy.110 Although the said initiative
did not yield outstanding results, nevertheless, it demonstrated that the powerful
ideological influence of economic globalization had not completely constrained
Malaysia’s policy preferences.111
To this extent, the AAPs are strong illustrations of the Malaysian government’s
freedom to develop its desired socio-economic strategies. They are striking mani-
festations of Malaysian policy independence amid the constraints being generated
by the intense competition for global markets and investments. The fortuitous
racial riots of 1969 convinced Malaysia’s political heads that stability and national
unity necessitated extensive alleviation of national poverty and substantial exten-
uation of ethnic inequalities in terms of income and wealthy.112 This realization
made social restructuring an ‘extraordinary’ measure that must be urgently adopted
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and social agendas as mutually exclusive, the government has underscored the
complementarity between the two by pushing for the rapid advancement of bu-
miputras’ welfare status without completely neglecting the conditions confronting
the non-bumiputras.113
The period between 1970 and 1990 largely reflected this conjecture. Foreign
investors have generally tolerated the imposition of AAP quotas and its associated
costs primarily because of their perceived role for sustaining and strengthening
socio-political stability.114 While Malaysia has been chiefly concerned with pursu-
ing economic growth, the government argued that it did so by balancing policies
designed to stimulate trade and investment with the ones intended to improve
social welfare.115 Hence, even when economic liberalization compelled the gov-
ernment to modify some of its AAPs, particularly during the economic slump in
mid-1980s, it did not completely thwart the core thrust of Malaysia’s social vision.
Another way of examining the political sustainability of ethnic-based AAPs is
by looking at their implications on the continued primacy of the UMNO-led BN
coalition. There are several important factors that can potentially alter the manner
with which these ethnic-oriented policies are crafted. First, advancements made
in the education sector have resulted to the rise of socio-civic organizations ac-
tively engaging in national policy debates. Although the government has typically
treated civil society pressures and criticisms as mere disturbances to day-to-day
governance, however, they have the power to influence decisions particularly when
oppositional parties decide to adopt and pursue these issues.116 Despite the limited
government attention, the level of critical voices and views expressed by non-state
actors over some specific components of AAPs has continued to increase.
Second, issues concerning multiethnic and multi-religious relations are also
quickly transforming, and therefore require new policy strategies. Despite the
relative success of the AAPs in diminishing the income and professional gaps
between Bumiputras and non-Bumiputras, the Malaysian society has remained
profoundly polarized and divided. The causes of underlying tensions among ethnic
groups are deeper and more complex than traditional economic considerations.
These involve the need to recognize and respect the differing cultural and religious
values being espoused by each ethnic community.117 As such, approaches to nation
building and the national identity construction must go beyond the strategy of
managing conflicts via economic equity.
Third, and lastly, Malaysia’s capacity to effectively fulfill its chosen goals and
objectives also depends on its national administrative apparatus. For the most part,
the four decades of AAPs have immensely enhanced government capacity by facil-
itating wealth creation, human resource development, technological advancement
and cross-sectoral capital base expansion.118 However, bureaucratic inefficiencies
and corruption are gradually eroding Malaysia’s capabilities for efficiently and
effectively competing at the global level. Such problem seriously tarnishes the im-
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the National Integrity Plan intended to address corruption, malpractices, abuse of
power, and all other inefficiencies that are plaguing the bureaucracy.119 However,
it remains unclear whether corrective policies will be implemented both at the
higher and lower tiers of the government.120 This is despite the government’s pro-
nouncements that “the effort to enhance integrity will involve participation at the
grassroots right up to the highest level of society.”121
Summary and Conclusions
Notwithstanding Malaysia’s great ethnic diversity, the country’s national secu-
rity policy and strategy are profoundly Bumiputric. In fact, the Malaysian con-
stitution provides legal justification for the provision of the exclusive rights and
privileges to Malays that are not readily available to other ethnic groups partic-
ularly the Chinese and Indian-Malaysians. Article 53 of the Constitution states
that:
It shall be the responsibility of the Yang di-Pertuan Agong (King of Malaysia) to
safeguard the special position of the Malays and natives of any of the States of Sabah
and Sarawak and the legitimate interests of other communities in accordance with
the provisions of this Article.122
Despite the continuous political supremacy and greatly enhanced economic status
of the Bumiputras, Article 153 remains entrenched in the Malaysian constitution.
Such provision legitimizes the interests of the Malays even at the expense of
all other Malaysian ethnic groups. Put differently, an ethnic-based approach to
Malaysia’s national security policy and strategy institutionalizes the prevailing
one-sided domestic security dilemma. This prevents the necessary shift toward a
pluralistic model of Malaysian political economy.
The Malaysian government that is perpetually ruled and controlled by the
UMNO-led BN coalition has pursued a number of ideological and material ap-
paratuses designed to secure its political primacy. On the one hand, ideological
security constructs have enabled the BN to moderate a state-configured religion
designed to eradicate its political nemesis. Although the government insists that a
state-manufactured Islam is a necessary component of Malaysian leadership role
in the Muslim world, however, its tendency to suppress deviant voices underlines
its regressive nature. On the other, material security apparatuses have allowed
the BN to secure its political interests by muffling “rogue” ideas and rational-
izing its continued supremacy as an indispensable part of Malaysia’s national
security. The result is the creation of a Malay-dominated status quo that exploits
Malaysia’s politico-economic and socio-cultural arrangements at the expense of
all non-Malay Malaysians.
Furthermore, complementary AAPs have also been enacted under the pretext of
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four decades has supported the government’s ‘social-equalizing’ policy initiatives.
The BN has offered a compelling case for the implementation of the AAPs by
arguing that economic growth is not sufficient for creating an equitable and a just
multiethnic society.123Accordingly, a number of AAPs have been introduced since
1970 up to the present in efforts to fairly distribute the fruits of economic progress
among various ethnic groups. The BN has also emphasized the need to ensure that
the trickle-down effects of export-led growth would eventually reach Malaysia’s
most economically disadvantaged sectors particularly the bumiputras. But behind
these economic imperatives lie the BN’s deep-seated political interests that must
be protected at all costs.
Hence, it is difficult to de-ethnicize Malaysia’s policymaking processes since
ethnicity has always been the core foundation the government’s national security
policy and strategy, both ideational and material. The notion of Malaysian security
has been customarily equated with Malay security given bumiputras’ pre-eminence
in virtually all aspects of the domestic affairs. For better or worse, Malaysia’s na-
tional security is conceived and developed around the bumiputra ethnicity. Yet even
for the “othered” bumiputras—the non-Muslim and non-Malay indigenous groups
of Sabah and Sarawak—bumiputraism has become an exploitative instrument that
legitimizes and empowers the Malay bumiputras at their expense. This leads to
widening cleavages among the bumiputras,124 who now demand greater special
rights and privileges instead of equal opportunities. The long-standing question of
“bumiputraism for whom,” therefore, remains as pertinent today as ever.125 To this
extent, it can be inferred that Malaysia’s national security is designed primarily
to counter the insecurities confronting Malays by promoting their ethnic interests
above all other racial groups. The end result is a one-sided security dilemma in
which the improvements in political, economic, social and cultural security of the
non- bumiputras regrettably lead to insecurities of the bumiputras.
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This article examines Taiwan’s cross-strait relations with China by analyzing the 
linkages between their respective security interests and free trade objectives in 
the twenty-first century. It argues that these entanglements induce a scenario 
akin to the prisoner’s dilemma that compels Taiwanese leaders and policymak-
ers to preserve the Chinese-dominated cross-strait status quo. To enhance their 
political appeals during general elections, the major political parties in Taiwan are 
being forced to cooperate with each other, albeit artificially. By adopting a paral-
lel, watered-down approach to sensitive political issues, particularly with respect 
to Taiwan’s sovereignty status, the omnipresent China factor is being legitimized 
further. Such an approach homogenizes the parties’ political agendas with respect 
to Taiwanese autonomy which leads to the island’s perpetual entrapment within 
the One-China trajectory. Using original and secondary sources in the empirical 
analysis of the security–trade nexus mainly from the Taiwanese perspective, the 
article highlights the slow yet steady co-optation of Taiwan’s sovereign interests 
within China’s sinicization project.
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Introduction
In the traditional version of the prisoner’s dilemma, an arresting police officer 
interrogates two suspects in separate rooms. They have two options: either impli-
cate each other by confessing or cooperate with each other by remaining silent. 
Regardless of how the other reacts, each party improves his own position through 
confession. In the event that one of them confesses, then it will be in the best inter-
est of the other party to confess as well to avoid greater penalty. However, if the 
other decides to remain silent, the one who confesses is rewarded with less pun-
ishment. Confession, therefore, becomes the dominant strategy for both suspects. 
Yet ironically, when the two parties decide to confess, the punishment is worse for 
both than when both keep quiet.1
The concept of prisoner’s dilemma has some practical applications to Taiwan’s 
cross-strait relations with China in the twenty-first century. Consider the two 
major political parties in Taiwan: the Kuomintang Party (KMT) and the Democratic 
Progressive Party (DPP). Each party is looking for ways to enhance its relative 
political appeal in order to win over the electoral masses. Both parties are expected 
to decide on, and announce their respective cross-strait policies and strategies 
towards China. If the KMT accuses the DPP of pursuing a pro-independence pol-
icy that can potentially destabilize the relatively peaceful and stable cross-strait 
environment, the former wins over the voters at the expense of the latter. Similarly, 
if the DPP accuses the KMT of supporting the One-China principle which 
Taiwanese voters may view as an assault to Taiwan’s sovereignty, the former wins 
over the electorates at the expense of the latter. Here, the ‘accusation strategy’ is 
akin to the prisoner’s confession, while the ‘agreement strategy’ is parallel to the 
prisoner’s silence in the prisoner’s dilemma story. Suppose that the former is 
labelled as ‘cheating’, while the latter is labelled as ‘cooperation’. Cheating, 
therefore, becomes the parties’ dominant electoral strategy. However, the out-
come when both parties cheat is worse for each party than the outcome when 
both parties cooperate. Such considerations are compelling the two parties to 
adopt a parallel, watered-down approach to handling difficult political issues—
particularly the Taiwanese sovereignty—to minimize electoral risks. This dilemma 
further strengthens the prevailing status quo, which in turn, results in the continued 
imprisonment of Taiwan inside the ‘dragon’s den’.
In light of this, the article critically examines the process through which 
Taiwanese officials and policymakers have contributed to the continuation of 
Taiwan’s politico-diplomatic ‘imprisonment’ within the ever-progressing sinici-
zation project.2 The underlying assumption is that the preservation of the cross-
strait status quo continues to imprison the Republic of China (ROC) within the 
People’s Republic of China (PRC’s) One-China trajectory. At the heart of the 
problem are uncertainties with regard to the real impact of cross-strait economic 
relations on Taiwan’s de facto sovereignty. On the one hand, the KMT believes 
that in order to protect Taiwan’s remaining political freedom the government must 
facilitate closer economic cooperation with China (Chow, 2011; Lee, 2010; Wang, 
Chen & Keng, 2010; Zhao & Liu, 2010). On the other hand, the DPP argues that 
such a strategy inevitably pulls Taiwan towards political unification with China 
(Clark & Tan, 2010, 2012; Hsieh, 2011; Rigger, 2010).
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Meanwhile, from the point of view of non-state actors—from the elite business 
sectors worrying about their profits, to grassroots civil societies fearing for their 
jobs—revisionist policies are welfare-threatening. As such, political parties pro-
moting a rather extreme approach to managing cross-strait relations that subverts 
the status quo are at risk of losing their electoral support base (Clark & Tan, 2010, 
2012; Kastner, 2006, 2013). Taiwanese parties, therefore, tend to veer away from 
the debates and dialogues that require them to give direct comments about 
Taiwan’s de jure independence. Instead, a watered-down version of cross-strait 
rhetoric stripped of One-China or ‘Two Chinas’ undertone is preferred. Yet by 
doing so, Taiwan is perpetually ensnaring itself within the Chinese politico- 
diplomatic confinements.
Beyond the domestic level, it may be well argued that although there is a strong 
desire on the part of Taiwanese political parties to break Chinese stranglehold, 
certain structural limits in the international system prevent them from doing so. 
Hence, the article also explores some of the external factors that restrain Taiwan’s 
action, along with their possible consequences and ramifications to Taiwanese 
domestic politics.
The article attempts to answer the following sets of question. First, how do the 
entanglements between Taiwan’s security considerations, on the one hand, and 
free trade objectives, on the other, affect its cross-strait relations with China? Do 
they reinforce or weaken Taiwan’s quasi-sovereignty status in the international 
system? Second, what factors—both internal and external—influence Taiwan’s 
political and economic engagement strategies with respect to China? How do they 
affect Taiwan’s capacity for escaping Beijing’s One-China trajectory?
To answer these questions the paper analyzes Taiwan’s security and trade 
entanglements with China. The idea is to empirically explain the decision of 
Taiwanese leaders and policymakers to retain the island’s quasi-independent 
 status instead of pursuing de jure sovereignty. Taiwan’s unique geo-political  status 
compels its leaders to resign themselves to the uncertainties and vicissitudes of 
the established cross-strait environment in the hope of preserving its left-over 
sovereign space underpinning its de facto autonomy. However, such a decision 
further reinforces the status quo, forcing state managers to strategically balance 
the country’s geo-political strategies with its geo-economic interests. The 
Taiwanese dilemma, therefore, is two-directional. On the one hand, recalibrating 
the current arrangement by promoting either political unification or de jure inde-
pendence invariably reduces Taiwan’s sovereign space given China’s aggressive 
promotion of One-China policy. On the other, pursuing either ‘warm’ or ‘cold’ 
economic relations with China also inevitably results to shrinking sovereign space 
given the likelihood of overdependence.
The article is divided into four sections. The second section discusses the 
results from key informant interviews (KIIs) conducted with three Taiwanese 
 officials that focused on the paper’s three main themes: national security, free 
trade and the nexus between the two. The goal is to provide a general understand-
ing of first, how Taiwan’s security interests and trade objectives are being linked 
together; and second, how these linkages determine the government’s political 
and economic engagement strategies with respect to China. The third section is 
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divided into two subsections and investigates the internal and external factors 
influencing the Taiwanese dilemma respectively. The goal is to assess the poten-
tial consequences and ramifications of these factors to Taiwan’s domestic politics, 
on the one hand, and examine the country’s capacity to escape from China’s 
 politico-diplomatic entrapment, on the other. The fourth section summarizes the 
article’s main points and concludes that Taiwan is trapped in what appears to be a 
perpetual prisoner’s dilemma.
Understanding Taiwan’s Security–Trade Nexus: 
Views from the Top
Table 1. Summary of Key Informant Interviews*
On National 




Taiwan WTO and 
RTA Center
(Deputy Director)










Free trade agreements 
must promote peace 
with China, integration 
with the US, and 








insecurity is a 
threat to national 
security























trade is a national 
security issue 






The One-China policy 
is both an impetus 
and a constraint 
for Taiwan’s trade 
diplomacy agendas
Source: Author’s first-hand interviews with key informants.
Note:  * Representatives from three different sectors participated in the interviews to provide 
comments and insights on the article’s three main themes, namely: national security, trade 
liberalization and security–trade linkages in Taiwan. These are the following: (a)  Deputy 
 Director at Taiwan WTO and RTA Center (hereafter, Informant 1); (b) Associate  Research 
Fellow at CIER or Chung-Hua Institution for Economic Research (hereafter, Informant 2); 
and (c) Director of Department of China Affairs at DPP or Democratic Progressive Party 
(hereafter, Informant 3). In the first part of the interviews, the participants discussed their 
general views on the concept of national security in Taiwan. In the second part, they 
discussed this security concept in relation to the country’s participation in various free 
trade activities. And in the third part, the informants discussed the linkages between the 
country’s security considerations and free trade objectives.
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On Taiwan’s National Security
Three key points emerged from the discussions concerning Taiwan’s national 
security: the cause of insecurity, the effect of insecurity and the goal of security. 
Prior to 2008, Taiwan adopted a number of politically sensitive programs that 
deviated from the general principles of the One-China policy. The segregating 
effect of the physical distance between Taiwan and China was aggravated by psy-
chological barriers resulting in mutual distrust and disengagement. These three 
‘Ds’—distance, distrust and disengagement—significantly contributed to the 
paranoia being felt by both the Taiwanese and Chinese officials due to behav-
ioural uncertainties emanating from both sides of the Taiwan Strait. This mutual 
paranoia and suspicion have had a tremendous influence on the PRC’s attitude 
towards the ROC’s economic activities which the former sees as ‘sovereignty-
upgrading’ mechanisms (Magcamit & Tan, 2015). As Informant 1 pointed out:
The Taiwanese government believes that the country must enjoy its freedom to pursue 
regional economic integration with other countries. The Chinese government, however, 
felt that a dialogue with Taiwan will be a necessary preliminary step. While Taiwan 
argues that it is not obliged to seek for permission from China regarding this issue, 
nonetheless, it recognizes the importance of accommodating the latter’s concerns with 
respect to One-China policy. Taiwan, therefore, makes the case that its pursuit of pref-
erential trade, for example, must not be interpreted as rejection of One-China policy, 
and the best way to prove this is to show by example. The idea of ‘normalization’ 
of cross-strait relations is a non-political label that neither challenges nor accepts the 
One-China policy.3
Hence, Taiwan’s insecurity is largely induced by fears over cross-strait interac-
tions. Taipei’s foreign economic policies are believed to be hijacked by Beijing to 
force the former to comply with the latter’s One-China doctrine thereby prevent-
ing the emergence of Two Chinas. Critics argue that such forceful exertion of 
Chinese influence over Taiwan’s foreign affairs in general threatens the latter’s 
national security. Accordingly, for most Taiwanese officials and policymakers, the 
China factor remains a serious impediment to Taiwan’s economic policymaking 
procedures. As Informant 2 stated:
China’s meteoric economic rise has made it difficult for other countries to conduct 
any type of business with Taiwan as they are now facing an ‘either–or’ situation—
either they are with China or with Taiwan. The reluctance of third countries to engage 
Taiwan demonstrates the extent to which the Chinese economic influence is altering 
the former’s foreign economic policy options while simultaneously constraining the 
latter’s.4
Obviously, the way out for Taiwan is both challenging and difficult given 
China’s seemingly uncompromising views towards cross-strait management. While 
the island’s economic statecraft is designed to limit its excessive dependence on the 
Mainland to the extent of offering asymmetric concessions to  prospective partners 
other than China, nevertheless, Beijing’s overwhelming presence significantly 
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undermines Taipei’s freedom to navigate its own diplomatic space. In the words of 
Informant 3:
Liberty and freedom are the ultimate expressions of national security. The freedom 
and liberty to choose instead of being dictated by external forces can only be achieved 
through democratization of the political processes in the country. Taiwan is governed 
by law, by constitution. The DPP as a liberal party upholds liberal values and princi-
ples. It pushes the government to observe and implement the fundamental covenants of 
the United Nations including civil and political rights, as well as economic, social and 
cultural rights. The present government, however, is side-tracking the goal of achieving 
sovereignty from China.5
Overall, based on the statements made by the Taiwanese officials, China’s 
expanding zone of influence is contracting Taiwan’s de facto sovereign space. 
Taipei’s failure to pursue its political and economic agendas independently threat-
ens the foundations of its national security. Securing Taiwan’s sovereign space, 
therefore, becomes crucial to achieving the freedom and liberty to realize its 
national objectives without the interference of other states particularly China.
On Taiwan’s Free Trade Activities
As argued earlier, China’s encroachment of Taiwan’s sovereign space poses signi-
ficant threats to the latter’s national security. And for Taiwanese officials, free 
trade has been increasingly viewed as a key strategy for cultivating diplomatic 
relations with other countries and mitigating the island’s overdependence on the 
Mainland. The freedom to engage with prospective partners other than the PRC in 
various types of trade arrangement is deemed crucial for the expansion of Taiwan’s 
sovereign space. Based on the interviews conducted, free trade performs three 
important functions: as a platform for regional economic and political integration; 
as a key to cross-strait normalization; and as a tool for minimizing overdepend-
ence on China. These functions underline free trade’s reinforcement effects with 
respect to Taipei’s sovereign space amid threats being induced by the One-China 
policy. With regard to trade’s role as a platform for regional economic and politi-
cal integration, Informant 1 commented that:
Economic integration must be differentiated from political integration. With respect to 
free trade agreements (FTAs), for example, some may be politically motivated, while 
others are economically motivated. In the case of China, FTAs being negotiated and 
concluded are designed to achieve political and strategic objectives rather than eco-
nomic ones. In that sense, all Chinese FTAs are meant to serve political objectives, after 
all, everything is meant to protect the political agenda. In the case of Taiwan, however, 
this is not necessarily true. For instance, under the proposed US–Taiwan FTA, the US 
is only asking Taiwan to match its tariff rates. In doing so, Taiwan needs to harmonize 
its regulatory regimes to improve transparency necessary for maximizing its benefits, 
while minimizing the costs of concessions. The Taiwanese policymaking circles have 
agreed that although external political pressures play a crucial role in the inception of 
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US–Taiwan FTA, however, expected economic benefits justify the need to enforce the 
said trade agreement. Taiwan’s chief economists and political analysts are very optimis-
tic about China’s relaxation of its policies in relation to Taiwan in light of Hong Kong’s 
successful conclusions of bilateral FTA with Chile and New Zealand.6
In other words, limiting bilateral trade with China is similar to putting too 
many eggs in one basket which inevitably creates dependency problem for 
Taiwan. The risk of being captured by China in economic sense is quite high. 
Informant 1 further highlighted Taiwan’s unique case by comparing it with 
Mexico’s bilateral trade relations with the US:
In the case of US–Mexico bilateral trade, although eighty per cent of Mexico’s total 
export goes to the US, the absence of geo-political tension between the two makes it 
less risky. The opposite is true in the case of Taiwan and China since we have to prepare 
for the rainy days. We clearly need to reduce the high level of dependency on China by 
diversifying, that is, joining more bilateral and plurilateral FTAs.7
Meanwhile, the role of free trade in normalization of cross-strait relations is 
viewed in the context of Taiwan’s WTO membership. Prior to the country’s acces-
sion, much of Taiwan’s economic insecurities emanated from the most-favoured-
nation (MFN) status accorded by WTO members to one another. The Taiwanese 
government, therefore, has deemed free trade as a national security issue that could 
be effectively addressed through WTO membership. During the negotiations,  several 
trade experts had expressed scepticism towards the WTO, citing discouraging 
results from various econometric simulations. Yet 10 years after its controversial 
entry in the WTO in 2002 as a separate customs territory, new empirical studies 
have shown free trade’s positive impacts on the Taiwanese political  economy.8 
Similar to other countries that have adopted neoliberal economic policies, how-
ever, not all sectors in Taiwan have experienced positive growth including agricul-
ture.9 Nevertheless, Informant 2 asserted that Taiwan’s acceptance to the WTO was 
a significant milestone in the country’s foreign affairs history, especially when 
viewed in the context of Beijing tight grip on Taipei’s diplomatic manoeuvrings:
On the one hand, Taiwan’s accession to the WTO facilitated the normalization of 
cross-strait relations. But while the WTO is aware of Taiwan’s discriminatory practices 
against China’s products, the latter does not file complaints to the Dispute Settlement 
Mechanism (DSM) since doing so would implicitly validate Taiwan’s claim as a legiti-
mate sovereign state. On the other, the intensification of East Asia’s desire for esta-
blishing regional economic integration via FTAs, has given China a new tool for further 
isolating Taiwan from vital political and economic activities in the region. At the same 
time, the implementation of Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (EFCA) 
between the two countries has resulted to overdependence on China.10
While multilateralism is still largely viewed as the optimal tool for economic 
statecraft, Taiwan’s relatively small size, however, substantially limits its influence 
over trade negotiations at the multilateral level. The second-best option for 
Taiwanese policymakers, therefore, is to engage more in bilateral and plurilateral 
FTAs. But the ubiquitous Chinese influence in the region has once again derailed 
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Taiwan’s bids for preferential FTAs with other prospective partners.11 As Informant 2 
(2013) claimed further:
Taiwanese officials expected that the passage of ECFA would pave the way for more 
FTAs with different countries but failed to materialize immediately due to the ambi-
guity surrounding its sovereign status. In short, sovereignty still matters. Attempting 
to establish diplomatic relations with other countries seems futile when a powerful 
neighbour opposes it. WTO is becoming less and less of an issue when compared with 
preferential FTAs.12
Within Taiwan’s policy circles, the general consensus is that the country must 
continue to engage China while it attempts to establish its own FTAs with neigh-
bouring countries. Although cross-strait relations have significantly improved 
after the restoration of three direct links in 2008—postal, transportation and 
trade—however, this should not give Taiwanese leaders a false sense of security. 
As Informant 3 (2013) stressed:
While the DPP does not oppose normalization of cross-state relations, nonetheless, 
it wants to establish relations with other states other than China. Although the US is 
adhering to One-China policy, however, it does not have a Once China principle since it 
does not support Taiwan’s unification with China for some politico-strategic reasons.13
Overall, based on these comments made by Taiwanese officials, free trade is a 
critical element of Taiwanese statecraft. Beyond classical economic considera-
tions, FTAs are fuelled by vital politico-strategic motives that help broaden and 
deepen Taiwan’s sovereign space. To this extent, the whole process of free trade 
acquires a new ‘utility function’, that is, as a ‘sovereignty-upgrading’ mechanism 
(Magcamit & Tan, 2015). The last section of the interviews discusses the policy 
positions being endorsed by these various institutions with regard to Taiwan’s 
efforts at linking security issues and FTAs within the national security agenda.
On Taiwan’s Security–Trade Nexus
Informant 3 argued that in order to preserve Taiwan’s national security, cross-
strait dialogues must promote peace with China, closer integration with the US, 
and friendship with Japan.14 Taiwanese think tanks believe that one way to reach 
these conditions is to vigorously incorporate the world’s three biggest economies 
when crafting ROC’s foreign trade policies both at the multilateral and regional 
levels. Informant 1 made a case for Taiwan’s active involvement in WTO  processes 
vis-à-vis the need for serious partners to establish preferential trade with:
There are two types of WTO members: rule makers and rule followers. This has always 
been the unwritten rule. Taiwan is definitely not a rule making country. Rules are drafted 
by the G8 countries. Since Taiwan depends on trade with the rule making  countries, the 
objective is to make money instead of distorting the money-making process. Therefore, 
it is a systematic issue and not a trade issue per se for as long as subsidies are kept 
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at minimum. With respect to regional FTAs, it will be more advantageous to join the 
Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) than ASEAN since we should always aim high in order 
to facilitate domestic reforms. High standards must be used as benchmarks to solve 
for inefficiencies. In terms of coverage, ASEAN+N and TPP are almost the same. The 
passage of an East Asia free trade will undermine Taiwan’s need to join ASEAN+N. 
Despite the proliferation of regional and trans-regional FTAs, the WTO still remains as 
the optimum choice. It is important to note that the Doha impasse does not mean the 
death of WTO.15 
Meanwhile, Informant 2 maintained that policy recommendations need to iden-
tify who the real stakeholders are. In the case of the Economic Cooperation 
Framework Agreement (ECFA), the communication between the government and 
the public has been unsuccessful as evidenced by contrasting views and lack of 
consensus about its significance across different sectors.16 Informant 2 also hinted 
about the influence of economic, as well as strategic incentives being derived from 
trade agreements with respect to the prevailing political climate in Taiwan:
For members of the opposition, ECFA is a politically sensitive topic affecting the coun-
try’s national security. For the local farmers, it is an economic issue threatening their 
livelihoods due to lack of capacity to compete with imported products. For ordinary 
citizens, it is a looming social concern that vindicates their distrust toward China. 
Although in general, the concern about China’s aggressive policy stance toward Taiwan 
has considerably declined over the past few years, the return of Democratic Progressive 
Party (DPP) to power might once again, aggravate cross-strait relations due to their 
explicit rejection of One-China policy. Despite President Ma’s declining popularity, the 
likelihood of DPP replacing KMT as the dominant political party in Taiwan remains 
slim given the significant strategic and economic considerations at stake.17
Informant 3, however, questioned such statements and claimed that the party 
now has a strong chance of replacing KMT considering the significant decline in 
the incumbent president’s popularity.18 Informant 3 argued that One-China 
 policy is both an impetus and a constraint for Taiwan’s trade diplomacy agendas. 
As such, DPP is framing policies that are more amicable and less defiant towards 
the PRC, contrary to popular beliefs that it is espousing radical anti-Sino princi-
ples. Moreover, the DPP, according to Informant 3 espouses a human-centric 
security:
Human security in the domestic context is the security in income, gender equality, and 
labour rights. It puts more emphasis on the rights of the people and the communities. It 
places more attention on equality issues between men and women. The biggest security 
concern among Taiwanese is still economic insecurity, although relatively speaking they 
have better social security system as opposed to other countries. The continuous decline 
in government tax revenues adversely affects different sectors of the population.19
Overall, based on the comments provided by the informants, security consid-
erations and trade agendas are fundamentally interlinked to each other. This is 
particularly relevant in the case of Taiwan given the geo-political context in which 
the country’s domestic and international political economy is embedded. The 
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overarching China factor significantly restrains Taiwan’s de facto sovereign 
space, and in doing so, is undermining the latter’s national security. Harnessing 
the geo-political and geo-economic powers of FTAs, therefore, becomes a crucial 
element of Taiwan’s foreign policymaking. However, the One-China framework 
governing cross-strait relations can simultaneously stimulate and constrain 
Taiwan’s sovereign space. On the one hand, it can motivate Taiwan to enhance its 
diplomatic ties with other countries through FTA creation that minimizes depend-
ence on China. On the other, China’s wherewithal to effectively employ ‘diplo-
matic blackmail’ against any county that violates its One-China principle by 
establishing state-to-state relations with Taiwan, implies that Taiwan’s foreign 
policies can only be applied exclusively in Chinese terms. This is the dilemma 
that is confronting Taiwanese political parties at present and the reason why they 
tend to have a homogenous stand on the sovereignty issue, that is, the freezing 
of Taiwan’s de jure independence.
Internal and External Factors Influencing 
the Taiwanese Dilemma
Several factors influence the capacity of Taiwanese political parties and their 
respective leaders for thawing the politico-diplomatic barriers induced by 
Beijing’s One-China policy. These are: popularity of nationalist objectives, via-
bility of political unification, level of economic interdependence and atmosphere 
in the multilateral environment. The first and second factors represent internal 
constraints sustaining the Taiwanese dilemma, while the third and fourth factors 
deal with the external constraints reinforcing it. It is worth noting, however, that 
these factors are all interconnected and therefore tend to overlap. Together, they 
help explain the limits to the ROC’s political and economic engagement strategies 
with respect to the PRC that undermine its attempts to escape from the ever- 
progressing One-China trajectory.
Internal Factors
Popularity of Nationalist Objectives
Defending ROC’s political and economic autonomy against the backdrop of pre-
ponderant Chinese power demands a heightened sense of Taiwanese nationalism 
based on collective idea of civic commonality as opposed to ethnic, religious or 
linguistic ties (Drover & Leung, 2001). This notion became the basis of the ‘New 
Taiwanese’ rhetoric introduced by ROC’s former president, Lee Teng-hui in 1988 
that symbolized the government’s reconciliatory efforts towards the mainland 
(Brown, 2004; Clark & Tan, 2010, 2012; Rigger, 1999). The new Taiwanese 
according to Lee is a ‘living community in which all the people commonly living 
in Taiwan struggled for and [were] dedicated to Taiwan and the Republic of China, 
irrespective of the time of coming to Taiwan, languages or regions’ (Drover & 
Leung, 2001, p. 22).
 at University of Canterbury Library on April 15, 2015aia.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
102 Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs 2(1)
At the heart of the doctrine is the amalgamation of politics, ethnicity and eco-
nomics manifested in the convergence between nationalist ideals and free trade 
objectives (Drover & Leung, 2001). But while free trade has been instrumental for 
reviving nationalist aspirations in Taiwan, at the same time, however, it signifi-
cantly boosted China’s influence over the country’s internal and external affairs 
(Bolt, 2001; Clark, 2009; Clark & Tan, 2010, 2012; Gold, 2009, 2010; Hirschman, 
1945; Wang, 2000). This has severely understated the importance of nationalist 
objectives in favour of short-term economic gains.
Different political actors have different views regarding the possible impact of 
cross-strait trade relations on Taiwan’s statehood. While the pan-green forces 
depict cross-strait engagements as threats to national security, the pan-blue forces 
highlight the security-enhancing features of such engagements. Despite the DPP’s 
warning about the imminent dangers being posed by deeper economic integration 
with China on national security, the KMT has still actively campaigned for 
enhanced Sino partnership to take advantage of the PRC’s economic boom 
(Chow, 2011; Clark & Tan, 2010, 2012; Lee, 2010; Wang et al., 2010; Zhao & 
Liu, 2010).
Therefore, it is interesting to see how ordinary Taiwanese view cross-strait 
relations. During the time of then-President Chen Shui-bian of the DPP, a survey 
conducted by the National Chengchi University (NCCU) in April 2007 revealed 
that cross-strait relations were viewed more as threats to national security instead 
of reinforcements. Results showed 61 per cent of the respondents demanding for 
regulations on cross-strait relations; 35 per cent requesting for loosened restric-
tions; and only 4 per cent favouring the current status quo (Clark & Tan, 2012). 
Following Ma’s election in 2008, a similar survey was conducted that saw the 
percentage of Taiwanese population wanting stricter regulations increased to 
71 per cent while those calling for more relaxed policies decreased to 26 per cent 
(Clark & Tan, 2012). These figures underscore the largely pessimistic views being 
held by Taiwanese citizens towards ROC’s dealings with the PRC, especially after 
signing the agreement for the reopening of direct links to cross-strait relations. 
To some extent, these findings reflect the persistence of Taiwanese nationalism 
amid the overcoming China factor.
The passage of ECFA, however, has altered Taiwanese perception towards the 
Chinese government in general but not without the great polarization of local 
opinion. On the one hand, the influential business sectors along with the top poli-
tical elites are largely supportive of the ECFA, highlighting its huge economic 
gains as the primary impetus for ratification of the agreement (Clark & Tan, 2012; 
Hsieh, 2011; Wang et al., 2010). On the other hand, parties opposed to any politi-
cal unification plans, along with other local firms adversely affected by the agree-
ment, argue that the ECFA symbolizes President Ma Ying-jeou’s long-term 
interest in selling Taiwan’s sovereignty by ceding all its political and economic 
authorities to the Mainland (Gold, 2009, 2010; Hong, 2012; Tien & Tung, 2011). 
Nevertheless, results from the surveys conducted by the Mainland Affairs Council 
(MAC) in 2010 indicated a generally favourable Taiwanese attitude towards the 
ECFA. Of the total number of respondents, 60 per cent agreed that ECFA has the 
potential to create long-term positive impacts to the economy; 23 per cent 
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expressed less optimism about its intended effects; while the remaining 11 per 
cent were neither supportive nor antagonistic towards the project.
ECFA supporters argue that the citizens’ favourable view towards the agree-
ment is largely driven by the satisfying conditions it generates. Among survey 
participants, 67 per cent expressed satisfaction with the ECFA and only 33 per cent 
claimed dissatisfaction (MAC, 2010). With regard to ECFA’s latent security threats 
against Taiwan’s sovereignty, 34 per cent believed that the agreement could under-
mine the country’s overall autonomy but a much larger 66 per cent downplayed the 
significance of these threats (MAC, 2010). Finally, with respect to ECFA’s role in 
Taiwan’s FTA promotion, 71 per cent of the respondents viewed the agreement as 
a necessary instrument for capturing more FTAs in the future, thus, implying its 
capacity for enhancing the country’s sovereign status (MAC, 2010).
These results suggest that Taiwan’s management style with respect to cross-
strait relations is more fluid than what might have been initially expected. Taiwan’s 
pragmatic engagement approach with China has significant influence on the 
 diplomatic climate between the two governments. The island’s speedy recovery 
from the global recession in 2009, coupled with the far-fetched warnings from the 
DPP with regard to the ECFA implementation, has further improved the Chinese 
image (Clark & Tan, 2010, 2012; Magcamit & Tan, 2015).
However, it is important to stress that the volatility of present conditions 
 prevents Taipei from fully trusting in the future of cross-strait relations. The high 
level of hostility (67 per cent) felt by Taiwanese near the end of President Chen’s 
term in 2007, for instance, highlighted the lingering suspicions towards Chinese 
intentions. While this level of perceived hostility has diminished few months 
after President Ma’s assumption to presidency (53 per cent), the ongoing Chinese 
military operations involving contested islands in East and Southeast Asia 
 continue to heighten anxieties over wider and deeper forms of cross-strait inter-
actions (MAC, 2010).
For the DPP, nationalist objectives such as the quest for national sovereignty, 
identity, territory and ethnic justice, are all deeply interwoven into its democrati-
zation agenda (Clark & Tan, 2012; Rigger, 2010). Replacing authoritarianism 
with democracy requires a propagation of Taiwanese nationalism necessary for 
overthrowing a China-centric regime and declaring non-negotiable freedom from 
the Mainland (Gold, 1986; Wachman, 1994). The DPP officials expected that by 
leading the nation in the pursuit of independence, the citizens would acknowledge 
their efforts by giving them the votes they needed to win government seats 
(Clark & Tan, 2010, 2012). Conversely, the KMT leaders heavily relied on the 
expected spillover effects of Taiwan’s economic miracle to justify their position 
that favoured the maintenance of cross-strait status quo order (Clark & Tan, 2010, 
2012). Hence, while the DPP was adamant in endorsing a state-to-state approach 
when dealing with the PRC; the KMT was cautious in implementing its own 
 version of the One-China principle despite its statements suggesting that the 
ROC is the legitimate government of all China (Hsieh, 2011; Rigger, 2010).
The results of the 1991 elections, however, forced the DPP to take a more 
restrained rhetoric after suffering a landslide defeat against the KMT. Since the 
explicit denouncement of One-China policy proved to be electorally costly and 
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politically infeasible at least in the short run, the DPP started to relax its policy 
on sovereignty and began to craft a new discourse emphasizing the country’s de 
facto, rather than de jure, independence from China (Clark & Tan, 2012; Rigger, 
2010). This resulted to internal conflicts amongst the DPP factions which 
 eventually led to defections of its pro-independence members and and the even-
tual establishment of the Taiwan Independence Party (Clark & Tan, 2012; 
Rigger, 2001; Wang, 2000).
The failure of nationalist objectives to bring about electoral success underlines 
their limits to securing Taiwan’s sovereign space. Extreme nationalist proposi-
tions in relation to Taiwan’s contested statehood yield low numbers of vote for the 
respective parties espousing them. This reflects the public’s fear that proposals for 
either complete unification or absolute independence severely undercut the exist-
ing cross-state stability stability. Interestingly, a huge segment of the voting popu-
lation prefers the preservation of the status quo, or the so-called ‘normalization’ 
of cross-strait relations (Hsieh, 2002, 2011; C.W. Huang, 2009). As a result, 
Taiwanese political parties, specifically the KMT and the DPP, are being com-
pelled to soften their nationalist objectives by taking a middle ground in attempts 
to placate the increasingly sceptic citizens and win their votes (Clark & Tan, 2012; 
Lin, 2001; Wang, 2000). But in doing so, the agendas designed to enhance 
Taiwanese politico-diplomatic sovereignty are substantially diluted if not com-
pletely eroded in favour of the status quo. The result is the homogenization of 
Taiwanese parties’ policy stance on de jure independence that further entraps 
Taiwan within the One-China trajectory.
Viability of Political Unification
On the one hand, a confident Taiwanese government engages in deeper and wider 
economic activities with China, thereby reducing the level of cross-strait tensions 
(Kastner, 2013). Heightened economic integration increases the costs of conflict 
for both countries, restraining Beijing’s hostile behaviour while expanding 
Taipei’s sovereign space.20 This gives the ROC leaders a sense of assurance that 
they are still operating within the PRC’s ‘zone of tolerance’, and therefore, rein-
forces the perceived need to maintain the status quo. Pleased with the existing 
pro-status quo Taipei regime, Beijing begins to relax its militaristic policies 
towards cross-strait relations, expecting that the island will soon abandon its 
nationalist goal of complete autonomy from the mainland (Gartzke, Li & Boehmer, 
2001; Kastner, 2013; Morrow, 1999).
On the other hand, a revisionist Taiwanese leadership questions the legitimacy of 
the existing status quo and threatens to establish a new form of cross-strait arrange-
ment (Kastner, 2006, 2013). Such a regime is pessimistic about the effectiveness of 
bilateral economic ties in influencing the target state’s behaviour especially when 
dealing with a superpower neighbour.21 Economic partnerships at bilateral levels 
are not likely to succeed when the political space for cooperation remains hostile 
(Gowa, 1994; Pollins, 1989). Even if they endure these challenges and mitigate the 
existing conflicts in the short term, nonetheless, new forms of tension may still 
emerge somewhere between the medium- and long terms (Waltz, 1979). Such 
 scenario, therefore, will inevitably lead to heightened tensions on both sides of the 
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Taiwan Strait, and will compel China to re-employ militaristic strategies to counter 
secessionist movements (Kahler & Kastner 2006; Kastner, 2006, 2013).
This revisionist approach is best exemplified by Taiwan’s former President 
Chen when he articulated his idea about the presence of an independent country on 
each side of Taiwan Strait.22 Chen had not only abolished the National Unification 
Council (NUC) but also rallied to achieve membership status at the United Nations 
(UN) under the name of Taiwan (Clark & Tan, 2010, 2012; Kastner, 2006, 2013). 
Such policies underscored the revisionist sentiments of a DPP-led government and 
were symbolic expressions of the country’s sovereign aspirations. But despite his 
bold statements with regard to its pursuit of sovereignty, Chen still showed restraint 
by not issuing a formal declaration of independence to prevent further military 
backlash from China (Clark & Tan, 2010, 2012; Kastner, 2006, 2013).
Although economic integration may indeed embolden Taiwanese leaders to pres-
sure Beijing to grant them full independence; however, such an attitude threatens 
several local interest groups benefiting from the improving cross-strait relations. This 
is especially problematic given Beijing’s strong resolve to uphold the One-China 
principle that undermines all considerations for the economic costs of war (Kastner, 
2006, 2013). The anxiety induced by a revisionist ROC government thwarts all 
healthy cross-strait economic activities, thereby adversely affecting the growing 
number of domestic stakeholders (Clark & Tan, 2010, 2012; Kastner, 2006, 2013).
Stability in cross-strait relations, therefore, is a primary concern for influential 
business sectors that play a pivotal role during national elections. As a conse-
quence, revisionist politicians are being compelled to moderate their nationalist 
discourse in order to protect their votes. Hence, intensifying cross-strait economic 
relations has a tendency to weaken the political allure of the DPP’s nationalist 
policies with respect to China. This became evident in the 2012 presidential elec-
tions when the DPP’s standard-bearer Tsai Ing-wen failed to convince Taiwanese 
voters that cross-strait relations would remain stable under her leadership. The 
outcomes of the event persuaded the party to reconsider and reformulate its 
approach towards the Mainland (Kastner, 2013). Thus, it may be argued that in 
the long run, there will be less incentive for Taiwanese politicians to launch strong 
pro-independence campaigns that are centred on nationalist agendas given their 
electoral costs to the parties espousing them (de Lisle, 2012). And again, by doing 
so, the chains that bind Taiwan within the One-China trajectory are being hard-
ened as the policies towards independence are homogenized even further.
External Factors
Level of Economic Interdependence
Although economic engagement, particularly in terms of trade, is commonly 
framed as the superpowers’ strategy for extracting politico-strategic concessions 
from their respective targets, nonetheless, small powers have also utilized these 
linkages to inform, constrain and transform the latter’s behaviour (Kahler & 
Kastner, 2006; Kastner, 2006). Such is the case between Taiwan and China. 
There are two types of engagement strategy that strongly capture the dynamics of 
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 cross-strait  relations between these two countries: conditional (tactical linkage) 
and unconditional (substantive/structural linkage).23
Under conditional engagement, the initiator adopts a quid pro quo approach by 
compensating the target for every policy change that it makes through increased 
economic exchanges rather than punishing it with sanctions (Kahler & Kastner, 
2006). However, there are a number of reasons why conditional engagement strate-
gies, in general, are deemed less popular than economic sanctions. First, in terms of 
economic costs, inducements are generally costlier than sanctions. While sanctions 
are carried out only when the target fails to initiate the policy change, inducements 
are paid when policy shift does take place and will continue for as long as the target 
maintains its favourable behaviour (Drezner, 1999/2000). Second, offering induce-
ments not only creates the perception that the target’s resolves are stronger than the 
initiator’s but also strengthens the former’s military capacity, thus, raising the 
incentives for maintaining the policy status quo (Drezner, 1999/2000). And third, 
the uncertainties of market conditions undermine credible commitments of both the 
initiators and the targets with respect to policy reforms that must be carried out once 
economic payoffs have been made (Drezner, 1999/2000). Despite such limitations, 
conditional engagement can still induce the desired  policy change particularly in 
cases involving democratic nations given their strong credibility for complying 
with agreed-upon commitments (Kahler & Kastner, 2006).
Meanwhile, an initiator state employing unconditional engagement strategy 
does not rely on tit-for-tat but on the capacity of economic interdependence to influ-
ence the target’s policy behaviour, and to that extent are more passive (Aggarwal & 
Govella, 2013; Drezner, 1999/2000; Kahler & Kaster, 2006; Mastanduno, 1992). 
The idea is to entangle the target into the initiator’s economic activities up to a point 
where cessation becomes extremely costly for the former. In general, unconditional 
engagement performs three crucial functions: informing the target of the initiator’s 
precise level of resolve without resorting to militaristic actions; constraining the 
target’s policy dominion; and transforming the target’s policy behaviour and atti-
tude (Drezner, 1999/2000; Kahler & Kastner, 2006; Kastner, 2006; Gartzke, Li & 
Boehmer, 2001). As such, the breadth and depth of economic interdependence, 
particularly with respect to trade, determine the likelihood of conflict between the 
initiator and target states when expected policy changes do not occur.
As mentioned earlier, the Taiwan case provides a vivid illustration of these two 
forms of economic engagement with respect to China. The reopening of direct 
links to cross-strait relations, along with the signing of the ECFA, highlights 
ROC’s attempts at conditional and unconditional engagements designed to 
inform, constrain and transform the PRC’s One-China policy.24 China’s refusal to 
rule out the threat or actual use of force in pursuing its unification objective under-
lines the importance of Taiwan’s effective management of economic engagements 
to ensure its survival, at the very least as a de facto sovereign state. Indeed, the 
Taiwanese government has utilized the existing cross-strait economic interde-
pendence as a bargaining chip in deciding its contested statehood. In attempts to 
harness the transformative effect of economic engagement as self-antidote against 
Chinese nationalistic goals, Taiwanese officials have set out specific  preconditions 
for the reopening of cross-strait links to trade, transit and communications, 
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namely: withdrawal of threat or actual use of force against Taiwan; removal of 
barriers to Taiwan’s diplomatic space and political liberation vis-à-vis democrati-
zation of the Mainland (Clark & Tan, 2012; Zhao & Liu, 2010).
However, China’s military and economic preponderance engenders a scenario 
in which cross-strait economic relations continue to intensify with or without the 
fulfilment of the aforementioned conditions. Notwithstanding the high levels of 
political risk involved, Taiwanese firms have continued to trade and invest more 
in China replacing the old ‘go slow, be patient’ approach with ‘active opening’ 
and ‘effective management’ mantras (Clark & Tan, 2012; Kahler & Kastner, 
2006). Accordingly, strong lobbying efforts from local business communities in 
Taiwan have placed enormous pressure on the government to abandon such pre-
requisites being demanded from China prior to the legalization of direct cross-
strait links (Clark & Tan, 2012; Wang et al., 2010; Zhao & Liu, 2010).
These calls have, to certain extent, resulted to the convergence of cross-strait 
policies, specifically with respect to economic issues being espoused by compet-
ing political parties in Taiwan. There are two main factors that have led to this 
convergence: the increasing enmeshment of Taiwan’s business interests with the 
Mainland affairs; and the rise of Taiwanese electorate favouring the status quo 
over independence and unification. Consequently, concerns over the adverse 
effects of excessive Sino-dependence on national security has gradually dimin-
ished in importance across Taiwan’s political gamut, forcing presidential candi-
dates to embrace a modified two-state approach for managing cross-strait affairs 
(Clark & Tan, 2012; Kahler & Kastner, 2006; Wang et al., 2012; Y. Wu, 2001). 
Despite significant efforts in moderating the country’s reliance on the PRC, cross-
strait trade and investment flows have continued to expand as ROC officials 
themselves began to realize the cost of restraining local business activities. Hence, 
even without gaining significant political concessions, Taipei’s economic compen-
sations to Beijing continue to roll over.
Furthermore, Taiwan’s democratic society also makes it easier for China to 
link its politico-strategic motives with cross-strait economic interdependence.25 
Beijing’s wilful assertion of influence over business matters to undercut local sup-
port for pro-independence party such as the DPP, for instance, highlights such 
entanglements. The imbalanced trade relations between the PRC and the ROC 
generate asymmetric political effects which are further reinforced by institutional 
differences (Clark & Tan, 2012; Kahler & Kastner, 2006; Kastner, 2013). On the 
one hand, Beijing is waiting for cross-strait economic relations to weaken 
Taiwanese nationalism and identity, which will then diminish local resistance 
against its One-China policy.26  On the other hand, Taipei is optimistic that Beijing 
will soon realize that its regional ‘hegemonic’ power is fuelled more by economic 
imperatives and less by nationalist rhetoric (Kahler & Kastner, 2006; Kastner, 
2013). This will then compel the government to replace its militaristic approach 
with pacifist method for managing cross-strait relations. When the quest for eco-
nomic interests leads to relaxation of Chinese nationalist objectives, allowing the 
peaceful settlements of political and ideological differences, Taipei’s gamble with 
Beijing would have then paid off (Kahler & Kastner, 2006; Kastner, 2013; 
Lee, 2010; Rigger, 2010; Zhao & Liu, 2010).
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In addition, multilateralism also imposes significant constraints on Taiwan’s 
capacity for launching a conditional engagement strategy (Kahler & Kastner, 
2006; Kastner, 2006). This is because China’s economic dynamism enables it to 
attract other countries that are willing to cultivate interdependence without 
demanding any politico-diplomatic concession. The constraints engendered by 
Taiwanese conditionalities are compelling the government to adopt unconditional 
engagement procedures wherein unrestricted cross-strait economic interdepend-
ence is expected to act as a pre-emptive measure against China’s military diplo-
macy. However, the authoritarian nature of the PRC’s political institutions implies 
that Chinese officials can easily circumvent the rules and procedures for manag-
ing cross-strait relations (Chow, 2012; Hong, 2012; Kahler & Kastner, 2006; 
Kastner, 2006; N. Wu, 2012; Zhao & Liu, 2010). 
This view is particularly popular among Taiwanese oppositionist groups that 
are predominantly represented by the DPP. Despite the perceived ‘harmony’ of 
economic agendas between rivalling political parties, the reality is that there are 
still segments of Taiwanese population that have reservations towards the coun-
try’s deeper and wider economic integration with China. This argument is clearly 
illustrated by the dramatic turn of events that took place after the KMT’s ‘blitz-
krieg’ passage of Cross Strait Services Trade Agreement (CSSTA) with China on 
17 March 2014.27 President Ma’s decision to cut-short a vital deliberation process 
in the Legislative Yuan concerning the controversial agreement has provoked the 
occupation of the parliament on 19 March 2014 by a multi-sectoral coalition led 
by student groups (Arrouas, 2014; Chung, 2014).
The demonstrators have demanded several conditions from the Taiwanese 
president: hold an inclusive citizens constitutional conference; reject the CSSTA 
in lieu of a monitoring mechanism for cross-strait agreements; pass a monitoring 
mechanism for Cross-Strait Agreements in the current legislative session; and for 
legislators from both parties to address the people’s demands (CALD, 2014). 
Thus, while big local business groups support unconditional economic engage-
ment, the grassroots civil societies insist on the maintenance of regulatory condi-
tions for facilitating cross-strait relations. The conflicts between these two 
segments of the population further side-tracks the respective policy strategies of 
Taiwanese political parties with respect to issues surrounding Taiwan’s quasi-
sovereign statehood.
Atmosphere in the Multilateral Environment
The World Trade Organization (WTO), unlike any other existing international 
institutions, does not require potential members to be sovereign states to gain 
accession. This unique constitutional feature of the organization has enabled some 
type of ‘cross-strait co-existence’ between the ROC and the PRC within the same 
multilateral space where both parties act as co-equals or parallel members (Bush, 
2011; Charnovitz, 2006; Cho, 2005; Hsieh, 2005; C.W. Huang, 2009). Hence, 
while Taipei’s WTO accession cannot be regarded as a bilateral accord with 
Beijing, nonetheless, it helps in facilitating some semblance of rule of law between 
the two parties. In addition, it allows the Taiwanese government to stand in an 
international tribunal thru the organization’s Dispute Settlement Understanding 
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(DSU) when disagreements over WTO rules and procedures with other members 
arise (Charnovitz, 2006; Hsieh, 2005). As pompously stated in the 2001 MAC 
report (cited in Cho, 2005, p. 743):
Taiwan and mainland China will be two independent, parallel, and equal members. The 
WTO mechanism offers the two sides a new channel for communication, dialogue, and 
consultation. The two do not have to set any preconditions or prerequisites. They can 
conduct dialogue and consultation on mutually concerned issues based on the WTO 
rules and framework.
However, questions remain as to whether or not China intends to acknowledge 
Taiwan’s co-equal status within the WTO given its claim of legitimate authority 
over the island, along with its long-term goal of reintegrating it with the Mainland. 
From the Chinese perspective, Taiwan remains a province of China with or with-
out peaceful unification (Clark & Tan, 2012; Lee, 2010; Zhao & Liu, 2010). As 
such, Beijing promotes a WTO framework with ‘One-China gestures’ by rejecting 
anything that connotes the presence of two Chinas (Cho, 2005, p. 751). Such ges-
tures are intended to cast off any political implications that might arise from 
China’s compliance with the WTO rules in relation to Taiwan at the global level. 
In addition, it aims to emphasize that adherence to these multilateral agreements 
does not, in any way, nullify Beijing’s One-China principle. In short, these One-
China gestures aim ‘to tell the world that interactions with Taiwan are not interna-
tional affairs but internal matters’ (Cho, 2005, p. 752).
A concrete example is the ‘nomenclature war’ launched by China against 
Taiwan as a subtle form of protest over their parallel status in the WTO. For 
instance, China uses the name ‘Chinese Taipei’ instead of TPKM to refer to 
Taiwan in the WTO and insisted that all members must follow the same 
(Charnovitz, 2006; Cho, 2005). It did not hesitate from calling the attention of 
representatives from other states that made the ‘mistake’ of calling the island, 
‘Taiwan’ during formal and informal sessions (Charnovitz, 2006; Cho, 2005). 
Moreover, China prefers to use the Chinese language when preparing official 
WTO documents involving Taiwan and rejects documents that bear the name of 
‘Republic of China’ (Cho, 2005). Such gestures are meant to send the message 
that the island is part of China’s separate customs territories similar to Hong Kong 
and Macao (Charnovitz, 2006; Cho, 2005). Hence, from the Chinese standpoint, 
WTO dialogues between Beijing and Taipei are domestic concerns of a single 
country with several subsidiaries.
In July 2005, however, China has formally accepted Taiwan’s TPKM title but 
demanded the cancellation of diplomatic titles given to some members of the 
Taiwanese Mission (cited in Charnovitz, 2006, p. 417). The WTO Secretariat 
granted the appeal and removed these titles from the updated version of its 
Members Directory, thus provoking Taipei officials to accuse the organization 
of ‘throwing away its neutrality under pressure from China’ (Bishop, 2005). 
At  present, only the top two officials of Taiwan’s Permanent Mission to the 
WTO are identified by their respective titles, while all lower-ranking representa-
tives only have their names and areas of expertise listed (Charnovitz, 2006; 
Cho, 2005).
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These nomenclature discriminations and One-China gestures towards Taiwan 
are intended to challenge the legitimacy of government’s equal standing in the 
WTO (Charnovitz, 2006; Cho, 2005). As far as Beijing is concerned, Taiwan’s 
WTO accession is solely based on its status as one of China’s separate customs 
and territories. Hence, it cannot and should not have a legal standing of its own 
within the said institution. Through these projections, Beijing is able to effectively 
portray its relations with Taipei as a local affair between the Mainland and one of 
its customs territories. China’s rejection of Taiwan’s independent legal status at 
the WTO explains its continuous refusal to conduct bilateral dialogues concerning 
cross-strait issues at the multilateral level.
Such an atmosphere in the WTO—the only multilateral institution that Taiwan 
has successfully acceded to thus far—severely undercuts the capacity of Taiwanese 
leaders and policymakers from either side of the political spectrum, to break free 
from China’s sinicization project. Indeed, the biggest delaying factors in Taiwan’s 
accession to the WTO that took 12 years were politically charged. On the one 
hand, were issues relating to its contested sovereignty, and on the other, were con-
cerns relating to its volatile relations with China (Hsieh, 2005; C.W. Huang, 2009). 
When China renegotiated its WTO membership with the US after its temporary 
withdrawal following the Tiananmen Square incidence in 1989, the two parties 
agreed that Beijing would not block Taipei’s accession (C.W. Huang, 2009; Liang, 
2002). In exchange, it was also agreed that China would be granted membership 
prior to Taiwan. Thus, aside from the domestic factors that constrain Taiwan’s 
march towards full independence are international conditions that seem to militate 
against such goal. In the end, Taiwan still remains trapped within the sinicization 
trajectory amid the omnipresent China factor.
Concluding Remarks
The entanglements between Taiwan and China’s national security interests, on the 
one hand; and free trade objectives, on the other, are coercing Taipei officials and 
policymakers to preserve the prevailing cross-strait status quo. In attempts to 
enhance their political appeals during national elections, the major political par-
ties in Taiwan are being compelled to ‘cooperate’ with each other by promoting 
pro-status quo policies. This leads to the progressive homogenization of their 
respective policy postures towards independence, that is, the freezing of Taiwanese 
de jure sovereignty. The result is Taiwan’s continued ‘imprisonment’ within the 
PRC-configured One-China trajectory.
Taiwan’s decision to either accelerate or decelerate the pace of cross-strait eco-
nomic interdependence depends on the level of security threat being induced by 
China. Success rests on the degree of importance that China places on cross-strait 
economic relations, on the one hand, and Taiwan’s resolves to terminate the agree-
ments when desired policy changes with respect to cross-strait politics do not 
materialize, on the other. However, the Taiwanese government’s efforts at secur-
ing its sovereign space through economic engagements are thwarted by its lack of 
political freedom, if not, the will to cancel payoffs even when Beijing’s behaviour 
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continues to violate prior conditions made. It would appear, therefore, that a con-
sensus for adopting a moderate approach to achieve nationalist agendas between 
Taiwan’s two major parties has been reached. While general sentiments towards 
each other may be as capricious as the Taiwan–China relation itself, nonetheless, 
both parties have been consistent in applying the norm of moderation in managing 
cross-strait affairs.
Consequently, both pro-China and anti-China political factions are being 
restrained from adopting and implementing policies that have the potential to 
destabilize the ‘normal’ conduct of cross-strait relations. While a highly China-
centric policy is condemned by citizens opposed to political unification with the 
Mainland, however, an extremely nationalistic policy is rebuked by sectors that 
see opportunities from healthy economic relations with Beijing. Such dilemma 
naturally leads to calls for ‘normalization’ of cross-strait relations. In the end, 
Taiwan is trapped in what appears to be a perpetual prisoner’s dilemma induced 
and preserved by the omnipresent China factor.
Notes
 1. For further discussion on the prisoner’s dilemma, see Kreps, Wilson, Milgrom and 
Roberts (1982), Milgrom (1984), Poundstone (1992) and Rapoport and Chammah 
(1965).
 2. Sinicization or Chinalization in this context refers to the policies of acculturation, 
assimilation or cultural imperialism of neighbouring cultures, specifically Taiwan, to 
China.
 3. Based on the author’s interview with a Deputy Director at Taiwan’s WTO and RTA 
Center on 17 April 2013 in Taipei, Taiwan.
 4. Based on the author’s interview with an Associate Research Fellow at CIER on 19 April 
2013 in Taipei, Taiwan.
 5. Based on the author’s interview with a Director at DPP on 11 April 2013 in Taipei, 
Taiwan.
 6. Based on the author’s interview with a Deputy Director at Taiwan’s WTO and RTA 
Center on 17 April 2013 in Taipei, Taiwan.
 7. Ibid.
 8. Based on the author’s interview with an Associate Research Fellow at CIER on 19 April 
2013 in Taipei, Taiwan.
 9. Ibid.
10. Ibid.
11. On 10 July 2013, a few months after the interviews were conducted, Taiwan signed 
a bilateral FTA with New Zealand. The Agreement between New Zealand and the 
Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu on Economic 
Cooperation (ANZTEC) is Taiwan’s first free trade pact with a non-diplomatic ally. 
This was immediately followed by the Agreement between Singapore and the Separate 
Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu on Economic Partnership 
(ASTEP), signed on 7 November 2013. It must be noted that these two bilateral 
trade agreements were signed after 2010, and therefore are outside the study’s scope. 
Nevertheless, their implications on Taiwan’s security and trade linkages will be briefly 
discussed in the succeeding sections.
12. Based on the author’s interview with an Associate Research Fellow at CIER on 19 April 
2013 in Taipei, Taiwan.
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13. Based on the author’s interview with a Director at DPP on 11 April 2013 in Taipei, 
Taiwan.
14. Based on the author’s interview with a Deputy Director at Taiwan’s WTO and RTA 
Center on 17 April 2013 in Taipei, Taiwan.
15. Based on the author’s interview with a Deputy Director at Taiwan’s WTO and RTA 
Center on 17 April 2013 in Taipei, Taiwan.
16. Based on the author’s interview with an Associate Research Fellow at CIER on 19 April 
2013 in Taipei, Taiwan.
17. Based on the author’s interview with an Associate Research Fellow at CIER on 19 April 
2013 in Taipei, Taiwan.
18. Based on the author’s interview with a Director at DPP on 11 April 2013 in Taipei, 
Taiwan.
19. Based on the author’s interview with a Director at DPP on 11 April 2013 in Taipei, 
Taiwan.
20. For further discussions on the commercial liberal argument, see Mansfield and Pollins 
(2003) and Polachek (1980). For the anti-commercial liberal arguments, see Ripsman 
and Blanchard (1996/1997, 2003).
21. For a more in-depth analysis on great power politics, see Mearsheimer (2001).
22. For more information on former President Chen’s leadership, see Clark and Tan (2010, 
2012), Hsieh (2011), Lee (2010), Muyard (2012), Rigger (2010) and Wang et al. (2010).
23. For further discussion on conditional and unconditional engagements, see Drezner 
(1999/2000) and Kahler and Kastner (2006). For tactical and substantive linkages, see 
Aggarwal and Govella (2013); and for tactical and structural linkages, see Mastanduno 
(1992).
24. For a detailed discussion on three cross-strait direct links, see Chen (2012), Chow 
(2012), Clark and Tan (2012), Dittmer (2012), J.Y. Huang (2012), Muyard (2012), 
Wang et al. (2010), N. Wu (2012) and Zhao and Liu (2010).
25. For a more detailed discussion on economic interdependence between democratic states 
and its impact on liberal peace, see Clark and Tan (2012), Gelpi and Grieco (2003), Lee 
(2010), Mansfield (1994), Oneal and Russett (1997), Papayanou (1999) and Pollins (1989).
26. For more in-depth analysis on Taiwanese identity politics, see Chow (2012), Lee 
(2010) and Zhao and Liu (2010).
27. For more information about the protest against the CSSTA, see Democratic Progressive 
Party (2014).
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Abstract: This article attempts to explore and analyse the evidence for cohabiting the human
security concept into the national security frameworks of ASEAN countries. Using the Philippines
and Malaysia as case studies, the article determines the extent to which public officials and
policymakers have redefined and reenvisioned national security by incorporating non-traditional,
people-centered elements of human security. The word 'cohabitation' refers to national govern-
ments' efforts to amalgamate statist and humanist dimensions of security when articulating and
implementing  their  national  security  rhetoric  and  agenda.  It  argues  that  human  security
naturally complements state security, and vice versa. As such, human security and state security
co-exist in a constructive manner that enhances the overall level of national security. In other
words, they are mutually constitutive rather than mutually corrosive. Both cases underscore a
two-pronged assumption. First, the meaning and provision of national security can neither be
eloquently articulated nor completely substantiated without considerations for 'below the state'
actors and issues. And second, the eminent status vis-à-vis power of the state in providing
national security can neither be trivialized nor undermined.
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1. Introduction
Twenty  years  after  the  official  debut  of  human
security in academic and policymaking circles in 1994,
the  concept  continues  to  be  a  source  of  important
debates directed at the progressive re-imagination of
national  security.  In  Southeast  Asia,  however,  the
concept has had very limited influence in the govern-
ments' formulation  and  implementation  of  their
respective national security rhetoric and agenda [1–3].
This  is  largely  due to the conflicting  views on what
should be considered as a threat  between the state
and various non-state actors within these societies. At
the heart of this conflict between statist and humanist
advocates  of  national  security  is  the  shared  belief
among Southeast Asian leaders in the ASEAN Way [1–3].
© 2014 by the authors; licensee Librello, Switzerland. This open access article was published 
under a Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/).
For the region's top officials, the ASEAN Way is deemed
the most appropriate style of diplomacy as it underlines
the value of traditional notions of sovereignty and non-
interference  in  conducting  interstate  relations  [4].
While the Western method of diplomacy is driven by
binding agreements through the adoption of legalistic
procedures  and  formalistic  solutions,  the  ASEAN
approach  operates  through  non-binding,  invisible
ground rules of informality,  inclusivity  and consensus
[4].  Different  labels  have  been  used  by  various
observers  to  describe  the  ASEAN  Way  such  as
'organizational  minimalism',  'soft  regionalism',  'soft
dialogue',  and  'thin  institutionalism' ([4]  pp.  14–27).
Such  a  preference  for  'sports  shirt  diplomacy' over
'business  shirt  diplomacy' has  naturally  limited  the
practical  application  of  human  security  in  rethinking
national security in the Southeast Asia ([4] pp. 14–27).
Against  this  backdrop,  this  article attempts  to
explore the evidence for the  'cohabitation' of human
security  concept  within  the  national  security  frame-
work of ASEAN countries in the twenty-first century. It
specifically  examines  the  Philippines  and  Malaysia's
experiences with cohabiting state-centric and people-
centered  dimensions  of  national  security.  The  word
cohabitation  in  this  context  refers  to  the  national
government's  attempt  at  amalgamating  statist  and
humanist elements of security when articulating and
executing its national security policies. The goal is to
determine  the  extent  to  which  policymakers  have
defined  national  security  based  on the  cohabitation
between  state-centric  and  people-centered  dimen-
sions of national security. Cohabitative security, there-
fore,  refers to the approach being employed by the
Philippine  and  Malaysian  governments  in  cohabiting
human  security  into  their  national  security  frame-
works.
The  article argues  that  human  security  naturally
complements state security, and vice versa. As such,
human  security  and  state  security  co-exist  in  a
constructive manner that enhances the overall level of
national security. On the one hand, state security does
not automatically negate human security nor compete
with individuals and communities; on the other, human
security does not necessarily threaten state security nor
compete against state actors and agencies. The reason
for this is that human security and state security are
mutually  constitutive  rather  than  mutually  corrosive.
This  is  particularly  relevant  in  the  context  of  the
increasing,  albeit  gradual,  recognition  among  ASEAN
governments that  human security  is  an essential  di-
mension  and  necessary  precondition  for  national
stability and security. Such a scenario implies that the
divisive dichotomy between these two security dimen-
sions  is  hardly  insurmountable.  Ironically,  it  is  the
insecurity  felt  by  individuals  and  states,  rather  than
security  that  is  transforming  ASEAN's  traditional
normative terrain into a region cognisant of the value
of  cohabiting  humanist  and  statist  components  of
national security.
Moreover,  by  examining  governments' efforts
toward cohabitative  security,  the  article argues  that
the  inherent  bias  against  states  can  be  mitigated,
enabling  mutual  trust  to  develop  between  the  arti-
ficially divided state and non-state agents of national
security. It highlights the areas where states, even if
only to some extent, have practically contributed to
the advancement of the human security agenda. This
is  not  to  defend  or  legitimize  the  shortcomings  of
states with respect to human security, but rather, to
reopen  the  channel  through  which  productive  dia-
logues  between  governments  and  citizens  can  take
place.  The  notion  of  cohabitative  security  does  not
provide a panacea to long-standing conceptual prob-
lems  of  national  security.  Nevertheless,  it  offers  an
alternative tool for reassessing governments' successes
and failures in terms of incorporating individuals and
societies in their respective national security discourses.
In advancing these arguments, the article examines
the  Philippines  and  Malaysia's  experiences  with
cohabitative  security  and  attempts  to  answer  the
following questions. First, who or what is the primary
referent  object  in  the  Philippines  and  Malaysia's
twenty-first  century  national  rhetoric  and  agenda?
Second, what are the main issues that threaten these
primary security referent objects? And third, how do
the Philippine and Malaysian governments, both past
and present, address these threats? Have they been
successful? Why or why not?
The article is divided into four sections. Section two
examines the current composition of the Philippines'
national  security  framework  by  identifying  its  main
components  and  analyzing  the  most  critical  issues
that  threaten  its  primary  security  referent  object—
development  space.  It  argues  that  against  the
backdrop  of  structural  poverty  and  institutionalized
inequality generated by a deeply-entrenched oligarchic
system, the main referent object of Philippine national
security  is  its  diminishing  development  space.
Development space refers specifically to the capacity of
the  Philippine  government  to  independently  and
effectively pursue its economic development goals and
objectives  against  these  constraints.  It  analyses  the
limits  to  the  Philippines' development-based  national
security  framework,  which  in  turn,  undermine  the
effectiveness  of  the  country's  cohabitative  national
security, namely: (i) limits to democratization; and (ii)
limits to Human Security Act (HSA).
Section  three  examines  the  present  condition  of
Malaysia's national security framework by identifying
its main components and analyzing the most critical
issues  that  threaten  its  primary  security  referent
object—diversity  space.  It  argues  that  against  the
backdrop  of  a  Bumiputra-centric  political  economy,
developed and controlled by the UMNO-driven Barisan
Nasional,  the main referent object  of  Malaysian na-
tional security is its shrinking diversity space. Diversity
space specifically  refers  to the capacity  of  all  ethnic
groups in Malaysia to participate freely in the country's
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political and economic affairs against these constraints.
It  analyses  the  limits  to  Malaysia's  diversity-based
national security framework, which in turn, undermine
the effectiveness of the country's cohabitative national
security,  namely:  (i)  limits  to  ideational  security
apparatuses;  and  (ii)  limits  to  material  security
apparatuses.  The  Philippines  and  Malaysia's  primary
security  referent  objects—development  space  and
diversity space—represent the non-traditional, people-
centred  dimension  of  security  as  opposed  to  its
traditional, state-centric dimension.
Finally,  section  four  summarizes  the  main  argu-
ments  presented  based  on  the  analysis  of  two
empirical case studies. It concludes that despite the
limitations  of  the  Philippine  and  Malaysian  govern-
ments in fully  cohabiting the concept of human se-
curity  into  their  respective  national  security  frame-
works, nonetheless, both countries have illustrated a
concrete way of giving entitlement to non-traditional,
people-centered  elements  of  security  as  legitimate
referent  objects  of  national  security.  Both  cases
underscore  a  two-pronged  hypothesis:  (i)  that  the
meaning and provision of national security can neither
be eloquently articulated nor completely substantiated
without considerations for 'below the state' actors and
issues; and (ii)that the eminent status of the state in
terms  of  power  in  providing  national  security  can
neither  be  trivialized  nor  undermined.  Therefore,
rather than downplaying a state-centric concept while
highlighting a people-centred model, cohabitative se-
curity  amalgamates  statist  and  humanist  views  of
national  security.  This  is  one  way  of  resolving  the
'entitled state/untitled human' dilemma in which the
state  is  typically  depicted  as  an  antagonistic  force
impeding the pursuit of human security.
2. Cohabiting Human Security into the 
Philippine's National Security Framework
2.1. The Philippines' 'Cohabitative' National Security
The  Philippines' 2011‒2016  National  Security  Policy
(hereafter, NSP) is a statement of principles designed
for the strategic pursuit  of the country's national in-
terest defined in terms sovereignty and territorial integ-
rity on the one hand, and people's well-being and insti-
tutions on the other [5]. Its primary objectives focus on
balancing  between  'guns  and  butter,' through  more
efficient  allocation of  the  country's  limited resources
and  effective  prioritization  of  internal  and  external
defense. It lays down a fairly comprehensive agenda
which  incorporates  nonmilitary  issues  and  threats
encroaching upon the boundaries of the state. In the
words of President Benigno Aquino III: 'our quest must
not only focus on ensuring the stability of the State and
the security of our nation...our ultimate goal must be
the safety and well-being of our people' ([5] p. 1).
This  holistic  approach to national  security  under-
scores the need to rethink traditional security which
made paramount the military protection of the state
from  external  threats  while  disregarding  issues
generating human insecurities. It is part and parcel of
the larger security sector transformation (SST) which
represents a paradigm shift in security governance by
acknowledging  the  blurring  between  internal  and
external threats  [6].  The main thrust  of  the NSP is
anchored  in  Aquino  III's  'social  contract' with  the
Filipinos,  emphasizing  commitments  to  transfor-
mational  leadership  through  empowerment  of  the
people  and  opportunities  to  enable  the  people  to
escape from the shackles of poverty ([5] p. 6). Aside
from  its  customary  role  in  fortifying  the  country's
juridical  borders,  the  NSP also aims to  cultivate an
environment conducive to human development, that
is, a development-based NSP agenda. Thus, it brings
together  under  one  cohesive  policy  agenda  a  wide
range of security issues, and balances these with its
national peace and development perspectives.
The country's desire to serving as a committed and
trustworthy member of the international community is,
to  a large extent,  driven by the emergence of non-
traditional  security  threats  transcending  national
borders  such  as  organized transnational  crimes,  ter-
rorism and weapons of mass destruction,  pandemics
and  infectious  diseases,  environmental  degradation,
and climate change to name a few [5]. In relation to
this,  the  country  also  acknowledges  the  significant
impact of globalization on its internal affairs. The NSP
document, therefore, promotes the objective of forging
strong  political  alliances  with  developed countries  to
further solidify its political presence in the international
arena, and secure its economic and defense require-
ments  [5].  The  government  believes  that  through
diplomatic engagements, nations will cooperate rather
than compete with each other [5].
In response to this changing security environment,
the  government  has  developed  a  national  security
model comprised of seven core elements that amplify
national  interests,  including:  socio-political  stability,
territorial  integrity,  economic  solidarity,  ecological
balance,  cultural  cohesiveness,  moral-spiritual  con-
sensus,  and  peace  and  harmony  ([5]  p.  3).  These
elements also take into consideration certain psycho-
social aspects of national security including the people's
customs and beliefs, as well as social characters and
norms  influencing  perception  of  government-initiated
policies  and  programmes  ([5]  p.  3).  Hence,  the
government is  very optimistic about the potential of
its twenty-first century NSP agenda for achieving not
only  national  peace  and  security,  but,  more  impor-
tantly, development and prosperity. Working under a
widely  popular  campaign  slogan  of  Daang  Matuwid
(the high road), Aquino III's NSP strongly emphasizes
the  country's  diminishing  development  space,  artic-
ulating  the  issue  as  a  national  security  threat  that
must be effectively secured ([5] p. 31):
"If the government is able to make good on the
promise of taking the high road, the 'Ang Daang
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Matuwid', then it must be sure that the people
are  afforded every  opportunity  to  pursue their
individual dreams of a better quality of life—all
under  the  consideration  of  national  security
where the welfare and well-being of the people
are of primordial consideration."
From the government's perspective, addressing the
country's  long-standing  problems  of  exacerbated
poverty, widening inequality, and other socio-political
maladies  engendered  by  limited  development  space
demands  complementary  policies  such  as  robust
public-private  partnerships  (PPP)  on  the  one  hand,
and  breaking  patronage politics  influencing  decision
making in government's programs and projects on the
other [5]. 
Despite  its  development-based  NSP  agenda,  the
government still  recognizes the importance of main-
taining  a  credible  external  defense  posture  since
globalization has not led to complete obsolescence of
war as an alternative tool for settling disputes when
diplomacy  fails.  Impaired  by  its  present  economic
status,  however,  the  country  is  struggling to  assert
and defend its  position in international  society.  The
government  usually  finds  itself  on  the  losing  end
when settling disputes with advanced countries, given
its  small  player  status  in  the  global  arena,  both
politically  and  economically.  The  debate  between
'guns and butter' has to be settled in favour of 'butter'
given  the  country's  scarce  resources.  After  all,  as
Aquino III has neatly put it,  'For Filipinos to feel this
renewed  sense  of  transformational  leadership,  they
must  also  see and feel  that  the  Government  is  for
them, with them and serving them' ([5] p. 31).
2.2.  Limits  to  the  Philippines'  Development-based
National Security
Clearly, the Philippine government recognizes economic
underdevelopment  as  a  critical  threat  to  national
security.  The  important  question  that  needs  to  be
examined,  however,  is  whether  it  is  genuinely  con-
cerned about addressing the country's economic plight
or is only paying lip service to the electorally-popular
idea of people-centered national security. Despite the
government's  grand  pronouncements  about  pursing
equitable economic development to enhance national
security,  however,  its  security  blueprint  faces  two
limitations  that  put  enormous  challenge  to  such
intention: (i) limits to democratization; and (ii) limits to
human security act. The following subsections discuss
these  limits,  which  help  explain  the  country's  con-
tinuously  shrinking  diversity  space,  and  subsequent
failure  to fully  embed  the  notion  of  human security
(defined in terms of economic security) into its national
security framework.
2.2.1. Limits to Democratization
Based  on  historical  analysis  of  politico-economic
developments in the Philippines, the decision of the
American colonial regime to transplant its own brand
of  representative  democracy  over  an  economic  ar-
rangement  ruled  by  landed  oligarchs  enabled  the
latter to seize authoritative control over what should
have been  'democratic' policymaking procedures and
institutions [7].  Oligarchs in  this  context  are  'actors
who command and control massive concentrations of
material resources that can be deployed to defend or
enhance  their  personal  wealth  and  exclusive  social
position' ([8] p. 6). Accordingly, an oligarch's ultimate
goal  'is  to  secure,  maintain,  and  retain  his  or  her
position  of  extreme  wealth  and  power  against  all
manner  of  threats' ([8]  p.  6).  In  Aristotle's  formu-
lation, democracy is defined as the rule by the poor
majority, whereas oligarchy is the rule of the wealthy
few  [8].  However,  democracy  and  oligarchy  'can
coexist indefinitely as long as the unpropertied lower
classes  do  not  use  their  expanded  political  partic-
ipation  to  encroach  upon  the  material  power  and
prerogatives of the wealthiest' ([8] p. 11).  In other
words, the two systems are compatible for as long as
the  two  realms  of  power  do  not  clash.  So  while
oligarchy  'rests  on  the  concentration  of  material
power',  democracy  'rests  on  the  dispersion  of  non-
material power' ([8] p. 11).
In the case of the Philippines, US officials left aside
policies  that  could  have  transformed  its  political
system into a more level playing field. The country's
domestic political space was insulated from revisionist
agendas espoused by various social factions springing
from a  broad  base  of  political  capital  [7].  In  stark
contrast  to  the  Philippine  experience,  the  Japanese
consciously  shut  down the elite's  access to political
power when they took  over  Korea,  creating  a  very
different political climate for the latter state [9]. The
Philippines' government's  capacity  for  independent
action, therefore, is effectively curtailed by oligarchic
groups attempting to amass public power to preserve
vested  interests  [10‒12].  Further,  the  'redemoc-
ratization' process that  took place immediately after
the  collapse  of  Ferdinand  Marcos' dictatorship  only
resulted in the reinstallation of the pre-Marcos political
order.  This  led to  the  re-emergence of  elite  ascen-
dancy over domestic economy—the sine qua non for
Philippine  economic  underdevelopment  ([7]  p.  49).
Despite the introduction of  various democratic insti-
tutional  reforms,  oligarchic  forces  are  still  able  to
manipulate  and  saturate  the  bureaucracy,  impairing
Philippine polity. 
The  question  therefore  is,  why  and  how  does
oligarchic power overcome state power? Throughout
Philippine  history,  several  influential  families  owning
huge corporations and vast lands have ruled over the
bureaucracy, exploiting the country's public goods and
resources  that  continue to fuel  institutionalized cor-
ruption. Several infamous terms such as  'anarchy of
families',  'booty capitalism', and  'cacique democracy'
([7] p. 50) have been used to describe the country's
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pitiful  politico-economic  construct.  The  conspicuous
incapacity of the government to 'immunize' itself from
oligarch  manipulation  has  been  at  the  crux  of
economic  underdevelopment  [13‒15].  This  unique
political  climate enables the  'top 5.5 % landowning
clans to own 44% of arable land and as few as 100
families  control  all  electoral  positions  on  a  national
level' ([16] p. 13). It is a side-effect of the strategy
employed  by  the  US  regime  to  consolidate  power
throughout the archipelago that the landed elite were
allowed to further  expand their  economic power by
means political appointments [7].
When put together, Filipinos' distinctive concepts of
family and land give rise to the so-called 'patron-client
relationships' which can be used to explain Philippine
political  economy  [17‒18].  The  patronage  system
which  emphasizes  the  Filipino  culture  of  'giving  for
gratitude' and 'labour for loyalty' explains the existence
of an omnipotent elite dominating the country's econ-
omy  cum  politics  [19].  In  this  scenario,  both  the
peasants' and  the  labourers' interests  feed  into  the
landlords' preferences through material and/or personal
transactions via colloquial networks [20]. 
Hence,  when  the  US  colonial  regime  decided  to
establish political offices for electoral contest, the elite
clans consolidated their power in order to give birth to
national  oligarchy instead of  a  national  government
(Anderson  1998).  With  this  newfound  power,  the
ruling elite are now in the position to thwart policies
that  favour  both  enemies  and  competitors.  This
system of politicking gave rise to what the Filipinos
call,  trapos  or  'dirty' traditional  politicians  [21‒23].
These  trapos  are  responsible  for  the  presence  of
'reverse accountability' in Philippine politics by holding
individual  voters  accountable  for  electing  their  re-
spective  patrons  to  power  in  exchange  for  favours
provided  in  the  past  or  those  promised  once  said
politician elected ([7] p. 55). The provision of favours,
however, does not always translate to actual votes. In
such  cases,  intimidation  and  aggression  are  often
employed by political players owning private armies to
ensure the delivery of paid votes [24]. The alternate
use of  benefits  and  violence for  preserving political
power  and  control  essentially  transforms  traditional
political aristocracy into some type of warlords [25].
In can be inferred, therefore, that the voters' support
for their  patrons is  largely a function of the latter's
'own interests,  rewards  for  loyalty,  and the  fear  of
vengeance' ([26] p. 260).
The nature of Philippine political-economy is referred
to  as  a  neo-patrimonial  system [10]. A  patrimonial
state  that  allows  oligarch  relations  and interests  to
dominate  bureaucratic  systems  creates  a  hunting
ground for the unrestricted accumulation of personal
wealth  [27].  Since  the  rent-seekers  emerging  from
this bureaucratic capitalist system are able to control
formal  state  structures  from  the  outside,  the  term
becomes  'neo-patrimonial' or  'booty capitalism' ([10]
pp. 18‒21).
The overwhelming oligarchic  influence has signif-
icantly  contributed  to  the  deterioration of  economic
development  in  the  Philippines  since  gaining  inde-
pendence from the United States in 1946 [28]. Even
the implementations  of  disastrous economic  policies
advanced by top government officials were eventually
manipulated  to  protect  the  interests  of  Filipino
oligarchs.  Philippine underdevelopment,  therefore,  is
not  just a matter of  constantly  choosing the wrong
policies, but rather the result of conscious efforts by
rent-seekers  to  maintain  them  for  the  continuous
exploitation of state mechanisms and resources.
A perfect illustration of  a  'wrong' policy selection
was  the  espousal  of  import  substitution  indus-
trialization  (ISI)  as  the  country's  primary  trade
strategy after  its  official  independence  from the US
[29‒30].  In  contrast  to  East  Asian  countries  that
launched an export-oriented strategy leading to annual
per capita GDP growth of 6%, the Philippines chose to
implement  ISI  and  became  the  worst  performing
economy in the Eastern half [31]. While the promotion
of ISI may indeed have been an honest mistake on
the part  of  Filipino technocrats,  the oligarchs' indif-
ference toward the correction of this mistake never-
theless underlined the unintended benefits it created
with  respect  to  the  their  interests.  Despite  the
exacerbated balance of trade and payments problems
created by ISI, this policy was maintained not for its
effectiveness in resolving the crisis but for its role in
opening a wider space for  'oligarch predation' ([7] p.
57).  This  confounding  relationship  between  local
oligarchs and the Philippine government is often re-
ferred to as 'rent capitalism' wherein rents are created
by the latter to provide the former with a synthetic
advantage by imposing restrictions on the free flow of
foreign goods and services into the market [32].
U.S. Governor-general William Howard Taft's 'policy
of  attraction'—originally  designed  to  entice  the
landlord class  into  collaboration  with the  Americans
rather  than  pursuing  revolutionary  struggles—trans-
formed the economic elite of the Spanish-colonial era
into a political-economic elite that continues to dom-
inate domestic politics today ([33] p. 142). And since
representative institutions had already emerged prior
to the development of a strong republic, patronage-
infested political parties had single-handedly squashed
government  reforms  that  threatened  to  curb  their
power. In the Philippine context, political parties are
'convenient vehicles of patronage that can be set up,
merged with others, split, reconstituted, regurgitated,
resurrected,  renamed,  repackaged,  recycled,  refur-
bished, buffed up or flushed down the toilet anytime'
([34] pp. 4‒5). This resulted to further marginalization
of  the  masses  who  were  unable  to  challenge  the
deeply-entrenched national oligarchy.
The palpable failure of American colonial regime to
renovate the foundations of domestic political power
vis-à-vis  the  imposition  of  its  own  brand  of  repre-
sentative  democracy  on  top  of  an  unjust  economic
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edifice, created an environment conducive to oligarch
predation by exploiting state institutions and manip-
ulating economic policy formulation [7]. The Philippine
government  has  continued  to  operate  within  this
context from one administration to another since the
country's formal independence. Therefore, implanting
a new constitutional framework that replicated a pre-
Martial  Law  system  within  a  relatively  unchanged
economic arrangement would be futile and counter-
intuitive to the prospect of change. In short, neither
regime  change  nor  democratization  helped  in  miti-
gating  the  oligarch's  influence  over  state  affairs,
particularly  in  decisions  involving  the  national  eco-
nomy.  As  a  consequence,  a  strongly  developed
Philippine republic is yet to emerge [7].
2.2.2. Limits to Human Security Act
The  post-1986  People  Power  Revolution  paved  the
way for rethinking national security as the security of
the people. The perceived divide between people and
state  is  artificial  as  they both  comprise  the nation-
state  [35].  Although  the  government  is  gradually
progressing toward the integration of human security
in its formulation of national security, the environment
within  which  such  policy  amendments  are  being
configured remains largely unstable and multifaceted.
Advancements made toward a humanist view of secu-
rity strategy are in danger  of  being undermined by
institutional mechanisms with inadequate capacity to
effectively  combat  contemporary  security  problems.
And  while  Filipino  policymakers  acknowledge  the
severity of  nontraditional  threats trespassing on the
country's supposedly sovereign boundaries, the term
human  security  is  still  nowhere  to  be  found  in  its
official NSP document. This implies that the normative
foundations  of  human  security  are  not  consistently
implanted  when  designing  a  definitive  NSP  agenda
despite  references  being  made  regarding  the  pro-
tection of grassroots civil societies [35].
A good example supporting this  argument is  the
passage of the Human Security Act of the Philippines
or the Republic Act No. 9372 in February 2007. This
Act defined human security as an  'act to secure the
state  and  our  people  from  terrorism' defined  as
'sowing  and  creating  conditions  of  widespread  and
extraordinary fear and panic among the populace, in
order to coerce the government to give in to an un-
lawful  demand' [36]. In short,  the country's HSA is
both too narrow and too broad at the same time. On
the one hand,  it  frames human security  within  the
narrow  context  of  terrorism  which  contradicts  the
government's holistic approach to national security, as
well  as  the UNDP's  comprehensive  interpretation  of
human security [37]. On the other hand, it precludes
the fundamental aspects of a terrorist act in favour of
broad and vague expressions such as 'widespread and
extraordinary fear and panic among the populace' or
'unlawful demand' which also run in contrast to the
definition  proposed by the UN High Level  Panel  on
Threats, Challenges and Change [38].
While  the  official  discourse  of  HSA  highlights  its
importance  for  giving  the  government's  all-out  war
against  terror  legal  teeth  by  complementing  AFP's
strategic  operations,  however,  law  enforcement
agencies  seem to  be  uncomfortable  with  its  imple-
mentation  [39].  Such  contradiction  underlies  reser-
vations toward the Act,  given its  use  of  misleading
semantics.  Moreover,  human  rights  groups  have
strongly opposed the legislation of the HSA arguing
that it constitutes the building blocks of martial law.
The rights that are at risk of being violated include
freedom  of  expression,  association,  speech,  move-
ment, and due process, among others [40]. The ac-
countability of  the Anti-Terrorism Council  for  human
rights  violations  while  carrying  out  its  mandate  of
fighting against terrorism is not specifically addressed
in the said Act, blurring the line between Judiciary and
Executive roles [40].
Supporters of the anti-terrorism legislation, on the
other  hand,  point  to  Section  2  of  the  Act  which
highlights  the  safeguard  mechanisms  for  protecting
human  rights  by  upholding  basic  rights  and  funda-
mental liberties as enshrined in the Constitution. They
argue that  the HSA is  crucial  for  strengthening  the
country's democratic ideals  since  'unlike the secrecy
surrounding the pre-HSA extrajudicial killings, the new
law makes the prosecution of terrorists a transparent
matter  that  proceeds  under  the  supervision  of  the
Philippine judiciary' ([41] pp. 215‒216). Despite such
contextualization,  the  inefficiencies  of  the  country's
criminal  justice  system  have  not  been  properly
addressed [42]. Understandably, several international
organizations,  most  notably the International  Feder-
ation for Human Rights and Human Rights Watch, are
sceptical about the effectiveness of these safeguards,
given the government's bad record for policy imple-
mentation, and they argue that what the Philippines
really  needs  is  not  a  new  and  dangerously  broad
counterterrorism law,  but  better  efforts  to  make its
current justice system work [43].
This age-old dichotomy between the ineffectiveness
of  the  law  and  the  inefficiency  of  the  system  is
underlined  in  the  report  published  by  the  National
Council of Churches in the Philippines, which asked,
'How  can  the  State—which  stands  criticized  for
tolerating, if not authorizing the gross and systematic
violations of human rights—guarantee that, in imple-
menting the HSA, the people's civil and political rights
are not trampled upon' ([40] pp. 168‒169)? As such,
various  segments  of  civil  society  including  the  aca-
demia and NGOs share the view that  RA9372 is  in
violation of the Philippine Constitution by purporting
information designed to mislead the people [40].
Overall,  these two limits have significantly under-
mined  the  Philippine  government's  efforts  at
effectively  cohabiting  human  security  (defined  in
terms of economic security) into its national security
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framework. At the root of this insecurity is a deeply-
entrenched patronage system controlled by powerful
Filipino  oligarchy.  The  pervasiveness  of  this  politico-
economic arrangement has resulted to structural pov-
erty and institutionalized inequality that undermines the
Philippines' supposedly people-centred national security
model.  Neoliberal  economic  policies  intended  to  im-
prove development have been cunningly exploited by
oligarchic  forces  to  their  uncontested  advantage.  By
systematically  obstructing  social-equalizing  measures
that  curtail  oligarchic  wealth,  'national' prosperity  is
permanently  entrapped within the elite strata of  the
society.  The omnipresence of neo-patrimonial culture
in the Philippines reinforces a 'bipolar' society wherein
a few families enjoy the abundance of wealth at the
expense of the majority. Despite the Philippines' co-
habitative  national  security  framework  underlining
equitable  and  inclusive  economic  development,  the
limits to democratization vis-à-vis its Human Security
Act, have significantly undermined this end goal.
3.  Cohabiting  Human Security  into  Malaysia's
National Security Framework
3.1. Malaysia's 'Cohabitave' National Security
Malaysia's national security rhetoric and agenda are a
reflection of the government's struggle to transform a
former British colonial territory into one cohesive and
united  nation.  Accordingly,  Malaysia  adopts  a  fairly
comprehensive approach in defining national security
by weaving together its military, political,  economic,
social,  cultural,  and  psychological  components  [44].
Several  material  and  ideational  factors  influence
Malaysia's conception of  national  security,  including:
geography  and  history;  multi-ethnic  identity  and
religious plurality; an aspiration for national unity and
integration;  and a  dream of  becoming a  developed
country and a model Islamic nation [45‒46].
As such, Malaysia's national security encompasses
both  internal  and  external  dimensions.  On  the  one
hand, the domestic security being derived from internal
peace,  law,  and  order  is  crucial  to  the  fulfilment  of
basic needs and demands of its pluralistic society [45‒
46].  The presence of  internal  stability and harmony
underpin Malaysia's  pursuit  of  national  development
and progress. Hence, the passage and enactment of
legislation considered draconian in some liberal dem-
ocratic states is deemed necessary by the Malaysian
government in  order to control  its  ethnically-diverse
population  [46‒48].  On  the  other  hand,  external
security focuses on wide-ranging transnational threats
engendered by regional  and global  events including
terrorism, maritime piracy, drug cartels, illegal migrant
workers, and human trafficking, to name a few [49‒
51]. Malaysia's pursuit of national security, therefore,
implies  the  notion  of  strategic  survival,  both  inside
and outside its sovereign boundaries.
The conception of Malaysian national security has
been  largely  inspired  by  the  Emergency  period
between the years 1948 and 1960 [45,52‒55]. This
period saw the Malayan forces, backed by their British
colonizers,  fight  against  the  Malayan  National  Lib-
eration Army (MNLA),  a  group of  Communist  insur-
gents who claimed to be promoting a new democratic
socialist Malaya [45,46,52]. In response, the coalition
launched its  'hearts and minds' campaign to weaken
the social appeal of Communist propaganda and earn
the  loyalty  of  those  sympathetic  to  them  [45,48,
52,56‒57]. This proved to be an effective component
of the coalition's anti-Communist strategy as it led to
the establishment  of  a  new constitution singed be-
tween  the  United  Malays  National  Organization
(UMNO) and the Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA)
in 1957 [45‒46]. It is worth noting that both signa-
tories are member parties of the ruling BN coalition.
The  new  constitution  recognizes  the  legality  of
special  preferences  and  privileged  positions  being
provided to the Malays [45,48,52‒58]. Islam has been
formally elected as the state religion, while Malay was
made as the country's official language. Moreover, the
new constitution has granted a fixed quota of posts in
the civil  service to Malays in addition to their guar-
anteed  traditional  land  rights.  In  exchange  for
accepting  these  terms  under  the  Constitution,  the
Chinese  have  been  offered  extended  rights  of
citizenship [45‒46,59]. As stated in Article 153 of the
Malaysian Constitution:
It  shall  be  the  responsibility  of  the  Yang  di-
Pertuan Agong (King of Malaysia)  to safeguard
the special position of the Malays and natives of
any of the States of Sabah and Sarawak and the
legitimate  interests  of  other  communities  in
accordance with the provisions of this Article [60].
Thus, the Constitution provides strong legal basis for
the  provision  of  exclusive  rights  and  privileges  to
Malays, locally known as the Bumiputras (literally, sons
of the soil) which are not extended to other ethnicities
thriving  in  Malaysia,  particularly  the  Chinese  and
Indian-Malaysians.  Notwithstanding  Malays'  continued
political supremacy and a considerably enhanced eco-
nomic  status,  Article  153 remains entrenched in  the
Constitution. The application of the Malaysian Consti-
tution legitimizes Malay interests even at the expense
of all other Malaysian ethnic groups.
The Emergency period served as a sine qua non for
legitimizing a national security framework that is both
operationally  despotic  and ideologically  centered  on
addressing  the  root  causes  of  threats.  Malaysia's
national security is essentially based on material and
ideational  constructs  designed  to  secure  its  ruling
dynastic coalition—the Barisan Nasional (BN)—rather
than the diversity space necessary for accommodating
the  political  and  economic  needs  of  its  multiethnic
population.  In fact,  the  BN defines  itself  as  a  con-
federation  of  political  parties  that  subscribe  to  the
objectives of the coalition, as opposed to the objec-
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tives of Malaysia's national interest [61]. 
Combining  ideological  constructs  with  a  coercive
apparatus  has  been  the  traditional  approach  to
developing  Malaysia's  national  security  rhetoric  and
agenda since the period of Emergency [46,52,54‒55,
62]. Such an approach is designed to secure the BN
by suppressing the growth of unorthodox ideas and
concepts,  while  justifying  the  supremacy  of  values
being cultivated by the ruling coalition. Together, coer-
cive and ideological instruments have played a crucial
role in Malaysia's national security, which made para-
mount the implicit protection of the Malay-dominated
coalition at the expense of its diversity space.
3.2.  Limits  to  Malaysia's  Diversity-based  National
Security 
In doing so, the UMNO-led BN coalition has vigilantly
upheld a paradoxical security framework propelled by
its  'hearts  and  minds'  slogan  exercised  through
coercive and repressive legislation [48, 62‒63]. Such a
paradox  presents  two  critical  limits  to  Malaysia's
diversity space that is pivotal to the country's cohab-
itative  national  security,  namely:  (i)  limits  to  ideo-
logical security apparatuses, and (ii) limits to material
security  apparatus.  The  interplay  between  these
factors substantially undermines the country's capacity
for  independently  formulating  and  executing  political
and economic policies vital to its national security. The
succeeding subsections discuss these limits which help
explain the country's continuously shrinking diversity
space, and therefore, its failure at fully embedding the
notion of human security (defined in terms of ethnic
security) within its national security framework.
3.2.1. Limits to the Ideological Security Apparatus
A  central  task  of  the  BN's  security  ideology  is  the
regulation  and  control  of  alternative  channels  for
discussing nonconforming opinions [48,62]. A variety
of  ideological  constructs  have  been put  in  place  to
legitimize the suppression of local political opponents
and critics,  thereby  protecting the prevailing  Malay-
dominated status quo. As Downs ([64] p. 96) argues,
these nonmaterial forces represent 'a verbal image of
the  good  society  and  of  the  chief  means  of  con-
structing such a society.' In other words, the govern-
ment  systematically  regulates  the  employment  of
ideologies to promote and preserve the security of the
BN  coalition,  pursued  under  the  pretext  of  safe-
guarding the constitutionality of specific Malay rights
and privileges that do not apply other ethnic groups.
The coalition's security ideologies serve a two-level
function:  first,  restricting  the  space  available  for
alternative ideas that question the BN; and second,
legitimizing  the  passage  and enactment  of  coercive
instruments vis-à-vis the coalition that exercises them
[48,63]. In doing so, they help in securing the pre-
eminent status of the coalition against threats coming
from various oppositional groups. The fluidity of ideas,
however,  implies  that  the  coalition's  security  ideo-
logies are neither permanent nor fixed but are con-
tingent on specific political and social contexts of the
time (48,  62].  Hence,  there  is  no  overarching  idea
that  dominates  Malaysia's  security  rhetoric.  Never-
theless, there is an underlying goal that binds these
security  ideologies  together,  that  is,  winning  the
hearts  and  minds  of  societal  actors  that  threaten
Malaysian  national  security  defined  in  terms  of  BN
security.
These coalition-enhancing ideational forces create a
'cloak  for  shabby  motives  and  appearances'  by
legitimizing and giving meaning to its conduct ([65] p.
314).  They  act  as  political  tools  for  securing  the
coalition's hegemony, rather than being mere reflec-
tions  of  the  country's  national  aspirations.  The
uncertainty and complexity of Malaysian politics in the
twenty-first  century  transforms  these  ideological
constructs  into  electoral  'chips'  necessary  for  con-
tinued survival of the coalition [48,53,62‒63,66‒68].
Accordingly, the ideational components underpinning
Malaysia's  national  security  framework  are  naturally
bent  to  quash  counter-narratives,  thereby  further
shrinking the country's diversity space. 
Islam plays a pivotal role in the hearts and minds
campaign  of  the  coalition.  As  a  Muslim-dominated
federal  constitutional  monarchy,  Malaysia's  national
security  becomes  a  function  of  its  state-configured
Islamic ideology [48,63,69‒71]. Its goal is to cement
the country's role as a worthy leader of the Muslim
world  by  projecting  an  image  of  moderation  and
tolerance [48,62‒63]. Islam must be the people's way
of life and the coalition's brand of leadership. It is the
very  'visible  hand'  that  runs and controls Malaysia's
internal  and  external  affairs,  and dictates  what  the
objectives  of  national  security  will  be.  Crafting  the
country's national security rhetoric and agenda based
on  the  underlying  goal  of  securing  the  coalition
becomes  the  paramount  concern  of  the  ruling  BN
political  elites,  particularly  for  those  comprising  the
United  Malays  National  Organisation  (UMNO)  party
[48,62‒63].
On  the  one  hand,  Mahathir's  security  ideology
represents  a  two-faced  Malaysian  national  security
framework by endorsing a non-violent and non-forcible
Islamic  rhetoric  at  the  international  scene,  while
encouraging coercive and aggressive policies in imple-
menting these teachings at the domestic sphere on the
other [48,59,63]. Such an approach to national security
effectively  aids  in the legitimization of the coalition's
domestic  security  machinery  which  means  the
perpetuation of the Malay-dominated BN coalition, and
therefore, the diminution of Malaysia's diversity space.
At the international level, the Mahathir regime has
portrayed Malaysia as the 'model Islamic state' of the
post-9/11  world  [48,51,55,62‒63].  The  former  PM
argued that  its  government  had  been successful  in
fighting terrorism domestically  by  adding ideological
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'sweeteners' to its coercive policies [51,55,62]. Such a
claim is  typically made in the context of the Emer-
gency,  where  the  defeat  of  communism  is  largely
viewed as a result of its hearts and minds ideology,
emphasizing  a  moderate  and  tolerant  Islam  [45‒
46,52,54,62].
At  the  domestic  level,  however,  the  opposite  is
observed. Mahathir's state-sponsored Islam has been
propagated  with  the  help  of  strong  coercive
legislation, particularly the Internal Security Act (ISA)
of  1960  and  its  replacement,  the Security  Offences
Special  Measures  Act  (SOSMA)  of  2012  [48,54,56,
59,63,72].  This  highlights  underlying  contradictions
within  Mahathir's  ideational  panorama—conquering
the hearts and minds of a fearful population through
the forced imposition of a coalition-made Islam. The
implicit goal of eliminating counter-narratives to BN's
vision of Malaysian nation-building has been pursued
under the banner of counterterrorism (48, 63).
On  the  other  hand,  Badawi's  security  doctrine
which  he  called  Islam Hadhari  (Civilizational  Islam)
still reflects Mahathir's aim at securing the coalition,
rather than the diversity of its multi-ethnic population
[48,63,73‒74]. Substance-wise, Islam Hadhari has no
significant  difference  from  Mahathir's  Asian  values
[75]. In terms of form, however, Abdullah's ideology
takes Mahathir's notion of the 'model Islamic state' to
a higher level,  by developing a comprehensive doc-
trine  embracing  Muslim  and  non-Muslim  audiences
alike,  both  at  home  and  abroad  [48,63].  In  other
words,  Malaysia's  signature  Islam  has  been  trans-
formed into an exportable commodity that reinforces
the  legitimacy  of  the  BN  coalition  beyond  the
country's borders [48,73].
The terms that have been used to develop Islam
Hadhari  were  fairly  'universal',  and as  such can  be
applied  to  different  contexts.  Badawi's  ideology
represents a shift toward understanding the contem-
porary era within the purview of Islam [73]. It is the
form, rather than substance that made Islam Hadhari
an appealing ideological construct [48,63]. By utilizing
charismatic  Islamic  terminology,  Badawi  has  suc-
ceeded in reigniting the coalition's unpopular security
ideology  (Liow  2005).  Badawi's  main  thrust  is  to
recalibrate Islam as a progressive religion that values
individual  and  communal  development  [76].  For
instance,  the fourth,  fifth, and sixth principles high-
light  Islam  Hadhari's  economic  undertones  which
reflect Badawi's promotion of Islam as a religion for
development  [48,51,63,57,77‒78].  By  restoring  the
sense  of  moderation  toward  the  practice  of  Islam,
Badawi had hoped that non-Muslim Malaysians would
feel embraced by the regime [69].
At  the  international  level,  Badawi  attempted  to
export Islam Hadhari to both Muslim and non-Muslim
countries. The idea is to cement Malaysia's role as a
model  nation  and  leader  of  the  Muslim  world  by
manufacturing it as a development model based on a
state-authorized version of Islam [48,63]. However, at
the domestic level, the operationalization of Badawi's
doctrines  is  questionable  at  best.  It  is  not  clear
whether  Islam  Hadhari  represents  genuine  efforts
toward  a  progressive  interpretation  of  Islamic
thinking, or merely a strategy for securing Malaysian
votes by not openly marginalizing its non-Malay and
non-Muslim population [69,76].
The coalition has utilized its ideological machinery
in justifying the coercive measures undertaken during
a series of crackdowns against 'deviant' sects such as
the  Tarikat  Samaniah  Ibrahim  Bonjol  in  2004,  and
Terengganu  or  Sky  Kingdom  in  2005  [79‒81].  In
2004,  seventy  members  of  the  Muslim  sect  Tarikat
Samaniah Ibrahim Bonjol  were arrested in  Selangor
by Islamic religious authorities [79‒81]. The govern-
ment claimed that the sect treated the Qur'an as a
historical  text,  which resulted to its  'casual'  attitude
toward  prayer  and  marriage.  In  the  aftermath  of
these  arrests,  Malaysian  chief  executive,  Khir  Toyo
announced his plan to vanquish some sixty divergent
sects operating in Selangor [79‒81]. In 2005, another
religious sect in Terengganu known as Sky Kingdom
was  also  shut  down by  the  Department  of  Islamic
Development [79]. The government claimed that the
movement  was  propagating  documents  that  coun-
tered  Islamic  teachings.  Its  leader,  Ayah  Pin  was
presented to the public as threat to national security
by espousing alternative views on religion and lifestyle
that differ from those provided by the government. In
doing  so,  Aya  Pin  was  not  only  jeopardizing  the
country's  official  religion  but  also  destabilizing  the
political status quo [80].
The  government  has  portrayed  these  religious
entities as threats to Malaysia's national  security by
espousing alternative views of Islam, and adopting a
lifestyle different from the ones endorsed by the BN
coalition. However, Sky Kingdom's 'threats' to national
security  were  ideational  rather  than  material  in
nature. These events offer a glimpse to the condition
of diversity space in Malaysia despite its multiethnic,
multireligious  society.  These  events  highlight  Ma-
laysia's unsecured diversity space amid a multiethnic,
multireligious society, which in turn, undermines the
country's national security.
Islam Hadhari has also provided the government an
effective ideological apparatus for stifling its political
rival,  the Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party (PAS). Badawi
has likened PAS' brand of Islam to a trap that must be
exposed  to  prevent  Malay  Muslims  from  being
ensnared [48,74].  Under  Islam Hadhari,  the  PAS is
faced with a lose-lose situation: either to comply with
a BN-sponsored Islam and operate within this limited
context or reject this model and become an enemy of
the  state  [48,55,63,76].  Either  way,  the  ideological
terrain within which PAS can manoeuvre is significantly
diminished. Needless to say, Islam Hadhari has further
enhanced the government's monopolistic control over
the  organization  and  facilitation  of  Islam.  Divergent
sects operating beyond the provisions and boundaries
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set  by  the  coalition  are  more  easily  detected  and
trounced. Hence, Islam Hadhari becomes an extension
of the implicit campaign against the expansion of the
diversity space critical for Malaysia's pluralistic society.
3.2.2. Limits to the Material Security Apparatus
The  government's  ideational  security  constructs  are
complemented by a material security apparatus. This
involves  are  coercive  laws  designed  to  secure  the
status-quo by removing all material and/or ideational
challenges  to  its  legitimacy  [45‒46,48,53‒55,58‒
59,63,67,82].  A primary example is  the recently  re-
pealed Internal Security Act (ISA) passed by PM Abdul
Rahman in 1960 [83]. The ISA served as a preventive
detention law which enabled the arrests of individuals
without  trial  and  criminal  charges  under  limited,
legally defined circumstances for sixty days. Moreover,
the Act also allowed the extension of  this  detention
period for up to two years upon the discretion of the
Home Minister with minimal  judicial review [83]. As
stated in Section 73 of the Act, 'any police officer may
arrest and detain without warrant any person who has
acted  or  is  about  to  act  or  is  likely  to  act  in  any
manner prejudicial to the security of Malaysia or any
part thereof' [83].
The ISA is further complemented by the Sedition
Act,  revised  in  1971  by  Malaysia's  second  PM  Tun
Abdul Razak which made any questioning of Malayan
paramountcy  an  act  of  treason.  The  Act  prohibits
virtually all activities with 'seditious tendency', resulting
to disaffection and hostility toward the government or
communal ill will [84]. Despite initial controversies, the
coalition has skilfully justified the presence of ISA and
Sedition  Act  as  necessary  legislation  for  ensuring
Malaysia's national security  [45‒46,52].Such laws are
deemed to be particularly relevant in the context of the
post-9/11 world order, where they serve as effective
counterterrorism measures akin to the Patriot Act of
the US, and the Anti-Terrorism Act of the UK.
In recent years, however, opposition to the ISA has
grown considerably. Critics have argued that the Act
was passed to stifle what should have been legitimate
political  oppositions  under  a  well-functioning  dem-
ocratic  society  and  as  such  had  been compared  to
internal pre-emptive strike, given its preventive nature
[53‒54]. For example, during the 1987 Operasi Lalang
(Weeding  Operation),  106  people  were  arrested
without  proper  charges under the ISA.  Most of  the
detainees were members of the opposition party and
various social activist  groups. The coalition issued a
White  Paper explaining  the  arrests,  stating  that
various groups which had played up sensitive issues
and  thus  created  racial  tension  in  the  country  had
exploited  the  government's  liberal  and  tolerant
attitude [54‒55,85‒86].
One  of  the  most  significant  outcomes  of  this
struggle was the introduction of section 8B of the ISA
which  blocked  judicial  review  of  ISA  detentions
including  those  brought  as  habeas  corpus  petitions
[87‒88]. In 2001, this section of the ISA was used to
detain  members  of  the  People's  Justice  Party  (PJP)
dubbed as the  'Reformasi or KeADILan 10' [87‒88].
The  detainees,  led  by  Anwar  Ibrahim's  wife,  Wan
Azizah Ismail pressed vocally for his release, Ibrahim
had been convicted of misuse of power and sodomy in
trials, which according to Human Rights Watch, were
marred by coerced confessions of key witnesses [87‒
88].  Prior  to  his  imprisonment,  Anwar  was  leading
rallies  across  Malaysia  in  support  of  his  newly-
formed reformasi movement, preaching to vast crowds
in favour of far-reaching social, political, and economic
reforms  [45,54‒55,86].  In  response,  Mahathir's  side
claimed  that  the  arrested  activists  were  planning
violent protests to overthrow the government and were
attempting  to  procure  dangerous  weapons  and
explosives [87‒88]. Yet despite the serious nature of
these charges, the government failed to produce any
credible evidence to support its claim.
These abuses  drove  oppositionist  groups,  human
rights  activists,  and  other  civil  society  advocates  to
mobilize  large-scale  protests  against  the  ISA,  por-
trayed  as  unnecessary draconian law that  does not
bode well for Malaysia's vision of progressing toward
'developed nation'  status  [87‒88].  The popularity of
these  movements,  along  with  the  resurgence  of  a
stronger opposition after the 2008 General  Election,
played a crucial role in PM Najib's decision to repeal
the  Act.  In  2012,  the Security  Offences  (Special
Measures)  Act  or  SOSMA has  officially  replaced  the
ISA [89]. The new Act is  envisioned  'to provide for
special measures relating to security offences for the
purpose of maintaining public order and security and
for connected matters.'
In contrast to ISA, the new law requires the filing
of  charges  based  on  credible  evidence  against
detainees  after  twenty-eight  days  [89].  Thus,  the
burden to  produce  reliable  proof  within  a  specified
time  frame  is  shifted  to  the  government's  law  en-
forcement  and  intelligence  agencies  responsible  for
combating terrorist activities. However, SOSMA is also
being  criticized  from both  sides.  On  the  one hand,
anti-terrorist  groups  argue  that  the  requirement  to
bring charges within twenty-eight days under SOSMA
weakens Malaysia's capacity to pre-emptively contain
terrorist  threats  [90].  On  the  other,  human  rights
groups criticise SOSMA for allowing police to authorise
communication intercepts and permitting prosecutors
to  present  evidence  without  disclosing  sources.
Moreover, acquitted suspects in the midst of an appeal
may  still  be  detained  in  prison  or  tethered  to  a
monitoring device until the appeal is formally settled
[90].
Overall,  these two limits have significantly under-
mined  the  Malaysian  government's  efforts  to  effec-
tively  cohabit  human  security  (defined  in  terms  of
ethnic security)  into its national  security framework.
The BN's ideational and material security apparatuses
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ensure the preservation of a Malay-dominated status
quo. In the process, the BN has become synonymous
with the Malaysian nation-state. The noble objective
of protecting Malays' interests is equated to the venal
objective of preserving the BN's political supremacy,
pursued  under  the  banner  of  securing  Malaysia's
shrinking diversity space. In pursuing its Bumiputra-
oriented  social  vision,  the  government  has  utilized
trade  liberalization,  along  with  complementary  neo-
liberal  economic  policies,  but  often  at  the  expense
other Malaysian ethnic communities. In other words,
they  have  been  fervently  pursued  to  reinforce  and
safeguard a Malay-imagined society.  As long as  the
constitutional frameworks that legitimize a Bumiputra-
centric  Malaysian  nation-state  are  sustained,  de-
ethnicizing the country's politico-economic and socio-
cultural  arrangements  remains  highly  implausible.
Thus,  Malaysia's  national  security  is,  for  better  or
worse, developed around Malay ethnic identity.
4. Conclusion
This article has critically examined the Philippines and
Malaysia's  experiences  with  cohabiting  the  human
security concept into their respective national security
frameworks. It argued that while on the one hand, the
Philippines'  primary  security  referent  object  is  its
shrinking development space amid a deeply-entrenched
patronage  system  controlled  by  a  powerful  Filipino
oligarchy;  on  the  other,  Malaysia's  main  security
referent object is its contracting diversity space amid a
Bumiputra-centric  political  economy,  developed  and
controlled by the perpetually ruling BN coalition. Both
the Philippines and Malaysia's primary security referent
objects—development  space  and  diversity  space—
represent the non-traditional, people-centred dimension
of  national  security  rather  than  its  traditional,  state-
centric dimension.
A variety of  limits  have severely  undermined  the
two  countries'  efforts  at  cohabiting  human  security
into their respective national security frameworks. In
the case of the Philippines, the limits of its democ-
ratization and its Human Security Acts have produced
an enormous challenge to securing its  development
space, defined in terms of economic security. Whereas
in the case of Malaysia, the limits to ideological and
material security apparatus have presented significant
constraints in securing its diversity space, defined in
terms of ethnic security.
These  limits  have  contributed  to  the  country's
lacklustre  experience  with  cohabitative  security.
Nevertheless,  both cases have illustrated a concrete
way of giving entitlement to non-traditional, people-
centered elements  of  security as legitimate  referent
objects  of  a  national  security  framework.  The
Philippine  and  Malaysian  experiences  underscores  a
two-pronged  assumption:  first,  the  meaning  and
provision of national security can neither be eloquently
articulated nor completely substantiated without con-
sideration of  'below the state' actors and issues; and
second, the eminent status of the state vis-à-vis power
in providing national security can neither be trivialized
nor undermined. 
Hence,  instead  of  downplaying  a  state-centric
concept  while  highlighting  a  people-centred  model,
cohabitative  security  amalgamates  statist  and  hu-
manist views of national security. This is one approach
to resolving the 'entitled state versus untitled human'
dilemma in which the state is ordinarily depicted as an
antagonistic  force  obstructing  the  quest  for  human
security.
This  invisible  yet  concrete  divide  between  states
and individuals vis-à-vis communities, creates a dist-
orted view that the state does not acknowledge the
multidimensionality of national security in the modern-
day era.  Thus,  despite  claims being made by  state
actors  with regard  to their  revised national  security
rhetoric  and  agenda,  non-state  actors  continue  to
view national  security  as  a  purely  militaristic  object
bereft  of  human  sensibility.  On  the  one  hand,  the
state claims to have created a novel national security
vision  protecting  human  security.  But  on  the  other
hand,  citizens  and  communities  equate  national
security  to  the  anachronistic  pursuit  of  sovereignty
and territorial boundaries.
The  employment  of  cohabitative  security  means
that  state  security  and  human  security  become
mutually  constitutive  and  reinforce  dimensions  of
national  security.  A  shift  in  the  government's  per-
ception  of  state  security  can  have  a  corresponding
impact  on  individuals  and  communities'  collective
perception of human security, and vice versa. There-
fore, this allows the state to have a more positive and
nurturing  image  in  the  security  narrative.  It  veers
away from the innate tendency to portray the state as
a  completely  distinct  security  domain  that  must  be
temporarily  de-emphasized  and/or  unaccounted  for
when advancing human security objectives.
In doing so, it  'unvilifies'  the role of the state in
pursuing  a  human  security  rhetoric  and  agenda.
Instead  of  being  diametrically  opposed,  the  cohab-
itative  security  approach  shows  that  state  security
complements human security, and vice versa. To some
extent, the invisible divide between the 'high politics'
of the states and the  'low politics' of the people and
communities  is  bridged,  enabling  state  actors  to
realize the multidimensionality of national security in
the  twenty-first  century.  A  more  collective  under-
standing of national security shared by governments
and citizens is therefore realized.
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Trading in Vain? Investigating the Philippines’ Development-oriented National 
Security and Free Trade Linkages  
 
(A draft of the chapter that will be published in the Japanese Journal of Political Science) 
Abstract: This paper examines the manner through which the Philippine government has 
utilized free trade in pursuing its development-oriented national security policies and strategies in 
the twenty-first century. It argues that against the backdrop of uneven economic development 
being perpetuated by deeply-entrenched oligarchic system and patronage culture, the primary 
referent of Philippine national security is its diminishing development space. Despite the 
government rhetoric with regard to the role of inclusive development in enhancing national 
security, the Philippine political economy remains highly oligarchic and patrimonial. Such a 
condition has resulted in institutionalised inequality and structural poverty that undermine the 
country’s supposedly development-based security model. The ability of the very few yet very 
powerful Filipino elites to transform country into an oligarchipelago underscores the 
inefficiencies emanating from this type of politico-economic arrangement. In light of this, the 
paper evaluates the impacts of the Philippines’ free trade activities on its overall level of 
development space by focusing on several crucial aspects of free trade that the government has 
failed to properly consider. Moreover, it scrutinizes the key factors that affect the utility of free 
trade for securing and enhancing the Philippines’ development space. The paper concludes by 
arguing that the Philippine government’s attempts at linking its development-centric security 
interests and free trade objectives have resulted not only in the the preservation of uneven 
economic development and but also the further reinforcement of the existing oligarchic system 
and patronage culture in the country.  
 
Keywords: national security, free trade, economic development, Philippines, oligarchy 
 
1.  Introduction 
The highly uneven development of the Philippine economy has been a long-standing threat to its 
national security. At the crux of the country’s lopsided economic development is a deeply-
entrenched patronage system that is being ruled and maintained by powerful Filipino oligarchs.1 
Such type of politico-economic arrangement has engendered institutionalised inequality and 
structural poverty that significantly undermine the government’s supposedly people-centric 
national security policies and strategies. As the incumbent President Benigno Aquino III stated 
in his 2011-2016 National Security Policy document:  
 
                                                          
1
 Jeffrey Winters (2011: 6) defines oligarchs as the ‘actors who command and control massive concentrations of material 
resources that can be deployed to defend or enhance their personal wealth and exclusive social position.’ Accordingly, an 
oligarch’s ultimate goal, according to Winters (2011: 6) ‘is to secure, maintain, and retain his or her position of extreme 
wealth and power against all manner of threats.’ In Aristotle’s formulation, democracy is defined as the rule by the poor, 
whereas oligarchy is the rule of the wealthy few. Nevertheless, Winters (2011: 11) argue that democracy and oligarchy ‘can 
coexist indefinitely as long as the unpropertied lower classes do not use their expanded political participation to encroach 
upon the material power and prerogatives of the wealthiest.’ In other words, the two systems are compatible for as long as 
the two realms of power do not clash. While oligarchy ‘rests on the concentration of material power’, democracy ‘rests on 
the dispersion of nonmaterial power’ (Winters 2011: 11). 
2 
 
If the government is able to make good on the promise of taking the high road, the ‘Ang Daang 
Matuwid’, then it must be sure that the people are afforded every opportunity to pursue their 
individual dreams of a better quality of life – all under the consideration of national security where the 
welfare and well-being of the people are of primordial consideration. 
 
By articulating the country’s lopsided economic development as a threat to national security, the 
Philippine government has essentially forged a security paradigm that is anchored on the 
overarching concept of inclusive development.2  Unfortunately, the neoliberal economic policies 
designed to enhance economic development such as free trade have been adeptly harnessed by 
oligarchic forces to their advantage. The elusiveness of trickle-down effects from GDP growths 
can be explained by the lack of ‘political will’ to challenge the elites’ stranglehold over the 
Philippine political economy. Consequently, the country’s experience with free trade has not 
entirely transformed the Philippine economy due to the perverse culture of patronage politics. 
The twin problems of poverty and inequality undermine the government’s supposedly 
development-oriented national security rhetoric and agenda.  
 
This paper critically analyses the Philippines’ use of free trade in securing and enhancing the 
primary referent 3 of its national security in the twenty-first century: its shrinking development 
space against the backdrop of deeply-embedded oligarchic system that breeds and sustains 
patronage politics. The term ‘development space’ in this context specifically refers to the capacity 
of the Philippine government to independently formulate and implement inclusive policies in 
addressing the threats being generated by imbalanced economic development. Here I argue that 
the concept of national security in the Philippines is primarily rooted in the capacity of the 
government to facilitate proportional levels of economic development that can minimise 
structural poverty and institutionalised inequality. However, the ability of the very few yet very 
powerful Filipino elites to transform country into an archipelago of oligarchies or 
‘oligarchipelago’ highlights the underlying oligarchic system vis-à-vis patrimonial culture that has 
come to define the Philippine development problematique. The continuous primacy of the 
                                                          
2
 The underlying assumption here is the concept of national security in the Philippines now accommodates state-centric 
and people-centric agendas given the rapid proliferation of nontraditional threats that undermine the quality of life of 
individuals and societies. In other words, a more holistic approach to framing the national security rhetoric is now being 
adopted in the Philippines and the incumbent administration’s 2011-2015 National Security Policy document is a concrete 
example of this assertion. Moreover, several local projects focusing on the development of the human security discourse 
have already been carried out by various sectors in the years following the UNDP’s introduction of the concept in 1994. 
Examples of these are the local NGO called Tabang Mindanaw which has proposed a justice-based human security 
framework, and the academic think-tank called Third World Studies Centre (TWSC) which has formulated a human security 
index for the Philippines. See, UNDP-Philippines (2005); and Atienza et al., (2010).  
3
 The term ‘referent’ in this study is defined as ‘things that are seen to be existentially threatened and that have a 
legitimate claim to survival’ (Buzan et al., 1998: 36). 
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oligarchy or family dynasties in the domestic political economy highlights the Philippines’ ‘soft’ 
state and weak democracy. Although oligarchy and patrimonialism do not necessarily facilitate 
conditions that lead to political and economic marginalisation, nevertheless, in the case of the 
Philippines, they have further exploited the inefficiencies of an elite-driven political economy. 
Such conditions have ultimately resulted in the country’s diminishing development space. 
 
In light of this, the paper answers the following questions. First, how does free trade affect the 
primary referent (i.e. development space) of the Philippines’ national security policies and 
strategies in the twenty-first century? Second, what are the factors that affect that capacity of free 
trade for securing and enhancing the country’s remaining development space? Third, and lastly, 
why does economic development in the Philippines continue to be highly uneven despite its vast 
experience with democratization vis-à-vis democratic institutions? 
 
To answer these questions, the paper is divided into six sections. In section one I have presented 
the context through which the Philippines’ development-oriented security and trade linkages will 
be examined. Here I have argued that against the backdrop of profoundly-implanted oligarchic 
and patronage systems, the primary referent of Philippines national security is its diminishing 
development space. Notwithstanding the government’s rhetoric with regard to the importance of 
pursuing equitable development via free trade in order to improve national security, the domestic 
political economy remains highly oligarchic and patrimonial. Examining whether the government 
is genuinely concerned in addressing the poverty and inequality conditions in the country or is 
only paying lip service to the electorally-popular idea of a people-centered national security 
framework is therefore imperative.   
 
In section two, I briefly examine the conditions underpinning the country’s uneven economic 
development. Here I identify some of the areas in which free trade can have a positive role. But 
as will be illuminated in the subsequent sections, the Philippines’ experience with trade 
liberalization highlights some of the strongest points against the utility of free trade for 
improving poverty and inequality conditions in the country.   
 
In section three I evaluate the impacts of the Philippines’ free trade activities on its overall level 
of development space. It focuses on the role of free trade as a double-edged strategy that 
simultaneously expands and contracts the country’s development space by expanding its 
4 
 
domestic economy, on the one hand, and reinforcing its oligarchic vis-à-vis patronage systems, 
on the other.  
 
In section four I investigate some of the key factors affecting the utility of free trade for securing 
and enhancing the Philippines’ existing development space. The goal is to find out the potential 
consequences and ramifications of these factors on the Philippines’ development-based security 
and trade linkages, and from there, evaluate the country’s capacity to overcome its oligarchic 
system vis-à-vis patronage culture.  
 
Finally, in section five I conclude by arguing that the Philippines’ elite-driven political economy 
legitimizes the county’s uneven economic development. The highly corrupt patronage culture 
that such an arrangement engenders runs in direct contrast to the government’s people-centric 
national security model that emphasises a more equitable and inclusive economic development. 
Through the strategic exploitation of the country’s free trade mechanisms, the Filipino oligarchs 
are able to maximise not only their economic power but also their political influence even at the 
expense of worsening poverty and inequality conditions. By preventing the passage of social-
equalising policies, the wealth of the nation has remained in the hands of the very few elites.  
 
2. The security threats of uneven economic development in the Philippines 
Today, a significant percentage of the Philippine population think of themselves as poor. Self-
rated poverty (SRP) ranges from 50.0% to 54.0% between 2004 and 2010; while self-rated 
hunger (SRH) averages to more than 20.0% for the same period.4 By the end of 2013, SRP has 
increased to 55.0%, while SRH has doubled to 41.0%.5 Its median SRP threshold, that is, the 
minimum monthly budget with which Philippine households will not consider themselves food-
poor, is estimated at US$109.0 for Metro Manila; US$82.0 for balance Luzon; US$91.0 for the 
Visayas; and US$73.0 for Mindanao.6   
 
The pervasive inequality in the country reinforces the socio-economic insecurities being felt by 
poor Filipino families on a daily basis. Such inequality is manifested not only in income terms but 
also in non-income terms such as the unequal access to various public goods and services (ADB, 
2007, 2009; Son and San Jose, 2009; Tabuga and Reyes, 2011). The country’s relatively stable 
                                                          
4
 As of 2014, SRP is estimated at 11.8 million; while SRH is estimated at 8.8 million as of 2014. For more details, see Social 
Weather Stations website, available online at http://www.sws.org.ph/.  
5
 Ibid.  
6
 Ibid.  
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Gini index underscores the difficulty in resolving this problem as inequality conditions remain 
virtually unchanged since the 1960s (ADB, 2007, 2009; Son and San Jose 2009). Over the last 
thirty years, the curve has fluctuated within a very narrow band of 0.44 and 0.48 – suggesting a 
relatively high level of inequality.7 During the same period, decomposed inequality revealed that 
more than 90.0% resulted from inequality between individuals within each region, while less than 
10.0% was caused by differences in mean per capita income or expenditure across regions (ADB, 
2009). Moreover, the data from 2009 showed that the income of the top 1.0% of families in the 
Philippines was equivalent to the aggregate income of the bottom 30.0% (ADB, 2009).  
Such inequality emerges from huge disparities both in the ownerships of physical capital and 
possessions of human capital (ADB, 2009; Son and San, Jose 2009; Tabuga and Reyes, 2011). 
These figures simply imply that wealth distribution in the country has not improved. Although 
average per capita income may have increased in absolute terms, nevertheless, the fruits of 
economic progress have not been equally shared by Filipinos. For instance, a huge part of the 
national income ($US6.6 billion) between 2003 and 2006 went to private corporations instead of 
private households ($US5.23) (NAPC, 2010). 
 
Despite a string of policy reforms introduced since 1986, the country’s tale of structural poverty 
and institutionalised inequality has remained largely predictable over the years.8 A central 
component of these structural adjustments related to tariff reform agendas prescribed by the 
WTO. The Philippines was geared toward the adoption of policies designed for the unilateral 
liberalisation of its key economic sectors. The principal driving force behind the aggressive 
liberalisation of Philippine trade was the failure of import substitution strategy to bring about 
competitive levels of development via industrialisation (Clarete, 1999, 2005; Cororaton, 2000; 
Habito and Cororaton, 2000). The restructuring of tariffs was first initiated in 1981 when the 
government rationalised its existing protectionist measures to a narrower band to better manage 
price distortions induced by trade barriers, on the one hand, and improve the overall efficiency in 
                                                          
7
 See World Bank’s computation of Gini Index, available online at http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.GINI.   
8
 Based on the Medium-Term Philippine Development Plan (MTPDP), the policies and reforms pursued since the 
restoration of democracy broadly fall into the following areas: ‘monetary and fiscal reforms for restoring and maintaining 
macroeconomic stability; trade, industrial, and financial reforms for improving economic efficiency and competitiveness; 
governance reform and decentralisation for improving the effectiveness of the national and local governments; and social 
policies and programs for fighting poverty, improving income distribution, and achieving the Millennium Development 
Goals(MDGs). These policies and reforms are embodied in a number of initiatives or programs implemented since 1986, 
including: trade liberalisation, tariff reduction and accession to the WTO; fiscal consolidation and tax reform; creation of an  
independent central bank with inflation targeting as a key policy tool; privatisation of several government owned and -
controlled corporations; power sector restructuring and reform; comprehensive agrarian reform; banking sector reform 
and capital market development; devolution of public services delivery to local government units; and declaration of 
poverty reduction as the overarching development goal and commitment to social programs for poverty alleviation and 
achieving MDGs.’  For full copy of the document, see the National Economic Development Authority’s website, available 
online at http://www.neda.gov.ph/?p=1128.  
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resource allocations based on the logic of comparative advantage, on the other (Clarete, 1999, 
2005; Malaluan, 2011). Where did it all go wrong? 
 
3. Free trade as a catalyst to the Philippines’ development-oriented national security  
For the devoted advocates of free trade, the Philippine economy has come a long way since its 
accession to the WTO in 1995. The country’s relatively open trade regime has been instrumental 
for achieving significant economic gains. Between 2005 and 2011, the Philippines has registered: 
an annual real GDP growth rate of 5.0%; a moderate average inflation rate of 5.0%; and a 
surplus in external account partly due to high remittances inflows of about 10.0% of GDP. 
Furthermore, according to the WTO, ‘growth has been broad-based across private consumption, 
investment, and exports, and was helped by fiscal stimulus implemented in 2008 and 2011 in 
response to the global economic crisis’ (WTO-TPR, 2012:1). In 2010, the Philippines was the 
world's 37th largest exporter of goods and the 27th largest exporter of services (WTO-TPR, 
2012).  
  
Furthermore, as one of the founding members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN), the Philippines has committed to the establishment of the ASEAN Economic 
Community (AEC) by 2015.9  A key component of the AEC is the facilitation of ASEAN FTAs 
with various partners aside from the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA).10 Thus, through its 
membership in the ASEAN, the Philippines has been able to negotiate and implement FTAs 
with the key countries particularly in the Asia-Pacific, including: the ASEAN-Australia-New 
Zealand Free Trade Area (AANZFTA, 2010); the ASEAN-China Free Trade Area (ACFTA, 
2010); the ASEAN-India Free Trade Area (AIFTA, 2010); the ASEAN-Japan Free Trade Area 
(AJFTA, 2008); and the ASEAN-Korea Free Trade Area (AKFTA, 2010). 11 In addition, the 
country has also successfully concluded its own bilateral agreement with Japan in 2008 under the 
so-called Japan-Philippines Economic Partnership Agreement (JPEPA).  
 
However, for the staunch critics of free trade, the term ‘multilateral punishment’ best describes 
the remorseful experience of the Philippines in the WTO (Bello, 2004: 3) According to them, the 
country’s membership in this multilateral institution has led to sheer catastrophes that adversely 
                                                          
9
 For more information on the ASEAN Economic Community, see the ASEAN website, available online at  
http://www.asean.org/communities/asean-economic-community.  
10
 For more information of the AFTA, see the ASEAN AFTA website, available online at  
http://www.asean.org/communities/asean-economic-community/item/asean-free-trade-area-afta-an-update.  





affected both its politico-economic and socio-cultural arrangements (Malaluan, 2011; IBON, 
2013). Virtually all the drawbacks and externalities predicted by those who opposed the country’s 
membership to the WTO had materialised (Bello, 2004, 2005). Moreover, the amendments being 
made in the Philippine Constitution designed to accommodate the WTO rules work mainly in 
favour of the huge multinational and transnational corporations (Bello 2004; IBON, 2013). Thus, 
proponents of the de-globalisation thesis argue that one of the side-effects of WTO membership 
has been the corrosion of national sovereignty (Bello, 2005; Altman, 2009). The manner in which 
the country’s legal system is realigned to complement WTO preconditions has undermined the 
function of free trade as an engine for industrialisation. By doing so, the critics have argued that 
the government has joined an institution that is not only blind to development but is also non-
democratic and non-transparent in its decision-making procedures (FGS, 2003; IBON, 2013). 
Effective control is monopolised by big trading powers through a process called ‘consensus’ 
which in practice has severely marginalised the small and weak trading countries like the 
Philippines (Bello,  2005: 4).  
 
Three crucial aspects of free trade have been gravely overlooked by the government which 
resulted to the country’s lacklustre performance: (1) failure of ‘good’ trade intentions; (2) failure 
of ‘good’ trade theories; and (3) failure of ‘good’ trade negotiations.  
 
Failure of ‘good’ trade intentions 
From the perspectives of most Filipino technocrats the progressive elimination of distortive 
protectionist mechanisms through unilateral reductions of tariff and non-tariff barriers will lead 
to the adoption of world market prices in the domestic economy (Clarete, 1995, 2005; Habito 
and Cororaton, 2000; Wignajara et al., 2011). Domestic firms will be subject to a highly 
competitive market environment being dominated by industrialised economies which will 
compel them to develop efficiency-enhancing strategies in order to withstand external 
competition and remain relevant in their respective industries. From the trade policymakers’ 
standpoint, the main motive for transforming the country’s highly protectionist trade regime into 
a more liberalised one is to achieve high levels of efficiency that make Filipino consumers better 
off. 
 
Hence, the Philippine government had initiated a three-phase trade reform schedule designed to 
stimulate the performance as well as enhance the competitiveness of its lethargic economy by 
maintaining a low and nearly uniform tariff rate. In Phase 1 (1981 and1985) the Tariff Reform 
Programme (TRP) was introduced to narrow down the tariff band from 100-0% to 50-10% 
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(Clarete, 2005). This was accompanied by the espousal of the Import Liberalisation Programme 
(ILP) intended to abolish all non-tariff import mechanisms but was temporarily suspended in the 
midst of mounting political pressures in the country toward the end of the Marcos regime 
(Habito and Cororaton, 2000; Cororaton, 2004; Clarete, 2005).  Nevertheless, Phase 2 was 
launched in 1991 with the implementation of the Executive Order 470 which further narrowed 
the range of tariff structure by clustering the commodities within a tariff scale of 10.0% to 30.0% 
(Clarete, 2005).  Finally, Phase 3 entered into force in 1994 with the introduction of a four-tier 
tariff rate classification: 3.0% for ‘non-endemic’ raw materials and capital equipment; 10.0% for 
‘endemic’ raw materials and capital equipment; 20.0% for intermediate goods; and 30.0% for 
finished products (Clarete, 2005).  
 
To predict the effects of having a freer trade on the Philippine economy after its WTO 
accession, ex-ante simulations using a fifty-sector computable general equilibrium (CGE) had 
been conducted.  Initial assessments of tariff restructurings showed a 2.3% cumulative impact on 
real GDP (Cororaton, 2004; Clarete, 2005). Statistical findings also suggested that although there 
would be a relatively small reduction in the employment level, specifically in service and 
agricultural sector, nonetheless, the number of jobs that would be created in the more 
competitive manufacturing sector would more than offset this loss (Cororaton, 2004; Clarete, 
2005; Aldaba, 2012). The predicted increase in real GDP would lead to more efficient income 
distributions and therefore, would make the poorest quintile income groups the biggest gainers 
by receiving the largest share of the GDP growth (Habito and Cororaton, 2000; Clarete, 2005). 
In short, ex-ante results had verified the optimistic claims made by the chief proponents of 
WTO membership and the pursuit of trade liberalisation in general. 
  
Critics, however, have expressed their scepticism toward these findings by emphasising some of 
the serious threats that it could pose to the economy. They argue that domestic producers do not 
possess the required minimum capacity to compete with industries from the advanced 
economies (Bello, 2004, 2005; Kawai and Wignaraja, 2010; Wignaraja et al., 2011). Although free 
trade creates some winners, however, their numbers are smaller than those that are forced out of 
their businesses. Displaced workers will then face significant adjustment costs as they search for 
new job opportunities and attempt to develop the required skills for these new jobs (Malaluan, 
2011; IBON, 2013). For instance, the abolishment of protectionist measures in the 
manufacturing sector will force local firms to shut down operations, thereby leading to higher 
unemployment rates that aggravate poverty conditions (Wignaraja, 2010; Wignaraja et al., 2011). 
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Similarly, intensified competition in the agricultural sector will drive down the prices of local 
produce in domestic markets and result to higher incidence of poverty in rural areas due to 
reductions in income (Mangabat, 1999; CETIM, 2000; Malaluan, 2011).  
  
These concerns have proved to be legitimate given the significant discrepancies between 
forecasted and actual outcomes from implementing low, nearly uniform tariff rates upon the 
country’s accession to the WTO. Contrary to the generally positive results that were derived 
from the ex-ante analyses of trade liberalisation, ex-post assessments showed only a fractional 
positive adjustment (Cororaton, 2004, 2008; Clarete, 2005). With respect to merchandise trade, 
results obtained from the ex-post assessments based on secondary data differed from those that 
came out of ex-ante CGE analyses. For most of the period covered in the ex-ante CGE analyses, 
imports have exceeded exports which indicated a trade deficit as a result of trade liberalisation 
(Cororaton, 2004, 2008; Clarete, 2005). In addition, rather than showing a fairly diverse exports 
basket from a huge number of industries, ex-post assessments revealed a concentration of 
exports in very few industries (Clarete, 2005; Lim, 2009; Usui, 2011; Aldaba, 2012, 2013).  
 
Failure of ‘good’ trade theories 
First, in terms of production, ex-post assessments revealed the manufacturing industry would be 
a part the problem rather than a solution to job reductions in agriculture and services contrary to 
initial reports obtained from ex-ante simulations (Cororaton et al., 2005; Clarete, 2005; Aldaba, 
2012, 2013). Theoretically, trade liberalisation would shift the resources from industries that are 
rendered uncompetitive by the lowering of import restrictions to those that would survive the 
increased market competition. In the case of the Philippines, however, the shares of various 
manufacturing sectors to total manufacturing production hardly changed (Habito and Cororaton, 
2000; David et al., 2007; Aldaba, 2012). In other words, the configuration of the merchandise 
sector remained largely stationary even during the period of aggressive tariff reduction. The 
evolution of the country’s production space, therefore, would suggest that although its exports 
basket may have become more sophisticated, nonetheless, industrial diversification have 
stagnated over the years (Clarete, 2005; Aldaba, 2012, 2013). 
  
Second, with respect to employment, ex-post analyses showed the service sector generating jobs 
at an annual rate of about 4.5%, thus making it the biggest source of labour force in the country 
(Clarete, 2005; Cororaton et al., 2006; Serrano, 2008). In fact, since 1988, the service sector has 
created more jobs for the Filipinos compared to the agriculture and manufacturing sectors. For 
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instance, between 1995 and 2010, an estimated 10.3 million new jobs have been created (ILO, 
2014). Out of this total, 46.9% came from services; 37.4% from agriculture; and only 15.7% 
from industry (ILO, 2014). Although both the agriculture and industry sectors continue to 
generate jobs, however, they usually fall short of the required levels particularly in the rural areas 
(ADB, 2007; David et al., 2007). Based on the percentage of Filipinos joining the labour force, 
an estimated one million jobs per year has to be created to allow improvements in household 
incomes; greater efficiency in domestic markets; and ultimately, reduction in poverty levels (ILO, 
2014).   
 
Third, with regard to development, the population’s per capita income in general has remained 
relatively constant even years after implementing its tariff reform programs (ADB, 2007; UNDP, 
2012). Put differently, the average Filipino’s standard of living has remained roughly the same 
since 1995. Although per capita income slightly dropped from $1,173 in 1980 to $1,165 in 2001, 
however, the proponents of trade liberalisation argued that this could not suggest that a more 
liberalised trade made the country either better or worse off (Clarete, 2005; Cororaton et al., 
2005; ADB, 2007).  Indeed, per capita income could have substantially diminished had tariff 
reforms not been pursued and the Philippines continued to be a non-WTO member. But for the 
staunch critics of neoliberal policies, per capita income could have significantly improved had 
trade protection been maintained or perhaps even intensified (Bello, 2005; Malaluan, 2011). 
Nevertheless, for the Filipino policymakers in favour of free trade, the positive trends being 
reflected by other development indicators including  life expectancy at birth and literacy rate are 
attributable to the its relatively open trade policies. For instance, Filipinos’ life expectancy has 
increased from 61.3 years in 1980 to 68.5 years in 2010 (UNDP, 2010). Similarly, the 
population’s literacy rate has also improved as the percentage of illiterate Filipinos dropped from 
12.21% in 1980 to 4.58% in 2010 (UNDP, 2010).   
   
Fourth, and lastly, the mediocre performance of Philippine exports according to ex-post 
assessments could be substantively explained by the high transaction costs rather than the 
difficulties related to market access (WTO-TPR, 2005, 2012; ADB, 2007). More specifically, the 
country’s inability to enhance its efficiency in mobilising products from the production points to 
the markets has significantly contributed to the underperformance of the Philippine export 
industries. In other words, the problem was more logistical in nature given the lack of 
responsiveness on the part of the Filipino exporters to the changing demands of importers of 
the country’s goods and merchandise. The Philippine experience has provided a clear illustration 
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of how transaction costs could potentially weaken, if not reverse, the expected positive net 
effects of lowering trade protection rates on resource allocations. It showed that reduction in 
import restrictions do not automatically lead to the efficient redistribution of resources to 
export-oriented industries due to substantial levels of transaction costs as opposed to being zero 
(WTO-TPR, 2005, 2012; ADB, 2007).  
 
The inability of various ex-ante and ex-post analyses to reasonably predict the impact of free 
trade on the Philippine economy have led the critics to claim that the government’s decision to 
abandon its import substitution policies has further aggravated the poverty and inequality 
conditions due to significant loss of jobs (Bello, 2004; Malaluan, 2011; IBON, 2013). Thus, as far 
as the opponents of free trade policies are concerned, the Philippine experience proves that trade 
liberalisation is not a straightforward solution to economic underdevelopment but only 
perpetuates structural poverty and institutionalised inequality in the country.  
 
Failure of ‘good’ trade negotiations  
The Philippines’ lack of central agency responsible for the formulation and implementation of its 
free trade goals and objectives creates inefficiencies that constrain benefits, including: (i) turf 
mentality among government offices; (ii) limited capacity for trade research; (iii) blurring of 
authority delineations; and (iv) absence of suitable mechanisms for consultations and feedbacks 
(Pasadilla and Liao, 2005; Wignaraja et al., 2011).  
      
First, representatives from various line agencies comprising the Tariff and Related Matters 
(TRM) Committee show symptoms of turf mentality that prevents the formulation of complete 
and cohesive cross-industry trade strategies (Pasadilla and Liao, 2005). A misplaced competitive 
spirit often dominates inter-agency dialogues which undermine efforts toward the facilitation of 
a more cooperative environment. The TRM members have developed a rather strange outlook 
that forces them to protect the industry that they are representing at all costs, regardless of  its 
effect on other industries and the economy as a whole (Aldaba, 2012, 2013; Abad et al., 2012). 
Rather than advancing the country’s collective trade interests, they insist upon the protection of 
their respective sectors which leads to sub-standard proposals and inferior outcomes. In other 
words, a better-equalised national position is traded over the narrowly-defined sectoral motives. 
Accordingly, identifying priority industries has become highly politicised since all representatives 




Second, the absence of a clear-cut mandate and delineated lines of authority in formulating trade 
policies has ultimately resulted to misunderstandings and grave misuse of national resources 
(Pasadilla and Liao, 2005). For one, going beyond the committee’s collegial nature in order to 
make and implement difficult decisions on highly contested issues can be very problematic 
(Abad et al., 2012). In addition, unqualified members from different line agencies are sometimes 
being tapped to represent the country in bilateral trade negotiations due to resource constraints 
(Nye, 2011). Given their lack of technical qualifications for negotiating and limited experience 
with the language and practice of international trade, they usually end up conceding to the 
agreements that are unfavourable to the country’s economic well-being. This problem was 
highlighted during the JPEPA negotiation rounds in which  the inexperienced Filipino 
negotiators agreed to the  nontrade-related demands being solicited by their Japanese 
counterparts but were previously rejected by the veteran trade representatives (Pasadilla and 
Liao, 2005; van de Haar, 2011). Such practice inexorably places the Philippines at a 
disadvantaged position without them realising the costs. This highly fragmented delineation of 
authority leads to loss of institutional memory which further underlines the lack of fit between 
the system and the country’s trade activities.  
 
Third, aside from the problem of disjointed coordination, the Philippine government is also 
severely restricted by its limited resources particularly for various trade researches (Pasadilla and 
Liao, 2005; Abad et al., 2012). The lack of financial resources for enhancing the technical 
capacities of concerned agencies for conducting extensive studies on trade policies undermines 
the efforts toward effective negotiations. The government agencies responsible for the 
formulation of trade policies lack the necessary skills and knowledge for understanding the 
complex dynamics of international trade negotiations. One of the more serious effects of this 
problem is the reliance of line agencies on the researches being funded by private-sector 
lobbyists that do not necessarily provide accurate findings and credible recommendations given 
their vested interest on these particular trade issues (Pasadilla and Liao, 2005; Abad et al., 2012). 
The derisory treatment of numerous trade matters that need to be explored results in incomplete 
understanding of the ramifications of different agreements that the government is signing or has 
previously signed.      
 
Fourth, the presence of strong top-down influence with respect to policy formulation enables 
lobbyists to exploit multiple power centres in various segments of the government (Pasadilla and 
Liao, 2005). The systematic involvement in policy planning process is being overwhelmed by 
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clientelist method being adopted by the powerful industrialists that is designed to capture the 
votes of the Congress and other key figures in the executive branch (de Dios and  Hutchcroft, 
2003; Nye, 2011). This type of political climate breeds disillusionment on the part of trade 
policymakers given the patron’s wherewithal to reverse or thwart the decisions that have been 
scrupulously formulated by the committee at the stroke of a prominent official’s pen. As such, 
patronage politics breaks the shield that is supposed to ‘immunise’ national trade strategies from 
unwarranted external pressures. Moreover, it causes sluggishness in the TRM mechanism 
considering how resolutions that have been fervently debated between inter-agency committees 
can easily be upended (Pasadilla and Liao, 2005). Government officials are usually having a hard 
time standing their grounds when confronted by representatives from private sectors given the 
former’s self-acknowledged limitations in contrast to the latter’s sense of entitlement.  
 
Lastly, and perhaps the most disappointing of all, the Philippines’ trade sectors lack significant 
level of awareness about the breadth and depth of the country’s involvement in free trade 
(Pasadilla and Liao, 2005; Wignajara et al., 2011). Ironically, despite their vested interest, local 
industry players often do not have well-defined goals in relation to the concessions that they 
wish to gain from the Philippines’ various trading partners. The failure to properly set 
expectations with regard to the preferential access to foreign markets represents a missed 
opportunity on the part of Filipino industrialists to positively contribute to the development of 
effective trade policy strategies (Abad et al., 2012; Aldaba, 2012, 2013). While this may be 
gradually changing, the Philippines’ trade orientation, however, remains largely defensive. Put 
differently, the government vis-à-vis the industrial players are more concerned about how to best 
safeguard the domestic interest rather than finding ways on how to more effectively exploit the 
foreign markets.  
 
Improving the overall process of trade policymaking in the country, however, is far from being a 
panacea. For better or worse, the Philippines’ trade positions and strategies still rest on the hands 
of the elected officials since they are a function of the country’s national priorities. The success 
in various trade negotiations, along with their actual impacts on the domestic economy, is 
contingent upon the general quality of the domestic polity and the choices that the government 
makes. Thus, while the institutionalisation of trade policy mechanisms may indeed help, 
nonetheless, much still depend on the head of state’s overarching vision for the nation.    
 
4. Limits to the Philippines’ development-oriented national security and trade linkages 
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Several factors influence the Philippine government’s capacity for overcoming the deeply-
entrench oligarchic factor permeating the country’s political economy. These are: (i) limits of 
‘patrimonial’ democratisation; and (ii) limits of one-size-fits-all economic policies. The first factor 
represents the direct influences of the Philippines’ oligarchic system vis-à-vis its patronage 
culture toward the country’s uneven economic development. The third factor represents the 
indirect influences of an oligarchy-driven and patronage-based political economy that further 
aggravate the structural poverty and institutionalised inequality in the country.  It is worth noting, 
however, that these factors are interconnected and therefore overlap with each other. Together, 
they undermine the development-upgrading utility of the Philippines’ free trade activities by 
reinforcing further the underlying oligarchic factor.  
 
Limits of ‘patrimonial’ democratisation 
The decision of the American colonial regime to transplant its own brand of representative 
democracy into an economic arrangement dominated by the landed oligarchs has enabled the 
latter to seize control of the country’s democratic institutions and procedures (Manacsa and Tan, 
2012; White III, 2015). In doing so, the United States set aside the policies which had the 
potential to transform the Philippine polity into a more level playing field. Consequently, the 
domestic political space had been insulated from the revisionist agendas being espoused by 
various social factions. The government’s capacity for independent actions, therefore, had been 
curtailed by the oligarchic groups attempting to amass public power to protect their vested 
interests (Villacorta, 1994; McCoy, 1994; Hutchcroft, 1998). In addition, the‘re-democratisation’ 
process that took place immediately after the end of the Martial Law had simply led to the 
reinstallation of a pre-Marcos political order (Quimpo, 2009, 2015; Manacsa and Tan, 2012; 
Hodder, 2014). The upshot is the reproduction of elite authority that has further subjugated the 
Philippine political economy – the sine qua non for the country’s highly asymmetrical economic 
development. Despite the introduction of various democratic institutional reforms, the 
underlying oligarchic force is still able to permeate and saturate the Philippine government vis-à-
vis bureaucracy.  
  
The question therefore is, why and how does oligarchic power overcome state power?  All 
throughout Philippine history, a few very influential families owning huge corporations and vast 
lands have ruled over the government. The Americans’ strategy for consolidating their power 
throughout the archipelago had enabled the elites to further expand their economic interests via 
political appointments (Krinks, 2002; Manacsa and Tan, 2012). In the process, these families 
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have exploited the country’s public goods and resources which continue to fuel institutionalised 
corruption. Several infamous terms have been used to describe the country’s pitiful politico-
economic condition such as ‘anarchy of families’; ‘booty capitalism’; ‘non-substantive 
democracy’; ‘ersazt capitalism’; and ‘cacique democracy’ (McCoy, 1994; Anderson, 1998; 
Hutchcroft, 1998; White III, 2015). The conspicuous incapacity of the government to ‘immunise’ 
itself from oligarchic manipulation has significantly helped in maintaining and exacerbating the 
country’s disproportionate development.   
 
When the United States’ colonial regime had decided to erect political agencies to facilitate 
electoral contestations in the Philippines, the elite clans had consolidated their powers to give 
birth to a national oligarchy instead of a national government (Anderson, 1998). Such a system 
has bred what the Filipinos now call as trapos, a pejorative term that is being used to describe 
traditional ‘dirty’ politicians (Magno, 1995; Manacsa, 1999; Eaton, 2003). These trapos are deemed 
to be responsible for the ‘reverse accountability’ in Philippine politics by holding the individual 
voters accountable for electing their respective patrons into power in exchange for favours that 
are either provided in the past or being promised to be delivered once elected (Hutchcroft,1998; 
Quimpo, 2009, 2015; Hodder, 2014). In this scenario, the peasants and the labourers’ interests 
are being co-opted by the landlords’ personal preferences. Thus, it may be inferred that the 
voters’ support for their patrons is largely a function of the latter’s ‘own interests, rewards for 
loyalty, and the fear of vengeance’ (Linz, 1975: 260).  
  
Even the implementations of disastrous economic policies being endorsed by some top 
government officials and policymakers have eventually been manipulated to protect the interests 
of the Filipino oligarchs. To this extent, the Philippines’ uneven development is not simply a 
matter of constantly choosing the wrong policies to implement, but rather the result of 
conscious efforts by the rent-seekers to maintain them despite their damaging effects to the rest 
of the country. A perfect example was the implementation of import substitution 
industrialisation by the government after its independence from the United States in 1946 (Ranis, 
1974; Bautista, 1989; Lim, 2001). In contrast to the export-oriented strategy launched by the East 
Asian countries that led to annual per capita GDP growth of 6.0%, the Philippines had chosen 
to implement the ISI and became the worst performing economy in the region (Sarel, 1994). 
Although the ISI promotion may have been an honest mistake on the part of the Filipino 
technocrats, nevertheless, the oligarchs’ general disinterest for rectifying such an error underlined 
their tendencies to exploit all profit-maximising policies, both good the and the bad. Thus, 
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several critics have argued that despite its problems, the ISI policy was maintained for its role in 
widening the space for oligarchic predation (Quimpo, 2009; Manacsa and Tan, 2012; Hodder, 
2014).  
Moreover, the ‘policy of attraction’ introduced by former U.S. governor-general, William 
Howard Taft’s (originally intended to entice the landlord class to collaborate with the American 
forces rather than joining the revolutionary factions) had transformed the economic elites of the 
Spanish-colonial era into political elites which now control Philippine politics (Hutchcroft, 2008: 
142). Since representative institutions have emerged prior to the development of a strong 
republic, political parties have become ‘convenient vehicles of patronage that can be set up, 
merged with others, split, reconstituted, regurgitated, resurrected, renamed, repackaged, recycled, 
refurbished, buffed up or flushed down the toilet anytime’ (Quimpo, 2005: 4-5). Paul Hutchcroft 
(1998: 18-21) has used the term ‘neo-patrimonial’ to describe this type of  political economy in 
which the rent-seekers emerging from a bureaucratic capitalist system are able to control formal 
state structures from the outside. The unique Filipino customs of ‘giving for gratitude’ and 
‘labour for loyalty’ have also complemented these prevailing patron-client relationships, thereby 
maintaining the omnipotence of the oligarchic elites (Grossholtz, 1964). 
 
The Philippine government has continued to operate within this context from one 
administration to another since the country had gained independence from the United States.  
As the Philippine case has exceptionally illustrated, a patrimonial state that allows oligarch 
relations and interests to dominate bureaucratic systems creates hunting a ground for 
unrestricted accumulation of personal wealth (Weber, 1978). Therefore, creating a new 
constitutional framework that replicates a pre-Martial Law system within a relatively unchanged 
economic arrangement is not only futile but also counterintuitive to any prospect of change. 
Neither regime change nor democratisation in the Philippines has seemed to help in significantly 
mitigating the oligarchs’ influence over the state affairs, particularly with regard to decisions 
involving the domestic economy. As a consequence, a strongly developed Philippine republic has 
yet to emerge (Manacsa and Tan, 2012; White III, 2015). 
 
Limits of ‘one-size-fits-all’ economic policies 
The 2011-2016 Philippine Development Plan (PDP) is Aquino III’s blueprint for implementing 
the government’s so-called ‘social contract with the Filipino People.’12 The Plan underlines the 
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twin problems of inadequate investment and human capital as the main culprits of Philippine 
economic and human underdevelopment. In doing so, it acknowledges the social reality that the 
large majority of the Filipinos are being excluded from the country’s economic growth. The 
Plan’s main economic thrust is straightforward: stick to the globalisation policies that have been 
implemented over the last decades; deepen and broaden privatisation through Public-Private 
Partnerships or PPPs; and selectively implement social protection programs such as conditional 
cash transfers (CCTs).13 A more in-depth analysis of the Plan, however, indicates serious 
problems which are likely to sustain the country’s uneven economic development. By insisting 
on the appropriateness of ‘one-size-fits-all’ economic policies, the government is misinterpreting 
the country’s current economic situation. 
  
First, the Plan lacks ingenuity in terms of formulating strategies that foster inclusive growth 
(IBON, 2011). The administration’s passive adherence to free market philosophy prevents it 
from taking a more proactive role in stirring its development goals. While the recent data have 
shown a relative growth in investments, exports and overall GDP, however, these figures have 
failed to translate to lower levels of inequality and poverty incidence.14 Critics have argued that 
the government’s phlegmatic devotion to free trade underlines its anachronistic outlook with 
regard to development policies (IBON, 2011). This is particularly unsettling when analysed 
against the backdrop of the continuing WTO stalemate in which member states, particularly 
those in the developing world, are rejecting more advanced liberalisation measures (Ezeani, 2013; 
Hartman, 2013).  
 
The selection of target sectors that the government envisions to develop reflects the 
administration’s lack of strategy for inclusive and sustainable national development. Examples of 
these are the cheap labour business process outsourcing; foreign-controlled ship-building; 
export-oriented agri-business and forestry; extractive mining; and international tourism.15 
Although investments and exports figures will certainly rise in these sectors, however, none of 
these can stimulate Filipino industrialisation. Thus, critics have claimed that that the principal 
task of the government’s development plan is to sell the country’s national and human resources 
to foreign investors at a bargain price (Bello, 2004, 2005; IBON, 2011). The government does 
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 Ibid.  
14 
For more details on the current data, see National Statistics Office’s official website, available online at 
http://www.nscb.gov.ph/poverty/. 
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not shy away from its explicit promotion of cheap labour export, setting aside the agenda for 
creating local jobs that will cut down the number of Overseas Filipino Workers (OFWs). In fact, 
it even attributed the country’s new-found resilience against global financial crises to the steady 
inflow of remittances. 
Moreover, the administration’s view of good governance is heavily influenced by the 
requirements of the free market, that is, improving governance and strengthening weak 
institutions to bring down the costs and risks of doing business instead of securing the poor’s 
rights to development (Bello, 2004; 2005; IBON, 2011). This gives the impression that the 
initiatives being undertaken to address bureaucratic maladies including institutionalised 
corruption are directed toward the goal of attracting foreign direct investments rather than 
practicing good governance to better serve the people.  
 
Second, the Plan also prioritises the creation of an environment conducive for foreign investors 
over the construction of a people-oriented development strategy that secures the general well-
being of the Filipinos (IBON, 2011; Malaluan, 2011). Despite the Plan’s well-articulated mission 
of fighting poverty and bridging inequality, its systematic evasion of politically unpopular yet 
socially beneficial policies (such as more just and equitable distribution of wealth, assets and 
incomes) undermines the credibility of the administration’s inclusive development rhetoric. The 
government seems to be more interested in the development of the business sector rather than 
the people themselves. While such a strategy may indeed foster a good business climate, 
nonetheless, it is not necessarily favourable for the economy as a whole. In short, the 
government seems to favour foreign investments over local capitals; private business profits 
overs the labourers’ welfare; and landowners’ claims over the farmers’ rights (Bello, 2004, 2005; 
IBON, 2011; Malaluan, 2011). These biases further strengthen the wherewithal of oligarchic 
elites for exploiting the bureaucratic systems and resources. In other words, the rudimentary 
equation of private business success to socio-economic advancements invalidates the 
government’s capacity toward inclusive growth and development. 
     
Third, the administration’s problem with budget deficit also compels it to pursue a more 
intensive privatisation scheme (IBON, 2011; NEDA, 2011). In developing the bulk of the 
proposed infrastructure programs included in the Plan, the administration relies on extensive 
public-private partnership (PPP). Such a strategy, however, has the unintended consequence of 
transferring government responsibility for creating public goods and delivering social services to 
the private firms. Consequently, the government becomes heavily reliant on the ability of the 
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private firms to generate even more profits from providing public goods and services (Bello, 
2004; IBON, 2011). The commonly-held view is that private funding enables the government to 
curb down its expenditures and debts. By doing so, the government is able to focus its scarce 
resources on more important issues that need immediate attention. Furthermore, the private 
sector is also said to enhance the efficiency for handling public projects given their technical 
expertise which the government tends to lack. In reality, however, estimating a project’s actual 
cost is not always straightforward since contingent liabilities may easily increase despite the strict 
procurement procedures (IBON, 2011). In addition, the private sector is not always immune 
from the inefficiencies which are commonly associated with different government agencies. 
Problematic contracts sometimes fail to provide the expected level of service and in the process 
may require additional budget in order to rectify the problem,  if not, a complete bailout (Bello, 
2004, 2005; Malaluan, 2011).  
 
Fourth, in efforts to cushion the effects of non-discriminatory privatisation, the Plan promotes 
CCTs as a smokescreen for the marginalising effects of globalisation policies (IBON, 2011). By 
enabling poor Filipino families to purchase basic health and education services from the private 
suppliers, the CCTs become an integral component of the privatisation of social services. Critics 
have argued that the administration’s unjustified expansion of the program is not only 
unsustainable but is also expensive to target because it is merely a debt-propelled aid devoid of 
any critical reform (Bello, 2010; Comia, 2010). Meanwhile, the more consequential but politically 
arduous socioeconomic restructurings are continuously being ignored given the government’s 
subscription to unadulterated free market economy. Examples of these are job creation on an 
economy-wide scale; higher wages and improved incomes; creating opportunities for Filipino 
agricultural and industrial producers; local technological progress and innovation; domestic 
capital accumulation, and greater equity (IBON, 2011; NEDA, 2011). By maintaining the current 
domestic conditions, foreign investors are able to systematically exploit the economy to their 
incontestable advantage, thereby shutting out local firms and producers (Bello, 2004, 2005; 
Malaluan, 2011). The huge and profitable infrastructure projects being carried out under the 
PPP, for instance, benefit not the people living under a dollar a day but the well-established 
foreign corporations and landed elites (Bello, 2004; IBON, 2011; Malaluan, 2011). Without 
proper monitoring and evaluation, the government’s highly optimistic assessments about its so-




Fifth, and lastly, the Plan is bent to increase tax collections from the poor workers while 
thoughtfully shielding the rich from further increases in tax obligations (Quimpo, 2009; IBON, 
2011). Instead of imposing direct taxes on high-income individuals and corporate profit, and 
indirect taxes on non-basic luxury goods and services, the administration’s strategy for 
addressing the country’s deficit problems is by tightening its development expenditures related to 
welfare spending, social investments and public infrastructures (IBON, 2011; NEDA, 2011). By 
insisting on higher taxes on essential goods as well higher fees for basic government services, the 
administration is effectively transferring a huge part of the burden to the lower-income groups. 
Indeed, recent improvements on tax revenue collections did not spring from better tax 
administration but from the reformed value added tax (RVAT), along with de facto higher tax 
liability from rising energy and oil prices. Thus, for the staunch opponents of the administration, 
the final outcome of the Plan is sustainable inequality rather than sustainable economic 
development. By systematically evading the social-equalising measures that cut into the oligarchs’ 
fortunes, the ultimate recipients of the increasing national wealth are the powerful elites. The 
elusiveness of trickle-down effects from the country’s recent growths in GDP can be explained 
by the lack of development-oriented leadership that challenges the elite interests. The Plan’s 
subconscious democratic biases prevent the government leaders and policymakers from fully 
appreciating the economic plight of the non-oligarchs and the non-elites in the Philippines.  
 
5. Conclusions 
This paper has critically explored and analysed the Philippines’ use of free trade in securing and 
enhancing its development space amid the uneven economic development being engendered by 
the deep-seated oligarchic and patrimonial systems. It argued that national security in the 
Philippines is largely anchored on the capability of the government to facilitate a more equitable 
form of economic development. Over the decades, however, the Philippine political economy 
has been characterised by pervasive oligarch practices and patronage culture. Such conditions 
have resulted in institutionalised inequality and structural poverty that both undermine the 
country’s supposedly development-based national security. The ability of the very few yet 
extremely influential Filipino elites to transform country into an oligarchipelago underscores the 
inefficiencies emanating from an elite-driven political economy that have buttressed the 
Philippine development puzzle.  
 
While oligarchy and patrimonialism do not automatically create conditions that result in 
economic and political marginalisation of the majority, nonetheless, the Philippine case has 
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unambiguously illustrated the manner in which the elites exploit their inefficiencies to maintain a 
patronage-based political economy. The rifeness of neo-patrimonial culture in the Philippines 
underpins a bipolar society that allows for few families to enjoy the unjust excessiveness of 
wealth while simultaneously forcing the majority to resign themselves to existing poverty and 
inequality. 
 
Furthermore, the primacy of the oligarchy or family dynasties both in the national government 
and the national economy have exacerbated the problems of ‘soft’ state and weak democracy in 
the Philippines. Under such conditions, political offices, elected politicians, and economic 
policies have all been consolidated to serve the interests of a political system that is permanently 
regulated by and for the oligarchy. The oligarchs’ deliberate exploitation of ineffectual free trade 
policies and mechanism has enabled them to maximise their economic wealth and political 
power despite their undesirable impact on poverty and inequality conditions in the country. By 
preventing the passage of social-equalising measures, the oligarchic elites are able to limit the 
distribution of national wealth among them. This highly corrupt patronage culture thwarts the 
government’s people-centric national security model that emphasises a more equitable and 
inclusive economic development. Without any countervailing force to rectify the system, the 
oligarchy will certainly adopt policies that will ensure it perpetual and uncontested control over 
the Philippine political economy.  
 
Finally, although the differences in leadership styles and management methods may have substantial 
effect on the political outcomes, particularly in countries where political institutions are weak, in the 
Philippines, however, state power has been transmogrified into a mere apparatus for securing 
oligarchic rather than the national interests. Despite the government’s all-inclusive security 
slogan that emphasises equitable economic development, nonetheless, its security blueprint faces 
critical limitations that frustrate such goal. The limits of limits of patrimonial democratisation 
combined with the limits of one-size-fits-all economic policies have contributed to the country’s 
lacklustre experience with free trade. This in turn has highlighted the multiple failures of the 
Philippine political economy – from intentions, to theories and negotiations. In the end, the 
Philippines’ linkage attempts have preserved the uneven economic development and further 
reinforced the oligarchic system and patronage culture. 
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